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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates a perceived gap between the medical profession’s rhetoric 
that the welfare of the patient is the medical practitioner’s first priority, and the 
reality of patient experience.  The Medical Board of Australia’s Good Medical 
Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia mandates the duty of medical 
practitioners to make the care of their patients their first priority.  This code also 
confirms that good medical practice is patient-centred. 
 
Patient-centred care should therefore be central to patient experience.  However, 
despite promotion of this goal by medical professional authorities, patient-centred 
care is not always being achieved as well as it might in practice.  This thesis is an 
attempt to understand the reasons why this divergence between rhetoric and 
practice is occurring, paying particular attention to the role of the law as a potential 
and actual promoter of, and barrier to, practices which are recognised components 
of patient-centred care, and consequently of good medical practice.  This aim is 
developed through two case studies, the way valid advance directives are observed 
or not, and the responses of medical practitioners to injuries to patients sustained 
during medical treatment. 
 
The methodology used includes analysis of hard law regulatory processes together 
with the development of and increasing reliance on the soft law documented in 
codes, guidelines and other regulatory standards which reflect the evolving ideals 
of medical professionalism.  In turn, an examination of disciplinary cases of 
tribunals and courts shows how conduct is interpreted in accordance with what is 
or is not professional behaviour.   
 
There is evidence that observance by medical practitioners of patient-centred care 
is often being overwhelmed by the scientific and technical aspects of medical 
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practice and other pressures on medical practitioners, such as concerns about legal 
liability.  The necessity for the observance of respect for the human being who is 
the patient is discounted to these priorities despite extensive evidence of improved 
outcomes for patients when patient-centred principles are implemented.  The 
reasons for this discount are complex but a major contributor to the less than 
optimum observance of patient-centred principles is medical professionalism as 
fostered by the current methods of socialisation and training of medical 
practitioners.  Bullying and humiliation of medical students in their training leads 
to desensitisation and a consequent lack of attention by medical practitioners to the 
necessity for patient-centred approaches to practice. 
 
An exploration of the direct and indirect impacts of the law upon the medical 
profession shows the domination of medical practitioner interests over the interests 
of their patients.  Therefore, this thesis considers whether the existing Australian 
legislative regime can be applied to achieving the promotion of the observance of 
quality, patient-centred practices by medical practitioners to the mutual benefit of 
doctor and patient.  It argues that medical disciplinary authorities can use the 
provisions of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law together with soft 
law regulation to more completely embed a patient-centred culture in medical 
practitioner behaviour.  
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PREFACE 
 
For nearly two and a half years I watched my husband, Frank, gradually dying.  A 
vital, intelligent man became a shell who could not walk, talk, communicate with 
anyone, read, watch television or turn on a radio.  He just sat at the nursing home 
all day doing nothing.  He lost his autonomy.  He was subjected to constant 
indignities.  He could manage nothing for himself.  The blessing was that he 
seemed minimally aware of it.  
 
Frank had, some years previously, been diagnosed with Parkinsons Disease.  On 
Friday 24 March 2006 he complained about pain.  Our local general practitioner 
could not pin down what was happening and decided to have him admitted to 
Calvary Hospital to find out.  The first hint came from the hospital’s emergency 
section, possible bowel blockage.  I visited Frank each day but he could not 
communicate with me because he was so heavily sedated.  Four days after his 
admission, I received a telephone call from a surgical registrar saying that Frank 
did not seem to understand what was happening - would I consent to a 
colonoscopy.  I gave consent and twenty minutes later I was contacted again by 
telephone and told that there was a bowel blockage.  An operation was required, 
with a 40% chance of survival, and no chance of survival without the operation.  
Would I consent?  I was given no information about what such an operation would 
entail.  I was given no time to discuss this ultimatum with my step-daughter and 
son.  Of course, I consented – what choice was there?  I had no face-to-face contact 
with anyone apart from a brief discussion with the surgeon afterwards who said 
that the operation had been completed and Frank was to be transferred to intensive 
care at The Canberra Hospital.  The anaesthetic affected his brain disastrously and 
he was left with a colostomy bag.     
 
  viii 
In this situation of urgency requiring rapid decisions Frank, the patient, seemed to 
be the last person to be considered.  We were given no information, nor the 
opportunity to discuss the proposed operation.  There was no attempt to involve us 
in the decisions concerning the proposed treatment – why it was needed – what 
other options there might be.  At that time, we did not realise that we had the right 
to be involved in the decision-making process.  All contact was by brief telephone 
calls.  Having made a judgement that there was only one option, the medical 
practitioners were only concerned to get our consent.  The implication was that we 
should put our faith in the medical practitioners.  Yes - they saved Frank’s life, but 
what sort of life?  The net result may not have been any different if we had been 
involved in the decision-making process, but we would have known more and 
understood more, and been more prepared for the catastrophic outcome.   
 
It has always seemed to me that there was a gross lack of sensitivity in the way the 
communications were made and consent obtained.  This led to my attempt to 
discover if there could be a more compassionate way for the medical system to 
prioritise the patient and to involve patients and their families in making such life-
changing decisions.
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BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
RHETORIC AND REALITY: CAN THE LAW 
ENFORCE QUALITY PATIENT-CENTRED 
CARE IN AUSTRALIA? 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
[i]t is helpful to remember that the adjustments required of the medical profession in 
this country had their parallels elsewhere in the world.  We were not unique, as 
those who live in Canada, the USA, Australia, Germany, and France and elsewhere 
all know.  What was really happening was a worldwide change in the relationship 
between the public and doctors as traditional paternalism in all its guises began to be 
displaced by patient-centred care.1 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Background and Context 
Until World War II, there were few reliable techniques or treatments to hold off 
death, or to cure illness.  Whilst better nutrition, improved sanitation, inoculation 
against disease and public control of response to epidemics had been leading to 
enhanced quality of life and increased life expectancy, the prime cause of death 
other than wars, accidents and homicides was still infections of various kinds.2  
The discovery of penicillin in 1928, and subsequently other antibiotics 
revolutionised the treatment of infections, as killer diseases like tuberculosis, 
leprosy and syphilis became distant memories.   
 
Over the ensuing decades, not only were infections being tamed, but new 
techniques were being developed to hold death at bay.  The early iron lungs and 
oxygen tents gave way to modern, streamlined techniques that could maintain life 
                                                      
1 Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 7. 
2 Marshall B Kapp and Bernard Lo, 'Legal Perceptions and Medical Decision Making' (1986) 64, 
Suppl.2 The Milbank Quarterly 163, 165. 
 2 
almost indefinitely.3  Ventilation and artificial feeding became established 
techniques.  Efficient methods of drug delivery made treatment more certain and 
reduced side effects.  The invention and use of artificial joints made severe arthritis 
a matter of history for many people.  Artificial limbs gave new independence to 
amputees and a host of aids has made life much more acceptable for the disabled. 
 
These medical and technical advances led to more frequent positive outcomes for 
patients from their medical treatment.  More certain medical outcomes meant that 
people placed great faith in their medical practitioners and became reluctant to 
query their advice.  The elevation in public esteem for members of the medical 
profession persuaded some medical practitioners that their technical knowledge 
and expertise should have precedence in determination of each patient’s ‘best 
interests’, leading to paternalistic attitudes towards their patients.4 
 
However, in England and Australia, commencing in the late 1990s, there was a 
series of high-profile and damaging medical scandals.  The public began to 
question whether medical practitioners were always acting in their patients’ best 
interests.5  In some of these cases, medical practitioners were making questionable 
decisions that more junior medical practitioners or other health professionals like 
nurses were reluctant to criticise or publicise.6  In other cases, longstanding 
warnings from more junior health practitioners had been ignored.7  As Irvine 
observed, tribalism and misplaced collegiality had led to the inclination to defend 
clinical practices of others, except in the most egregious of circumstances.8   
 
                                                      
3 Alan Rothschild, 'Capacity and Medical Self-Determination in Australia' (2007) 14 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 403, 411. 
4 Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 268 [17]. 
5 The large number of babies dying from heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, (Ian Kennedy, 
Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary 1984–1995 CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 268 [17]), the multiple murders of his patients by Dr 
Harold Shipman (See eg, Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (First Report Death Disguised 19 
July 2002)) and other harmful conduct by medical practitioners in the United Kingdom were joined 
by scandals in Australia such as the King Edward Memorial Hospital in Perth (deficiencies in 
obstetric and gynaecology services), The Canberra Hospital (substandard neurosurgery practitioner) 
(Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for 
Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44) and Queensland Public Hospitals (including 
deaths of patients of Dr Jayant Patel at Bundaberg Base hospital) (Geoffrey Davies, Queensland 
Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, Report (20 November 2005)). 
6 Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for 
Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 46. 
7 See eg, Department of Health, Off-Protocol Prescribing of Chemotherapy for Head and Neck 
Cancers (Interim Report, 31 March 2016) [32];  Geoffrey Davies, Queensland Public Hospitals 
Commission of Inquiry, Report (20 November 2005) [1.2]. 
8 Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 25. 
 3 
There have been numerous reports and inquiries concerning deficient behaviour by 
medical professionals.9  For example, the Royal College of Physicians stated that 
publication of these reports, and their discussion in the media, were highly 
damaging to the medical profession and led to calls for greater independent and 
external scrutiny.10  As Dixon-Woods et al observed:   
[t]he extreme nature of the transgressions, the innocence and dependency of the 
victims, the huge discrepancy between claims of virtue of the offenders and their 
actions, and the frequency with which new transgressions were reported, ... 
 
led to momentum to impose greater regulation on the medical profession.11   
 
The rhetoric underlying the public face of a medical profession that had expected 
patients to give it unquestioning trust because of its superior technical knowledge 
and intimate connection with questions of life and death, had been undermined — 
an apparent reality that this trust had frequently been misplaced.  Where these 
scandals had occurred, not only had technical knowledge been found wanting but 
patients had not been fully informed about what treatment was being undertaken.12  
Public outrage generated calls for the focus of medical practice to shift from 
medical practitioner decision-making to a partnership of mutual respect between 
patient and medical practitioner in a radically-new social context,13 namely the 
traditional uneven relationship giving way to a partnership of equals.  In the United 
Kingdom, these medical scandals also reinforced a growing realisation within the 
General Medical Council that a better informed public was demanding not only 
                                                      
9 see eg. a few, Mary Dixon-Woods, Karen Yeung and Charles L Bosk, 'Why Is UK Medicine No 
Longer a Self-Regulating Profession?  The Role of Scandals Involving "Bad Apple" Doctors' (2011) 
73 Social Science and Medicine 1452;  Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public 
Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 CM 5207(1) (July 
2001);  Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003);  Dame Janet Smith, 'The 
Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the 
Future 9 December 2004);  Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol 
Prescribing of Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016);  Geoffrey 
Davies, Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry (Report (20 November 2005));  Thomas 
A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for Internal and 
External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44. 
10 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) [1.7]. 
11 Mary Dixon-Woods, Karen Yeung and Charles L Bosk, 'Why Is UK Medicine No Longer a Self-
Regulating Profession?  The Role of Scandals Involving "Bad Apple" Doctors' (2011) 73 Social 
Science and Medicine 1452 (6). 
12 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [107]. 
13 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) [1.27]. 
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that technical competence was necessary for good medical practice, but that there 
must be a series of behaviours against which good medical practitioners should be 
judged.14  
 
It is tempting to consider that, following all these reports, members of the medical 
profession would have been galvanised into adjusting their activities and 
perspectives to prevent the occurrence of other situations where deficient practices 
could become apparent.  However, more recent public scandals in the United 
Kingdom15 and Australia16 together with ongoing reports of bullying of juniors by 
senior medical practitioners17 suggest that many medical practitioners have not 
taken to heart the necessity to adjust their behaviours and to improve their 
professional conduct by promoting patient interests.  For example, the charge of 
                                                      
14 Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 91. 
15 The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Investigation in 2009 — high mortality rates in 
patients admitted to emergency care (Healthcare Commission, Investigation into Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust (March 2009)). 
16 The Djerriwarrh Health Services Report in 2015 — high perinatal mortality rates (Professor Euan 
M Wallace, Report of an Investigation into Perinatal Outcomes at Djerriwah Health Services 
(Executive Summary) (an FOI request to try and obtain the full report only provided the executive 
summary));  The St Vincent’s Hospital cancer scandal — uniform low dosing of chemotherapy 
treatment for head and neck patients (Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-
Protocol Prescribing of Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016)). 
17 See eg, Julia Medew, 'Medical Students under Pressure Amid Reports of Bullying in Australian 
Hospitals', The Sydney Morning Herald (Online) (24 May 2015) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/medical-students-under-pressure-amid-reports-of-bullying-in-
australian-hospitals-20150524-gh8jq5.html>; ''Bullying and Harassment' at Canberra Hospital Sees 
Urology Training Accreditation Withdrawn', ABC News (Online) (24 June 2015) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-24/canberra-hospital-loses-urology-training-
accreditation/6569432>;  Kimberley Ivory and Karen Scott, 'Let's Stop the Bullying of Trainee 
Doctors — for Patients' Sake' (26 May 2015)  The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/lets-
stop-the-bullying-of-trainee-doctors-for-patients-sake-42243>;  Quentin McDermott, Karen 
Michelmore and Hagar Cohen, 'Monash Medical Centre Senior Surgeon Helen Maroulis under 
Investigation over Claims of Bullying, Intimidating Colleagues' Four Corners (25 May 2015) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015;  Expert Advisory Group on Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual 
Harassment, Report to RACS (8 September 2015). 
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bullying was taken seriously by the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons which 
convened an expert group to advise on several matters including bullying.18   
 
All the reports into medical scandals emphasise the prevailing medical culture in 
the organisation as the main characteristic that led to the problems that arose.  For 
example, a ‘club culture’ with insiders and outsiders in the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
scandal,19 concern with upgrading of status of the hospital to the detriment of 
patient care in the Mid Staffordshire case,20 and failure to query the performance of 
individual practitioners rather than heed concerns expressed by nurses in the 
Queensland Hospitals report21 highlight concerns with status within the 
organisation, professional arrogance and obsession with clinical independence.   
 
The safety issues apparent in the reports referred to above suggest the necessity for 
the protection of patients from inherently deficient medical practices.  The more 
frequently that medical scandals are publicised, the clearer is the public demand for 
detailed regulatory oversight to minimise their occurrence.22  More detailed 
regulation has the object of encouraging safer behaviours and includes procuring 
compliance by medical practitioners with their obligations as spelled out in the 
Codes of Ethics promulgated by regulatory authorities. 
 
                                                      
18 Expert Advisory Group on Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual Harassment, Report to RACS (8 
September 2015).  At page 4 it stated: ‘Research results and consultation feedback confirm that 
discrimination, bullying and sexual harassment are pervasive and serious problems in the practice of 
surgery in Australia and New Zealand. The effects are significant and damaging.’  Also at page 4 it 
stated that the research found that: 
49% of Fellows, trainees and international medical graduates report being subjected to discrimination, 
bullying or sexual harassment;
54% of trainees and 45% of Fellows less than 10 years post-fellowship report being subjected to 
bullying 
71% of hospitals reported discrimination, bullying or sexual harassment in their hospital in the last 
five years, with bullying the most frequently reported issue 
39% of Fellows, trainees and international medical graduates report bullying, 18% report 
discrimination, 19% report workplace harassment and 7% sexual harassment 
the problems exist across all surgical specialties and 
senior surgeons and surgical consultants are reported as the primary source of these problems.  
19 Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 165. 
20 Healthcare Commission, Investigation into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (March 2009) 
95. 
21 See eg Geoffrey Davies, Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, Report (20 
November 2005) [1.2], [1.34]. 
22 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) [1.7].  
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2 From Public Safety to Quality Patient-Centred Care 
As this section shows, public safety has been the primary rationale for government 
regulation of medical professionals commencing with the passage of the Medical 
Act 1858 in the United Kingdom to establish a system of registration of medical 
practitioners.  The primary focus on safety evidenced by the legal requirement for 
medical professionals to be registered was joined with concerns about quality in 
medical practice when, in 1995, the GMC published the first edition of Good 
Medical Practice (the GMC Code)23.   
 
Likewise in Australia, safety has been joined by quality as a requirement in all 
healthcare settings in Australia.  Since 1 July 2010, regulation of medical 
practitioners has fallen under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (the 
National Law), an Australia-wide system of reciprocal legislation based upon a 
template law first passed in Queensland, the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law 2009 (Qld). 
 
The first objective of the National Law s3(2) is as follows: 
(2) The objectives of the national registration and accreditation scheme are— 
(a) to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health 
practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a 
competent and ethical manner are registered;   
 
Government regulation is not limited to the ‘hard law’ terms of statutes.  It is 
accompanied by the ‘soft law’ detailed in charters, standards, codes, frameworks 
and guidelines, and it is through these instruments that notions of ethics and quality 
are developed. 
 
                                                      
23 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) As a type of preamble in the 
latest edition, Good Medical Practice sets out ‘The duties of a doctor registered with the General 
Medical Council’ that are required to earn and maintain the trust of patients who commit their lives 
and health to them.  It emphasises both maintaining technical skills and quality practice.  It also states 
that ‘[s]erious or persistent failure to follow this guidance will put your registration at risk’  through 
disciplinary proceedings before the General Medical Council. 
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A prime example of the status of the ‘soft law’ embodied in a code is the Medical 
Board of Australia’s Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia (the MBA Code).24  This Australian Code of Practice reflects the United 
Kingdom GMC Code25 in the requirement for medical practitioners to make the 
care of their patients their first concern.  Both codes express this requirement as a 
duty of medical practitioners.  The MBA Code declares: ‘Doctors have a duty to 
make the care of their patients their first concern and to practise medicine safely 
and effectively’.26  It clearly states: ‘Good medical practice is patient-centred.’  It 
also emphasises that ‘[medical] professionalism embodies all the qualities 
described [in the MBA Code].’27  The MBA Code and the GMC Code set out 
standards that must be observed by medical practitioners if they are to meet the 
expectations of the community and their colleagues in the medical profession.   
 
As is apparent from the above, recurring themes in government regulation of 
medical practitioners are those of the medical practitioner’s duty to the patient (as 
distinct from the legal concept of duty) and what is meant by quality.  These two 
concepts, together with what is encompassed in the idea of patient-centred care, 
will be explored at the end of this chapter. 
 
3 Achieving Quality Medical Practice through Patient-Centred Care 
The more recent focus on quality as well as safety has led to the adoption in many 
countries in the world, particularly those in the Western medical tradition, of the 
principles of ‘patient-centred care’.  Patient-centred care, sometimes called 
consumer-centred care, is now recognised by health authorities in many countries 
as the best way to achieve quality clinical care and patient satisfaction with the 
health system.28  It is one of six ‘dimensions of quality’ listed by the World Health 
Organisation that are required to achieve a quality health system.29   
 
                                                      
24 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
25 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) - a preamble under the 
heading ‘The duties of a doctor registered with the General Medical Council’;  also [1]. 
26 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
27 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
28 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 2011) 
9. 
29 World Health Organisation, Quality of Care (WHO Press, 2006) 10.  The listed dimensions are that 
the health system must be: effective, efficient, accessible, acceptable/patient-centred, equitable, safe. 
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In introducing the paper entitled Patient-Centred Care, the chairman of the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) said: 
In a large and complex health care system striving for efficiency, some busy health 
professionals may tend to treat patient conditions only on the basis of symptoms and 
scientific evidence. Scientific analysis and treatment is a foundation of modern 
health care, but it may lead to a reduced consideration of the patient as a person. 
The patient-centred movement powerfully demonstrates that fully involving the 
individual patient as a person at all stages with unique needs, concerns and 
preferences will lead to more efficacious and satisfying outcomes.30 
 
Patients’ experiences of patient-centred care have been shown to have positive 
implications for the quality and safety of their interactions with the medical system.  
As ACSQHC, Patient-Centred Care states: 
[i]t is clear that patient-centred care has significant benefits associated with clinical 
quality and outcomes, the experience of care, the business and operations of 
delivering health services, and the work environment.31  
 
The ACSQHC’s Discussion Paper on Patient- Centred Care comments that ‘ ... 
high quality health care is always patient focused ... ’, meaning providing care that 
is ‘ ... respectful of and responsive to individual preferences, needs and values’.32   
 
Patient focus has sometimes been missing in the past.  According to Leadbeater 
and Garber, hospital patients and their families have been subject to a system 
designed around the medical profession and its procedures and hierarchies rather 
than accommodating the social relationships where clinicians have the skills and 
knowledge and can find the time to communicate effectively.33 
 
Similarly, as Sir Ian Kennedy has observed, there is still a perception among some 
medical practitioners and an expectation by their patients that, because of their 
                                                      
30 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 2011) 
i. 
31 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 2011) 
9. 
32 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care, Discussion 
Paper (September 2010) 40. 
33 Charles Leadbeater and Jake Garber, Dying for Change (Demos, 2010) 57.
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knowledge, training and expertise, medical practitioners should make all medical 
decisions.34  However, paternalism is inconsistent with a patient-centred health 
system.  As the United Kingdom Supreme Court remarked in Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board, there have been 
[d]evelopments which ... point away from a model of the relationship between the 
doctor and the patient based upon medical paternalism.  They also point away from 
a model based upon a view of the patient as being entirely dependent on information 
provided by the doctor.  What they point to is an approach to the law which, instead 
of treating patients as placing themselves in the hands of their doctors (and being 
prone to sue their doctors in the event of a disappointing outcome), treats them so 
far as possible as adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment is 
uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of 
risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of their choices.35 
 
B THESIS PROBLEM, AIM, METHODOLOGY AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
1 Thesis Problem and Aim 
Given that patient-centredness seems to be the new paradigm, this thesis argues 
that the traditional legal emphasis, under the shadow of tort law,36 on technical 
skills to ensure patient safety must be joined by adoption of patient-centred quality 
medical practice.  To this end, there is now a plethora of codes, standards, 
frameworks, guidelines and other directions in soft law instruments that promote 
the benefits of patient-centred medical practice.37  The primary benefits are patient 
safety that comes from improved communication with patients and better outcomes 
because of their involvement in the decision-making concerning diagnosis and 
proposed treatments.  Likewise, attention to patient-centred principles leads to 
enhanced quality in medical practice.38  The conceptual framework upon which this 
                                                      
34 Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 363 [22]. 
35 See eg, Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [81];  See also, Christian Coons 
and Michael Weber, 'Introduction: Paternalism — Issues and Trends' in Christian Coons and Michael 
Weber (eds), Paternalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 19;  Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale 
(Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 7. 
36 See eg, Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582;  Whitehouse v 
Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 
37 See eg, Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia (at March 2014);  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National 
Safety and Quality Health Service Standards (September 2012);  Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure Framework (2013);  Medical Board of 
Australia, Guidelines for Mandatory Notifications (at 17 March 2014);  Australian Commission on 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 2011). 
38 See eg, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality 
Health Service Standards (September 2012) 23. 
 10 
thesis rests is that good medical practice is not only patient-centred, but that 
patient-centredness equates to the ideals of medical professionalism.   
 
A great deal of academic39 and regulatory40 effort has been put into developing 
regulatory structures and procedures to procure safer practice.  However, little is 
written about the quality benefits to be reaped from the adoption by medical 
practitioners of patient-centred medical practice.  The distinguishing characteristics 
of this thesis lie in its focus on its core theme and the approach it takes to that 
focus, to bring new perspectives to the issue.  The overarching concern is the focus 
on professionalism as the foundation for quality.  Much of the material referenced 
has been examined in other contexts but this thesis subjects that material to 
scrutiny through the lens of professionalism as the path to quality medical practice.  
The approach to the professionalism focus lies in the systematic and methodical 
survey of the material, including identification of those regulatory and legal 
processes that both enhance and detract from the tenets of professionalism.  
Therefore this thesis will focus on the theoretical foundations of medical 
professionalism by way of the concept of patient-centred medical practice and the 
assumptions upon which it rests and show how they flow through to quality 
medical practice.  The role of law in mediating that relationship will be explored.   
 
2 Methodology 
The methodology used to answer these questions will include an analysis of the 
hard law regulatory processes aimed at securing safe medical practice that have 
been legislated by the National Law.  That legislation specifies matters that must 
be included in registration and accreditation prerequisites.  The traditional focus on 
safety will be exposed further through analysis of case law concerning alleged 
medical negligence, and the requirement for patient consent before any medical 
procedure is commenced.  This emphasis relates back to a preoccupation with 
safety and to narrower aspects of what the concept of medical professionalism 
                                                      
39 See eg, John Braithwaite, Judith  Healy and Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and 
Quality ( Discussion Paper, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2005);  
Judith Healy and John Braithwaite, 'Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation' 
(2006) 184(10) Supplement MJA S56;  Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality 
(Ashgate, 2011). 
40 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012);  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
Australian Safety and Quality Framework for Health Care (at December 2010). 
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embraces, such as a duty of care and the respect for the patient’s autonomy 
inherent in the notion of consent before touching.  Similarly, the traditional and 
historical development of the soft law documented in codes, guidelines and other 
regulatory standards reflects the evolving ideals of medical professionalism.  To 
this end, this thesis also undertakes a comparison of the development of codes and 
other viewpoints concerning medical professionalism in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America.  This theoretical enquiry is bolstered by empirical 
evidence of outcomes of disciplinary cases heard by Australian civil and medical 
tribunals that refer back to what is or what is not professional behaviour. 
 
Analysing the constituents of medical professionalism and how it underpins good 
quality patient-centred medical practice makes it possible to identify the gaps 
between the rhetoric of safe, quality, patient-centred medical practice and the 
medical culture that has led to the deficient practices identified in the inquiries and 
reports into medical scandals such as those referred to above.  Medical professional 
culture includes ethical virtues such as compassion and altruism as well as less 
defensible conduct like paternalism, arrogance and the paramountcy of clinical 
discretion.  While medical practitioner organisations assert the ongoing 
commitment of their members to the virtuous aspects of medical practice, there is 
evidence that the rhetoric is being undermined by the conduct of some individual 
practitioners. 
 
3 Thesis Argument and Contribution to the Literature 
What this research shows is that there can be a gap between the rhetoric of patient-
centred care and the reality of patient experience.  The aim of this thesis is to 
explain where and why this gap exists and to propose what could be done to 
minimise it.  The issue is whether the law should only be concerned with minimum 
standards of clinical competence to underpin safety or whether, in addition, it can 
and should instigate quality by way of patient-centred medical practice.  This thesis 
argues that the codes, guidelines and standards that comprise the soft law 
regulatory framework for medical practitioners include norms and aspirations 
beyond minimum safety standards.  It concludes that regulators, through statute 
and disciplinary case law, are concerned to achieve and enhance quality through 
patient-centred medical practice.  The question then is whether and how the law 
can be mobilised to modify the behaviour of medical professionals so as to instil 
 12 
the philosophy and practices of patient-centred care, thereby leading to enhanced 
quality in medical practice and the assurance of patient safety.   
 
What also will become obvious in this thesis is that there is a series of recurring 
dichotomies in medical practice that should be resolved in the interests of patient 
care.  Firstly, there is the gap between the rhetoric of patient-centred care and the 
reality of much patient experience, as in the title to this thesis, that will be 
identified in more detail as this thesis proceeds.  Then there is the emphasis on 
safety that does not necessarily or directly relate to quality.  What also stands out is 
the need to reconcile the hard law and the soft law lying behind medical practice.  
In addition, there is what Jonsen calls a ‘profound moral paradox’ that pervades 
medicine, ‘the incessant conflict between two basic principles of morality: self-
interest and altruism’.41  It is submitted that viewing these dichotomies through the 
lens of patient-centred medical professionalism can lead toward their resolution.  
Reality may come closer to the aspirations reflected in the rhetoric, quality practice 
of necessity embraces safety concerns, soft law can be as effective as hard law in 
modifying practitioner behaviour, and altruistic actions need not be against 
practitioner self-interest. 
 
C THESIS OUTLINE 
 
In order to show how the principles of medical professionalism underpin good 
patient-centred medical practice, Chapter II commences by analysing what medical 
professionalism encompasses.  It provides an outline of those factors that are 
common to all occupations that are termed professions.  It then proceeds to 
examine some features of medical practice that distinguish the medical profession 
from other professions.   
 
Chapter II examines the history of codes of ethics or practice from the era of the 
Hippocratic Oath to current statements expressed in codes of practice.  This history 
shows the gradual shift from self-interested concerns about how medical 
practitioners should deal with each other and the obligations owed to them by their 
                                                      
41 Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1532. 
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patients and members of the public.  The modern status of the welfare of the 
patient is now the primary responsibility of the medical practitioner, as confirmed 
in the MBA Code and in the GMC Code.42   
 
However, as codes cannot provide answers to all ethical questions that arise in 
medical practice, ways of dealing with ethical dilemmas can be bolstered by 
training in medical ethics.  Medical professionals are urged to adopt certain 
principles that exemplify good medical practice, principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, that appear in various guises in both the 
MBA Code and the GMC Code.  In addition, the system of medical ethics is heavily 
reliant on statements that are based in philosophical principles that reflect how the 
medical profession sees itself and how it wishes to present itself to the public.43  
These philosophical principles have been supplemented by recent interest in what 
has been termed ‘virtue ethics’ as a base upon which ethical decision-making in 
difficult medical circumstances can rest.44  Virtuous behaviour by medical 
professionals is an indicator of good character45 and is required because of the 
inherent vulnerability of the patient46 who comes seeking healing, comfort and 
relief of disagreeable symptoms.  Regulatory bodies have recognised the 
importance of ethics training to rehabilitate the reputation of the medical profession 
that has been bruised by recurring medical scandals in recent years.  One recently-
developed method of training that is designed to assist in internalising medical 
ethics is suggested.  
 
Codes of practice have also been supplemented in recent years by 
recommendations for or charters of professionalism that are intended to emphasise 
medical virtues.47  Much of the content of charters is contained in the codes of 
practice.  These charters are an attempt to re-establish in public estimation the 
                                                      
42 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013). 
43  Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2001). 
44 Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
45 Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford University 
Press, 1993) 68. 
46 Thomas Faunce, Who Owns Our Health? (UNSW Press, 2007) 75. 
47 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005);  ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation and 
European Federation of Internal Medicine, Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A 
Physician Perspective (2002). 
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medical profession’s reputation for trustworthiness, altruism and compassion.  This 
reputation has been tested by revelations of medical misconduct in recent public 
inquiries — bullying, arrogance, a ‘club’ culture, tribalism, failure to report 
colleagues’ deficient activities and technical incompetence.48 
 
However, the promotion of caring, skilled, altruistic behaviour being urged on the 
public is being undermined by aspects of the conduct of some medical 
practitioners. This conduct contradicts the efforts by medical regulators and 
medical associations to convince a sceptical public that medical practitioners have 
changed.  Poor communication with patients,49 paternalism,50 disregard of patient 
dignity,51 bullying of colleagues52 and arrogance53 are still evident.  One 
explanation for this behaviour can be found in the ‘hidden curriculum’ evident in 
training of medical students, and continued into early medical practice under 
supervision.54  The influence of the hidden curriculum will be explored to show 
how medical training can teach young doctors to stifle their emotions and to adopt 
uncaring approaches to patients. 
 
The right to object to performing certain medical procedures on conscientious 
grounds can conflict with other provisions in codes of practice.  Thus, this chapter 
argues that the promotion of the medical profession as compassionate, altruistic 
and patient-centred, is also undermined when patients are denied medical 
treatment, even procedures that are legal in Australia.  Chapter II suggests that 
ways can be found to accommodate both the views of the medical practitioner and 
those of the patient so that the patient does not feel abandoned. 
                                                      
48 See eg, Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 25;  Julia Medew, 
'Medical Students under Pressure Amid Reports of Bullying in Australian Hospitals', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Online) (24 May 2015) <http://www.smh.com.au/national/medical-students-under-
pressure-amid-reports-of-bullying-in-australian-hospitals-20150524-gh8jq5.html>. 
49 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [117]. 
50 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [94] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
51  Lynn V Monrouxe and Charlotte E Rees, '"It's Just a Clash of Cultures": Emotional Talk within 
Medical Students' Narratives of Professionalism Dilemmas' (2012) 17 Advances in Health Science 
Education 671, 683. 
52 ‘“Bullying and Harassment” at Canberra Hospital Sees Urology Training Accreditation 
Withdrawn', ABC News (Online) (24 June 2015) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-24/canberra-
hospital-loses-urology-training-accreditation/6569432>;  Expert Advisory Group on Discrimination, 
Bullying and Sexual Harassment, Report to RACS (8 September 2015) 4. 
53 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [50] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
54  Frederic W Hafferty and Ronald Franks, 'The Hidden Curriculum, Ethics Teaching, and the 
Structure of Medical Education' (1994) 69 Academic Medicine 861;  Frederic W Hafferty, 'Beyond 
Curriculum Reform: Confronting Medicine's Hidden Curriculum' (1998) 73 Academic Medicine 403. 
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Chapter III proceeds to analyse the regulatory regime that governs the professional 
activities of medical practitioners.  Given the priorities of quality and safety in 
registration of medical practitioners, there is legislation, now under the National 
Law, that provides for registration and re-registration of medical practitioners 
together with requirements for discipline for those whose conduct is found to not 
meet professional standards.55  The National Law also sets out the outlines for 
accreditation of health care institutions and educational bodies.56  However, the 
National Law leaves the minutiae of regulation to be developed by relevant 
National Boards and other bodies that are more familiar with the workings of the 
medical profession.  Regulation is realised through policies outlined in the ‘soft’ 
law of codes, charters, frameworks, standards and other documentation, emanating 
both from National Boards and other bodies like the government-funded 
ACSQHC. 
 
Soft law has become ubiquitous in regulatory environments.  Soft law achieves its 
results mainly through voluntary compliance or through contractual obligations as, 
in comparison with the hard law of statutes, it is not otherwise directly enforceable.  
But soft law can become hard if it is given a legislative imprimatur by being 
adopted in a statute,57 or by being endorsed by the common law.58  Yet Aronson 
points out that ‘ ... Australia’s version of the rule against fettering statutory 
discretions has led its courts to decline to enforce soft law as such ... ’.59 
 
Chapter III then investigates how soft law achieves its intended outcomes when it 
does not have a statutory base or does not have a specific endorsement in common 
law.  It surveys the influential theory of Responsive Regulation developed by Ayres 
and Braithwaite, which has been adopted to attempt to achieve safer activities of 
                                                      
55 National Law s 38 and Part 7. 
56 National Law Part 6. 
57 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 10. 
58 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [77] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
59 Mark Aronson, 'Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court' (2007) 35 Federal 
Law Review 1, 3. 
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health practitioners.60  The Ayres/Braithwaite theory of Responsive Regulation has 
been widely applied in Australia and several overseas jurisdictions.61 
 
Chapter III proceeds to survey the hard and soft law by which the activities of 
health practitioners are ordered.  The hard law is evaluated by an analysis of how 
disciplinary proceedings are initiated and decided.  The soft law in codes, and 
guidelines of both government and specialist medical bodies such as the Royal 
Australasian College of Physicians and the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
will be considered.  The most important soft law instruments, the Australian 
Charter of Healthcare Rights and the National Safety and Quality Health Service 
Standards, will be explored to show how they promote professional ideals and 
patient-centred care.  Then, Chapter III examines reported disciplinary cases in 
courts and tribunals for the three years from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2016.62  This 
case examination extracts recurring patterns of activities of medical practitioners 
that have led to disciplinary proceedings and makes suggestions as to how some of 
these patterns might be minimised.63   
 
Two recurring problems found by Australian courts and tribunals were inadequate 
medical records and deficient clinical practice.  Each of these problems is 
scrutinised and suggestions made for reducing their negative effects on patients — 
how to ensure more complete medical records, and how to establish that each 
medical practitioner is up-to-date and fit to practise. 
 
                                                      
60 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992);  John 
Braithwaite, Judith Healy and Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality 
(Discussion Paper, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2005);  Judith 
Healy and John Braithwaite, 'Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation' (2006) 
184(10) Supplement MJA S56;  Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 
2011). 
61 See eg, Charlotte Wood et al, Applications of Responsive Regulatory Theory in Australia and 
Overseas (Occasional Paper 15, June 2010);  Brigid M Gillespie and Andrea Marshall, 
'Implementation of Safety Checklists in Surgery: a Realist Synthesis of Evidence' (2015) 10 
Implementation Science 137. 
62 Those years have been chosen because the National Law did not commence until July 2010 and 
there is a lead time between the initiation report and the appearance of a matter in tribunal or court 
proceedings.  By choosing those three years, it is anticipated that the bulk of the cases considered will 
be determined under the National Law.  Those few cases that were still under former legislation have 
not been included in the summaries.  
63 The cases themselves were not analysed as the point of the survey was to extract the patterns of 
activities rather than how each case was decided. 
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Chapter IV examines some structural biases in the legal system that operate in 
favour of medical practitioner interests and compete with patient-centred care 
principles.  These structural biases are best understood by exploring three 
important, but interrelated areas of the law within the law of negligence.  Firstly, in 
the context of an action alleging negligent conduct by a medical practitioner, the 
chapter reviews the law relating to the professional standard of what treatment 
should be provided to a patient in the patient’s particular circumstances.  The 
Bolam64 standard is based on accepting the judgement of a responsible body of 
medical professional opinion.  Over the years, the courts have moved away from an 
almost unquestioned acceptance of the Bolam standard as applicable to determine a 
patient’s ‘best interests’ and whether the alleged conduct of the medical 
practitioner is negligent or not because it accords with a responsible body of 
medical opinion.  Australian courts first,65 and now more recently, the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court,66 have modified the Bolam principle, stating that it no 
longer applies to the information that must be provided to the patient before the 
patient can be said to have given informed consent.  However, the progress made 
by the courts in constraining the reach of the Bolam standard has now been 
undermined by the reinstatement of a modified Bolam test under civil liability 
legislation.67  The Ipp Report, the Review of the Law of Negligence68 will be 
considered later in Chapter IV.  
 
Secondly, an important legal principle is the common law requirement that the 
patient consent before any treatment regime is initiated.  Medical practitioners are 
not exempt from the legal rule69 that any touching may be assault or trespass unless 
appropriate consent has first been obtained.  Proper consent also involves the 
patient being aware of risks and benefits associated with any treatment proposed, 
together with risks or benefits associated with failure to undertake any treatment at 
all.70  Without this information, any consent is deficient.  Thus, actions for 
negligence against medical practitioners can include not only allegations of 
deficient technical skill but also the failure to warn patients of risks.  Where 
                                                      
64 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
65 See eg, F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189;  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
66 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
67 See eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5O. 
68 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report). 
69 See eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 800 (Sir Stephen Browne P);  882 (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson). 
70 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
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patients are unable to give or withhold consent, medical practitioners may treat so 
long as the treatment provided is in the patient’s best interests.71  However, there is 
ample evidence that when a patient’s refusal to consent does not accord with the 
medical practitioner’s view, the patient may be regarded as lacking mental 
capacity.72  The courts have developed detailed tests for how a patient’s capacity is 
to be determined.73  Yet, there is evidence that, in practice, patient autonomy is 
being supplanted by medical practitioner judgement, leading to these tests being 
evaded and, on occasion, ignored, 74 derogating from patient-centred medical 
practice. 
 
Thirdly, the assessment of technical competence through actions against medical 
practitioners where negligence is alleged has not always provided injured patients 
with adequate compensation for injury.  The interests of patients have been 
subjugated to medical practitioner interests in several aspects of personal injury 
law.  As Justice Ipp comments, injuries to patients are treated differently from 
injuries incurred in the workplace and, in some jurisdictions, in motor vehicle 
accidents.75  The ability of patients to obtain compensation has also been restricted 
by civil liability legislation enacted throughout the country as a consequence of the 
report of the Ipp Panel.76  Among other changes to the law of negligence, a three 
year statute of limitations now applies in contrast to a six year limitation in the case 
of debts or contracts.77  Quantum of damages is limited78 and, in many cases, 
damages are denied because the injury is not deemed severe enough.79  One way of 
moderating adverse effects of civil liability legislation is to take personal injuries 
out of the tort system altogether.  Thus, this chapter asks whether the time has 
come for a ‘no fault’ liability system to be instituted, thereby making sure that each 
injured person will have proper care for the injury caused without having to prove 
that someone has been negligent. 
                                                      
71 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 867 (Lord Goff); 
72 See eg, Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam);  NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297;  Social Development Committee, Parliament of 
Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987). 
73 See eg, In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 292 (Thorpe J);  Re MB [1997] 
EWCA Civ 3093 [30] (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
74 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [16]—[21]. 
75 Justice David Ipp, 'The Politics, Purpose and Reform of the Law of Negligence' (2007) 81 
Australian Law Journal 456, 461. 
76 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report). 
77 See eg, Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 14;  Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 11;  Limitation of Actions 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 5. 
78 See eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Part 2. 
79 See eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 16. 
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Chapter V is the first of two further illustrations of medical practice that examines 
contradictions between what the law requires and what can happen in practice, 
further evidence of how law and medical practice may hinder realisation of patient-
centred care.  This chapter looks at advance directives that have been promoted to 
the public by governmental and medical authorities as a way of making provision 
for future situations where consent to medical treatment cannot, for any reason, be 
given.80  Advance directives are an extension of the principle of autonomy and are 
recognised as such by the courts.81  Most state and territory legislatures have passed 
relevant provisions to establish and support their creation and use.82  Yet 
legislation, cases and practical factors have undermined the full realisation of their 
potential to guide clinicians in the types of treatment that the patient wishes or does 
not wish to undergo.  Despite the fact that there is a great deal of hard law in statute 
and cases, there are some gaps in its application and interpretation.83  There is also 
a body of academic criticism of the validity of legally faultless advance 
directives.84  However, these arguments are easily countered by the legal 
recognition of the competent individual’s right to make provision for future events, 
whether in a contract, a will or some other planning device.  Finally this chapter 
will make some suggestions that could promote acceptance of and compliance with 
advance directives. 
 
Chapter VI examines the incidence of medical mishaps that may cause injury to 
patients.  It cites research that suggests that medical injuries occur more frequently 
than is generally understood by the public.  Not all of these injuries occur through 
negligence.  Nevertheless, a part of medical practice that is conceivably poorly 
                                                      
80 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 1. 
81 See eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff);  Hunter and New England 
Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [36] (McDougall J). 
82 Advance Care Directives Act 2013 (SA);  Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA);  
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT);  Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT);  
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld);  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). 
83 See eg, Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2);  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(c);  
Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam);  Qumsieh v Guardianship and 
Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45. 
84 See eg, Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 277;  Helga Kuhse, 'Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance 
Directives, Personhood and Personal Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 347;  
Michael Quante, 'Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 365, 373;  Rebecca Dresser, 'Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients' 
(1994) 46 Rutgers Law Review 609. 
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understood by health practitioners is how to best deal with the aftermath, making 
sure that the needs of an injured patient are the prime focus and that the occurrence 
of an injury is used as an opportunity to learn ways to ensure it is not repeated.  
However, despite efforts by regulators and professional organisations to ameliorate 
the worst effects of adverse events on patients, many medical practitioners are 
failing to acknowledge their occurrence or to adequately deal with their aftermath.   
 
Open disclosure is behaviour that is required of medical practitioners following any 
adverse event.85  The Open Disclosure Framework prepared by the ACSQHC 
provides details of procedures to be implemented in response to an adverse event.86  
Open disclosure principles include patient-centred care principles such as treating 
patients with dignity, communicating with them and providing information and 
emotional support, together with access to and continuity of care, and respect for 
patient needs. 
 
From the patient’s point of view, the most troubling behaviour of many medical 
practitioners is a failure to internalise a safety culture in day-to-day medical 
practice.  As the MBA Code acknowledges, medical practice is inherently risky and 
adverse events will occur.87  However, despite the requirement in the MBA Code 
for medical practitioners to be aware of the importance of the principles of open 
disclosure,88 too often adverse events are not adequately acknowledged to an 
injured patient.  Not acknowledging an adverse event can lead to failure to 
promptly initiate treatment or take other actions to minimise the harmful effects of 
the injury, whether physical, psychological or financial.  
 
There is a series of actions that injured patients and their families need from 
medical practitioners and hospital administrators when faced with the reality of an 
adverse incident.  Research suggests that resort to litigation may be avoided if the 
                                                      
85 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [6.2.1]. 
86 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework (2013). 
87 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [6.1]. 
88 Ibid [6.2.1]. 
 21 
treating medical practitioner and responsible hospital administrators face up to the 
matter and provide open and honest information to those affected.89  The 
information needed by injured patients and their families is also reflected in the 
principles of Open Disclosure.   
 
One way of reducing simple errors that may have catastrophic consequences is to 
encourage, and sometimes to mandate, the wider adoption of checklists, a simple 
but effective way of reducing the incidence and severity of medically-caused 
injuries.  Chapter VI canvasses arguments in favour of their adoption, together with 
matters that can act as barriers to their acceptance as important tools in medical 
practice. 
 
Chapter VII summarises the conclusions from the previous chapters.  It argues that, 
in light of the evidence provided there, the law can promote quality in patient-
centred medical practice and is not limited to enforcing minimum standards of 
technical competency and safety.  It also draws together the recommendations 
made throughout this thesis.  In addition to the existing regulatory support for 
quality aspects of medical practice, there are some additional processes that can be 
implemented by regulatory authorities through their powers to direct standards.90  
Medical regulatory authorities also have powers such as through their approval of 
training by medical schools,91 by accreditation processes for health care facilities,92 
by requirements to show ongoing professional development as part of annual re-
registration,93 and by promulgation of codes and guidelines,94 to introduce matters 
that can lead to better quality in medical practice.  Comprehensive education in 
medical ethics is critical.  Regular revalidation is designed to demonstrate that a 
medical practitioner is up-to-date and fit to practise.  Simple initiatives to improve 
record keeping, checklists to enhance safety together with requirements that health 
                                                      
89 See eg, Nancy Berlinger, After Harm (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 47;  R Lamb, 'Open 
Disclosure: The Only Approach to Medical Error' (2004) 13 Quality and Safety in Health Care 3, 4;  
Bill Madden and Tina Cockburn, 'Duty to Disclose Medical Error in Australia' (2005) 14 Australian 
Health Law Bulletin 13, 17;  Malcolm Parker, 'A Fair Dinkum Duty of Open Disclosure Following 
Medical Error' (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 35, 41. 
90 See eg, National Law ss 35, 38, 47. 
91 National Law Part 6.  
92 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012). 
93 National Law s 38. 
94 National Law Part 5 Division 3. 
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care institutions include important quality matters in their staff contracts, can also 
reinforce standards.  As this thesis argues in Chapter III, the law can require 
adoption of specified quality practices through the threat of escalation of legal 
sanctions.  The existence of and publicity surrounding disciplinary proceedings are 
not supposed to be punishment but are designed to act as a deterrent to members of 
the profession who may stray from professional norms.  They also signal to 
members of the public that deficient behaviour will not be tolerated. 95 
 
This chapter also summarises the contribution of this thesis to the literature, 
emphasising achievable initiatives that can enhance the observance of patient-
centred principles by medical practitioners.  Training and socialisation into the 
culture of medicine can emphasise technical skills over the equally important 
function of the medical practitioner, caring for the patient.  Care in the sense of 
providing good medical treatment is enhanced in providing comfort and a mutually 
trusting relationship.   
 
Finally, this chapter suggests some areas for future research, ranging from 
immediate problems such as updating the findings of the original Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study to some contentious issues that may benefit from a 
patient-centred focus, such as end-of-life decision-making. 
 
The medical system is an important part of Australian society.  Whilst most 
medical practitioners are conscientious in their dealings with patients, there are still 
aspects of medical culture that can lead to less than optimal outcomes and this 
thesis has identified some of these aspects.  It also suggests some comparatively 
simple measures that can lead to greater patient satisfaction and to more rewarding 
interactions between those patients and their medical practitioners. 
 
Before moving on to the substantive chapters, three important concepts, namely 
duty, quality and patient-centred care, will be explained.  As each comprises 
                                                      
95 NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177,183–184 (Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies 
and Owen JJ). 
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different shades of meaning, analysis of what is embraced in these notions can 
convey how they may be better understood in the context of the arguments that will 
be presented. 
 
D IMPORTANT CONCEPTS 
 
The three important concepts that require elucidation, duty, quality and patient-
centred care are interrelated in various ways.  This section will not only explore the 
concepts but will point out where these interrelationships occur.  Each part in the 
section will examine both soft and hard law references before presenting evidence 
from the literature of how each concept is applied.  It will then suggest how the 
allusions and references to each concept can be interpreted in the health law 
explored in this thesis. 
 
1 Duty 
Duty appears as a basic obligation in the most important soft law instruments 
governing medical practitioners.96  For example, the MBA Code states: ‘Doctors 
have a duty to make the care of patients their first concern and to practise medicine 
safely and effectively. They must be ethical and trustworthy’.97  Similarly, the 
preface to the GMC Code recites ‘The duties of a doctor registered with the 
General Medical Council.‘  Likewise, the AMA Code refers to a primary duty ‘ ... 
to provide ... patient(s) with the best available care.’98  The imperative to patient-
centred practice is characterised as a duty, thus relating it to the ideal of patient-
centred care. 
 
In the common law, the primary reference to duty appears as an integral part of the 
idea of how negligence should be established when an allegation has been made 
that there has been a breach of a duty owed by one to another.  The duty of care has 
been encapsulated in the famous dictum by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson: 
                                                      
96 See eg, Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia (at March 2014);  General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013). 
97 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
98 Australian Medical Association, AMA Code of Ethics 2004.  Editorially revised 2006.  Revised 
2016. 
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The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour;  and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour?  receives a 
restricted reply.  You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which 
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.  Who, then, in 
law is my neighbour?  The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called in question. 99 
 
Likewise, as McHugh stated in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council:  
The present case fell within the familiar category of cases where the plaintiff was a 
member of a class of persons to whom the defendant had a duty – according to a 
body of common law precedent – to take reasonable care for the safety of members 
of that class. Teachers and students, doctors and patients ... 100 
 
Macquarie Dictionary provides several meanings for the word duty.  Relevant to 
the practice of medicine are the first three as follows — ‘1. that which one is bound 
to do by moral or legal obligation;  2. the binding or obligatory force of which 
which is morally right;  moral obligation;  3. action required by one’s position or 
occupation:  office;  function’.101 
 
The hard law of statute recognises how duty is related to function.  The Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law has two definitions characterised as a duty.  
In section 5 it states: 
‘exercise a function includes perform a duty’. 
Schedule 7 is headed: Miscellaneous provisions relating to interpretation.  Section 
12 in that part provides: 
‘function includes a power, authority or duty’. 
Thus, the National Law recognises that functions performed under its provisions 
can be termed duties.  The notion of function is advanced by the Macquarie 
Dictionary definition above.  Similarly, the duty of a medical practitioner can also 
be seen as relating to his or her function.  
 
Some philosophers have attempted to clarify what is embraced in the idea of duty 
outside the strict legal interpretation of what the notion implies.  Whitely’s 
suggestion is directly relevant to the trust inherent in the ideal of the doctor-patient 
relationship.  He proposes that:  ‘It cannot be a duty to do, or not to do, an action, 
                                                      
99 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
100 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005} 223 CLR 422, 432 (McHugh J). 
101 Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 5th ed, 2009) 520–521. 
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unless that action is covered by some commitment’.  He adds:  ‘The ground of my 
duty is always a specific feature of the situation, namely, a trust-relation between 
myself and some other person or persons.’102 
 
Brandt’s suggestion takes the idea further: ‘Failure to do one’s duty without 
suitable justification or excuse is a reflection on one, and is the object of sanctions, 
[or] at least unfavourable attitudes on the part of the relevant group of people.’103 
 
Johnson and Cureton in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy pick up the 
notions of commitment and coercion, particularly self-imposed.  They suggest that: 
‘Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or 
incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our 
own powers of reason.’104 
 
Thus, duty can be seen as an obligation that may or may not be compelled by the 
law, but that always has a moral dimension.  Duties attach to medical practitioners 
particularly because of the trust implicit in the doctor-patient relationship.105  
Whilst the content of the notions of obligation and duty are not necessarily always 
the same, Brandt suggests that, in most cases, they can be used interchangeably 
without ‘noticeable jar’.106   
 
In cases such as Wyong Shire Council v Shirt107 and March v Stramare,108 duty is 
almost invariably used in the phrase ‘duty of care’, though sometimes also as 
‘breach of duty’.  However, in cases such as Reibl v Hughes,109 Sidaway110 and 
Montgomery,111 the word appears in the circumstance of the doctor’s duty of 
disclosure, to advise of risks, to answer truthfully.  Nowhere is there any judicial 
explanation of the concept, but in all these contexts, the notion of obligation is a 
clear connotation.  
 
                                                      
102 C H Whiteley, 'On Duties' (1952-1953) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95, 98. 
103 R B Brandt, 'The Concepts of Obligation and Duty' (1964) LXXIII (291) Mind 374, 392. 
104 Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, 'Kant's Moral Philosophy', The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N Zalta (ed) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kant-moral/> Section 3. 
105 See Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005} 223 CLR 422, 432 (McHugh J). 
106 R B Brandt, 'The Concepts of Obligation and Duty' (1964) LXXIII (291) Mind 374, 393. 
107 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1979-1980) 146 CLR 40. 
108 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Limited (1990-1991) 171 CLR 506. 
109 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3rd) 1. 
110 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871. 
111 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
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Thus, the dimensions of the concept of ‘duty’ can include two senses: a non-legal 
and primarily moral one and a legal one.  It is used in negligence law in the context 
of the duty of care owed by a medical practitioner towards the patient when 
undertaking any diagnosis, treatment or advice.  In its non-legal moral sense, duty 
is integral to the obligations of medical practitioners to their patients.  Both the 
MBA Code and the GMC Code catalogue duties of medical practitioners to observe 
the behaviours they describe as professionalism.112 
 
2 Quality 
The comparatively recent establishment of bodies devoted to quality in health 
care113 was given impetus by evidence of unethical and deficient behaviour from 
health professionals and medical researchers.114  Consequently, this section aims to 
explain how ‘quality’ is used in the context of health care.  
 
Notwithstanding the appearance of the word in its name, ACSQHC does not 
define quality but constantly refers to the necessity for its adoption by all 
health care professionals and health care institutions.  For example, the soft 
law Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights ‘ ... describes the rights of 
patients and other people using the Australian health system. These rights 
are essential to make sure that, wherever and whenever care is provided, it is 
of high quality ... ’.115  The similarly soft law Introduction to the National 
Safety and Quality Health Service Standards states that: 
The primary aims of the NSQHS Standards are to protect the public from harm and 
to improve the quality of health service provision. They provide a quality assurance 
mechanism that tests whether relevant systems are in place to ensure minimum 
                                                      
112 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4];  General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) [1–6].  
Professionalism will be examined in more detail in Chapter II. 
113 The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care was only established in 2006.  
<https://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/about-us/governance/>;  The Clinical Excellence Commission 
in New South Wales was set up in 2004.  <http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov.au/about/about-cec>;  The 
predecessor of the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence was the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence which was set up in 1999 ‘to reduce variation in the 
availability and quality of National Health Service treatments and care’. 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/about/who-we-are> following some of the scandals of the late 1990s in the 
United Kingdom. 
114 See eg, ‘The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male’ that continued for 40 years, 
even for 30 years after it was confirmed that penicillin was effective in treating syphilis (Albert R 
Jonsen, A Short History of Medical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2000) 108);  Dame Janet Smith, 
'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – Proposals for 
the Future 9 December 2004). 
115 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights. 
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standards of safety and quality are met, and a quality improvement mechanism that 
allows health services to realise aspirational or developmental goals. 116 
 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary states that the word ‘quality’ originally 
came from Old French, Latin and Greek, all of which meant a particular attribute 
or feature.  Over the years the meaning has evolved to include other meanings, 
such as a standard as measured against other things of a similar kind, and has also 
acquired an implication of high grade or inherent superiority.117  
 
The concept of quality is itself comprised of a variety of facets and will fluctuate 
depending on the context in which it is being applied.  For example, the quote from 
the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards above picks up three 
different nuances of the word ‘quality’ as described above from The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary.  The first reference is to quality as a characteristic.  
The second reference, ‘quality assurance’ comprises the monitoring and evaluation 
of performance in the delivery of services, and how it affects the quality of 
outcomes, the context of the latter use implying a better standard.  The third 
reference is to quality as a standard.  The fourth reference is in the context of 
achieving high standard.  Reflecting the variation in usage of the word, one 
conjecture concerning the phrase ‘quality of’ could suggest simply a standard, 
whilst ‘quality in’ might imply high quality. 
 
The hard law of the National Law also refers to quality, firstly and most 
particularly in the context of its objectives and guiding principles.  Section 3(2)(c) 
provides that one of the objectives is ‘ ... to facilitate the provision of high quality 
education and training of health practitioners;’ whilst one of its guiding principles 
is found in section 3(3)(c) that provides that: ‘restrictions on the practice of a 
health profession are to be imposed under the scheme only if it is necessary to 
ensure health services ... are of appropriate quality’. 
 
When looking to cases for guidance, there are typically no discussions of what 
quality entails, nor any cases that elaborate a meaning of quality.  When the word 
arises in the context of cases concerning medical situations, it is often in the 
situation of quality of life as compared to quantity.  As Lord Kerr and Lord Reid 
                                                      
116 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012). 
117 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 1973) 1724.  The 
dictionary advises that this latter usage dated from late Middle English. 
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pointed out in Montgomery:  ‘The relative importance attached by patients to 
quality as against length of life, or to physical appearance or bodily integrity as 
against the relief of pain, will vary from one patient to another.’118  
 
Likewise in Australia, some references in tribunal cases discussed quality as 
referred to in the MBA Code119 or the surgeons Code,120 but others varied by 
reference to ideas such as quality of life,121 quality of care,122 quality of records,123 
quality of professional conduct.124.  
 
‘Quality’ is not defined in the MBA Code125 either.  The MBA Codes sets out the 
‘qualities’ required of Australian medical practitioners.  It also refers to ‘quality’ 
when talking of systems of quality assurance [6.2.2], making only justifiable 
claims about quality of outcomes [8.6.2], providing doctors who are their patients 
with the same quality of care as all patients [9.3.1] and human research as vital for 
improving quality of healthcare [11.1].  However, the code of the Royal 
Australasian College of Surgeons specifically advises that the ‘ ... nature of the 
surgeon-patient relationship is critical to the quality of care ... ’126 that implies the 
second meaning, quality as a standard. 
 
Determination of what quality in health care comprises is a complex exercise but 
its achievement is an ideal promoted by governments, health professionals and the 
society in which they are located.127  Whilst hard and soft law instruments in 
Australia refer to quality in various guises, there is no specific list of the factors 
required as has occurred in the United States.  Following the major report of the 
Institute of Medicine’s Committee on the Quality of Health Care documenting the 
                                                      
118 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [46]. 
119 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Kanapathipillai [2016] ACAT 16 [57];  Medical Board of 
Australia v Veettill [2015] WASAT 124 [12]. 
120 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44.  The reference in [121] is to Clause 13.1.9 of the surgeons’Code - ‘Openness and honesty are 
generally relevant to the development of trust between a health practitioner and patient, a quality 
which is integral to the therapeutic relationship’.  This provision uses quality in the sense of an 
attribute. 
121 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Griffiths [2017] VCAT 822 [20]. 
122 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Lewis [2017] SAHPT 1 [19]–[20]. 
123 HCCC v Chen [2016] NSWCATOD 144 [132];  Medical Board of Australia v Fox [2016] VCAT 
408 [42]. 
124 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Melhuish [2016] ACAT 29 [75]. 
125 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014). 
126 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Code of Conduct [2.1]. 
127 See eg, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Safety and 
Quality Goals for Health Care;  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards (September 2012);  Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2013 Quality Systems Assessment (2014). 
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incidence of error in medical practice, To Err is Human,128 the Committee 
produced another significant report, Crossing the Quality Chasm.129  It proposed 
the following six components to define quality in health care.  Examples of each of 
these components are reflected in the MBA Code and appear in square brackets 
after each.  Quality in health care should be:  
Safe: Avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them. [1.4], 
[2.2.2], [6.2.5]. 
Effective: Providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could benefit 
and refraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit (avoiding 
underuse and overuse, respectively). [1.4], [2.4.4]. 
Patient-centred: Providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual 
patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all 
clinical decisions. [1.4]. 
Timely:  Reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays, for both those who receive 
and those who give care. [4.5.1]. 
Efficient: Avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and 
energy. [5.1], [5.2]. 
Equitable: Providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and socio-economic 
status.130 [3.8.2], [5.3]. 
 
The World Health Organisation proposes that quality can be ‘measured’ against 
what the latest expert understanding suggests is most beneficial in achieving the 
desired results.  Its definition is as follows 
Quality: the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase 
the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current 
professional knowledge.131 
 
Buttell et al have taken account of proposals from a number of sources including 
the World Health Organisation when they submit : 
Quality consists of the degree to which health services for individuals and 
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes (quality principles), 
are consistent with current professional knowledge (professional practitioner skill), 
and meet the expectations of healthcare users (the marketplace).132  
 
Both of these recommendations are aimed at assuring that outcomes from health 
related pursuits achieve optimal results.  Likewise, Donabedian defines quality 
                                                      
128 Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human (National Academy Press, 2000). 
129 Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm (National Academy Press, 2001). 
130 Ibid 39–40. 
131 World Health Organisation, World Alliance for Patient Safety: The Conceptual Framework for the 
International Classification for Patient Safety, Final Technical Report (January 2009) 24. 
132 Phil Buttell, Robert Hendler and Jennifer Daley, 'Quality in Healthcare: Concepts and Practice' in 
Kenneth H Cohn and Douglas E Hough (eds), The Business of Healthcare (Greenwood Publishing, 
2007) 61, 62. 
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assurance to mean all actions taken to establish, protect, promote, and improve the 
quality of health care.133 
 
Consequently, there does not appear to be one specific use of the concept of quality 
in health care.  ‘Quality’ is used in various senses depending on the context, a 
particular attribute or feature, a standard as measured against other things of a 
similar kind, and also as something which has a high grade or inherent superiority.  
 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, quality will be used in the sense of a 
standard of excellence, of high grade or of superiority.  Quality as excellence is an 
expectation implied in the ideals of professionalism outlined in the MBA Code and 
the GMC Code.134  The focus of this particular sense of the word ‘quality’ also 
accords with the aspirations repeated in important ‘soft law’ instruments governing 
medical practice.    The Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights describes the 
rights of patients and persons in their interactions with the health system.  They are 
‘essential to make sure [that health care] is of high quality ... .’135  Similarly, the 
National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards aim to provide a quality 
assurance mechanism which can lead to ‘quality improvement ... to realise 
aspirational or developmental goals’.136   
 
3 Patient-Centred Care 
The good physician knows his patients through and through, and his knowledge is 
bought dearly.  Time, sympathy and understanding must be lavishly dispensed, but 
the reward is to be found in that personal bond which forms the greatest satisfaction 
of the practice of medicine.  One of the essential qualities of the clinician is interest 
in humanity, for the secret of the care of the patient is in caring for the patient.137 
 
The achievement of patient-centred medical practice is an aspiration.  However, 
just because it is an ideal does not mean that medical practitioners should ignore 
                                                      
133 Avedis Donabedian, Introduction to Quality Assurance in Health Care (Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
134 Both codes also oblige medical practitioners to participate in systems of quality assurance.  (MBA 
Code [6.2.2]; GMC Code [22]). 
135 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights. 
136 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012) 3.  This implication of excellence is also implied in other bodies 
with an important role in fostering clinical improvement, see eg, the Clinical Excellence Commission 
and the Hunter New England Health Excellence Program in New South Wales.  The motto of 
Women’s Healthcare Australasia is ‘Supporting excellence in health care’. 
137 Francis W Peabody, 'The Care of the Patient' (1927) 88 (March 19) JAMA 877, 882. 
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the statement reflected in paragraph 1.4 of the MBA Code, that ‘good medical 
practice is patient-centred’138 despite the statement of Hiley J in the Northern 
Territory Supreme Court.  He asserted that:  ‘The clause 1.4 paragraph is expressed 
in very general and aspiration terms.  It is not couched in imperative terms and 
does not prescribe and identify any specific obligations.  It has no clearly 
identifiable content’.139 
 
Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that patient-centredness is entering into the 
lexicon of medical practice, including academic discourse.140  Therefore, this 
section will canvas references to patient-centred care in soft law instruments, 
followed by its characterisation in the hard law of cases.  It will then consider how 
patient-centred care is represented in the literature.  Out of this information, this 
part will propose some recurring facets of patient-centred care and note their 
relationship to the rights of patients expressed in the Australian Charter of 
Healthcare Rights.  Finally, this section will indicate the relationship between the 
ideal of patient-centred care and the concepts of duty and quality. 
 
Patient-centred care is now widely recognised141 as not only providing superior 
care for patients, but also enhanced morale for health care workers and business 
benefits for health care institutions.142  For example, ACSQHC has asserted that: ‘ 
... [i]t is clear that patient-centred care has significant benefits associated with 
clinical quality and outcomes, the experience of care, the business and operations 
                                                      
138 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
139 Nitschke v Medical Board of Australia [2015] NTSC 39 [119].  Similarly, in Medical Board of 
Australia v Melhuish [2016] ACAT 29 at [65] the tribunal agrees with Nitschke that paragraph 1.3 is 
aspirational and states that it ‘ does not consider that it [clause 1.4] creates a standard that could 
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140 See eg, Raymond C Tallis, 'Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World' 
(2006) 6 Clinical Medicine 7, 10;  Lars Sandman and Christian Munthe, 'Shared Decision Making, 
Paternalism and Patient Choice' (2010) 18 Health Care Analysis 60, 61, 83;  Richard Baker, 'Patient-
Centred Care after Shipman' (2004) 97(4) Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 161, 161;  Donald 
H Irvine, 'Time for Hard Decisions on Patient-Centred Professionalism' (2004) 181 MJA 271, 271;  
Anne-Marie Audet, Karen Davis and Stephen C Schoenbaum, 'Adoption of Patient-Centred Care 
Practices by Physicians' (2006) 166 Archives of Internal Medicine 754, 758. 
141 See eg, a small sample, Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm (National Academy 
Press, 2001);  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care 
(August 2011);  Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors 
in Australia (at March 2014);  General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013);  
Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003);  Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman 
Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the Future 9 
December 2004). 
142 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 
2011) 9. 
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of delivering health services, and the work environment’.143  Haidet et al have 
observed that ‘[a] growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that patient-
centered care is associated with a number of favorable biomedical, psychological, 
and social outcomes.144  Likewise, Sandman points out that:  
Patient centred care (PCC) is gaining ground as a leading ideology of modern 
medicine and health-care and is increasingly advocated as a guide for how diagnose, 
consultations, treatment, and care should be performed.145 
 
The ideal of patient-centred care is not simply a series of directions for health care 
professionals and organisations that deliver health care services.  It involves a 
change of emphasis from the priorities of individual or institutional health care 
providers to an emphatic focus upon the patient.  Everything from design of 
buildings to the provision of health related services should revolve around the 
patient who is to be included in decision-making processes.146  Proponents of 
patient-centred care principles see that a change in culture is necessary.147  This 
change in culture must permeate through all staff, from the medical specialist to the 
cleaner.  Patient experiences are enhanced by attention to improving first the small 
things, like clean bed linen, prompt response to call buttons and empathic 
admission and discharge procedures.  Any change in culture should then flow 
through into other aspects of the health care system.  Adoption of patient-centred 
care principles has been recognised as the foundation for developing systems of 
high quality health care.148   
 
The MBA Code, in describing what is good medical practice, states that 
professionalism embodies all the qualities described in the code.  Thus, if good 
medical practice is patient-centred, patient-centred good medical practice equates 
to the qualities of professionalism, the touchstones against which all conduct of a 
medical practitioner are evaluated.  Irvine does not bother pondering about the 
relationship between patient-centred care and professionalism.  He asserts: 
                                                      
143 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care ( August 
2011) 9. 
144 Paul Haidet et al, 'Characterizing the Patient-Centeredness of Hidden Curricula in Medical 
Schools: Development and Validation of a New Measure' (2005) 80 Academic Medicine 44, 44. 
145 Lars Sandman and Christian Munthe, 'Shared Decision Making, Paternalism and Patient Choice' 
(2010) 18 Health Care Analysis 60, 61. 
146 The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
1984–1995, Learning from Bristol, Report CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 373 [39]. 
147 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) xiv. 
148 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 
2011) Foreword. 
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‘Patients want doctors who are competent, respectful, honest and able to 
communicate with them. That is patient-centred professionalism’.149 
 
The notion of patient-centred care can be found in other soft law instruments.  The 
AMA Code makes patient care its primary focus.150  The GMC Code describes its 
detailed provisions for making the duty of medical practitioners to the primacy of 
the patient as ‘professionalism in action’.151 The code of the Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons (the RACS Code) refers to patient-centred practice as the 
priority for its members.152 
 
Whilst patient-centred care is not specifically mentioned in the National Law, it is 
implied in the definition of unprofessional conduct.153  The term has also appeared 
in a recent Western Australian Statute.  Section 4(d) of the Health Services Act 
2016 (WA) proclaims the act’s purpose as including: ‘to promote a patient-centred 
continuum of care, including patient engagement, in the provision of health 
services’.  An early attempt by the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for 
personally controlled electronic health records documented that:  ‘Since the 1990s, 
e health has been increasingly seen by most developed countries as central to the 
provision of current and future high quality, patient-centred care.’154 
 
A confirmation of the duty of the medical practitioner to make the care of his or 
her patient the primary concern as required by paragraph 1.4 of Good Medical 
Practice, was provided in the New South Wales Court of Appeal. This concern was 
recognised as ‘patient-centred care’ in the case of Gorman v NSW Health Care 
Complaints Commission155 by one of the expert witnesses, Dr Young where he 
said:  ‘The cornerstone of good patient management in the General Practice setting 
                                                      
149 Donald H Irvine, 'Time for Hard Decisions on Patient-Centred Professionalism' (2004) 181 MJA 
271, 271 
150 Australian Medical Association, AMA Code of Ethics 2004.  Editorially revised 2006.  Revised 
2016 [2.1]. 
151 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) 4. 
152 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Code of Conduct, Preamble, College Pledge, Section 2.1, 
Section 8. 
153 National Law - paragraph (e) of the definition in section 5: 
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154 Rhonda Jolly, ‘Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011’, Bills Digest No 100, 
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is continuous and comprehensive patient centred care.’156  This statement is an 
articulation of the statement in paragraph 1.4 that good medical practice is patient-
centred.  This evidence had been provided to the New South Wales Medical 
Tribunal when the complaint against Dr Gorman was first investigated.157   
 
Further afield, in the English case of R (on the application of Morris) v Trafford 
Healthcare NHS Trust, the court noted a Department of Health guidance.  
Strengthening Accountability Involving Patients and the Public provides in its 
executive summary that ‘...the overall aim of section 11 is to make sure patients 
and the public are involved and consulted from the very beginning of any process 
to develop health services or change how they operate. This will lead to patient-
centred care and improvement in the patients' experience.’158 
 
There are numerous references to patient-centred care in tribunal proceedings, 
some observing that the medical practitioner in question either did or did not 
practise in  patient-centred manner.159 
 
The literature also abounds with references to patient-centred care.  For example, 
Healy recognises that ‘medical culture needs to ... consider collective good practice 
solutions and redesign service delivery as patient-centred’.160  Tallis states:  
The scientific discipline that underpins medical practice is a powerful critical force 
supporting the drive to a high-quality patient-centred health service and a corrective 
to the panic or rhetoric that has informed many changes in the organisation of 
healthcare.161 
 
The practice of patient-centred care involves adherence to a set of behaviours by 
medical practitioners and health care institutions that demonstrate the ‘ ... duty to 
                                                      
156 Gorman v NSW Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 251, [30] (Hoeben JA). 
157 HCCC v Gorman [2011] NSWMT 7 [73]. 
158 R (on the application of Morris) v Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2334 (Admin) 
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159 See eg, a small sample, HCCC v Dr Maendel (No 2) [2013] NSWMT 10 [13];  Professional 
Standards Committee Inquiry in Dr Joachim Fluhrer [2013] NSWMPSC 7 [24];  Dr Reid v Medical 
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323 BMJ 908;  C A Vincent and A Coulter, 'Patient Safety: What About the Patient?' (2002) 11 
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Making, Paternalism and Patient Choice' (2010) 18 Health Care Analysis 60. 
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make the care of patients their first concern ... ’.162  The Institute of Medicine in the 
United States defines ‘patient-centered care’ as:  ‘Providing care that is respectful 
of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values, and ensuring 
that patient values guide all clinical decisions’.163 
The following standards appear to be to be common principles in the concept of 
patient-centred care adopted by many organisations world-wide.  Many are 
expressed in different language but have the same intent.164  They are reflected in 
paragraphs in the MBA Code.  Some examples appear in square brackets after each 
paragraph. 
 Involving patients, families and carers in planning and undertaking all aspects of 
medical treatment [2.2.11], [2.3], [3.2.4], [3.6.3], [3.8.3], [3.9.1]. 
 Respect for patient needs, wants and values [1.4], [2.4.1], [2.1.5], [3.1], [3.2.1]. 
 A safety culture [1.4], [3.10], [4.2.1], [4.3.3], [4.4.3], [6], [8.4]. 
 Treating patients with dignity [2.4.1], [3.2.1]. 
 Communication, education and information [1.4], [2.2.5], [3.1], [3.2.5], [3.3], 
[3.8.1], [3.9.2],[3.11], [3.12.7], [3.12.10], [4.5.1]. 
 Designing processes for patients not for providers [2.4.3], [ 3.2.2]. 
 Access to and continuity of care [2.1.3], [4.3], [4.5]. 
 Emotional support [3.3.1], [3.12.6], [3.12.9], [3.12.10]. 
 Privacy [3.2.], [3.4.2], [3.4.5], [3.8.3]. 
 Rights to complain [3.10.8], [3.11], [8.10]. 
 
As can be seen from the above list, the involvement of patient, families and carers 
in all decision-making concerning treatments is crucial to the ideal of patient-
centred care.  This sense of partnership as vital is reinforced by the terms of 
Standard 2 of the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards.165 
 
In the United States the Picker Institute in collaboration with Harvard Medical 
School have defined what they call ‘Principles of Patient-Centered Care’.  They 
suggest the following: 
 Respect for patients’ values, preferences and expressed needs; 
 Coordination and integration of care; 
                                                      
162 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
163 Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm (National Academy Press, 2001) 3. 
164 For example, Vincent and Coulter list access to care, responsiveness and empathy, good 
communication, clear information provision, appropriate treatment, relief of symptoms,improvements 
in health status, safety and freedom from medical injury. (C A Vincent and A Coulter, 'Patient Safety: 
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Service Standards (September 2012) 22–25. 
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 Information, communication and education; 
 Physical comfort; 
 Emotional support and alleviation of fear and anxiety; 
 Involvement of family and friends; 
 Transition and continuity; 
 Access to care.166 
 
Clearly, whilst the ideal of patient-centred care exists as an aspiration for medical 
practitioners to strive to achieve, it is not devoid of meaning.  Patient-centred care 
is referred to in varying contexts as a touchstone for quality,167 each reference 
presuming that the term has real content.  The standards referred to above and as 
contained in the MBA Code, exemplify the matters that will lead to patient-centred 
care in practice.  The law can also obligate the concrete procedures that give 
content to the idea.168  
  
Yet, Coulter observes that some critics see attempts to promote a more patient-
centred approach as peripheral to the serious business of treatment and care, and an 
unnecessary and burdensome addition to a long list of demands made on health 
professionals.169  This is an interesting criticism.  The serious business of treatment 
and care requires a patient who must be involved in all aspects of treatment and 
care.  This requirement is documented in the MBA Code170 and the National Safety 
and Quality Health Service Standards.171  Also, this thesis argues that good patient-
centred medical practice equates with medical professionalism as documented in 
the MBA Code.  Suggesting that a patient-centred approach is unnecessary and 
burdensome is to insist that observing the tenets of medical professionalism is an 
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167 See eg, Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm (National Academy Press, 2001) 39;  
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unreasonable demand.  Abiding by the principles recorded in the MBA Code is one 
of the factors taken into account by tribunals which determine whether or not the 
conduct of a medical practitioner is professional.172  Similarly, as the commentary 
on patient-centred care above claims, the core principles of patient-centred care 
align with the elements of the Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights.173 
 
Little et al suggest two fundamental problems with the implementation of patient-
centred care in practice.174  The first is to know which of the elements is the most 
important.  Secondly, they see a problem with the feasibility of implementation of 
all the factors or whether some need to be targeted to specific patient groups.  As 
they comment:  ‘It makes little sense to try to implement each component of the 
patient centred approach unless they are consonant with patients’ perspectives’.175  
They particularly comment that feasible use of time may not be possible in a busy 
surgery.176  Once again, this criticism is interesting.  Surely the patient-centred 
factor of communication would elicit some guide to what element the patient feels 
important.  As for the feasible use of time, what is feasible is what is practicable in 
the circumstances.  However, the conclusions from their research in fact showed 
that: ‘Most patients strongly want a patient centred approach.  There are likely to 
be at least three important domains of patient centredness from the patients’ 
perspective: communication, partnership, and health promotion’.177   
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Thus, patient-centred medical practice now seems to be more and more widely 
adopted with research cataloguing the benefits both to patient care and to morale 
among health practitioners.178  Patients are entitled to expect that their interactions 
with the health system will make them better not cause injury or death.  There are 
numerous ways in which patient safety can be compromised but close attention to 
patient-centred principles minimises risks.179   
 
Adoption of a patient-centred culture entails close attention to quality as a way to 
ensure patient safety.  Healy observes that the quality movement promotes the 
concept of patient-centred care, that is designing health care around the interests of 
patients, not just those of providers.180  Research by Little et al into whether 
patients’ perceptions of patient centredness predict outcomes, showed that 
measurement of patients’ perceptions in these circumstances ‘ ... provide a marker 
of the quality of care.  If doctors don’t provide a positive, patient centred approach 
patients will be less satisfied, less enabled, and may have greater symptom burden 
and use more health service resources’.181 
 
Patient-centred care is also the result of the observance by medical practitioners of 
their duty to make their patients their first priority, the centrality of the patient as 
confirmed by the MBA Code.182  
 
4 SUMMARY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS 
The aspirational character of the MBA Code is reflected in its description as: ‘ ... 
set[ting] out the principles that characterise good medical practice and mak[ing] 
explicit the standards of ethical and professional conduct expected of doctors .... ’.  
To reiterate, Clause 1.4 states: ‘Doctors have a duty to make the care of their 
patients their first concern, ... ’.183  Similarly, as Good Medical Practice refers to 
professionalism as embodying all the qualities described in that code, the concept 
of duty as an obligation is thereby connected to the idea of quality as excellence. 
 
                                                      
178 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 
2011) 9. 
179 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 
2011) 91. 
180 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 8. 
181 Paul Little et al, 'Observational Study of Effect of Patient Centredness and Positive Approach on 
Outcomes of General Practice Consultations' (2001) 323 BMJ 908, 911. 
182 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
183 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.1]. 
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As stated above, the conceptual framework upon which this thesis rests is the 
equivalence of patient-centred principles to the ideals of medical professionalism.  
The concept of quality, in its sense of a standard of excellence, is integrated with 
professionalism by the terms of Clause 1.4 of the MBA Code quoted earlier in this 
chapter — ‘Professionalism embodies all the qualities described here ... ’.  Patient-
centred care is also one of the facets of quality listed by the United States Institute 
of Medicine as outlined above.   
 
The relationship of quality with duty appears in Clause 1.4 of the MBA Code that 
sets out ‘Professional values and qualities of doctors‘ and Clause 8.1 that 
emphasises ‘ ... the core qualities and characteristics of good doctors ... ’ and that 
includes the duty to the patient.184 
 
The duty to patient priority is a duty to patient-centred medical practice, the 
priority of the patient being the primary task of the medical practitioner.  In 
addition, adoption of a patient-centred culture entails close attention to quality as a 
way to ensure patient safety.  There are numerous ways in which patient safety can 
be compromised but close attention to patient-centred principles minimises risks.185  
Healy observes that the quality movement promotes the concept of patient-centred 
care, that is designing health care around the interests of patients, not just those of 
providers.186  Research by Little et al into whether patients’ perceptions of patient 
centredness predict outcomes, showed that measurement of patients’ perceptions in 
these circumstances ‘ ... provide a marker of the quality of care.  If doctors don’t 
provide a positive, patient centred approach patients will be less satisfied, less 
enabled, and may have greater symptom burden and use more health service 
resources’.187 
 
Having explored the concepts of duty, quality and patient-centred care in medical 
practice, it is now time to move on to showing how rhetoric and reality can part 
company.   
                                                      
184 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
185 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 
2011) 91. 
186 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 8. 
187 Paul Little et al, 'Observational Study of Effect of Patient Centredness and Positive Approach on 
Outcomes of General Practice Consultations' (2001) 323 BMJ 908, 911. 
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As Audet, Davis and Schoenbaum point out:  
Our results point to a gap between knowledge and practice, between what physicians 
say they want to achieve (patient-centered practice attitudes) and what they are able 
to do (patient-centered practice adoption).188 
 
The following chapters will identify some elements of medical practice that 
undermine the necessity to prioritise patient-centred care as the essential standard 
in medical practice for achieving safer and better quality medical care. 
 
 
                                                      
188 Anne-Marie Audet, Karen Davis and Stephen C Schoenbaum, 'Adoption of Patient-Centred Care 
Practices by Physicians' (2006) 166 Archives of Internal Medicine 754, 758. 
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CHAPTER II: PATIENT-CENTRED CARE AND THE 
LIMITS OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONALISM 
 
 
The first step on the way to understanding modern medicine ... is to unravel the 
rhetoric of medicine.1 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explores what underlies the notion of medical professionalism.  The 
principles of medical ethics and the ideals of medical professionalism provide the 
foundations for the assertion by the medical profession of its trustworthiness and 
its right to self-regulate.  From its earliest days, medicine has seen itself as a moral 
enterprise,2 a consciousness partly explained by differing religious traditions.3   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 2. 
2 See eg, Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 21;  Thomas S Huddle, 'Teaching Professionalism: Is Medical Morality a 
Competency?' (2005) 80 Academic Medicine 885, 886;  Richard L Cruess and Sylvia R Cruess, 
'Expectations and Obligations: Professionalism and Medicine's Social Contract with Society' (2008) 
51 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 579, 580;  Jeremiah A Barondess, 'Medicine and 
Professionalism' (2003) 163 Archives of Internal Medicine 145, 148;  Susan D McCammon and 
Howard Brody, 'How Virtue Ethics Informs Medical Professionalism' (2012) 24 HEC Forum 257, 
258;  Alan Cribb and Sarah Bignold, 'Towards the Reflexive Medical School: the Hidden Curriculum 
and Medical Education Research' (1999) 24 Studies in Higher Education 195, 206;  C Ronald 
MacKenzie, 'Professionalism and Medicine' (2007) 3 HSS Journal 222, 223. 
3 Jonsen describes precepts of compassion, honesty, humility, mercy, humanity and learning 
underlying the conception of medicine from Christianity (Albert R Jonsen, A Short History of 
Medical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2000) 13), Islam (Ibid 19), Judaism (Ibid 21) Buddhism and 
Confucianism (Ibid 38). 
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Medical professionalism is underpinned by a strong focus on the ethical values that 
medical practitioners proclaim and that are emphasised as necessary to build and 
sustain the trust that the public has in its doctors.4  
This chapter commences by describing what is encompassed in the concept of 
medical professionalism.  It outlines what is common to all occupations that term 
themselves professions, a body of specialised knowledge, a strong emphasis on 
ethical values and the obligation to serve the community in which it functions.  In 
exchange, the community grants the profession the right to regulate itself.   
 
The rhetoric of codes obliges medical practitioners to adhere to the principles of 
professionalism and patient-centred care and their message of integrity, 
trustworthiness, altruism and respect for patient autonomy.  But there are some 
features that are closely associated with medical professionalism, that may detract 
from the medical profession’s rhetoric enshrined in its codes.5    
 
This chapter continues by exploring how codes of practice have developed as a 
way of demonstrating, both to the public, and to members of the medical 
profession themselves, the ethical values by which the profession identifies itself.  
It shows how codes have evolved from an emphasis on inter-professional concerns, 
to acknowledge and prioritise the well-being of the patients that are the 
justification for medical practice.  
 
However, codes and guidelines issued by professional bodies cannot provide the 
answers to all ethical problems that arise.  This chapter explores what medical 
ethics encompasses, the broad principles to guide medical practitioners who are 
confronted, from time to time, by problems that cannot be resolved by strictly 
                                                      
4 For example, the Australian Medical Association (AMA) identifies the following as core values of 
the medical profession: 
 respect, 
 trust, 
 compassion, 
 altruism, 
 integrity, 
 justice, 
 accountability, 
 protection of confidentiality, 
 leadership, and 
 collegiality. 
Australian Medical Association, Position Statement on Medical Professionalism 2010 (2010) [3.2]. 
5 These features include a government-granted monopoly, arrogation of the entitlement to define 
illness, paternalism, arrogance, hierarchy and the assertion of the right to self-regulate. 
 43 
technical expertise.  The two most influential theoretical streams of medical ethics 
are, firstly, principlism, and secondly, virtue ethics.  Each of these approaches will 
be scrutinised to identify both their good points and their deficiencies. 
 
In addition, some eminent medical bodies, aware of adverse publicity surrounding 
medical scandals in recent years, have supplemented codes.  They have 
promulgated charters of professionalism in an attempt to re-kindle the former good 
reputation of the medical profession. 
 
Yet, behaviours like poor communication,6 arrogance,7 paternalism,8 disregard of 
patient dignity9 and autonomy and bullying of patients and colleagues10 are still 
prevalent.  These behaviours have often been learned in the process of being 
trained, both at an undergraduate level and during clinical experiences.11  The 
‘hidden curriculum’ is known to be as influential as the formal instruction 
provided.12  The way the ‘hidden curriculum’ influences attitudes is explored.  This 
exploration shows how medical students can be conflicted by inconsistent 
messages conveyed by both good role models and some questionable behaviours of 
persons charged with their instruction.   
                                                      
6 See eg, Angela Coulter, The Autonomous Patient (The Nuffield Trust, 2002) 53;  Vikki A Entwistle, 
'Hurtful Comments are Harmful Comments: Respectful Communication is not just an Optional Extra 
in Healthcare' (2008) 11 Health Expectations 319, 319. 
7 Se eg, Jack Coulehan, 'Teaching Professionalism: Engaging the Mind but not the Heart' (2005) 80 
Academic Medicine 892, 896;  Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 25. 
8 See eg, Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 25;  Australian Health 
Ministers Advisory Council, Responding to the Medical Indemnity Crisis: An Integrated Reform 
Package (2002) [4.19];  Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 
130. 
9 See eg, Rebecca Dresser, 'Human Dignity and the Seriously Ill Patient' in President's Council on 
Bioethics (ed), Human Dignity and Bioethics (President's Council on Bioethics, 2008) 505, 509;  
Andrew H Brainard and Heather C Brislen, 'Learning Professionalism: A View from the Trenches' 
(2007) 82 Academic Medicine 1010, 1011;  Carlo Leget, 'Analyzing Dignity: A Perspective from the 
Ethics of Care' (2013) 16 Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 945, 951. 
10 See eg, Jennifer Laura Johnston et al, 'Medical Students' Attitudes to Professionalism: An 
Opportunity for the GP Tutor?' (2011) 22 Education for Primary Care 321, 325;  Alasdair Maclean, 
'From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent Any Better Following a 
Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?' (2012) 20 Medical Law Review 108,127;  Heidi Lempp 
and Clive Seale, 'The Hidden Curriculum in Undergraduate Medical Education: Qualitative Study of 
Medical Students' Perceptions of Teaching' (2004) 329 BMJ 770, 772;  Expert Advisory Group on 
Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual Harassment, Report to RACS (8 September 2015),4. 
11 Medical students absorb ways of acting by exposure to the activities of lecturers, fellow students 
and other instructors.  They also take in subtle messages concerning acceptable conduct, conveyed by 
the priorities of medical schools. 
12 See eg, Heidi Lempp and Clive Seale, 'The Hidden Curriculum in Undergraduate Medical 
Education: Qualitative Study of Medical Students' Perceptions of Teaching' (2004) 329 BMJ 770, 
770;  T A Faunce and S N Bolsin, 'Fiduciary Disclosure of Medical Mistakes: The Duty to Promptly 
Notify Patients of Adverse Health Care Events' (2005) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 478, 478;  
Jack Coulehan, 'Teaching Professionalism: Engaging the Mind but not the Heart' (2005) 80 Academic 
Medicine 892, 894;  Alan Cribb and Sarah Bignold, 'Towards the Reflexive Medical School: the 
Hidden Curriculum and Medical Education Research' (1999) 24 Studies in Higher Education 195, 
197;  Susan P Phillips, 'Blinded by Belonging: Revealing the Hidden Curriculum' (2013) 47 Medical 
Education 124, 125;  Liz Mossop et al, 'Analysing the Hidden Curriculum: Use of a Cultural Web' 
(2013) 47 Medical Education 134, 136. 
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Thus, this chapter suggests that what may be required in efforts to encourage the 
assimilation of ‘virtuous’ behaviour and to inculcate the principles of medical 
ethics and medical professionalism in patient-centred medical practice, is to 
identify ways of reducing the influence of the ‘hidden curriculum’ and other 
entrenched attitudes that can lead to offhand attitudes to patients.  What is in issue 
is a conflict between the explicit commitments to professional values inherent in 
good medical practice like compassion, altruism and respect for patient dignity and 
autonomy and the tacit learning of detachment, self-interest and privilege.13  Sir 
Donald Irvine sees medical education as the best way of ‘ ... internalising the 
values and standards of the new professionalism’.  He recognises the negative 
impacts that accompany the ‘hidden curriculum’ and argues that ‘[w]hat we need 
now are individual medical schools to take responsibility, and to be sure, at least, 
that their teaching faculty members are all exemplars of good doctoring.’14  This 
chapter will propose that teaching of medical ethics should assume a higher 
priority in education of medical students. 
 
Finally, this chapter notes some internal conflicts in codes of ethics.  It will 
criticise provisions that permit medical professionals to decline on conscience 
grounds to perform a medical procedure, even one that is legally available in 
Australia.  It will suggest ways that could be adopted to reconcile the interests of 
those medical practitioners and their patients. 
 
B THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM 
 
As the practice of medicine is not a business and can never be one, the education of 
the heart — the moral side of the man — must keep pace with the education of the 
head.  Our fellow creatures cannot be dealt with as man deals in corn and coal;  “the 
human heart by which we live” must control our professional relations.15 
 
                                                      
13 Jack Coulehan and Peter C Williams, 'Vanquishing Virtue: The Impact of Medical Education' 
(2001) 76 Academic Medicine 598, 604. 
14 Donald H Irvine, 'Everyone Is Entitled to a Good Doctor' (2007) 186 MJA 256, 260. 
15 William Osler, ‘On the Educational Value of the Medical Society’ in Aequanimitas With Other 
Addresses to Medical Students, Nurses and Practitioners of Medicine (Blakiston, 1904) 349–350. 
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Medical professionalism should lie at the heart of all encounters between medical 
practitioners and their patients.  The need for professionalism in medical practice 
has received much attention in practice journals and academic writings.16 
 
This section commences by giving a brief account of the development of medicine 
into a profession in its own right.  It describes the features of those occupations that 
call themselves professions to distinguish themselves from what were trades or 
crafts.  It then scrutinises certain characteristics of medical professionalism that 
arguably distinguish it from other professions such as monopoly, defining illness, 
hierarchy, self-regulation, arrogance and paternalism.  Whilst these characteristics 
may also exist in some measure in other professions, they manifest themselves in 
particular ways in the medical profession reflecting the power imbalance between 
practitioner and patient.17 
 
As a general conclusion, the status of the medical profession has, in the past, 
allowed it to resist the addressing of a range of problems that detract from its claim 
to professionalism.18  The law has provided many protections for the activities of 
medical practitioners and has respected and endorsed the medical privileges and 
discretions of members of the medical profession.  The profession wants to retain 
this virtually unquestioned recognition of its clinical prerogatives by non-
members.19   
 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 See a small sample, eg Jeremiah A Barondess, 'Medicine and Professionalism' (2003) 163 Archives 
of Internal Medicine 145;  C Ronald MacKenzie, 'Professionalism and Medicine' (2007) 3 HSS 
Journal 222;  ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation and European Federation of Internal 
Medicine, Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Perspective (2002);  Richard 
L Cruess and Sylvia R Cruess, 'Expectations and Obligations: Professionalism and Medicine's Social 
Contract with Society' (2008) 51 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 579;  Jason E Glenn, 'The 
Eroding Principle of Justice in Teaching Medical Professionalism' (2012) 24 HEC Forum 293;  
Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003);  Malcolm Parker, 'Embracing the 
New Professionalism: Self-Regulation, Mandatory Reporting and their Discontents' (2011) 18 
Journal of Law and Medicine 456. 
17 See eg, Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 57;  Cameron Stewart and Andrew Lynch, 'Undue Influence, Consent and 
Medical Treatment' (2003) 96 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 598, 599;  United States 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions (US Government Printing Office, 1982) 39;  Ian 
Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Clarendon Press, 1988) 181. 
18 For example, it has been resistant to permitting supervision and scrutiny of its activities by 
‘outsiders’ such as lawyers or bureaucrats. (Roger S Magnusson, Angels of Death (Melbourne 
University Press, 2002) 103;  Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 98;  
Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 125). 
19 Roger S Magnusson, Angels of Death (Melbourne University Press, 2002) 107. 
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1 The Meaning of Professionalism 
Macquarie Dictionary’s first meaning for a profession is as ‘ ... a vocation 
requiring knowledge of some department of learning or science, especially one of 
the three vocations of theology, law and medicine, (also known as the learned 
professions)’.20  MacKenzie argues that the learned professions also see themselves 
as using this specialised knowledge in the service of others, commitments to 
various ideals and a social contract with the community in which it works.21  The 
mark of any profession is socialisation to its attitudes and philosophies and the 
devotion to the learning and skills of that profession.  In turn the community grants 
the profession autonomy in practice,22 a monopoly over the use of its particular 
knowledge and skills23 and the right to regulate itself.24 
 
Professions have acquired a dominant position in society.25  Their members are the 
repositories of specialised knowledge acquired through many years of academic 
and practical training.26  At the end of basic training, aspiring professionals are 
subject to a rigorous examination process to prove that they have the knowledge 
and skills necessary for admission to the profession.27   
 
 
                                                      
20 Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 5th ed, 2009) 1325. 
21 C Ronald MacKenzie, 'Professionalism and Medicine' (2007) 3 HSS Journal 222, 224. 
22See eg, Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 84;  Christine Jorm and 
Peter Kam, 'Does Medical Culture Limit Doctors' Adoption of Quality Improvement?  Lessons from 
Camelot' (2004) 9 Journal of Health Service Research and Policy 248, 249;  Jonathan Montgomery, 
'Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine' (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185, 201;  Frederic W Hafferty, 
and Ronald Franks, 'The Hidden Curriculum, Ethics Teaching, and the Structure of Medical 
Education' (1994) 69 Academic Medicine 861, 862. 
23 See eg, Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 42;  Eliot 
Freidson, Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 83;  Leon R Kass, '"I Will Give No 
Deadly Drug": Why Doctors Must Not Kill' in Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (eds), The Case 
against Assisted Suicide  (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) 17, 25;  Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching 
the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1534; 
24  See eg, Sylvia R Cruess, Sharon Johnston and Richard L Cruess, 'Professionalism for Medicine: 
Opportunities and Obligations' (2002) 177 MJA 208, 208;  Thomas Faunce, 'Health Legislation: 
Interpretation Coherent with Conscience and International Human Rights' in Suzanne Corcoran and 
Stephen Bottomley (eds), Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press, 2005) 299, 313;  Eliot Freidson, 
Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 95; 
25See eg,  Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 41;  Thomas Faunce, 
Who Owns Our Health? (UNSW Press, 2007) 63;  Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine (McClelland and 
Stewart, 1976) 42;  Fredric D Wolinsky, 'The Professional Dominance, Deprofessionalization, 
Proletarianization, and Corporatization Perspectives: An Overview and Synthesis' in Frederic W 
Hafferty and John B McKinlay (eds), The Changing Medical Profession (Oxford University Press, 
1993) 11–24. 
26 See eg, Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 54;  Sylvia R 
Cruess, Sharon Johnston and Richard L Cruess, 'Professionalism for Medicine: Opportunities and 
Obligations' (2002) 177 MJA 208, 209. 
27 This examination process is crucial to demonstrate that the professional can be allowed to ‘practise’ 
on members of the public, both as a way to confirm acquired expertise and to gain the experience to 
enhance that expertise. 
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2 The Evolution of Medicine as a Profession 
Healers have been present in human societies for millennia.  In the middle ages, 
persons pursuing similar occupations joined into guilds to assert their common 
interests.28  Universities began to train physicians.  Both guilds and universities 
provided a public profile for physicians that gave them the basis for their standing 
in the community.29  The Royal College of Physicians of London was established 
in 1518 by a charter from King Henry VIII that gave it the authority to determine 
who could legally practise medicine thus exemplifying the modern idea of a 
profession as a self-regulating body.30  Physicians began to term themselves a 
profession to distinguish themselves from surgeons and other health practitioners 
and also to emphasise their superiority as university trained practitioners.31   
 
The precursor for the British Medical Association, the Provincial and Medical 
Surgical Association, was founded in 1832 as a forum for physicians to exchange 
scientific information related to the practice of medicine.  It adopted the name, 
British Medical Association in 1855 and provided an impetus for the 1858 
legislation establishing the General Medical Council and the Medical Register, 
both of which are still operating today.32  The American Medical Association was 
founded in 1847.33 
 
3 Features of Medical Professionalism 
Professionalism cannot be imposed by governments or by regulatory culture.  It 
must emerge from and be sustained by doctors themselves.34 
 
Medical professionalism underlies good patient-centred medical practice.35  Whilst 
members of all professions are permitted to learn their skills as a way of earning a 
good living, the society also expects that they will use their skills for the benefit of 
                                                      
28 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Routledge, 1996) 33. 
29 Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 19. 
30 Jeffrey Lionel Berlant, Profession and Monopoly (University of California Press, 1975) 130 
31 C Ronald MacKenzie, 'Professionalism and Medicine' (2007) 3 HSS Journal 222, 222. 
32 British Medical Association, The History of the BMA, <http://bma.org.uk/about-the-bma/who-we-
are/our-history>. 
33 American Medical Association, The Founding of the AMA, <http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history/the-founding-of-ama.page?>. 
34 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) 44. 
35 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
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their society,36 thus ensuring their high prestige and authoritative voice in public 
life.37  However, some commentators have observed that the medical profession 
has features that can detract from the observance of patient-centred care principles.  
Those characteristics of the medical profession that do not reflect the duty of the 
medical practitioner to make the care of the patient the practitioner’s first concern, 
can detract from the patient-centred objective of a partnership between medical 
practitioner and patient in achieving optimum health outcomes.  They may also add 
to a public perception that the medical profession is not keeping its side of the 
social contract that grants prestige in exchange for service to society. 
 
(a) Monopoly 
By restricting, in the name of public safety, the practice of medicine to those who 
have shown their technical competence, the state has conferred a practical 
monopoly on the medical profession.  The law forbids non-registered persons from 
performing medical procedures and may prosecute those who do.  As Jonsen 
observes,  
[i]n essence it comes down to a social tolerance for a monopoly in return for a 
promise of social benefit in the form of competent and dedicated medical care.  The 
monopoly exists because physicians set the standard of competence, educate the 
candidates, and examine their skills.38 
 
However, the existence of a monopoly also gives the medical practitioner the 
power to grant or deny access to medical care on irrelevant grounds like bias or 
discrimination.  Denying patients access to medical care on moral or religious 
grounds is also forbidden under codes of practice, though medical practitioners can 
decline to personally provide that care.39  As Charo contends, the fact that abortion, 
birth control and in vitro fertilisation are, by the terms of the monopoly given to the 
medical profession, restricted to medical practitioners, makes the medical 
profession a form of public utility, obliging its members to provide those services 
to all who want them.40 
 
                                                      
36 See eg, Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1534;  Sylvia R Cruess, 
Sharon Johnston and Richard L Cruess, 'Professionalism for Medicine: Opportunities and 
Obligations' (2002) 177 MJA 208, 208;  see also Australian Medical Association, Position Statement 
on Medical Professionalism 2010 (2010) [2.4]. 
37 Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 53. 
38 Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1534. 
39 See eg, Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia (at March 2014) [2.4.7];  General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 
2013) [59]. 
40 R Alta Charo, 'The Celestial Fire of Conscience - Refusing to Deliver Medical Care' (2005) 352 
NEJM 2471, 2473. 
 49 
The medical profession’s connection with increasingly predictable and positive 
outcomes of treatment for illness or disease based on scientific observation and 
experience has meant that the public has been prepared to put its trust in medical 
practitioners.41  It ought therefore be permitted to regulate which persons should be 
permitted to practise medicine.  It also argues that the safety of members of the 
public is dependent on excluding other persons who purport to practise some form 
of healing.42  As Frenk and Durán-Arenas comment, by confirming a monopoly for 
the medical profession, the state creates the conditions for pricing some segments 
of the population out of the market.43   
 
The profession’s technical knowledge is publicly recognised so this practical 
monopoly has been officially approved.44  The medical practitioner alone can 
provide to a patient a certificate of illness45 that gives the patient the right to be 
absent from work, eligible for compensation or requiring specialist attention.  Only 
a medical practitioner can prescribe restricted drugs and authorise tests.46 
 
 
(b) Defining Illness 
However, in addition to these features of the medical monopoly, Freidson’s 
research suggests that medicine has arrogated to itself the right to determine what 
is illness or not and the right to treat illness.47  Kennedy agrees by commenting that 
the first decision that he is ill is made by the patient but he needs confirmation 
before the benefits of being ill can be accessed.  The monopoly power to confirm 
or deny illness is in the hands of the doctor.48  Kennedy further comments that the 
monopoly of licensure gives the medical practitioner the sole right to declare, and 
if necessary, certify that an individual is or is not ill: ‘If illness is a judgment, the 
practice of medicine can be understood in terms of power.  He who makes the 
                                                      
41 Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 21. 
42 Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance (Aldine Publishing, 1970) 122.  For example, from 1966 to 
1980 the American Medical Association tried to prevent chiropractors from practising as a profession. 
(Susan Getzendanner, 'Permanent Injunction Order against AMA' (1988) 259 JAMA 81, 82.) 
43 Julio Frenk and Luis Durán-Arenas, 'The Medical Profession and the State' in Frederic W Hafferty 
and John B McKinlay (eds), The Changing Medical Profession (Oxford University Press, 1993) 25, 
32. 
44 Sylvia R Cruess, Sharon Johnston and Richard L Cruess, 'Professionalism for Medicine: 
Opportunities and Obligations' (2002) 177 MJA 208, 208. 
45 Australian Medical Association, Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Certificates Certifying 
Illness 2011 
<https://ama.com.au/sites/default/files/documents/Guidelines_for_Medical_Practitioners_on_Certific
ates_Certifying_Illness_2011_0.pdf> 
46 Thomas Faunce, Who Owns Our Health? (UNSW Press, 2007) 42. 
47 Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 5. 
48 Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 9. 
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judgement wields the power’49 thus reinforcing the disparity between medical 
practitioner and patient. 
 
Confirmation of the status of being ill can mean that the sufferer is looked after by 
others and is relieved of responsibility for the duration of the illness.  As Illich 
observes: 
The physician has increasingly abandoned his role as moralist and assumed that of 
enlightened scientific entrepreneur.  To exonerate the sick from accountability for 
their illness has become a predominant task, and new scientific categories of disease 
have been shaped for the purpose.50   
 
The process of defining illness requires the medical practitioner to locate the situs 
of the illness, try to explain what caused it and to suggest what is required to free 
the patient of the illness as diagnosed.51  If the illness is severe, it may require the 
patient to be dependent on others for all manner of assistance from feeding to 
mobility, from pain relief to personal functions.52 
 
The existence of the medical profession’s legal and practical monopoly — as 
Kennedy comments ‘power’53 — over illness and its incidents also leads to an 
expectation by practitioners that they should be accorded respect by patients and 
the community.54  
 
(c) Hierarchy 
In addition to the high power and status of the medical profession is the internal 
hierarchy apparent in team settings, particularly in hospitals.55  Senior clinicians 
expect to be obeyed by more junior medical practitioners, by students and by other 
health professionals like nurses.56  To a certain extent, hierarchy is necessary in the 
education of students who expect to learn from more experienced practitioners.57  
However, the pervasiveness of hierarchy in the medical profession can lead to 
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55 Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 (July 2001) 269. 
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unprofessional conduct,58 to the ostracism of whistle blowers,59 to forgiving 
mistakes of their fellows,60 to the diffusion of responsibility for adverse events61 
and to the rejection of the expertise of the lower ranking.62  It can also lead to 
bullying of ‘inferiors’63 and to their reluctance to complain about it.64 
 
(d) Self-Regulation 
Despite unprofessional behaviour as outlined above, the medical profession has 
always claimed the right to regulate itself.  One of the distinguishing features of 
any profession is the right to discipline its members as they see fit.  Professions 
argue that only they have the technical skills and the knowledge of ethical 
principles relevant to the profession concerned.  Ayres and Braithwaite comment 
that to some extent there is a symbiosis between state regulation and self-
regulation.65  Chapter III will show that much regulation is based on the premise 
that the internal features of an industry are best understood by those within it.  Yet, 
self-regulation can insulate professions such as the medical profession from 
searching external scrutiny.66  Chapter III also provides further details about the 
limitations of self-regulation for medical practitioners. 
 
Because of the widespread preference for individual private practice by medical 
practitioners, the opportunities to scrutinise the work of individual medical 
practitioners are limited.  Unlike the profession of law where the bulk of work 
                                                      
58 Andrew H Brainard and Heather C Brislen, 'Learning Professionalism: A View from the Trenches' 
(2007) 82 Academic Medicine 1010, 1010. 
59 Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for 
Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44, 45. 
60 Christine Jorm and Peter Kam, 'Does Medical Culture Limit Doctors' Adoption of Quality 
Improvement?  Lessons from Camelot' (2004) 9 Journal of Health Service Research and Policy 248, 
249. 
61 Rick Iedema et al, 'Patients' and Family Members' Experiences of Open Disclosure Following 
Adverse Events' (2008) 20 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 421, 424. 
62 Clare Kitchen, 'You're Taking Out the Wrong Kidney, Surgeon was Told' Daily Mail (Online) (27 
July 2014) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-123005/You’re-taking-wrong-kidney-surgeon-
told.html>. 
63 See eg, Julia Medew, 'Medical Students under Pressure Amid Reports of Bullying in Australian 
Hospitals', The Sydney Morning Herald (Online) (24 May 2015) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/medical-students-under-pressure-amid-reports-of-bullying-in-
australian-hospitals-20150524-gh8jq5.html>;  Kimberley Ivory and Karen Scott, 'Let's Stop the 
Bullying of Trainee Doctors — for Patients' Sake' X The Conversation (Online) (26 May 2015) 
https://theconversation.com/lets;  Quentin McDermott, Karen Michelmore and Hagar Cohen, 'Monash 
Medical Centre Senior Surgeon Helen Maroulis under Investigation over Claims of Bullying, 
Intimidating Colleagues'  Four Corners (25 May 2015)  <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015>;  
‘“Bullying and Harassment” at Canberra Hospital Sees Urology Training Accreditation Withdrawn', 
ABC News (Online) (24 June 2015) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-24/canberra-hospital-
loses-urology-training-accreditation/6569432>. 
64 Expert Advisory Group on Discrimination, Bullying and Sexual Harassment, Report to RACS (8 
September 2015) 10. 
65 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 3. 
66 Wendy Levinson et al, Understanding Medical Professionalism (McGraw Hill, 2014) 254. 
 52 
involves interactions with other practitioners, the work of a medical practitioner is, 
more often than not, concealed from external scrutiny.67  The medical practitioner 
is usually dealing one-on-one with the patient.  Unless some dramatic adverse 
event occurs, other medical practitioners are not normally in a position to evaluate 
the work of the medical practitioner.68  
 
This lack of regular and open scrutiny can lead to the concealment of deficient 
practices.  Assessment of performance is limited by the lack of technical 
knowledge of those outside the profession.  The profession has been trusted to keep 
its own house in order and to discipline those that stray outside the bounds of 
competence or ethics.69  Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan point out that the medical 
profession has a long tradition of self-regulation but that the ‘ ... complacent 
approach of “leaving it to the doctors” is now under challenge’.70   
 
The option to self-regulate may be abused if there is reluctance to investigate too 
deeply the activities of another member of the profession.  The record of the 
medical profession shows numerous failures to deal with either incompetence or 
with medical practitioners whose ability to practice is impaired by drugs, illness or 
temperament.71   
 
Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan have also observed that regulation in the health 
sector has traditionally been ‘soft’, essentially non-interventionist.72  Similarly, 
Healy has commented that medical boards are reluctant regulators except in 
egregious cases.73  Reluctance by regulators to deal with even demonstrated cases 
of unprofessional behaviour was exemplified by English cases such as that of Dr 
Harold Shipman.  Dr Harold Shipman was among many other practitioners74 who 
were dealt with leniently by the GMC.  Shipman was addicted to pethidine and was 
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convicted of forgery, fraud and possession of pethidine.  The GMC seemed to be 
less interested in the safety of patients than in the rehabilitation of medical 
practitioners.75  Shipman was permitted to continue in practice receiving only a 
warning letter.76  The GMC process relied on psychiatric reports from medical 
practitioners who were nominated by and known to the medical practitioner who 
had been convicted of drug offences.  There was no independent inquiry as to 
whether patients were being put at risk.77   
 
Failures in self-regulation have led to greater external scrutiny by regulators, even 
if they have been reluctant on occasion.  But the fact that there are still so many 
facing disciplinary proceedings suggests that many medical practitioners are not 
observing professional norms of conduct.  Disciplinary cases are analysed in more 
depth in Chapter III.   
 
(e) Arrogance 
Several commentators have suggested that arrogance is a hallmark of the medical 
profession.  Turner comments that the medical profession sees itself as somehow 
superior to other learned professions.78  Magnusson sees the drive to preserve 
‘clinical discretion’ and the designation of decisions as doctors’ ‘turf’ as a mark of 
medical arrogance.79  Kass contends that this arrogance derives from physicians’ 
own attitudes and prejudices that colour their activities with respect to their 
patients.80  He argues that physicians need to be protected against their own 
arrogance and weakness, precisely because they have the power of life and death 
over their patients.81  Pellegrino maintains that arrogance born of self-importance 
and a sense of infallibility can demean patients and add to the indignity of the 
illness itself.82 
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Any arrogance towards patients and other health care professionals is contrary to 
the ethical requirement to treat both patients83 and colleagues with respect.84  Any 
arrogant behaviour can also undermine the profession’s insistence that it is caring 
and trustworthy and derogate from good patient-centred medical practice.  
 
(f) Paternalism 
An adjunct to arrogance exhibited by some medical professionals is the expectation 
that patients should observe their directions without question.  Medical paternalism 
is a function of the power differential between the medical practitioner and the 
patient, where the vulnerable patient needs the medical expertise.85  Strong forms 
of paternalism have been based on the assumption that the medical practitioner 
knows what is best for the patient and can make decisions without informing the 
patient of the facts, alternatives or risks.86  As Gawande relates, doctors used to 
make the decisions and patients did what they were told.   
Doctors did not consult patients about their desires and priorities and routinely 
withheld information — sometimes crucial information, such as what drugs they 
were on, what treatments they were being given, and what their diagnosis was.  
Patients were even forbidden to look at their own medical records ...87 
 
The requirement that the patient consent to medical treatment is now well-
established, a recognition of patient autonomy in the face of medical power.  
However, the requirement for consent to medical treatment is not necessarily a 
bulwark against medical paternalism.  Coulehan reports the surgeon who has 
boasted that consent is a farce, as he can get a patient to agree to anything he wants 
— ‘It’s not what you say, it’s how you say it’.88  Furthermore, the case of Medical 
Board of Australia v Adams saw the practitioner suspended for six months and 
imposition of conditions.89  In a 12 month period he had forged consent forms for 
37 patients90 on the grounds that consent forms were complex, required completion 
on admission91 and created too much work for himself and his staff.92  These cases 
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illustrate that patient autonomy can be illusory as the medical practitioner may 
have the final say.93   
 
Courts have recognised a ‘therapeutic privilege’ that may entrench medical 
paternalism.  Whilst the medical practitioner has a duty to give the patient 
complete information so that the patient can determine whether or not to go ahead 
with a procedure,94 ‘therapeutic privilege’ permits the medical practitioner to 
withhold information about risk if it can be shown that a reasonable medical 
assessment of the patient would suggest to the medical practitioner that there 
would be a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient.95  
 
The judgement of the medical practitioner as to what to tell the patient also takes 
into account the medical practitioner’s assessment of the character and emotional 
condition of the patient.  Thus it is proper that a medical practitioner acting in the 
best interests of the patient would be concerned that a warning about the outcome 
of a surgical procedure may frighten the patient into refusing an operation that, in 
the view of the medical practitioner, is best treatment for the patient in the 
circumstances.  As Lord Scarman said in Sidaway: 
There is no evidence to justify an inference that this careful and compassionate man 
(the history of the case, which I have related, shows that he merited both adjectives) 
would have failed to consider what was in the best interests of his patient. He could 
well have concluded that a warning might have deterred her from agreeing to an 
operation which he believed to be the best treatment for her.96 
 
Notwithstanding, the United Kingdom Supreme Court has held that the therapeutic 
exception should not be abused. 
It is a limited exception to the general principle that the patient should make the 
decision whether to undergo a proposed course of treatment: it is not intended to 
subvert that principle by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an 
informed choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers to 
be contrary to her best interests.97  
 
However, medical paternalism, while still occurring on occasion, is no longer the 
problem it used to be.  In his judgement in Chester v Afshar, Lord Steyn 
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commented:  ‘In modern law medical paternalism no longer rules and a patient has 
a prima facie right to be informed ... ’.98 
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Montgomery, confirmed 
that recent ‘ ... social and legal developments point away from a model of the 
relationship between the doctor and the patient based upon medical paternalism.’99 
 
Likewise in Australia, in Breen v Williams, Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed that 
‘ ... recent decisions of Australian courts have rejected the attempt to treat the 
doctor-patient relationship as basically paternalistic ... ’.100 
 
The principle is clear as is borne out by recent cases cited above — that 
paternalism is no longer acceptable within the doctor-patient relationship and the 
courts will, if necessary, penalise a failure to respect patient autonomy.101  
Professionalism dictates that failure to acknowledge and respect patient autonomy 
is both legally and ethically unacceptable.102 
 
(g) Conclusion 
The status of the medical profession has allowed it to resist the addressing of a 
range of problems such as those outlined above that can detract from its claim to 
professionalism.  The vulnerability of the patient created by the power differential 
in the doctor-patient relationship necessitates personal reference by the medical 
practitioner to ethical principle.103  
 
C CODES OF ETHICS AND PRACTICE – ACKNOWLEDGING THE 
PATIENT 
 
The critical sense and sceptical attitudes of the Hippocratic school laid the 
foundation of modern medicine on broad lines and we owe to it: first, the 
emancipation of medicine from the shackles of priestcraft and of caste;  secondly, 
the conception of medicine as an art based on accurate observation, and, of man and 
nature;  thirdly, the high moral ideals expressed in that most memorable of human 
                                                      
98 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, 143 (Lord Steyne). 
99 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [81]. 
100 Breen v Williams (1995-1996) 186 CLR 71, 114 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
101 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [99] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
102 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [2.1.5];  Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [99] (Dame 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
103 See eg, Jeffrey Lionel Berlant, Profession and Monopoly (University of California Press, 1975) 37;    
Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford University 
Press, 1993) 36. 
 57 
documents, the Hippocratic oath;  and fourthly, the conception and realization of 
medicine as a profession of a cultivated gentleman.104 
 
Medical codes of ethics or codes of practice set out a series of behaviours to which 
medical practitioners must adhere.  They declare what the medical bodies that 
prepare them consider to be professional behaviours based on lists of principles 
and virtues.  Some of these principles and virtues recur in most codes.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council’s Good Medical Practice 
(the GMC Code) commences by saying that ‘[p]atients must be able to trust doctors 
with their lives and health’.105  In Australia, the MBA Code declares that all the 
qualities it describes, including self-awareness and self-reflection, are embodied in 
professionalism.106  As Pellegrino and Thomasma argue, medicine is a moral 
community because of the nature of illness, the nonproprietary nature of medical 
knowledge and the nature and circumstances of the professional oath.107  Codes are 
intended to reassure patients.  The aspirations expressed in codes form part of the 
rhetoric of patient-centred medical practice.  Yet, as Brazier and Cave have 
observed, in the past, codes of practice have often seemed to be more concerned 
with the ethical obligations of medical practitioners to each other and reference to 
patient concerns has been limited.108  Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress 
observed that few codes have been subjected to scrutiny by patients.109 
 
Codes of ethics have now evolved from standards governing etiquette between 
medical practitioners into a body of principles directed to both the public and the 
profession that underpin society’s trust in and expectations of its doctors.  Wynia 
asserts that members of professions should adhere to the ideals articulated in codes 
of ethics or practice because they are designed to create trust between the 
professional and members of the society.110  Cruess and Cruess note that these 
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codes detail the behaviour expected of professionals as the demonstration to the 
community of the ideals that underpin their social contract with the community.111  
 
However, these declarations of principles were not always so extensive.  The 
Hippocratic Oath sets out some currently recognisable principles but the 
background to modern codes, both in England and Australia, shows a strict focus 
on inter-personal relations between medical professionals.  It is only in recent years 
that codes have evolved to place the care of the patient at the core of the doctor’s 
attention. 
 
This section commences by an examination of the Hippocratic Oath.  It is still 
called upon in the 21st Century as the model for ethical medical practice.  Yet its 
shortcomings are now apparent and will be outlined below.  A series of modern 
codes of conduct grew out of the writings of a number of early physicians who 
were concerned to reduce the degree of infighting between members of the 
profession.  The background to modern codes will be considered, noting the 
comparatively recent emergence of the patient as the prime object of the medical 
practitioner’s concern. 
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1 The Hippocratic Oath 
The Hippocratic Oath 112 has been lauded by Dowbiggin as setting out worthy 
ideals of a person who professes competence, is utterly trustworthy and who puts 
the needs of those who consult him before his own needs.113  However, some 
writers have observed that this oath is not based upon any altruistic concern for the 
patient.  It reflects more the hypocritical altruism that disseminates the message 
that if a patient gives the physician his business, he will not take unfair advantage 
of the privilege of being invited into the patient’s house.  By subscribing to the 
Hippocratic Oath, the group of physicians concerned was declaring to the public 
that there were particular activities that might be considered unwelcome by a 
stranger that they would not do, thus distinguishing themselves from others who 
were not prepared to subscribe to those limitations. 
 
As Jonsen comments, examination of text and the context of Hippocratic medicine 
suggests that altruism was missing in the Hippocratic practitioner who was a 
skilled craftsman and whose objective was a good living.114  Pellegrino and 
Thomasma agree by noting that, whilst the Hippocratic Oath appears to recognise 
that its adherents are members of a moral community who have certain 
                                                      
112 I swear by Apollo the physician, and Asclepius, and Hygieia and Panacea and all the gods and 
goddesses as my witnesses, that, according to my ability and judgement, I will keep this Oath and this 
contract: 
To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to be a partner in life with him, 
and to fulfill his needs when required; to look upon his offspring as equals to my own siblings, and to 
teach them this art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or contract; and that by the set rules, 
lectures, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the art to my own sons, 
and those of my teachers, and to students bound by this contract and having sworn this Oath to the 
law of medicine, but to no others. 
I will use those dietary regimens which will benefit my patients according to my greatest ability and 
judgement, and I will do no harm or injustice to them. 
I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan; and similarly I will 
not give a woman a pessary to cause an abortion. 
In purity and according to divine law will I carry out my life and my art. 
I will not use the knife, even upon those suffering from stones, but I will leave this to those who are 
trained in this craft. 
Into whatever homes I go, I will enter them for the benefit of the sick, avoiding any voluntary act of 
impropriety or corruption, including the seduction of women or men, whether they are free men or 
slaves. 
Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my professional 
practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as considering all such 
things to be private. 
So long as I maintain this Oath faithfully and without corruption, may it be granted to me to partake 
of life fully and the practice of my art, gaining the respect of all men for all time. However, should I 
transgress this Oath and violate it, may the opposite be my fate. 
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responsibilities, the oath itself is morally defective in having the purpose of 
protecting the guild.115   
 
The Hippocratic Oath asserts that those who strictly observe its principles will earn 
the respect of all men.  Some of those principles are reflected in codes of practice 
to this day.116  This oath is often quoted by contemporary medical practitioners 
arguing against medically assisted suicide or abortion, both of which are forbidden 
by the terms of the Hippocratic Oath.  Yet, it requires its adherents to forswear 
surgery, a requirement no longer heeded by medical practitioners.  Again, it is 
unlikely that the provision that the physician’s teacher be held in the same esteem 
as the physician’s parents and supported for his life would be observed today.117    
 
2 Historical Codes of Medical Ethics as Codes of Etiquette 
It was only in the eighteenth century that the idea of medicine as a profession was 
conceived by John Gregory, a Scot and Thomas Percival, an Englishman.118  The 
medical profession had previously been considered a ‘merchant guild’.119  As 
McCullough remarks, medical practitioners were primarily concerned with 
etiquette in response to the ‘intensely competitive entrepreneurial world’ of 
medicine pertaining at the time.120  
 
Gregory’s Observations on the Duties and Offices of a Physician121 emphasised 
both scientific and clinical competence, cautioned against physician self-interest 
and developed the idea of medicine as a public trust.  According to Gregory, 
gentlemen from the best families applied to study medicine.122  Physicians were 
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expected to act like gentlemen123 and, as such, their behaviour would lead to ethical 
solutions for any dilemmas that could arise in medical practice.124   
 
In 1792, Thomas Percival put together a code of ethics in a treatise that he called 
Medical Jurisprudence.  He noted that the work was undertaken as a request from 
physicians and surgeons in the Manchester Infirmary.125  Jonsen comments that the 
request was made in response to a dispute between the governors of the infirmary 
and its staff.126 
 
The first clause epitomises the dichotomy between the self-interest in professional 
reputation and patient concerns when it states: 
§1. Hospital.  Physicians and Surgeons should minister to the sick with due 
impressions of the importance of their office;  reflecting that the ease, the health, 
and the lives of those committed to their charge depend on their skill, attention, and 
fidelity.  They should study, also, in their deportment, so as to unite tenderness with 
steadiness, and condescension with authority, as to inspire the minds of their 
patients with gratitude, respect, and confidence. 
 
Reflecting the etiquette to be observed in medical practice at that time, subsequent 
clauses are concerned with the relationships between medical practitioners, and the 
strict priorities governing which medical practitioner is to attend patients in 
hospitals.  Patients in hospitals cannot be allowed a choice of physician or surgeon 
because it upsets the ‘ ... regular and established succession of medical 
attendance.’127  It is not until Chapter II of Medical Jurisprudence that there is a 
single reference to the patient’s good as the prime focus of the medical 
practitioner.128 
 
 
 
 
3 The Development of Current Codes of Practice 
Historical preoccupations with medical etiquette can still be found in quite modern 
medical codes of ethics.  The dichotomy between professional interests and patient 
concerns is on stark display in the development of the current codes of ethics in 
England, the United States and Australia.  They address professional reputation and 
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behaviour as well as acknowledging that awareness of patient concerns underlies 
good medical practice. 
 
(a) England 
As stated above, the precursor for the British Medical Association, the Provincial 
and Medical Surgical Association, was founded in 1832.  Formulation of the 
medical practitioner’s code of practice and ethical conduct is now the responsibility 
of the General Medical Council (the GMC).  The first edition of the current code, 
Good Medical Practice, was not prepared until 1995129 the expectation being that 
‘gentlemen’ did not need to be told how to practise medicine.130  Before 1995, the 
GMC provided all medical practitioners, at the time of their qualification, with a 
copy of the ‘Blue Book’.131  The ‘Blue Book’ described disciplinary processes of 
the GMC and set out those behaviours that would lead to the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings against them for serious professional misconduct.  These 
behaviours included the disallowance of advertising, forbade deprecation of other 
medical practitioners and prohibited sexual relationships with patients or their 
wives, personal abuse of alcohol or drugs and neglect of patients.132  However, the 
‘Blue Book’ did not outline the attributes of a good doctor and there was no 
agreement between the GMC or the deans of medical schools at that time as to 
what those qualities were.  In other words, as Sir Donald Irvine relates: ‘ ... how 
could the profession know what was expected of it?’133 
 
The GMC Code labels its substantive provisions as ‘Professionalism in Action’ and 
commences with the duty of doctors to make the care of their patient their first 
concern.134  The GMC also promulgates guidelines for ethical conduct by medical 
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practitioners,135 sets standards for their registration and is in charge of disciplinary 
processes.136  
 
(b) United States of America 
The American Medical Association was founded in 1847 when it approved a 
founding code of ethics and laid the foundations for standards for the training of 
medical practitioners.137  The Percival Code138 became the basis for the first code of 
medical ethics of the American Medical Association when adopted at a National 
Medical Convention in Philadelphia in May 1847.  
 
Embroidering §1 of Percival’s Medical Ethics, Chapter 1 Art.I §1. provided as 
follows: 
A physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his mind 
ought to be imbued with the greatness of his mission, and the responsibility he 
habitually incurs in its discharge.  Those obligations are the more deep and 
enduring, because there is no tribunal other than his own conscience, to adjudge 
penalties for carelessness or neglect.  Physicians should, therefore, minister to the 
sick with due impressions of the importance of their office;  reflecting that the ease, 
the health, and the lives of those committed to their charge, depend on their skill, 
attention and fidelity.  They should study, also, in their deportment, so to unite 
tenderness with firmness, and condescension with authority, as to inspire the minds 
of their patients with gratitude, respect and confidence. 
 
The emphasis on the rights of the medical practitioner continues in Chapter 1 
Art.II. – Obligations of Patients to their Physicians.  The first clause, §1 provides: 
The members of the medical profession, upon whom are enjoined the performance 
of so many important and arduous duties towards the community, and who are 
required to make so many sacrifices of comfort, ease, and health, for the welfare of 
those who avail themselves of their services, certainly have a right to expect and 
require, that their patients should entertain a just sense of the duties which they owe 
to their medical attendants.  
 
The duties of patients as outlined in Article II include never wearying the physician 
with tedious details that do not relate to the illness (§5), being promptly and 
implicitly obedient to prescriptions of the physician (§6) and always sending for 
the physician in the morning (§9).  Whilst every case should be treated by the 
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physician with ‘ ... attention, steadiness and humanity’, ‘[r]easonable indulgence 
should be granted to the mental imbecility and caprices of the sick.’139  
Amendments were made in 1903, 1957 and 1980 that slowly began to 
acknowledge patients’ concerns over professional concerns as the basis of good 
medical practice.  By 2001, the focus had firmly fallen on the patient.  Article VIII 
of the 2001 Principles of Medical Ethics — that is Item 1 in the American Medical 
Association’s Code of Medical Ethics — advises physicians that: ‘A physician 
shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount’ 
and, in addition, Article II confirms that the physician must ‘ ... uphold the 
standards of professionalism ... ’.140 
 
(c) Australia 
The first identifiable Australian version of a code of ethics was published in 1859 
by a group calling itself the ‘Australian Medical Association’.  It was at that time a 
New South Wales organisation formed in 1844 to ‘ ... maintain and secure the 
dignity and the privileges of the medical and surgical profession in this colony ... ’ 
and to seek legislation to ‘ ... put down quackery ... ’ by preventing unqualified 
people from practising medicine.141  That organisation, like many other early 
attempts at establishing medical associations in the various colonies of Australia, 
fell by the wayside through internal squabbling.142 
 
This particular code was, like the 1847 code of the American Medical Association, 
based upon the Percival code of 1792.  Chapter I Article I §1 was in almost 
identical terms to the first article in the 1847 American Medical Association Code 
as quoted above.  Until 1962 when the modern AMA was formed, following the 
early difficulties in establishing medical associations in the Australian colonies, 
medical practitioners had been grouped into state branches of the British Medical 
Association.   
 
The first code of ethics of the AMA appeared in 1965.  It called upon the prayer of 
Maimonides — Moses ben Maimon who lived from 1135–1204, principles of the 
Hippocratic Oath, the Declaration of Geneva and the 1949 World Medical 
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Association (WMA) International Code of Medical Ethics.143  This 1965 code 
acknowledged the basis of the doctor-patient relationship to be one of ‘ ... absolute 
confidence and mutual respect.’  The personal responsibility of the doctor was to 
observe ethical standards at all times and give advice and take action always in the 
patient’s best interests.144  Other than the obligation of secrecy, the remainder of the 
code was concerned with dealings between medical practitioners and their 
obligations to each other.  The 1989 code was in substantially similar terms to the 
1965 code.  It was not until 1992 that more focus was put on the patient though 
even this code was still largely concerned with inter-personal relations between 
medical practitioners. 
 
By 2004, another code of ethics had been drafted.  This code was revised in 2006 
and was the version in force at the time of the legislation that brought all health 
practitioners in Australia under a national registration and regulatory scheme.145  
Whilst being in similar form to the 1992 code, it expanded the focus upon patient 
care, commencing with the obligation to ‘[c]onsider first the well-being of your 
patient,’146 and to ‘[t]reat your patient with compassion and respect.’147 
 
Upon enactment of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law and its 
commencement in 2010, the AMA Code of 2004 was overtaken by the MBA 
Code.148  This code is authorised by the National Law149 and is an integral part of 
the armoury of standards that underpin the regulation of medical practitioners in 
Australia.  The obligations to observe patient confidentiality, to refrain from 
improper conduct including sexual relationships with patients or any member of 
the patient’s household and to act in the best interests of the patient — all specified 
in the Hippocratic Oath — are reflected in the MBA Code.  The MBA Code  
[d]escribes what is expected of all doctors registered to practise medicine in 
Australia. It sets out the principles that characterise good medical practice and 
makes explicit the standards of ethical and professional conduct expected of doctors 
by their professional peers and the community.150   
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It firmly places the patient in the forefront of medical practice: ‘Doctors have a 
duty to make the care of patients their first concern and to practise medicine safely 
and effectively. They must be ethical and trustworthy’.151  
 
However, despite the duties specified in codes, Chapter III argues that there is 
evidence that adherence to those obligations has not always been honoured.  
Therefore, this thesis contends that negative outcomes as a consequence of these 
lapses may be mitigated by inculcating an ethical sense in medical practitioners 
and it is to an analysis of theories of medical ethics to which this chapter now 
turns. 
 
D MEDICAL ETHICS - THE ASPIRATION FOR COMPASSIONATE 
AND PATIENT-FOCUSED MEDICAL PRACTICE WHERE CODES 
HAVE NO ANSWERS 
 
As noted above, the mark of a profession is a body of specialised knowledge used 
in the service of society, deference to ethical ideals and a social contract with its 
community.  The vulnerability of the patient when seeking care of the medical 
practitioner, leads to the necessity for the medical profession to exhibit the ethics 
upon which society grants it special status. 
 
In Australia, the MBA Code ‘ ... sets out the principles that characterise good 
medical practice and makes explicit the standards of ethical and professional 
conduct expected of doctors ... ’152 whilst the AMA Code of Ethics ‘ ... articulates 
and promotes a body of ethical principles to guide doctors’ conduct in their 
relationships with patients, colleagues and Society.’153   
 
However, recognition of the need for medical practitioners to be guided by ethical 
principle is a relatively recent occurrence.  Evidence before Dame Janet Smith in 
the Shipman Inquiry observed:  ‘Medical ethics were not taught, as they ought to 
be, as part of the undergraduate course;  nor were they usually taught during the 
post registration year.’154  Goldie remarks that despite a 2500 year history, it is only 
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in the last 30 years that medical ethics has been included in the formal medical 
curriculum.155  Similarly, Coulehan comments: 
[p]rofessional ethics, based on virtue and duty, ... confined itself to the special 
interests and obligations of physicians.  In fact, [professional ethics] ... acquired a 
bad reputation as being more a set of rules to protect the interests of physicians than 
a code of moral conduct to protect patients.156 
 
Jonsen notes that medical ethics had previously been learned by young doctors 
following the example of senior practitioners.157  Likewise, Coulehan observed that 
in the past, teaching about ‘good’ doctors focused on ethics teaching together with 
assuming that  
[p]hysicians-in-training would acquire professional values by osmosis from mentors 
and role models as they progressed through their training, just as generations of 
physicians had presumably done in the past.158 
 
However, professional and regulatory bodies now recognise the centrality that 
medical ethics plays in the doctor-patient relationship and good medical practice 
and are concerned to find ways to inculcate the values of medical ethics into both 
undergraduate and post-graduate medical training.  The importance of medical 
ethics training for trainees lies in developing medical practitioners whose ethical 
approach to their patients contributes to a public perception that medical 
practitioners deserve the prestige and reputation that had been dented by past and 
continuing reports of deficient behaviour.159  As Stern and Papadakis observe: 
‘What is at stake is nothing less than the privilege of autonomy in our interactions 
with patients, self-regulation, public esteem, and a rewarding and well-
compensated career’.160 
 
1 Approaches to Medical Ethics 
As not every contingency can be documented in codes and guidelines, medical 
professionals need some broad principles to guide them in their ethical decision-
making.  As Huddle has argued 
Inculcating medical ethics is often held to play an important part in the teaching of 
professionalism.  As with the rest of the clinical curriculum, ethics is generally 
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taught as offering students a skill ... a set of conceptual tools with which to clarify 
and respond to moral difficulties that arise in the practice of medicine.161 
 
There are two highly regarded and important approaches to medical ethics.  The 
first, principlism, is based on a set of principles of bioethics, whose function is to ‘ 
... provide ... a framework for identifying and reflecting on moral problems’162 that 
arise in medical practice.  The second major theory, virtue ethics, argues that 
simple adherence to rules is not sufficient to internalise ethical behaviour.  Rather, 
an emphasis on the habitual exercise of the virtues expected of medical 
practitioners goes to the heart of being a good physician163 who will act 
appropriately for the good of the patient.164 
 
Coulehan declares that: ‘Values, beliefs, and community are ... essential 
components of medical professionalism.165  Similarly, Huddle observes: ‘ ... 
“professionalism” has come to designate the ethical obligations towards patients 
and society that are entailed in the physician’s role ... ’.166  He continues: 
[i]n asking for professionalism, that is, for just, altruistic, conscientious, and 
compassionate physicians ... , medical educators are asking for morality, which is at 
bottom asking for more than just expertise.  The bread and butter of morality in 
medicine is not the “hard cases”, where the right way forward is difficult to see;  it is 
in acting rightly when the right path is clear before us but other pressing needs and 
desires pull us away from that path in the midst of day-to-day medical routine ... 167 
 
(a) Principlism 
This approach has been influential in recent years.  It incorporates theories from 
the writings of several prominent 20th century philosophers168 together with ideals 
extracted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Hippocratic Oath 
and the Declaration of Geneva.   
 
                                                      
161 Thomas S Huddle, 'Teaching Professionalism: Is Medical Morality a Competency?' (2005) 80 
Academic Medicine 885, 885–886. 
162 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2001) 15. 
163 Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 31. 
164 Ibid 23. 
165 Jack Coulehan, 'Teaching Professionalism: Engaging the Mind but not the Heart' (2005) 80 
Academic Medicine 892, 893. 
166 Thomas S Huddle, 'Teaching Professionalism: Is Medical Morality a Competency?' (2005) 80 
Academic Medicine 885, 885. 
167 Ibid 886. 
168 See eg, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971);  Amartya Sen, 
Inequality Reexamined (Clarendon Press, 1992). 
 69 
This part commences by analysing the most important exposition of principlism by 
Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics.169  Its four 
principles have been adopted by the World Medical Association as representing the 
most important standards for ethical decision making in medical practice.170  
Beauchamp and Childress promote a set of principles that should ‘ ... function as an 
analytical framework that expresses the general values underlying rules in the 
common morality.’171  They suggest four moral ideals as principles to ‘ ... function 
as guidelines for professional ethics’: 
1. respect for autonomy (respecting the decision-making capacities of autonomous 
persons) 
2. nonmaleficence (avoiding the causation of harm) 
3. beneficence (providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and harms) 
4. justice (distributing benefits, risks and costs fairly).172 
 
Their work has been highly commended by a number of commentators.  Mason 
and Laurie refer in their book, Law and Medical Ethics173 to Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics as a ‘classic’ in the field of applied ethics174 despite accusations 
of pro-Western bias.175  They also compliment the approach of Beauchamp and 
Childress and their four principles as providing an example of how any discussion 
of ethical questions benefits from reflection that refers to accepted values.176   
 
Medical practitioner and ethicist, Raanan Gillon maintained that these four 
principles together with reflection about the scope of their reach should be adopted 
by all health care workers and will encompass most of the moral dilemmas that 
they encounter.177  He suggests that this approach can be applied whatever the 
personal philosophy, religion or political views of the health care worker in 
question.178  He continues that whilst we can agree about moral commitments to 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, it is still possible 
to disagree about those to whom these commitments are owed.  However, it is easy 
for health practitioners to know to whom they owe these moral obligations because 
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of the special relationship to their patients that requires the health practitioner to 
provide help without causing injury.179 
 
Similarly, in discussing professionalism in medical practice, MacKenzie refers to 
these four elements as the ethical underpinnings of medical practice.180  Brazier and 
Cave also adopt these four principles as underlining ethical obligations of medical 
practitioners.181  Jonsen refers to them as entering the vocabulary of medical 
ethics182 when the public was shocked by medical research scandals such as the 
Tuskegee revelations in the USA (leaving syphilis untreated for 40 years after 
knowing it was treatable)183 and the New Zealand cervical cancer scandal 
(deliberately failing to treat some women with cervical carcinoma in situ).184 
 
The review by Beauchamp and Childress of medical codes of ethics notes that 
codes are full of principles that are of concern to medical practice and its traditions 
but they sometimes clash with more general moral norms.185  Beauchamp and 
Childress also query whether these codes are not designed more to protect the 
interests of the medical profession than to provide wide and impartial moral 
guidance to its members.186  The apparent lack of consultation with patients is 
exemplified by the challenge made by Burke to guidelines issued by the GMC in 
the United Kingdom.187  
 
However, despite this broad support, this approach has its critics.  For example, 
Gillon acknowledges that there does not appear to be a method of resolving 
conflicts between the principles.  Pellegrino and Thomasma have also criticised 
this ‘four principles’ approach on the ground that it does not take into account 
either the internal morality of medicine or the clinical realities of the doctor-patient 
relationship, so it should be replaced by alternative theories based on virtue188 to 
which this thesis now turns. 
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(b) Virtue Ethics 
Core values of the medical profession as listed by the AMA, include virtues such 
as trust, compassion, integrity, justice and altruism.  To these, Pellegrino and 
Thomasma add prudence,189 temperance190 and fortitude.191  Faunce lists trust, 
competence, integrity, compassion, prudence and loyalty to patient suffering.192  
McCammon and Brody refer to honesty, trust, beneficence and altruism.193 
 
Eighteenth century Enlightenment physician John Gregory lauded the virtues as a 
way of distinguishing medical practitioners who are dedicated to the art of 
medicine from those who consider it as a mere article of trade194 on the grounds 
that only morals guided by sympathy can engage patients and enhance the 
probability of a cure.195 
 
As with principlism, several commentators have espoused the need for virtue ethics 
as a way of providing doctors with tools to deal with moral questions that arise in 
practice.  Huddle comments that:  ‘Medical educators and patients alike want 
physicians who are “professional” ... : just, altruistic, conscientious, 
compassionate, honest, and scrupulous about financial conflicts of interest.’196  
McCammon and Brody claim that what Jonsen called the medical profession’s 
‘profound moral paradox’197 of self-interest as juxtaposed against the societal 
expectation of altruism and compassion from their physicians, has led to the recent 
interest in the significance of virtue ethics for the medical profession.198   
 
McCammon and Brody also argue that:  ‘[I]deally, virtue ethics combines two 
important tasks of ethics, to serve as both an inspiration and a practical guide.’199  
They maintain that the recent interest in virtue ethics is a way of re-introducing the 
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physician’s character into medical ethics.200  There needs to be more open 
discussion of professional and unprofessional behaviour in medical schools, 
including dealing with mistakes and near-misses as a tool for learning.201  Coulehan 
comments that whilst the explicit curriculum focuses on teaching the virtues, the 
process of internalising the virtues is undermined by the hidden curriculum’ with 
its emphasis on detachment and self-interest.202  The problem is how to instil the 
virtues into trainee medical practitioners so that they are embraced and become 
part of the medical practitioner’s lived experience.  Training along the lines of the 
‘Giving Voice to Values’203 system may address any disconnect between learning 
ethical rules and internalising their requirements.  The ‘Giving Voice to Values’ 
process for teaching ethical behaviour will be considered further in Part 2 of this 
section. 
 
The most frequently-cited core values of the medical profession are the virtues of 
trust, altruism and compassion.  Similarly, they are cited by advocates of the need 
for virtue ethics in medical practice as fundamental moral standards.  This section 
will analyse why their adoption is seen by so many commentators as underpinning 
good, patient-centred medical practice. 
 
(i) Trust 
Medicine concerns the experiences, feelings, and interpretations of human beings in 
often extraordinary moments of fear, anxiety, and doubt. In this extremely 
vulnerable position, it is medical professionalism that underpins the trust the public 
has in doctors.204  
 
This section shows how fundamental the medical virtue of trust is to the 
achievement of patient-centred care principles by medical practitioners.  As the 
first statement in the GMC Code declares:  ‘Patients must be able to trust doctors 
with their lives and health’.205  Mason and Laurie remark that trust works better in 
an atmosphere of morality rather than by an imposition of rules that can be 
inflexible.206 
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On occasion, patients need to provide to their medical practitioners sensitive 
information and to expose their bodies for examination.  They are also reliant on 
the medical practitioner to provide advice and treatment with due care.  As 
Pellegrino and Thomasma explain, trusting another person also means being 
vulnerable to the person trusted, and the necessity of having confidence that this 
vulnerability will not be exploited even if the one trusted has motives for doing 
so.207   
 
The vulnerability of the patient inherent in the doctor-patient relationship has led to 
courts working towards recognising fiduciary duties.  In law, a fiduciary 
relationship has traditionally arisen in the context of property held by a trustee on 
behalf of a beneficiary.  However, in Breen v Williams208, Brennan CJ said: ‘ ... the 
relationship of doctor and patient is one where the doctor acquires an ascendancy 
over the patient and the patient is in a position of reposing trust in the doctor.’209  
Gaudron and McHugh JJ have also confirmed that the categories of fiduciary 
relationship are not closed as the courts have identified various circumstances that 
point towards the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
These circumstances, which are not exhaustive and may overlap, have included: the 
existence of a relation of confidence;  inequality of bargaining power;   ... a 
dependency or vulnerability on the part of one party that causes that party to rely on 
another.210 
 
However, the medical practitioner must also trust the patient.  Kennedy argues that 
confidence and trust can only prosper when the patient is treated as a partner.211  
Kass claims that trust is a necessary ingredient in the therapeutic relationship and 
has a connection to the healing process.212  Fletcher criticises the former inclination 
of medical practitioners to hide information from their patients as demonstrating a 
lack of trust in the patient.213  The medical practitioner needs the patient’s trust for 
co-operation once they have, together, determined the treatment plan.  Similarly, as 
Honneth observes, the patient requires the dignity of being trusted by the medical 
practitioner.214   
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The medical practitioner’s virtue of being trustworthy permits the vulnerable 
patient to rely on the practitioner for guidance when treatment regimes are being 
planned.  But the complementary trust in the patient by the doctor strengthens the 
partnership between equals that is fundamental to professionalism and quality 
patient-centred care. 
 
(ii) Altruism 
High among the moral virtues that are adopted by the champions of medical 
professionalism is altruism.  Barondess asserts that medical professionals are 
expected to be moral and altruistic and to use their skills for the benefit of the 
community.215  But underlying medical practice is, as mentioned previously, 
Jonsen’s ‘profound moral paradox’ of the persistent conflict between altruism and 
self-interest.216  Whilst these terms need not be mutually exclusive, Jonsen suggests 
that altruism has sometimes been seen as a disguised form of self-interest.217  
McCammon and Brody have observed that as care of the patient is the first priority 
in the job description, attributing altruism to the physician is not only unfounded218 
but unnecessary.  Cruess, Johnston and Cruess comment that there is an 
expectation that because of the trust that the community places in physicians, they 
should be altruistic and place the interests of patients first.219  Yet, as they remark, 
public mistrust, because of the profession’s failure to self-regulate, has sometimes 
led to a perception that the medical profession has put its own interests above those 
of patients;  and that the medical associations have protected unprofessional 
colleagues.220 
 
Yet, the AMA has placed altruism high among the core values underpinning the 
medical profession so, despite the above scepticism, the public is entitled to expect 
its medical practitioners to be altruistic.  Altruism is also expected as part of the 
social contract whereby medical practitioners will use their professional skills for 
the benefit of members of the community.  But as Cruess and Cruess observe:   
[t]here are ... both written and unwritten portions [of the social contract] entailing 
moral commitments that are fundamental to both the social contract and to 
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professionalism.  One cannot legislate altruism, commitment, or independent 
professional judgement;  they must come from within the individual physician.’221   
 
(iii) Compassion 
Nussbaum sees compassion as having three strands - a belief in the observer that 
the suffering is serious rather than trivial, that the suffering person does not deserve 
that suffering and that the observer experiences the emotion of the suffering 
person.222  The ability to look outward from oneself and to focus on the sufferings 
of others is a virtue that should be reflected in all decisions of medical 
professionals.   
 
The MBA Code lists ‘compassion’ as one of the ‘[P]rofessional values and qualities 
of doctors’223 and requires ‘Being courteous, respectful, compassionate and honest’ 
as part of the high standards of professional conduct required in a good doctor-
patient partnership.224   
 
Compassion has been identified as an essential virtue in medicine since earliest 
times.225  Newton talks of medical professionalism, essential to maintain the 
integrity of the profession, as demonstrating compassion.226  Faunce lists 
compassion as one of the professional virtues together with loyalty and 
competence.227     
 
Whilst the compassion of the medical practitioner provides a measure of extra 
comfort to patients who are subjected to the sometimes dispassionate workings of 
the medical system, it must be held in perspective.  Beauchamp and Childress 
maintain that too much emotional involvement from the medical practitioner may 
derogate from rational, practical decision-making.228  Nevertheless, contemporary 
decision science argues the importance of recognising both an emotional and a 
rational aspect to decision-making.  Kahneman points out that the 
emotional/intuitive feature of our decision-making processes has an evolutionary 
                                                      
221 Richard L Cruess and Sylvia R Cruess, 'Expectations and Obligations: Professionalism and 
Medicine's Social Contract with Society' (2008) 51 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 579, 583. 
222 Martha C Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 306. 
223 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
224Ibid [3.2.1]. 
225 Ron Paterson, 'Regulating for Compassion?' (2010) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 58, 60. 
226 Bruce W Newton et al, 'Is There a Hardening of the Heart During Medical School?' (2008) 83 
Academic Medicine 244. 
227 Thomas Faunce, Who Owns Our Health? (UNSW Press, 2007) 52. 
228 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2001) 33. 
 76 
basis, as a way to determine how to solve the problems that are needed to 
survive.229  The recognition that our minds first look at a heuristic, that is ‘ ... a 
simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to 
difficult questions. ... ’230 before the rational asserts itself, has been used in the 
decision-making processes of many fields, including medical diagnosis, legal 
judgment, finance and military strategy.231 
 
2 Giving Voice to Values 
According to Stern and Papadakis: ‘Until the late 1970s, the formal teaching of 
ethics, professionalism ... was not part of the medical school curriculum’.232  They 
proceed to state that most medical schools now have a formal ethics course.233  
Burack et al have observed that:  
Contemporary medical ethics education has concerned itself with teaching either 
facts or moral reasoning processes, but not with the motivational network of values, 
attitudes, and feelings that underlies moral behaviour.234 
 
One possible method of ethics teaching,the Giving Voice to Values (GVV) system 
has been used to assist in the process of internalising ethical values.  The GVV 
system is based on experience gained in the context of business ethics.  However, 
this approach is being adapted for use in varying contexts including medicine, 
nursing, engineering, law and accounting.235   
 
The philosophy of this approach is to move away from what is forbidden to what is 
possible.  Mary Gentile’s book236 noted that, rather than an emphasis on externally-
imposed rules, the internalisation of ethics could be based upon values that people 
already have.  It is not a question of right or wrong but what each person 
experiences ‘ ... deeply and internally ... ’ about particular behaviour.237  Whilst we 
can recognise and name the reality, rather than try to change it we have choices 
about how we respond.238  Gentile identifies four sets of conflicting values and 
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asserts that most ethical dilemmas fall into one or other of these categories – truth 
versus loyalty, individual versus community, short-term versus long-term and 
justice versus mercy.239 
 
The process commences with becoming aware of an issue, analysing it and then 
developing an action plan to deal with the issue.240  The traditional approach has 
been to identify what the problem is and work out what the right thing in response 
may be.  The GVV approach is that once the right thing to do has been identified, it 
is necessary to decide how the ‘right’ approach can be implemented.  
Consequently, the GVV approach is deeply involved in solving problems and this 
is achieved by discussion of problem scenarios to determine what action should be 
taken.  In addition, the GVV approach is concentrated on ‘ ... enhancing 
effectiveness by repeated practice in delivering responses and providing peer 
feedback and coaching.’241  The GVV approach also calls upon research that shows 
how human beings are subject to biases242 that can affect how problems are dealt 
with and teaches the necessity for awareness of these biases before decisions are 
made.   
 
A pilot study of the GVV approach in the context of nursing found that ‘ ... the 
educational power of simulation, experiential or scenario-based learning that is 
central to the GVV methodology is clearly a valuable pedagogical initiative, one 
that ought to take a more prominent place in our educational endeavours’.243  Thus, 
the GVV approach has been found to be effective in instilling ethical approaches in 
nursing and could clearly be adapted to ethics training for medical students, and 
periodic ethics reinforcement for medical practitioners. 
 
As the high numbers of boundary violations identified in Chapter III, particularly 
sexual indiscretions, will show, enhanced ethics education is important, both 
during undergraduate training, and for ongoing professional development 
obligations.  The numbers of boundary violations suggest that current systems of 
ethics education are not necessarily having the desired impact.  Whilst not 
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suggesting that the GVV system is necessarily superior to the current system, it is 
offered as an adjunct that may improve outcomes. 
 
3 Conclusion 
McCammon and Brody have declared that: ‘Regardless of whether it is virtue-
based or principle-based or duty-based, medicine is a moral enterprise’.244  Thus, 
adherence to a set of strong ethical principles is fundamental to the concept of 
medical professionalism.  Medical ethics lies at the heart of the social contract 
between the medical profession and the society.  It is partly because of the 
declaration of the medical profession’s strong ethical values that the society is 
prepared to grant the profession its high prestige and its place at the policy table 
when healthcare funding decisions are being made.   
 
The professed principles and virtues are not simply aspirations.  They are deeply 
embedded in the ideals of medical professionalism.  The Royal College of 
Physicians’ Working Party on Medical Professionalism remarked in its Foreword 
that it began its task with the ‘assumption that at the heart of good medical care is a 
set of values, attitudes and behaviours called medical professionalism’.245  It 
continued ‘ ... medical professionalism lies at the heart of being a good doctor.  The 
values that doctors embrace set a standard for what patients expect from medical 
practitioners’.246  Similarly, as will be shown in Chapter III, in disciplinary 
proceedings, the behaviour of medical practitioners is assessed against a standard 
referable to what the profession and the public considers to be professional.   
 
E MEDICAL PRACTITIONER VIEWS OF MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONALISM 
 
Cruess, Johnston and Cruess report that some eminent medical practitioners have 
been concerned about how doctors can provide quality care, preserve their clinical 
autonomy and adhere to the values of the Hippocratic Oath.247  This soul-searching 
led to distinguished medical bodies in USA and United Kingdom undertaking their 
own reviews of what medical professionalism means in the 21st Century.  
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Following well-publicised medical scandals of recent years,248 some eminent 
members of the medical profession called for a revisiting of what medical 
professionalism comprises in light of the way changes in health care were 
threatening the nature and values of medical professionalism.249 
 
1 United States and Europe 
In 1999, the European Federation of Internal Medicine, the American College of 
Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine and the American Board of 
Internal Medicine, having agreed that physician views were similar even in quite 
different health care systems, met to initiate a project to define the principles of 
medical professionalism.  The resulting Charter on Medical Professionalism,250 
published at the same time in The Lancet251 and Annals of Internal Medicine,252 is 
based on three principles.  The principles are Primacy of patient welfare, Primacy 
of patient autonomy and Primacy of social justice.253  The principle of the Primacy 
of patient welfare emphasises altruism as contributing to the trust central to the 
physician-patient relationship.  These principles are supplemented by ten 
Professional Responsibilities.254  As the committee concluded:   
To maintain the fidelity of medicine’s social contract ... we believe that physicians 
must reaffirm their active dedication to the principles of professionalism, which 
entails not only their personal commitment to the welfare of their patients but also 
collective efforts to improve the health care system for the welfare of society.  This 
Charter on Medical Professionalism is intended to encourage such dedication and to 
promote an action agenda for the profession of medicine that is universal in scope 
and purpose.255  
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2 United Kingdom 
Professionalism cannot be imposed by governments or by regulatory culture.  It 
must emerge from and be sustained by doctors themselves.256 
 
A few years later, a working party of the Royal College of Physicians undertook its 
own review into how medical practitioners should be dealing with changes in the 
way medicine was being practised.  The review was undertaken following several 
inquiries into medical scandals that had questioned and criticised long-held views 
about the balance of power in the doctor-patient relationship.257  In 2006, the 
Report of the Working Party on Medical Professionalism commented that the 
medical profession had been slow to adapt to changing social expectations.258  It 
declared that the medical profession had discarded notions of mastery, practitioner 
autonomy, privilege and self-regulation.259  It noted that both the King’s Fund260 
and the Picker Institute261 were recommending that medical practitioners change to 
adopt patient-centred care principles.   
 
The Working Party defined medical professionalism as signifying ‘ ... a set of 
values, behaviours, and relationships that underpins the trust the public has in 
doctors ... ’.262  The report described how medical professionalism achieves these 
values, behaviours and relationships as follows: 
Medicine is a vocation in which a doctor’s knowledge, clinical skills, and judgement 
are put in the service of protecting and restoring human well-being. This purpose is 
realised through a partnership between patient and doctor, one based on mutual 
respect, individual responsibility, and appropriate accountability.263 
 
The centrality of the notion of a partnership between medical practitioner and 
patient is embedded in the ideals of patient-centred care.  The report looked 
forward to entrenching the ideals of professionalism within medical culture.  
However, these charters and reviews did not address a significant difficulty 
preventing their adoption, unfortunate attitudes of some medical practitioners 
absorbed during their medical training, to which this chapter now turns. 
                                                      
256 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) 44. 
257 See eg, Ian Kennedy, Learning from Bristol, Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 (July 2001);  Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman 
Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the Future 9 
December 2004). 
258 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) [1.7]. 
259 Ibid [2.9]. 
260 Ibid [1.16]. 
261 Ibid [1.17]. 
262 Ibid xi. 
263 Ibid [2.6]. 
 81 
 
F LEARNING TO BE A PROFESSIONAL – TRAINING THE 
DOCTORS OF THE FUTURE 
 
1 Introduction 
The requirement for professionalism pervades every aspect of doctors’ interface 
with the patients committed to their care.  Previous sections have outlined how 
concern with what medical professionalism entails has been approached through 
theories of medical ethics, through codes and guidelines and through charters 
promulgated by bodies of distinguished medical practitioners.  These approaches 
have adverted to the damage done to the reputation of the profession particularly 
through damaging reports of irregularities in various medical treatment settings.  
However, despite the good intentions of medical regulators, professional medical 
associations and bodies of distinguished medical practitioners, some unacceptable 
and deviant behaviour is still occurring.  One factor that can undermine these 
efforts to instil professionalism among doctors lies in the way that the doctors of 
the future are trained and socialised. 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the hidden influences on medical students 
and trainees.  However, not all influences are malign.  This section commences by 
showing how important good role models are in training and socialisation of young 
medical graduates.  As Wear et al comment: ‘Role modeling is not new to medical 
education, but is becoming increasingly called for as perhaps the most important 
factor in students’ ongoing professional development’.264  
 
Whilst learning from teaching faculty is not the only way that medical students are 
socialised, the effect is significant because of their early exposure to its influences.  
Students also absorb behaviours of fellow students.  However, there is a substantial 
body of literature that documents a disconnect between positive and negative 
influences and shows how socialisation of students in their process of learning to 
become medical professionals has, in a number ways, detracted from the adoption 
of patient-centred care principles. 
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The following parts of this section outline how hidden influences, for good or ill, 
play a part in shaping the attitudes of trainee medical practitioners towards 
professionalism and their behaviours towards their patients and more junior health 
practitioners.  As Ozolins, Hall and Peterson report, students in Queensland felt 
that the notion of ‘being’ a doctor was ‘ ... at the heart of the informal and hidden 
curriculum.  It serves a purpose of teaching them “how to be” and think like 
doctors.’265  
 
Firstly, this section considers the positive aspects of the ‘hidden curriculum’ 
whereby good role models can instil such positive traits as patient-centredness,266 
and compassion and respect.267  However, to show how patient-centred practice can 
be undermined by the socialisation process, this section will look secondly at 
examples of unprofessional behaviour by those charged with medical education 
and training, and will move on to explore the gap between what is being taught and 
what is being learned,268 including how humiliation is used as an educational tool.  
The following part briefly considers the subtle messages that can discount the 
importance of disclosure when adverse events occur.  More importantly, the 
‘hidden curriculum’ can detract from reflective practice so that the opportunity, as 
Kenny et al observe, ‘to learn effectively from experience and develop the affective 
aspect of’269 professional practice may not be realised.  To conclude, as Levinson et 
al suggest, work needs to be done to: ‘(1) change the actual practice behaviors[sic] 
of the physician role models that trainees will encounter during their clinical 
experiences; and (2) alter the conditions under which these physicians carry out 
their work.’270 
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2 Role Modelling as a Positive Influence on Medical Training 
The first requirement for a sea change in professionalism is to increase dramatically 
the number of physicians who are able to role-model professional virtue at every 
stage of medical education.271  
 
According to Burack et al, traditionally medical students learned about 
professionalism by absorbing ‘the way things are done’ from their lecturers in 
medical school and their exposure to more senior practitioners.272  Harden et al 
point out that there were, in fact, two traditional ways of education for medical 
students: 
 the classroom model, where students learn through attendance at lectures, at 
practical classes, or by working independently; 
 the apprenticeship model, where students or young doctors work in the clinical 
setting with the consultant or other member of staff serving as a role model.273  
 
Levinson et al recognise these two traditional methods of teaching medical students 
but caution that there may be a conflict between the messages imparted in each 
context.274  Hogg has observed that: ‘Teachers and trainers set an example to new 
students and provide role models for them both in the classroom and placements in 
hospital and community when they are most impressionable.’275   
 
Kenny et al note that enhancing role modelling is a recent concern in medical 
education.276  They observe that: ‘Role models are central to enculturation because 
professional behaviour is learned in the experience of practice’.277  Johnston et al 
also observe that attitudes and actions of those teaching are significant as they are 
the role models observed by students.278  They point out the benefits of mentoring 
by primary care physicians who are adept at imparting, communication skills, and 
the holistic approach and person-centredness.  These skills that are so integral to 
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general practice, are transferable to wider medical practice.279  Similarly, Newton et 
al comment that ‘[p]hysicians who are role models should work more closely with 
medical students to develop an empathic relationship with ... patients’ but also note 
that there is a chronic lack of clinical role models and perhaps a lack of positive 
role models.280 
 
Yet, research carried out by Sloan, Donnelly and Schwartz has found that there are 
good surgical role models.  Students canvassed by them chose the most important 
factors that they saw as differentiating ‘better preceptors from the poorer ones’, one 
of the factors being ‘the degree to which the preceptor served as a positive role 
model’.281 
 
These observations also apply when the teaching method is problem based learning 
during clinical exposure in hospitals.  Hill points out the centrality of the preceptor-
student relationship.  ‘A one-to-one relationship between a senior faculty member 
and a student ensures an appropriate role model exists for future professional 
development’.282 
 
Abu et al also noted that students recognised the need for positive role models in 
teaching professionalism because it leads to deeper and more experiential 
learning.283  A survey by Lempp and Seale of a single medical school in the United 
Kingdom suggested that many staff members were positive role models.284 
 
Stern and Papadakis observe that teaching in the hidden curriculum happens 
through role modelling and the telling of parables (stories about cases) as well as 
through more formalised teaching.  Some teachers in medical faculties see 
themselves as role models, a prime method of teaching professionalism to their 
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students.  But a role model is just that — a model.285  Consequently, as they 
continue, teachers must provide an environment that is consistently professional, 
both in medical schools and in clinical contexts.286  
 
However, whilst good medical professionalism can be taught to medical students 
by their observation of the conduct of positive role models, it is also possible to 
absorb the negative behaviours of some role models and carry them into medical 
practice.  As Karnieli-Miller et al note: ‘Experiences with both negative and 
positive behaviours shape students’ perceptions of the profession and its values’.287 
 
 
3 Examples of Unprofessional Behaviour 
Some medical professionals who were training students do not appear to have been 
aware of the promulgation of the charters in US and the United Kingdom outlined 
above.  Monrouxe and Rees in 2012 documented unprofessional behaviour in 
teaching of some Scottish medical students.288  Brainard and Brislen in 2007 
described some American students as disclosing gross breaches of professionalism 
in their medical training in 2007.289  In both studies, students reported 
unprofessional behaviour, as documented below, by those who were supposed to 
be teaching and evaluating them in the tenets of medical professionalism. 
 
Brainard and Brislen referred to a report by a third year medical student: 
A student was asked to forge an attending’s signature on a discharge order. When 
she protested, stating that forgery was likely unprofessional, her supervising resident 
promised her an “A” in professionalism in exchange for the signature. She 
complied.290 
 
Abu et al tell of students who ‘ ... felt they learned negative values and 
unprofessional behaviours because this was what they witnessed in real world 
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settings and because their mentors sometimes treated both them and their patients 
unprofessionally’.291   
 
Faunce contends that the student may learn ethical and unethical principles by way 
of osmosis through contacts with cynical staff members in informal settings.292  As 
Brainard and Brislen report:  ‘[Students] seem to adopt an implicit set of rules that 
place hospital etiquette, adherence to academic hierarchy, and subservience to 
authority above patient-centred virtues.’293  What is absorbed can include the 
dismissive behaviour detailed below and as observed and reported by numerous 
writers.294   
 
(a) Undermining Patient Dignity 
As Monrouxe and Rees record, unannounced inspections of 100 hospitals in 
England found 40 to be sub-standard in their recognition of patient dignity.295  The 
English study has been confirmed by students in USA, Brainard and Brislen, who 
have told of unprofessional conduct by medical faculty that continues and is 
protected by an established hierarchy.296   
 
Brainard and Brislen comment that whilst the formal professionalism curriculum 
places the patient at the centre of the ethical order by exalting the virtues of 
altruism, respect, honour, integrity, excellence and accountability, there is another, 
‘hidden’ curriculum that emerges in the practical learning environment that ‘ ... 
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encourages the learning of an opposing set of values.’297  Students reported that 
patients continue to be ‘ ... examined, disrobed, or treated without respect for their 
dignity and without their consent.’298  In the same study, students also noted that 
their medical educators have made derisive comments about their patients’ weight, 
ethnicity and diseases.299   
 
 
Monrouxe and Rees reported one student as saying: 
I had a surgeon trying to goad me into calling a patient ‘fat’ basically which was 
pretty uncomfortable he asked me to examine the patient ... and he said ‘no- no step 
back, stay by the end of the bed and describe what you see’ and so he started saying 
something and she was a really big lady, he was dying for me to call her you know 
call her ‘fat’ and he was saying ‘She’s fat just say it’.300 
 
Levinson et al reported that both ‘[r]esidents and medical students had observed, 
and also admitted to participating in unprofessional behavior including ... engaging 
in disrespectful comments ... about others.  Between one fourth and one half of 
residents surveyed described witnessing multiple incidents ... of disrespect of 
patients ... by other residents’.301  Similarly, Karnieli-Miller et al’s research showed 
that: ‘The most common theme in the students’ stories was denoted manifesting ... 
disrespect in clinical interactions with patients ... .’302 
 
Monrouxe and Rees comment that students learn behaviour from physicians 
trained when paternalism by medical practitioners was more acceptable and they 
imbibe the culture of treating patients dismissively.303 
 
(b) Trivialising the Patient 
The result of negative role models is that medical students are sometimes 
socialised rather than instructed about dismissive attitudes to patients and other 
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health professionals.  Cribb and Bignold maintain that medical students, as a 
strategy for coping with the stresses of ‘demanding academic and clinical 
challenges’,304 trivialise and joke about patients and their bodies and cadavers, and 
thereby distance themselves from the reality of medical practice.305  Coulehan and 
Williams argue that these dismissive attitudes also lead to cultivation of an attitude 
of them and us,306 inferior patients and superior medical practitioners, weak 
patients and strong physicians.307  Hafferty and Franks observe that patients are 
seen by these students not as recipients of faithful attention but as objects described 
by the use of derogatory language.308   
 
Wear et al’s research evaluated the contention that ‘[i]t has long been known that 
students become more cynical as they move through their training’.309  They 
investigated ‘one dimension of this phenomenon: how medical students perceive 
and use derogatory and cynical humour directed at patients’.310  They found that the 
objects of cynical and derogatory humour were those patients whose conditions the 
students categorised as being ‘their own fault’ such as obesity, smoking, excessive 
drinking or drugs, driving recklessly, unsafe sex or other ‘own fault’ behaviours.311  
These patients were considered to be ‘fair game’.312  Wear et al suggested that 
humour is a form of cultural insider knowledge that endows ‘native speakers’ with 
a sense of their own cultural distinctiveness or even superiority.313 
 
Coulehan and Williams comment that an adjunct to an attitude of superiority is the 
sense of entitlement.  This sense of entitlement is inspired by the accepted rigour of 
the process of learning the technical aspects of medical practice and the 
consciousness that healing the sick is a highly esteemed occupation.  They also 
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remark that this sense of entitlement extends to the expectation of high status and a 
substantial income.314   
 
Other writers also document trivialising the patient as part of the training of many 
medical students.  For example, Burack et al identified that ‘referring to patients in 
disparaging or derogatory ways, or otherwise showing disrespect’ was seen by 
some attending physicians as one sort of behaviour that ‘“rais[ed] red flags” about 
possible deficiencies in concern, respect or compassion for patients’.315  Karnieli-
Miller et al found that some students were using inappropriate humour or 
comments behind the patient's back, thus showing disrespect for the patients 
concerned.316 
 
4 Authorised and Irregular Curricula in Medical Education 
Unprofessional behaviour reported by medical students, such as that documented 
above, underlines the importance, in the training of medical students, of the 
‘hidden curriculum’.  Socialisation into the medical profession occurs by 
assimilating messages about what is or is not important in being a medical 
professional.317  As Stern and Papadakis confirm:  
Inherent conflicts between what we teach and what students see in real-life settings 
will not promote professionalism.  At a minimum, such conflicts must be explained 
to students.  Efforts to teach the ideals of professionalism can be easily 
overwhelmed by the powerful messages in the hidden curriculum.318 
 
Hafferty outlines three different curricula that shape the medical professional.  
Firstly there is the formal curriculum of lectures and clinics aimed at providing the 
student with information about the human body, diagnosis of illnesses, drugs and 
treatments and the other matters that are ‘offered and endorsed’.  Second comes the 
informal curriculum that is not formally stated and occurs on an interpersonal level 
between faculty members and students, in the corridors and the ‘tea room’.  Finally 
there is the hidden curriculum that Hafferty specifies as the ‘influences that 
function at the level of organizational structure and culture’, those hidden messages 
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that are conveyed even while the formal curriculum is being taught.319  Frequently 
the terms ‘informal curriculum’ and hidden curriculum’ are used as though they are 
both part of the hidden curriculum of unscripted influences on medical students.320  
On other occasions, they are referred to together as influencing medical students on 
an informal basis.321 
 
Hafferty was concerned to emphasise that medical training is a process of ‘moral 
enculturation’ whereby the transmission of normative values and emotions saw the 
medical school function as a ‘moral community’.322  Coulehan and Williams 
comment that whilst some medical schools teach medical ethics and humanities, 
the impact of these courses is generally limited.   
Because the tacit value system of the hospital is so potent in forming the student’s 
view of doctoring, the explicit values embodied in ethics and humanities courses 
may have little impact.  For example, in their medical ethics courses, students may 
have learned the components of informed consent and the ethical and judicial 
standards by which consent is judged.  Furthermore, in their courses on physician-
patient communication, students may have learned the appropriate methods of 
facilitating or negotiating informed consent.  These topics are in the explicit 
curriculum.  However, in their surgical clerkships they may encounter a culture in 
which none of this material is relevant.323 
 
As Jones observes, the perception that consent is obtained merely for medico-legal 
purposes can trivialise the practical importance of an ethical viewpoint by reducing 
ethical principles to formalised processes such as consent forms.324  Coulehan and 
Williams argue that students consider that what they learn in the clinical hot house 
is what is the best for the patient.  The students thereby purport to be placing the 
patient first when in reality they are emphasising practices that benefit the medical 
practitioner.325   
 
Hafferty contends that ‘ ... a great deal of what is taught — and most of what is 
learned — in medical school takes place not within formal course offerings but 
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within medicine’s “hidden curriculum”’.326  He identifies structural issues as at the 
heart of the hidden curriculum.  He says that much of what is valued or not in 
medical education can be discerned by how the medical school ‘sells’ itself.  Thus, 
if the curriculum only has ethics teaching as a minor subject fitted in amongst the 
more ‘important’ subjects, the message is conveyed that ethics is of low 
significance.  If the school is seeking funding and advises that any funds received 
will be directed into new buildings or into research, the message is clear that those 
are the priority areas.327  
 
The experiences of unprofessional behaviour by practitioners as role models328 
charged with educating medical students in professionalism, demonstrate the 
dichotomy between the professionalism rhetoric and the practice of medical 
practitioners.  McCammon and Brody argue that where students have seen their 
superiors violating moral norms, they can perceive this as a betrayal.329   
 
5 The Use of Humiliation in the Hidden Curriculum 
Lempp and Seale contend that much of the teaching at the medical school they 
surveyed involved humiliating students particularly on clinical rounds.  They 
maintain that humiliating students is one way that the hierarchy that is a feature of 
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the medical profession is conveyed to medical students.330  The use of humiliation 
as a way to teach and socialise medical students has been widely reported.331 
 
Another result of the use of humiliation in the hidden curriculum appears to be the 
desensitisation of students in anticipation of the forthcoming rigours of medical 
practice.  Students are being taught skills such as how to break bad news and how 
to communicate with their patients but research has indicated that over time, 
students become desensitised332 and ‘ ... lose a measure of their humanity ... ’.333  
Behaviour leading to desensitisation can be absorbed by students as they observe 
interactions between clinicians and patients.334  According to Karnieli-Miller et al, 
their research suggests that the socialisation process has resulted in some medical 
students suppressing their emotions to an extent that has detached them from their 
humanity.335  Cribb and Bignold claim that professional socialisation of medical 
practitioners ‘ ... requires a distancing from, and in some respects an “alienation” 
from the everyday world’.336  They refer to consistent findings from sociological 
researchers into medical education that there is a ‘ ... loss of idealism amongst 
medical students as they move from articulating humanistic ideals upon entry to an 
increased pragmatism and sometimes cynicism’.337  Newton et al suggest that one 
reason for a decline in empathy of some students is related to students’ ‘learning to 
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assume an authoritative role in providing care’ while simultaneously seeing 
themselves as being abused by their mentor/role models.338   
 
Students are usually aware of the right thing to do but can feel helpless because of 
the hierarchies endemic in medical practice,339 from medical professionals teaching 
in medical schools to the hierarchies observable in hospitals and other medical 
institutions.  McCammon and Brody describe some students as reporting feelings 
of moral distress when feeling powerless to change a situation that they perceive as 
unprofessional.340  According to McCammon and Brody: ‘Moral distress is 
generally defined as “when you know what the right thing to do is, but you are 
unable to do it”’.341  They suggest that moral distress in medical students includes 
three elements:  
First, the betrayal of the moral value is committed by someone with legitimate, 
respected power and authority. Second, the fact that the moral value has been 
violated is clear; the case does not admit of ethical ambiguity or reasonable 
differences of opinion (as would be true in many real-life cases of moral distress). 
Finally, the authority figures who violate the moral value may have been the same 
who earlier taught the importance of that moral value to the trainee.342 
 
McCammon and Brody remark that there is a tendency by educational institutions 
to ‘fix or diffuse’ moral distress by referring the student to therapeutic measures.  
Instead, they should ‘ ... admit that there really might be wrong things going on out 
there and that some form of corrective action is required.’343  However, as Hafferty 
points out: ‘Redesigning the “learning environment” of a medical school is a vastly 
different ... undertaking than redesigning a curriculum alone’.344 
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6 Adverse Events and the Hidden Curriculum 
Another aspect of the of the hidden curriculum lies in the way a particular medical 
practitioner or institution deals with adverse events in medical practice.  Berlinger 
claims that  
 ... the hidden curriculum teaches students and residents how to compose and 
contribute to successful narratives about mistakes, when success is measured in 
terms of personal or institutional protection from litigation or in terms of 
transmitting tribal norms.  What we do not learn from these stories is whether the 
hidden curriculum is capable of teaching early-career physicians how to tell injured 
patients, and their families, what happened, why it happened and who is responsible 
, with clarity, candour, and compassion.345   
 
Faunce and Bolsin observe that, in some institutions, what has been learned in the 
hidden curriculum may actually obstruct any disclosure.346  Bolsin et al comment 
that the medical profession is experienced and adept at promoting bad behaviour 
around reporting poor care, and attributes these behaviours to the hidden 
curriculum.347 
 
Berlinger comments that medical students have learned that their teachers believe 
in, practise and reward the concealing of errors.  The hidden curriculum makes sure 
that they learn that if the patient does not ask, then the physician does not tell.  
Some physicians do not regard this conduct as lying.348 
 
Halbach and Sullivan recommend that there should be explicit teaching about how 
to prevent errors and how to handle the aftermath.  They consider that there is a 
need to address the hidden curriculum in medicine to facilitate a change of 
culture.349  Similarly White et al suggest that students need disclosure training after 
medical error rather than be expected to rely on the hidden curriculum to teach 
disclosure skills.350 
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7 Non-Reflective Learning 
Several writers have commented upon the problem of non-reflectivity concerning 
the accepted values of medical ethics.351  Treadway and Chatterjee report that 
junior medical practitioners will consciously follow the accepted and traditional 
values of medical professionalism but not realise that their behaviour conveys 
values that are diametrically at variance with the received wisdom that the medical 
profession is compassionate and caring.352  Sociologists, Hafferty and Franks have 
reflected that medical education as it now occurs is concerned with establishing a 
distinct medical morality.353  Yet, medical students should learn not only what 
ought to be done but why it should matter.  As Cribb and Bignold argue: 
Discussion of rights and duties or ‘principles‘ — or some other framework 
underpinning ethics — may provide ethics ‘knowledge’ but it does not necessarily 
provide ‘ethical attitudes’ or generate ethical doctors.  If we are interested in moral 
education we need to be concerned not only with clarifying what ought to be done 
but also how and why people come to care about doing what ought to be done ...354 
 
Students also learn from observation of and contact with their teachers that requires 
attention not only to what messages are being revealed but how these messages are 
conveyed.  As Phillips observes:  
[d]espite lofty, formal institutional values, what students learn suffers from the often 
unintended missteps of faculty, staff, colleagues and environment that can never be 
cleansed of all ‘bad’ elements. If, however, we demonstrate a willingness to see the 
hidden disavowed curriculum ... then we can use contradictory messages as a 
starting point for the discussion of values with students, rather than pretending that 
medicine is value-free.355 
 
Similarly, Mossop et al comment that: ‘The power of role-modelling should be 
harnessed to provide reflective learning experiences for students’.356 
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The necessity for doctors to learn reflection in their attitudes to being medical 
professionals has been emphasised by the GMC which has instituted a system for 
revalidation of medical professionals.  The GMC makes clear in its framework that 
simply gathering information is not sufficient.  Each medical practitioner must 
reflect on the information collected as the appraiser will want to know how the 
doctor will develop or modify practice as a result of that reflection.357 
 
Similarly, the Medical Board of Australia’s Expert Advisory Group on 
Revalidation emphasises that use of multi-source feedback in continuing 
professional development programs ‘ ... has been shown to identify gaps in both 
clinical and professional performance, to trigger self-reflection and to improve 
practitioner performance.’358  This report emphasises the necessity for reflection 
and self-awareness as factors in learning during the continuing professional 
development process.359 
 
7 Conclusion 
This section has shown that, despite the positive aspects of role modelling in 
teaching professionalism, too often the negative aspects of the hidden curriculum 
overwhelm the positive and leave students either disappointed in their instructors 
or cynical about how they should treat their patients.360  Some teachers actually 
consider that they should use abuse of their students as a way of reinforcing 
learning.361  However, some commentators contend that use of abuse against 
students can be equated with child abuse, where victims later become 
perpetrators.362  Therefore, success of the effort to instil an ethical sense into 
medical practitioners and ensure that it is internalised to the extent that it outweighs 
contrary pressures in medical practice, is closely dependent on the training 
provided to medical students.  The unspoken can overwhelm formal instruction 
concerning the professional tools students need to assist them in navigating the 
                                                      
357 General Medical Council, The Good Medical Practice Framework for Appraisal and Revalidation 
(March 2013) 1. 
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362 See eg, Tim J Wilkinson et al, 'The Impact on Students of Adverse Experiences during Medical 
School' (2006) 28 Medical Teacher 129, 133;  Donald G Kassebaum and Ellen R Cutler, 'On the 
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ethical minefield that confronts them in daily practice.  Medical regulators must 
supervise the accreditation process for training institutions to guard against lack of 
attention to informal influences that derogate from internalising ethical values.  
The Medical Board of Australia could, through its accreditation processes, mandate 
the sort of ethics training required and supervise its implementation to minimise 
the detrimental aspects of the hidden curriculum.  It can also make sure that ethics 
is taught in a way that encourages reflection by medical students, not just a mere 
learning of rules. 
 
While professionalism is the key to quality patient-centred medical practice, there 
is one aspect of the professional expectations outlined in the codes that should be 
closely monitored.  Recourse to conscientious objection as a way of denying some 
patients access to legally available medical procedures should be managed to make 
sure that the patients concerned are not abandoned by their medical practitioners.  
The next section scrutinises the exercise of conscientious objection and proposes 
ways to satisfy the interests of both medical practitioner and patient. 
 
G CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION — PROFESSIONALISM IN ISSUE 
 
Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the 
most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under 
omnipotent moral busy-bodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his 
cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good 
will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own 
conscience.363 
 
Whilst codes of ethics such as the MBA Code and the GMC Code describe the 
behaviours expected of medical practitioners, there may be occasions where their 
provisions conflict.  This section analyses provisions in codes of practice that 
excuse medical professionals from performing a procedure on conscientious 
objection grounds.  Allowing medical practitioners to give a blanket refusal can 
deny patients access to legally permitted practices and conflicts with the priority of 
the care of the patient.  Courts, codes of ethics and legislation have almost 
universally recognised conscientious objections by medical practitioners.  Whilst 
there is no community expectation that medical practitioners should always be 
required to act against conscience, medical professionalism and the principles of 
patient-centred care demand that alternative arrangements — such as referral to 
                                                      
363 C S Lewis, 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment' in Walter Hooper (ed), God in the Dock 
(William B Eerdmans Publishing, 1970) 287. 
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another practitioner or health service organisation — be made so that patients are 
not abandoned.  Refusal to make alternative arrangements depreciates the duty to 
practise the patient-centred care expected of medical professionals.   
 
Dickens complains that the monopoly of licensure prevents some people from 
access to legally available procedures when the medical practitioner has a personal 
religious objection to providing it.364  Government legislation restricts particular 
functions such as performing an operation or prescribing restricted drugs to 
registered medical practitioners.  If the practitioner objects on conscientious 
grounds to performing a legally-available procedure such as a termination of 
pregnancy, the patient may have to find another practitioner who will perform the 
procedure.  The restriction of the procedure to registered medical practitioners and 
the criminalisation of its performance by non-registered persons means that the 
patient has no alternatives.  This could have devastating consequences for a patient 
whose life is at risk.  
 
If the first priority of the medical practitioner is the care of the patient, any legally-
sanctioned procedure that is necessary for the health and well-being of a patient 
should be provided.  The most common procedures to which medical practitioners 
may object are abortion, sterilisation, contraception and in vitro fertilisation 
techniques,365 all of which are legally permitted in Australia.  In USA, objection 
has been made to circumcision, artificial insemination and even to pain-killing 
drugs for terminally-ill patients,366 all of which are legally permissible in Australia.  
As Dickens comments, any indiscriminate appeal to conscience may be in violation 
of the rights of others.367   
 
1 Conscientious Objection in Codes of Ethics 
There is no mention in either the Hippocratic Oath368 or the Declaration of 
Geneva369 that a medical practitioner may refuse to treat a patient based on 
religious or moral beliefs.  Nor does the World Medical Association’s 
                                                      
364 Bernard M Dickens, 'Conscientious Objection: A Shield or a Sword' in Sheila A M McLean (ed), 
First Do No Harm (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 337, 345. 
365 Ibid 337. 
366 Martha S Swartz, '"Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses": Personal Beliefs Versus 
Professional Responsibilities' (2006) 6 Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 269, 276. 
367 Bernard M Dickens, 'Conscientious Objection: A Shield or a Sword' in Sheila A M McLean (ed), 
First Do No Harm (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 337, 337. 
368 Hippocratic Oath - Classical Version. 
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International Code of Medical Ethics370 make any mention of a physician’s choice 
to refuse to undertake a legally permitted medical procedure.  However, 
recognition of conscientious objections appears in the codes of practice that apply 
in Australia and the United Kingdom. 
 
(a) Australia 
The MBA Code371 provides in paragraph 2.4.6.that the medical practitioner has the ‘ 
... right to not provide or directly participate in treatments ... ’ to which he or she 
has a conscientious objection but directs that the medical practitioner inform the 
patient and colleagues and not impede access to treatments that are legal.  This 
provision is bolstered by paragraph 2.4.7 where the medical practitioner is told to 
not allow moral or religious views to deny a patient access to medical care but is 
advised that he or she is free to ‘ ... decline to personally provide or participate in 
that care.’  There is no requirement to facilitate transfer of a patient and the 
patient’s records to another medical practitioner who will provide the treatment 
denied.  The only mention of transfer of records is in the context of a sale or 
relocation of practice372 though there is reference to facilitating transfer of health 
information when requested by the patient.373 
 
The AMA Code374 is even less specific.  It advises that when ‘ ... a personal moral 
judgement or religious belief alone prevents you from recommending some form of 
therapy ... ’, the medical practitioner should advise the patient who can then seek 
care elsewhere.375  There is no requirement for the medical practitioner to facilitate 
the transfer nor to pass on medical records.  In the section on professional 
independence, the medical practitioner has the ‘ ... right to refuse to carry out 
services ... ’ that he or she considers professionally unethical or against his or her 
moral convictions,376 but again there is no requirement to facilitate transfer of the 
patient and the patient’s medical records to another medical practitioner.  The only 
mention of records is the requirement to ‘[m]aintain accurate contemporaneous 
clinical records’.377 
 
                                                      
370 World Medical Association, WMA International Code of Medical Ethics.  Adopted by the 3rd 
General Assembly of the World Medical Association, London, England, October 1949. 
371 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at 2014). 
372 Ibid [3.15.2]. 
373 Ibid [8.4.7]. 
374 Australian Medical Association, AMA Code of Ethics - 2004 (at November 2006). 
375 Ibid [1.1p]. 
376 Ibid [3d]. 
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The AMA Position Statement on Conscientious Objection recognises sincerely-
held beliefs and moral concerns, but not self-interest or discrimination.378  It 
counsels the medical practitioner to continue to provide treatment in an emergency 
even if it conflicts with personal beliefs.379  This statement also provides that the 
medical practitioner must continue to treat the patient with dignity and respect 
despite having an objection to the proposed procedure and may continue to provide 
other treatment.380  Once again, there is no requirement that the doctor should 
facilitate transfer to another practitioner, though patients must be advised that they 
have the right to see another doctor.381  There is also no mention of transfer of 
medical records. 
 
Acceptance of the medical practitioner’s right to decline to provide a medical 
service on account of a conscientious objection that is documented in Australian 
codes and position statements protects the medical practitioner but can leave the 
patient without access to legal procedures.  This may not be a major problem in 
larger communities where there are more practitioners, but may cause great 
hardship in smaller centres without alternatives.  Even where other practitioners are 
available, the lack of assistance to transfer to another practitioner can leave a 
vulnerable patient without necessary treatment.  Lack of assistance to transfer 
throws the responsibility on the patient to try to determine in advance what the 
attitude of the medical practitioner is going to be, not easy for a patient who is less 
than self-reliant and who is conscious of the power differential in the doctor-patient 
relationship.   
 
In these circumstances it would be sensible for the MBA Code to require medical 
practitioners to put up a notice making clear those procedures that the medical 
practitioner will not perform on conscientious grounds.  Similarly, a requirement 
for a doctor to facilitate transfer of a patient, and the patient’s medical records, to 
another doctor would assist the patient to have access to legally-available medical 
procedures.  The main problem with a requirement to transfer would be if there 
were an emergency situation.  As mentioned above, the AMA Position Statement 
on Conscientious Objection makes clear that appropriate emergency treatment 
must be provided even if that treatment conflicts with the personal beliefs and 
values of the medical practitioner.  However, once there is a requirement in the 
                                                      
378 Australian Medical Association, Position Statement on Conscientious Objection (2013) [2]. 
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MBA Code, either or both to put up a notice or to facilitate transfer of patient and 
medical records then that requirement becomes part of medical professionalism.   
 
(b) United Kingdom 
The GMC Code382 is more specific.  Paragraph 52 provides that a doctor with a 
conscientious objection to a particular procedure must advise the patient of the 
right to see another doctor and provide sufficient information for the patient to 
exercise that right.  The doctor must not express disapproval of the patient’s ‘ ... 
lifestyle, choices or beliefs ... ’ and must assist the patient by arranging for another 
‘suitably qualified colleague’ to take over where it is not practicable for the patient 
to arrange to do so.  There is no mention of transfer of records, but the clause could 
be interpreted such that where a colleague takes over ‘ ... your role ... ’ this would 
include access to medical records. 
 
This procedure has the advantage of giving equal weight to the rights of each party.  
The practitioner is relieved of an obligation to treat against conscience and the 
patient is not abandoned. 
 
 
(c) International 
Following ‘heated debate’ about whether health professionals had the right to 
refuse to carry out medical procedures to which they object on moral or religious 
grounds, a survey of medical practitioners in USA reported by Curlin et al found 
that most believe that it is ethically permissible to explain moral objections to 
patients and to assist in referring the patient to another medical practitioner who 
does not object to the proposed procedure.383  However, there is a substantial 
number of physicians who do not see that they have any obligation to advise 
patients about their objection, nor to refer them to another physician.384  This 
throws the onus on patients to initiate discussions to determine the attitude of the 
doctor and to find further information.  The findings of this study were that male 
physicians and those who were religious were most likely to express objections to 
morally controversial medical treatment and least likely to advise their patients of 
this, nor refer them to physicians who might undertake these procedures.385  In the 
                                                      
382 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013). 
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wake of the Canadian Supreme Court’s Carter v Canada ruling386 that denial of 
physician-assisted suicide contravenes the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,387 the Canadian parliament has now passed legislation to permit medical 
assistance for suffering patients who wish to die.  Christian medical practitioners 
there have been agonising about their responsibility to refer patients where 
personal conscience will not permit them to provide assistance in dying.388 
 
Conscience clauses have been legislated in nearly all states in the USA, permitting 
health practitioners to refuse to participate in procedures to which they have a 
religious or moral objection.389  In addition the Federal Hyde-Weldon Amendment 
does not even require the objection to be based on personal belief or conscience, 
any reason being permitted.390  These clauses permit health professionals to refuse 
to provide services they find objectionable.  They may also refuse to refer the 
patient to someone else without a similar moral objection and may even refuse to 
inform the patient of alternative legal options.391  Swartz tells of a pharmacist who, 
when presented with a prescription for an oral contraceptive, not only refused to 
dispense the medication, he failed to ask the patient if she had any medical 
conditions where pregnancy might prove dangerous.  He refused to inform her of 
other pharmacies that might dispense the medication.  When the patient located 
another pharmacy, he refused to transfer the prescription.  This conduct led to a 
complaint being made to the relevant disciplinary body.392  Judges subsequently 
determined that ‘ ... the state’s interest in assuring that professionals practice [sic] 
their professions in a competent manner and that patients have access to requested 
care outweighed the pharmacist’s constitutional rights to exercise his religion 
freely’.393 
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2 Arguments Against Conscience Clauses 
Health professionals are entitled to monopoly practice yet assert the right to deny 
patients access to alternative providers on the grounds that giving patients 
information about alternatives makes those health professionals complicit in the 
objectionable practice.394  Charo criticises this attitude whilst recognising that 
health professionals do not have to violate their own consciences.  She suggests 
that a valid referral to another practitioner respects the conscience of the refusing 
medical practitioner while similarly respecting the views of the patient.  They 
should not be at odds when the convictions of both can be accommodated.395 
 
A similar point has been made by Dickens396 who argues that conscientious 
objection has now become a sword rather than a shield against having to perform 
medical procedures against the religious beliefs of the medical practitioner.  
Assertion by a medical practitioner (as noted above, mainly males) of a right to 
refuse a procedure where the reproductive health of a woman may be at risk is a 
denial of her right to safe, competent medical care.  Like Charo, Dickens considers 
that referral is a sound way of accommodating the beliefs of both medical 
practitioner and patient.397   
 
Swartz maintains that courts have been less willing than legislators to grant blanket 
refusal rights, especially to institutional bodies that can be characterised as public 
or quasi-public.398  The problem for many patients is that, in a particular area, the 
only provider may be a religious body.  Yet, Swartz reports that some state courts 
have characterised private hospitals as ‘quasi-public’ so that they were not entitled 
to refuse to perform legally available abortions.399  However, courts have been 
more sympathetic to individuals who have been dismissed for religiously-based 
refusals to participate in abortions.400 
 
Swartz also tells of a medical practitioner who refused to perform an abortion on a 
pregnant woman with an infection in her amniotic fluid, the recommended 
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preferred therapy.  In consequence of the refusal, the woman suffered septic shock 
and had to have a hysterectomy.401  The result was the prioritising of the moral 
objection over the patient’s health.402  Swartz takes the view that medical codes of 
ethics should specify that the professional is professionally obligated to provide the 
necessary care ‘ ... so long as it is not medically contra-indicated, prohibited from 
the standpoint of professional ethics, or illegal’. 403  She considers that this is 
especially true for medical professionals who, because of their state-granted 
licences ‘ ... hold a monopoly on the type of care they provide’.404   
 
Likewise, both Dickens405 and Charo406 argue that the existence of a monopoly of 
medical practice in the hands of medical practitioners means that they should not 
be able to hold their patients hostage.  As Dickens remarks, the physician receives 
the licence or registration to practise based upon mastery of medical science, not 
upon personal religious beliefs.407 
 
Savulescu contends that the doctor’s conscience has no place in public medicine 
and goes as far as to state that any doctor who compromises the delivery of medical 
services to clients on conscience grounds should be punished by removal of his or 
her licence to practise.408   
 
It should be noted in passing that conscientious objection to performing a particular 
legally available procedure could be seen as one extreme of a continuum where 
patient-centred care lies in the centre. The opposite extreme to refusals based on 
moral or religious grounds, is the over-zealous advocacy of treatment forcing a 
particular moral perspective on the patient by depriving the patient of information 
about alternative options.  As will be seen in Chapter IV, in the Scottish case of 
Montgomery,409 the medical practitioner’s moral judgement that vaginal birth is 
superior to a caesarian section, even in an anxious diabetic mother, led to a 
catastrophic outcome. 
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In the landmark case of R v Bourne410 where the legality of access to an abortion 
for a young rape victim was in question, Macnaghten J criticised the circumstances 
where obstetricians might refuse to perform an abortion based upon personal 
religious sentiments, saying: 
On the other hand, there are people who, from what are said to be religious reasons, 
object to the operation being performed under any circumstances.  That is not the 
law either.  On the contrary, a person who holds such an opinion ought not to be an 
obstetrical surgeon, for if a case arose where the life of the woman could be saved 
by performing the operation and the doctor refused to perform it because of his 
religious opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of being brought 
before this Court on a charge of manslaughter by negligence.411 
 
As can be seen, the professional obligation to make the patient the medical 
practitioner’s first priority is not only undermined, but can be repudiated where a 
medical practitioner refuses a ‘legal’ procedure and fails to compromise by 
referring the patient to a doctor who does not object to the procedure proposed.  
Consequently, the Medical Board of Australia should amend the MBA Code to 
adopt similar provisions to those in the GMC Code, that require the medical 
practitioner to facilitate transfer of the patient to another practitioner who has no 
moral objection to the procedure in question.  Obliging medical practitioners to 
display a notice where particular ‘legal’ procedures will not be performed, would 
also assist patients who may not want to ask. 
 
H CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that despite medicine’s fundamental notion of the 
centrality of the care of the patient, the drive for professionalism has not been able 
to eliminate behaviours of some medical practitioners that undermine this 
principle.  Charters of medical professionalism and codes of ethics spell out the 
way that doctors must deal with their patients.  Yet, as this chapter has detailed, 
medical practice is pervaded by such things as occurrences of dismissive behaviour 
towards patients, students being humiliated and the perfunctory observance of the 
principles of patient-centred care, all brought about by pressures on medical 
practitioners that detract from adherence to ethical and professional norms. 
 
Responses that are contrived to overcome these derogations from the primacy of 
patient-centred care may be many.  However, the emphasis on professionalism 
returns, time and time again, to the need for enhanced education of medical 
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practitioners in the fundamental tenets of medical ethics and medical 
professionalism.  This enhanced education process should lead to the internalising 
of principles that can sustain medical practitioners who are faced with ethical 
dilemmas in practice.  The accreditation processes for medical training established 
by the Medical Board of Australia could be brought to bear upon accredited 
educational institutions to amend their curricula to insist upon the promotion of the 
status of medical ethics in the education of future doctors.  The Board should also 
make sure that, when re-registering medical practitioners, medical ethics are dealt 
with in continuing professional education modules, even to the extent of insisting 
that each medical practitioner should have to revisit the subject at least every few 
years.  Constant reinforcement should lead practitioners to reflect and internalise 
the tenets of medical ethics and professionalism. 
 
The elevation of the status of medical ethics as a subject within medical schools 
must also be accompanied by adoption of medical ethics principles by those 
teachers whose behaviour has led to disrespectful and dismissive behaviour both 
towards patients and more junior medical practitioners.  The Medical Board of 
Australia has the power to discipline teachers and practitioners who are found to 
have shown dismissive behaviour towards patients, thus providing bad examples 
for medical students. 
 
Last but not least, the acceptance that medical practitioners can decline to perform 
a procedure because of a conscientious objection is a major derogation from the 
professional norm of the priority of the care of the patient.  The registration system 
designed to lead to safer patient care can have the perverse effect of detracting 
from patient care when the practical and legal monopoly given to medical 
practitioners leads to denial of treatment based upon the practitioner’s 
conscientious objection.   
 
The content of medical professionalism has been explored in this chapter.  Chapter 
III now turns to consider both the hard and the soft law underlying regulation of 
medical practitioners.  Statute and case law, particularly in disciplinary processes, 
both call on concepts of medical professionalism as the standard by which medical 
practitioners are to be judged.  Details of what professionalism comprises is to be 
found in codes, guidelines, charters and frameworks most of which are soft law 
instruments.  Chapter III argues that soft law can be as authoritative as the hard law 
that underpins it. 
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CHAPTER III: THE LEGAL REGIME UNDERPINNING 
MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS — HOW ‘HARD’ LAW 
AND ‘SOFT’ LAW CONVERGE TO GOVERN MEDICAL 
PRACTICE 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide the background to the legal 
regime that regulates the professional activities of medical practitioners in 
Australia.  This chapter’s secondary purpose is to scrutinise the Australian 
disciplinary regime for medical practitioners.  In all health systems based on the 
Western medical tradition, the first priority is the safety of individual members of 
the public.  The necessity to protect members of the public by making sure that its 
medical practitioners were properly trained led to the Medical Act 1858 (UK) that 
provided for a system of registration and a body to supervise its implementation.  
Likewise in Australia, legislation to ensure that medical practitioners had 
appropriate training and to establish the bodies to oversee implementation of this 
requirement, was passed in each jurisdiction.1 
 
However, since 2010 there has been a uniform system for registration and 
regulation of medical practitioners in Australia under the Health Practitioner 
Regulation National Law (the National Law).2  Firstly, medical practitioners are 
governed under the ‘hard law’ of the National Law.  The National Law lays down 
the structure of, and the bodies that must implement, the regulatory scheme.3  
However, the National Law does not specify all necessary regulatory provisions 
but it sets out broad parameters for accreditation of educational institutions and 
health care providers4 and for registration and renewal of registration of health 
practitioners.5  The National Law also institutes the regulatory arrangements for 
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5 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Part 7. 
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monitoring of conduct and for disciplining of health practitioners.6  Apart from 
these specific provisions, it then gives to ‘industry’ bodies, including the relevant 
National Board,7 the power to develop the ‘soft law’ comprised in charters, codes, 
guidelines, frameworks and standards8 that provide the more detailed specification 
of both technical and ethical conduct.  These regulatory instruments are intended to 
secure co-operation from members of the regulated profession and their 
compliance to achieve the outcomes desired.9 
 
This chapter commences by analysing what is comprised in the idea of soft law as 
the way in which complex regulatory environments can be effectively and 
efficiently monitored.10  Soft law is intended to influence behaviour11 and can be as 
effective as statute in securing compliance with specified norms of conduct.12   
 
As soft law is not directly enforceable under the terms of a statute, how does this 
vast array of instruments intended to have regulatory effect actually affect 
behaviour?  This chapter grounds its analysis on features of the influential theory 
of effective regulation developed by Ayres and Braithwaite in their well-known 
book, Responsive Regulation.13  A range of reports aimed at enhancing safety in the 
Australian health system has used the Responsive Regulation approach.14  
Responsive regulation influences behaviour by way of a process of persuasion 
backed by the threat of escalating sanctions.  This chapter examines the features of 
responsive regulation as applied to health care and shows it to be an efficient and 
effective but relatively cheap technique for securing regulatory compliance. 
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The chapter then scrutinises the hard and soft law that directly affect the way 
medical professionals practise in Australia.  After that, this chapter analyses the 
disciplinary system in place for health practitioners, exploring the rationale behind 
any decision to discipline and its outcomes.   
 
The chapter continues by summarising the complementary roles of both hard and 
soft law in the regulation and discipline of medical practitioners.  In this context, 
the dichotomy between hard and soft law is sometimes clear.  However, this 
chapter will demonstrate how the two can converge.  The total elimination of 
disciplinary proceedings is virtually impossible, as the determinations of 
disciplinary cases attest.  The conduct of many medical practitioners undermines 
the profession’s efforts to demonstrate to a sceptical public that the welfare of the 
patient is truly the first priority of the medical profession.  Scepticism has been 
generated by recurring reports of medical scandals in both Australia and the United 
Kingdom.15  
 
This chapter also examines reported cases in courts and tribunals for the period 
from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2016.  Chapter I pointed out the reasons for choosing 
this time frame.  This investigation calls attention to the recurring patterns of 
conduct of some medical practitioners that has led to the proceedings.  As tribunals 
constantly reiterate, disciplinary proceedings are primarily concerned to protect the 
public from substandard practice16 and to provide a deterrent to other 
practitioners.17  Two of the recurring behaviours identified by tribunals are the 
inadequacy of medical records and deficiencies in clinical standards.  Each of these 
behaviours is then scrutinised and suggestions made concerning ways that these 
behaviours might be remedied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
15 See eg, Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016);  Australian Commission on 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, Review of the Department of Health and Human Services' 
Management of a Critical Issue at Djerriwah Health Services (November 2015).  
16 See eg, Health Care Complaints Commission v Priyamanna No 2 [2016] NSWCATOD 3 [11];  
Health Care Complaints Commission v Chowdhury (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 127 [15]. 
17 Health Care Complaints Commission v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 [35] (Meagher JA). 
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B QUASI-REGULATION AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
 
1 Introduction 
This section examines the way in which soft law18 has emerged as the dominant 
method of regulation.  This examination does not consider soft law as applied to 
the activities of government bodies such as the Department of Health.  Rather, it is 
concerned with the impact of soft law on individuals and organisations in the 
private sector and those that provide services subject to government supervision or 
financing, such as public hospitals.  The Report of the Commonwealth 
Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, the Grey Letter Law report 
refers to ‘the principle that mandatory regulation should be the minimum necessary 
to achieve the set objectives’.19  Yet in the context of health and safety, regulation 
may need to be more stringent than the minimum.20 
 
2 Definition of Soft Law 
As will be observed shortly, the idea of ‘soft law’ is an oxymoron.  Nevertheless, 
regulation by way of soft law is now more pervasive in modern society than 
specific legislation in influencing and controlling the behaviour of individuals and 
organisations.  As Weeks maintains:  ‘Soft law is best understood as occupying a 
space between instruments so soft as not to be law on the one hand and hard law of 
the positivist variety on the other’.21  Weeks also comments that:  ‘Soft law 
instruments occupy a broad section of the spectrum between unstructured 
discretion and legislation.’22   
 
The idea of soft law first arose in the context of international law rather than as an 
adjunct to statutes and regulations.  As Creyke and McMillan observe:  ‘ ... 
international law rules often appear in the guise of soft law ... ’23 as they lack the 
enforcement processes that underlie domestic legal systems.  Creyke and McMillan 
also point out that the term soft law is a non-sequitur.  Law is either hard because it 
is enforceable by the state, or it is not law.24  However, the term has now become 
                                                      
18 Sometimes called quasi-legislation or quasi-regulation. 
19 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) xiv. 
20 Ibid xxii. 
21 Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016) 17. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Robin Creyke and John McMillan, 'Soft Law v Hard Law' in Administrative Law in a Changing 
State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008) 377. 
24 Ibid 378. 
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part of the language of domestic law.  As the Administrative Review Council 
declared: ‘“[S]oft law” refers to a vast and varied range of instruments, among 
them codes of practice ... guidelines and rules of conduct ... ’.  Because there is 
such a huge variety of instruments that could potentially be considered ‘soft law’, 
there was a need for further delineation.  In the circumstances, the Council adopted 
the following:   
Soft law has been described in terms of rules of conduct or commitment that are set 
out in instruments that are without legal force although not devoid of all legal effect 
and that are intended to have some practical effect on behaviour.25 
 
The Administrative Review Council’s report, in its Pyramid of Business Rules, 
recognised some legislative instruments as soft law.26  However, Weeks expressly 
rejects that classification. 
To the extent that the Complex Regulation Report might be understood as including 
delegated legislation within the definition of soft law, this book will respectfully 
depart from its reasoning, regardless of whether such instruments are registered 
under the Legislation Act 2003 [sic].27  
 
The Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) provides for registration of legislative instruments 
as defined.  The First Parliamentary Counsel may include in the Register any 
information he or she considers ‘likely to be useful to users of the Register’.28  A 
legislative instrument is described in section 7 as follows:  
Generally the following are legislative instruments: 
 an instrument described or declared by a law (including this Act) to be a 
legislative instrument; 
 an instrument registered on the Federal Register of Legislation as a legislative 
instrument;  
 an instrument made under a power delegated by the Parliament that determines 
the law or alters its content. 
However, an instrument is not a legislative instrument if an Act (or a regulation 
under this act) so provides. 
 
Section 15K(1) of the Legislation Act 2003 provides that: ‘a legislative instrument 
is not enforceable by or against any person (including the Commonwealth) unless 
the instrument is registered as a legislative instrument’. Consequently, a great 
number of instruments of a ‘legislative character’ has been registered including 
some with administrative content that might otherwise be considered to be soft law.   
 
 
                                                      
25 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 5. 
26Ibid x. 
27 Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016) 15.   
28 Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 15A(4). 
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3 Rationale for Government Regulation 
Governments identify problems such as health or safety concerns, or defective 
market mechanisms before deciding how risks should be handled.29  Regulators 
have to decide whether explicit legislation is required, or whether soft law 
regulation will achieve the regulatory object.  Indeed, resolution of the problem can 
largely be handed over to the industry concerned to self-regulate.  Sometimes a soft 
law response should be instituted while a longer term solution to the identified 
problem can be found.30  
 
However, according to the Administrative Review Council, whatever regulatory 
arrangements are instituted, they should comply with the ‘ ... administrative law 
values of lawfulness, fairness, rationality, openness ... and efficiency’.31  Any 
associated accountability mechanisms must be both efficient and effective.32   
 
4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Soft Law Regulation 
Soft law regulation has several advantages over explicit legislation.  Whilst 
legislation has the advantage of enforceability, quasi-legislation can be developed 
or amended quickly to provide the greatest flexibility in changing circumstances.33  
One of the reasons for this is that development of soft law regulations is not subject 
to the intense scrutiny of the parliamentary process.34    
 
Soft law regulation provides the adaptability to deal with the broad range of 
situations that arise in day-to-day activities of bodies being regulated.  It can be ‘ ... 
helpful in fleshing out broad legal principles and clarifying regulatory 
requirements’.35  Soft law provisions can be relatively easy to amend if they are 
found not to be operating in the manner envisaged when they were promulgated.36  
Soft law can also produce innovative solutions to perceived problems at the least 
                                                      
29 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) 50. 
30 Ibid xxi. 
31 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 16. 
32 Ibid 4. 
33 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) 40;  Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016) 27. 
34 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) 41;  Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016) 29. 
35 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 6. 
36 Ibid 31. 
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cost,37 especially where governments can secure co-operation with the affected 
industry.38  
 
However, some of the perceived advantages of soft law regulation may, on 
occasion, turn out to disadvantage some industry players.  The advantage of speed 
and flexibility may be offset by lack of detailed scrutiny leading to a failure to take 
adequate care to consider all possible contingencies.39   
 
Likewise, the compliance burden of some standards may be excessive on small 
operators, who may not have the resources to comply with some highly technical 
rules.40  Sometimes there is a perception in an industry that regulators have 
acquired too much discretion.41  In addition, challenges to soft law rules can be 
difficult and expensive.42 
 
Increasingly, governments are incorporating external materials such as standards 
into delegated legislation, acknowledged by the Administrative Review Council as 
a species of soft law.43  Section 14 of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) authorises the 
incorporation into legislation by government regulators of instruments prepared 
outside of government.  This section is a recognition that industry bodies are more 
familiar with the concerns of their particular operations and can bring industry 
expertise to the regulatory table.  Standards promulgated by Standards Australia, or 
guidelines prepared by industry bodies can be adopted into legislation and be 
registered as legislative instruments making them enforceable.  
 
                                                      
37 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 5. 
38 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997), 26.  For example, in the context of medical practice, soft law regulation can call 
upon the huge reservoir of technical expertise only available when the industry is consulted (Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 38). 
39 Robin Creyke and John McMillan, 'Soft Law v Hard Law' in Administrative Law in a Changing 
State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008) 377, 389. 
40 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) 1, 31. 
41 Editorial, 'Neuter AHPRA, Former Medical Board Chief Says', Medical Observer (Online) (25 
February 2016) <http://www.medicalobserver.com.au/professional-news/neuter-ahpra-former-
medical-board-chief-says>. 
42 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 14;  see generally also, Greg Weeks, Soft Law 
and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
43 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) x. 
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As Abetz states:  ‘There are very sensible and practical reasons for incorporating 
standards in delegated legislation’.44  Advantages include less cumbersome 
legislation, uniformity of standards both nationally and internationally.  Where the 
legislation adopts the standard as in force ‘from time to time’, amendments are 
more simply made than having to totally remake the regulation.45  However, whilst 
according to the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth), a legislative instrument may 
incorporate ‘ ... any matter contained in any other instrument or writing as in force 
or existing at the time when the first-mentioned instrument commences’46 it must 
not incorporate ‘ ...  any matter contained in an instrument or other writing as in 
force or existing from time to time’.47  
 
Yet, adoption into delegated legislation by government agencies of Australian 
Standards48 without thorough assessment to determine whether they are apposite 
for the purpose for which they are being applied can be heavy-handed, when a 
lighter touch might have been adequate.49  In addition, because of the assignment 
by Standards Australia in 2003 of its copyright to a company called SAI Global 
Limited, access to the standards even by governments and libraries is strictly 
limited.50  The ‘Rule of Law’ principle that ‘ ... the law must be accessible, as well 
as clear and intelligible’ is thereby compromised.51   
 
5 Self-regulation and Co-regulation 
The Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation defined 
‘regulation’ as follows:  ‘Regulation includes any law or “rule” that influences the 
way people behave.  Regulation is not limited to government legislation;  and it 
need not be mandatory’.  It views the various forms of regulation on a spectrum 
running from self-regulation, through quasi-regulation to explicit government 
regulation via statutes, rules, regulations and other legislative instruments. 52 
                                                      
44 Peter Abetz, A Gap in Scrutiny?  Access to Australian Standards Adopted in Delegated Legislation 
(Paper presented at Australia-New Zealand Scrutiny of Legislation Conference, Perth, 11-14 July 
2016) 3. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 14(1)(b). 
47 Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 14(2). 
48 Developed by Standards Australia, a non-governmental, not-for-profit, standards body. 
49 Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, Rethinking Regulation, Report (January 
2006) 175. 
50 Peter Abetz, A Gap in Scrutiny?  Access to Australian Standards Adopted in Delegated Legislation 
(Paper presented at Australia-New Zealand Scrutiny of Legislation Conference, Perth, 11-14 July 
2016) 5. 
51 Ibid, 4. 
52 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) 2. 
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Self-regulation is the method by which an industry can be regulated with minimum 
intrusion by government.  Self-regulation can be achieved by voluntary agreement 
between industry members that a specific set of principles will apply.53  Failure to 
adhere to these principles may lead to expulsion from an industry association or 
other disciplinary processes.54  Industry players may also commit themselves to 
varying review mechanisms, such as peer review, industry-based dispute-resolution 
mechanisms and internal complaint-resolution.55   
 
Co-regulation can come about when governments are involved with industry 
bodies in setting minimum standards by legislation and co-operating with the 
expertise of the industry concerned in preparing industry codes or other 
mechanisms.56  Co-regulation through quasi-regulation provides detailed guidelines 
for furthering the broad objectives of government policies and provides any 
industry being regulated with greater certainty and consistency.57  As the 
Administrative Review Council commented:  ‘ ... [c]o-regulation seeks to combine 
the advantages of the predictability and binding nature of legislation with a more 
flexible self-regulatory approach’.58 
 
6 The Theory behind Responsive Regulation 
Because of the complexity of modern governmental regulation,59 Ayres and 
Braithwaite contend that good regulatory policy is based on the recognition of the 
interdependence between private and public regulation.  If government regulators 
want to achieve a particular policy outcome, the industry will be more amenable to 
regulation if it is consulted about the intended outcome and how best to get there.60  
However, regulators are also concerned that industry participants actually comply 
                                                      
53 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 7. 
54 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 95. 
55 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 14. 
56 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 9. 
57 Robin Creyke, and John McMillan, 'Soft Law v Hard Law' in Administrative Law in a Changing 
State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008) 377, 388. 
58 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 9. 
59 Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, Rethinking Regulation, Report (January 
2006) 1. 
60 Ibid xii. 
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with the regulatory landscape that has been developed.  It is here where the well-
known Ayres and Braithwaite theory of responsive regulation can be effective. 
 
Responsive regulation rewards ‘good’ behaviour by permitting a high level of self-
regulation, or at least by minimising controls, but punishes non-compliant 
behaviour by gradually increasing punitive sanctions.  Government regulators have 
extensively relied on self-regulation of industries.  There is more likely to be 
compliance when an industry group is involved in and accepts the regulatory 
scheme, because the industry has been deeply involved in its preparation.61  
Responsive regulation is based upon appealing to the enlightened self-interest of 
individual and corporate players who see that they ultimately benefit from 
observance of regulatory requirements.62  According to Ayres and Braithwaite, 
persuasion is cheaper than punishment.63 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite argue for a ‘speak softly but carry a big stick approach’.64  
By that, they mean that the regulator has to have a broad series of escalating 
sanctions that can be implemented when compliance is deficient.  Having only a 
few sanctions, so stringent that courts and regulators are reluctant to use them,65 
reduces their regulatory impact.  By being willing to escalate up the pyramid of 
sanctions for ‘bad’ behaviour, and equally to reward compliance by implementing 
a softer form of regulation, they argue that it is possible to achieve satisfactory 
regulatory obedience at the least cost and aggravation to all parties.66 
 
7 The Limits to Self-Regulation of Medical Practitioners 
In keeping with the Ayres and Braithwaite theory, industry self-regulation in the 
medical profession is the preferred strategy.  ‘When self-regulation works well, it 
is the least burdensome approach from the point of view of both taxpayers and the 
regulated industry’.67  Self-regulation in the medical profession turns on the fact 
that it is the profession itself that is most familiar with its unique technical and 
practical features.  As outlined in Chapter II, the medical profession has 
historically claimed the right to self-regulate in exchange for the expectation that it 
                                                      
61 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 7. 
62 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992 19. 
63 Ibid 26. 
64 Ibid 40. 
65 Ibid 36. 
66 John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation' (2011) (44) University of British 
Columbia Law Review 475, 502. 
67 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992 38. 
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will use its specialised knowledge in the service of the community.  As Dame Janet 
Smith commented: 
[t]here was a strong belief, apparently shared by Government, that the medical 
profession itself provided the best (indeed the only) means of imposing high 
standards of clinical care and professional conduct on doctors and of monitoring 
those standards.  It was believed it would do so rigorously.  Hence, matters of 
professional concern were left to be determined ... with the GMC [General Medical 
Council] as ultimate arbiter of fitness to practise.  This belief, which was fostered by 
the profession, was difficult to challenge in an area involving questions of 
professional expertise.68 
 
However, despite the undoubted benefits of involving members of a specific 
industry in developing and managing their own regulatory system, governments in 
Australia have chosen to closely monitor regulation of medical practitioners.  A 
tradition of comprehensive self-regulation by the medical profession in the past 
was not able to prevent aberrant behaviour by a small group of medical 
practitioners and has led to their regulation becoming more prescriptive.  The 
recurring ‘scandals’ affecting medical practice,69 including in Australia, have led 
the public and government regulators to consider that the medical profession 
cannot be trusted to preside over a totally self-regulatory system.  Faunce and 
Bolsin commented that, in a series of three ‘whistleblowing sagas’ in Australia, in 
each case ‘ ... the problems were exacerbated by a poor institutional culture of self-
regulation ... ’.70 
 
As Dixon-Woods et al observe in the United Kingdom context, public trust in the 
profession to regulate itself to provide safe outcomes to patients by singling out 
and removing ‘bad apples’ has been substantially dented.  There is evidence that 
the profession has been more interested in shielding its members from disciplinary 
actions than demonstrating zero-tolerance towards serious infractions.71  Similarly, 
Dame Janet Smith reported: 
[t]he GMC was ‘doctor-centred’. It appeared to assume that all doctors were good, 
competent and conscientious until proved otherwise. It would deal with the 
profession’s ‘bad apples’ for the sake of the profession. It would do so in its own 
way and did not welcome scrutiny. Its procedures were designed to be fair to doctors 
and to ensure that no doctor would lose his/her right to practise without very good 
cause. It did not focus on the reasonable expectations of the public and it did not see 
                                                      
68 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [30]. 
69 See eg, the Bristol Royal Infirmary, the Shipman Inquiry, Djerriwarrh Health Services, Graeme 
Reeves, Jayant Patel, Off-Protocol Prescribing at St Vincent’s Hospital. 
70 Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for 
Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44, 44. 
71 Mary Dixon-Woods, Karen Yeung and Charles L Bosk, 'Why Is UK Medicine No Longer a Self-
Regulating Profession?  The Role of Scandals Involving "Bad Apple" Doctors' (2011) 73 Social 
Science and Medicine 1452, 1457. 
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itself as having a duty to ensure that all members of the medical profession were 
willing and able to provide a proper professional service.72 
 
In Australia, Judith Healy has written extensively about regulation of health care 
professionals.73  Healey concurs with Mary Dixon-Woods and her colleagues and 
with Dame Janet Smith by saying: 
The limited use of stern disciplinary sanctions by medical boards can be interpreted 
in three ways.  First, most patients’ complaints may be on minor matters that do not 
warrant a stern response to doctors; second, the boards apply a responsive approach 
that aims to remediate, rather than punish doctors; or third, the medical boards are 
‘soft on doctors’.  The registration boards rightly aim to correct rather than cull 
poorly performing health professionals, have developed a hierarchy of options to 
respond proportionately to complaints, and can direct practitioners down a ‘health 
pathway’ as well as a ‘disciplinary pathway’. While revoking the licences of doctors 
who engage in gross infractions clearly is necessary, some argue that there is no 
evidence that culling a few bad apples acts as a deterrent and so improves the 
general quality of medical care.  As medical boards have been reluctant regulators 
except in egregious cases, the public suspect [sic] they are more concerned to 
protect professionals than to protect patients.74  
 
Kennedy was an early critic of the medical profession in the United Kingdom, 
where in his Reith lectures he declared that  
[p]rofessional self-regulation is always open to the criticism that it is not sufficiently 
energetic, that ranks will be closed to protect a fellow member, rather than opened to 
admit that questioning outsider.  Certainly, the medical profession can never be 
expected to become the champion of the consumer’s cause.75 
 
Furthermore, when analysing why the United Kingdom medical profession was no 
longer wholly self-regulating, Dixon-Woods et al noted: 
The organising collegial principle of the medical profession was that all fully 
qualified members were equal in authority, self-directing and self-disciplined, and 
sufficiently conditioned by norms of conduct and their individual consciences, to 
ensure that all members would conduct themselves honourably.  In effect, it was 
assumed that there were no “bad apples”.76 
 
Thus, the medical profession provides a prime example of the need for more 
intrusive regulation by government regulatory authorities than is suggested by its 
former insistence upon its right to wholly self-regulate.  However, whilst self-
regulation by the medical profession has often been shown to be deficient, 
                                                      
72 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [15.47]. 
73 Healy has written both on her own and with collaborators in the Regulatory Institutions Network at 
The Australian National University. 
74 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 129. 
75 Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 125. 
76 Mary Dixon-Woods, Karen Yeung and Charles L Bosk, 'Why Is UK Medicine No Longer a Self-
Regulating Profession?  The Role of Scandals Involving "Bad Apple" Doctors' (2011) 73 Social 
Science and Medicine 1452, 1455. 
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government regulators who wish to be more prescriptive have needed to call upon 
the expertise of the medical profession to determine the detail of regulation.77   
 
In the context of the United Kingdom, Dame Janet Smith, referring to the expertise 
in the General Medical Council, commented: 
I would like to believe that the GMC’s culture will continue to change in the right 
direction by virtue of its own momentum. However, I do not feel confident that it 
will do so. I am sure that there are many people within the GMC, both members and 
staff, who want to see the regulation of the medical profession based on the 
principles of ‘patient-centred’ medicine and public protection. Indeed, I think it is 
likely that all members are theoretically in favour of those principles. The problem 
seems to be that, when specific issues arise, opposing views are taken and, as in the 
past, the balance tends to tip in favour of the interests of doctors.78
 
8 Responsive Regulation in Health Care 
Because of the limitations on self-regulation by medical professionals as outlined 
above, the responsive regulation model has been promoted by Braithwaite, Healy 
and other colleagues to improve safety in the health care system.79  They have 
extensively researched ways to reduce the alarming incidence of injuries and death 
to patients, particularly in hospitals.  They deal with mandatory reporting of 
sentinel events, benchmarking in accordance with clinical protocols and continuous 
quality improvement.80  Whilst these matters are critically important, there is an 
equally important deficit in information about how individual medical practitioners 
should respond to their overarching obligation to good patient-centred medical 
practice and how a safety culture can be instilled at the individual level.   
 
Most medical practitioners work in or are employed by private practices that 
charge a fee for service.81  The choice to practise as a private practitioner is 
particularly appealing where the medical practitioner has acquired advanced 
degrees or recognition by one of the prestigious specialist colleges of medicine.  
The preference for private practice is bolstered by a constitutional guarantee in the 
                                                      
77 National Law s 33 where National Boards are appointed.  As National Law s 35 provides, one of 
the functions of a National Board is to ‘develop or approve’ standards, codes and guidelines.  See 
Section C below. 
78 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [27.308]. 
79 See eg, Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011);  Judith Healy and 
John Braithwaite, 'Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation' (2006) 184(10) 
Supplement MJA S56;  John Braithwaite, Judith Healy and Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health 
Safety and Quality (Discussion Paper, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2005). 
80 John Braithwaite, Judith Healy and Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality 
(Discussion Paper, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2005) 18. 
81 Department of Health Doctor Connect web site 
<http://www.doctorconnect.gov.au/internet/otd/publishing.nsf/Content/workingInPrivatePractice>. 
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social services power under section 51(xxiiiA) of the Australian Constitution.82  
The overall effect of cases against the Commonwealth under section 51(xxiiiA) is 
now a practical guarantee that medical practitioners who choose to do so, can carry 
on a private practice on their own account and cannot be forced to become 
employees of the Commonwealth to provide medical services.83  As so many do 
practise on their own account, the opportunities to use regulatory tools like 
contractual performance obligations is limited.  In addition, private work like this 
reduces the possibility that colleagues can observe inadequate behaviour.84 
 
Healy has designed a regulatory pyramid85 following her more recent research, as a 
modification of one used by Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan in their discussion paper 
for the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC).86  
Her pyramid is reproduced below.87  
 
                                                      
82 The terms of s51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution provide that the Commonwealth of Australia has 
power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to 
the provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, unemployment, 
pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorize 
any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances. 
It is the words in brackets that have been interpreted by the cases as providing a constitutional 
guarantee of private practice. 
83 See eg, General Practitioners Society v Commonwealth (1980) 145 CLR 532, 553–554 (Gibbs J). 
84 Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970) 152. 
85 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 5. 
86 John Braithwaite, Judith Healy and Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality 
(Discussion Paper, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2005) 15. 
87 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 5. 
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As quoted above,1 Healy comments that medical regulators have been ‘reluctant 
regulators’ except in egregious cases leading members of the public to suspect that 
they are more concerned to protect the professionals concerned than the public.2   
                                                      
1 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 129.  
2 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 129. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Command  
and Control 
Criminal or  
civil penalty 
Licence revocation  
or suspension 
Legal instruments 
Ombudsman 
________________________ 
Meta-regulation 
Enforced self-regulation 
External clinical audit 
Mandated adverse event reporting 
Performance indicators/targets 
_________________________________ 
Co-regulation 
Benchmarking 
Registration boards 
Disciplinary procedures 
Advisory councils 
__________________________________________ 
Self-regulation 
Accreditation of health services 
Clinical governance 
Peer review 
Standard-setting 
_________________________________________________ 
Market Mechanisms 
Pay for performance 
Performance contracts 
Public reporting 
Consumer information 
___________________________________________________________ 
Voluntarism 
Clinical protocols 
Personal monitoring 
Continuing education 
Cultural change 
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Likewise, in the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council came under 
suspicion from the public.  As Dame Janet Smith reports: 
The fact is that the public has come to regard the GMC with suspicion and distrust 
because it perceives that the GMC acts, not in the interests of patients, but in the 
interests of doctors.3 
 
Healy has also been highly critical of the medical profession’s efforts to embrace 
safer health care.  Her view is that medical practitioners have not been prepared to 
acknowledge that human beings make mistakes and consequently, that they must 
design safer systems where adverse events cannot occur.  As she observes: 
High-risk industries assume both human fallibility and system fallibility, but the 
health sector has been reluctant until recently to acknowledge that professionals can 
make mistakes and that systems can fail.  This is paradoxical since the health 
professions value learning from failures as well as successes ... .  [There are] 
regulatory efforts to inculcate a safety culture and to design safer systems.  This is a 
challenge since the medical profession, in particular ... has been reluctant to 
overcome its complacency, to put patients first, and to comply with interventions to 
improve safety and quality.4 
 
The Healy regulatory pyramid is well adapted to the safety aspect of health care 
but is not as appropriate for encouraging better professional embrace of patient-
centred care.  For example, there is no specific mention of professional codes of 
conduct.  Codes could be added to the list of co-regulatory interventions through 
the melding of hard law requirements with the need to draw on professional 
expertise in development of codes.  The pyramid does advert to the place of 
clinical protocols and continuing professional education but, once again, these 
appear to be in the context of the promotion of a safety consciousness rather than 
promotion of quality patient-centred care.   
 
When the medical regulator considers that there is a threat to patient safety caused 
by conduct of a medical practitioner, such as conduct specified in section 140 of 
the National Law providing for mandatory notifications,5 disciplinary proceedings 
can be instituted.  Section D will outline the hierarchy of disciplinary sanctions 
available under the National Law.  Healy suggests a pyramid of available sanctions 
that could be adapted to medical disciplinary matters, by the addition of conditions, 
fines, reprimands, cautions and suspension.6  As the cases summarised in Section D 
                                                      
3 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [15.77]. 
4 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 137. 
5 See Section D below. 
6 Judith Healy, Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011) 221. 
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show, a pyramid of sanctions of this type is already being implemented by 
tribunals in the discipline of medical practitioners.7 
 
9 Conclusion 
Soft law has become the preferred means by which governments achieve 
compliance by industries with overall regulatory goals.8  This section has shown 
that soft law regulation can be applied to control a far broader range of activities 
and conduct than can total reliance on statute supported by the common law.  It can 
provide flexibility under changing circumstances.  It can be implemented more 
rapidly than hard law and can fill in gaps that become apparent as contingencies 
emerge.  Soft law development can also draw on a wider range of expertise than is 
possible in the legislative process, a factor that is important for developing soft law 
regulatory protocols for health practitioners..  
 
As the Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business has 
observed: ‘ ... there is much to be said for establishing the key principles and 
objectives in legislation and allowing regulators discretion in how they are applied 
including through subordinate or quasi-regulation’.9  Subordinate and quasi-
regulation are more appropriate to an industry or profession when the expertise of 
the profession is harnessed in their preparation. 
 
C HARD AND SOFT LAW GOVERNING MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
 
1 Introduction 
As the introduction to this chapter states, medical practitioners, along with all 
health practitioners, are subject to the provisions of the Health Practitioner 
Regulation National Law (the National Law) that specifies how they are to be 
regulated.  This legislation establishes, in some detail, the machinery for 
supervising the processes of registration of health practitioners.  Regulation of 
health practitioners is no longer achieved through a series of statutes that differ in 
content from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Whilst registration of health practitioners 
is constitutionally a matter for states and territories, the states and territories have 
                                                      
7 Section 196(2) of the National Law sets out a similar hierarchy of sanctions.  
8 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 38. 
9 Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, Rethinking Regulation, Report (January 
2006) 160.
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accepted that there are good overriding reasons why a ‘uniform’ system should be 
adopted.  For example, in New South Wales, Ms Carmel Tebbutt, as Deputy 
Premier and Minister for Health stated: 
Under the national law registered health practitioners will pay a single registration 
fee that will entitle them to work across the entire country without being required to 
meet additional criteria or pay additional fees.  The national law will ensure that 
nationally uniform processes and criteria exist for registering practitioners and 
accrediting educational programs.  The establishment of these uniform processes 
and standards will mean that uniformly high standards will be applied nationwide 
and that the public can have increased confidence that all registered health 
practitioners meet appropriately high standards.10   
 
Likewise, the Minister for Health in the Victorian Legislative Assembly, Mr 
Andrews stated: 
The cornerstone of the national law is protection of the public. It provides a 
framework for the regulation of health practitioners in relation to registration, 
accreditation, complaints and conduct, health and performance, and privacy and 
information sharing. It builds on the best elements of existing regulatory models, 
such as the Victorian Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (‘the HPR act’) [sic] 
and other health practitioner legislation throughout Australia.11  
 
This section explores the relevant provisions of the National Law concerning 
registration, accreditation and discipline.  However, as mentioned above, statutes 
are often too rigid to respond promptly to changing circumstances.  Hence, the 
need for a broad range of soft law regulatory instruments to enhance the 
effectiveness of the legislation.  This section also examines soft law, paying 
particular attention to the most important regulatory tools developed by ACSQHC 
and showing how these are necessary for the proper regulation of medical 
professionals.    
 
In addition, many professional bodies prepare and supervise codes of conduct for 
medical professionals, together with technical guidelines about appropriate 
treatment protocols.  This section will briefly review the relevant codes of conduct 
for the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP) and the Royal 
Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS) and provide some examples of treatment 
protocols and position statements.  
 
 
 
                                                      
10 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 October 2009 (Ms Carmel 
Tebbutt). 
11 Parliament of Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 October 2009 (Mr 
Andrews) 3695. 
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2 Background 
Following a report of the Productivity Commission in 2005,12 the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) determined that a national scheme be established 
to govern the registration, regulation and accreditation of all health practitioners.  
The report found that the system of state and territory registration and regulation at 
that time was inhibiting mobility of health professionals in a health system subject 
to perpetual personnel shortages.13  Because health regulation was not a power 
given to the Commonwealth of Australia under sections 51 or 52 of the Australian 
Constitution, or referred to it by a state under section 51(xxxvii) of the 
Constitution, responsibility for regulation and registration of health practitioners 
was devolved to individual states and territories.14  The resulting complexity led the 
Productivity Commission to argue for the establishment of a ‘ ... consolidated 
national accreditation regime ... ’ to ‘ ... encourage “cross-professional” workplace 
innovations ... ’ and to ‘ ... facilitate the development of uniform national 
registration standards for health professionals.’15  A meeting of COAG on 14 July 
2006 agreed to ‘establish a single national registration scheme for health 
professionals’, and a ‘single national accreditation scheme for health education and 
training’.16  The Intergovernmental Agreement for a National Registration and 
Accreditation Scheme for the Health Professions made between the 
Commonwealth and each state and territory was entered into on 26 March 2008.17  
COAG also agreed on 26 March 2008 that the scheme should commence on 1 July 
2010 based on Queensland legislation designated as the model for state and 
territory parallel legislation. 
 
3 Hard Law in the National Law 
Uniform legislation to govern the accreditation, registration and regulation of all 
health practitioners is now in place.  The legislation, first passed in Queensland as 
the ‘Schedule’ the terms of which are contained in section 4 of the Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld), has been mirrored in all 
states and territories of Australia creating the Health Practitioner Regulation 
                                                      
12 Productivity Commission, Australia's Health Workforce, Research Report, 2005. 
13 Ibid iii, 11. 
14 See eg, Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT);  Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW);  Medical 
Practice Act 2004 (SA);  Medical Practice Act 1994 (Vic);  Medical Act 1894 (WA). 
15 Productivity Commission, Australia's Health Workforce, Research Report, 2005 xxiv. 
16 Council of Australian Governments, Communique (Meeting, 14 July 2006) 4. 
17 Intergovernmental Agreement for a National Registration and Accreditation Scheme for the Health 
Professions (26 March 2008). 
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National Law (the National Law).  Each Australian jurisdiction has passed, in 
accordance with the National Law, complementary legislation that applies within 
its own area, known as the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 
(participating jurisdiction).  The primary justification for the National Law is to 
protect the public by ensuring that ‘ ... only health practitioners who are suitably 
trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered, 
... ’.18  
 
Part 4 of the National Law establishes the Australian Health Practitioner 
Regulation Agency (AHPRA), called the National Agency,19 as the central body 
for registration of health practitioners and for investigating professional conduct, 
performance and health of health practitioners.  AHPRA’s disciplinary processes 
operate across all jurisdictions except for New South Wales that has retained its 
Health Professional Councils Authority and Health Care Complaints Commission, 
and Queensland where the disciplinary function is performed by the Queensland 
Health Ombudsman.   
 
Part 5 of the National Law sets up National Boards.  Section 31 establishes 
National Health Practitioner Boards with powers over each of the 14 professions 
designated as health professions as named in the National Law.20  Members of each 
National Board are appointed by the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial 
Council comprising ‘ ... Ministers of the governments of the participating 
jurisdictions and the Commonwealth with portfolio responsibility for health.’21   
 
Under section 32, each National Board is given the powers that allow it to exercise 
its functions.  Section 35 outlines the functions of each National Board that include 
                                                      
18 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 3(2)(a). 
19 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 23(1). 
20 The National Boards are: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Practice Board of Australia; 
Chinese Medicine Board of Australia; 
Chiropractic Board of Australia; 
Dental Board of Australia; 
Medical Board of Australia; 
Medical Radiation Practice Board of Australia; 
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia; 
Occupational Therapy Board of Australia; 
Optometry Board of Australia; 
Osteopathy Board of Australia; 
Pharmacy Board of Australia; 
Physiotherapy Board of Australia; 
Podiatry Board of Australia; 
Psychology Board of Australia. 
21 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s5. 
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approving accreditation of programs of study submitted to it by an accreditation 
body, and developing registration standards to ensure appropriate qualifications for 
registration for members of the relevant health profession.  Among other functions, 
a National Board must also oversee ‘receipt, assessment and investigation’ of 
notifications concerning registered health practitioners or students,22 and establish 
panels to conduct hearings about ‘health and performance and professional 
standards for registered health professionals or students’.23  
 
Section 38(1) of the National Law imposes on a National Board the obligation24 to 
develop registration standards for health professionals, that must include provision 
for professional indemnity insurance, criminal history of applicants for registration 
and continuing professional development.  Section 38(2) also specifies standards 
including physical and mental health of applicants, but registration standards must 
not include any matter that is included in accreditation standards.25  
 
Section 39 of the National Law gives each National Board the discretion26 to 
develop and approve codes and guidelines that are to direct the activities of 
relevant health practitioners and also other matters applicable to the exercise of its 
functions.  In 2009 the Medical Board of Australia (MBA) issued a code of 
conduct under section 39 entitled Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for 
Doctors in Australia (the MBA Code).27  It incorporates by reference the Code of 
Ethics of the AMA,28 the Declaration of Geneva29 and the International Code of 
Medical Ethics30 issued by the World Medical Association (WMA), thus giving 
those instruments the same regulatory impact as the MBA Code itself.31  Section 39 
provides the legislative ‘hook’ for the soft law codes and guidelines that direct the 
conduct of health practitioners. 
 
                                                      
22 National Law s 35(g). 
23 National Law s 35 (h). 
24 The legislation uses the word ‘must’. 
25 National Law s 38(3). 
26 The legislation uses the word ‘may’. 
27 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at 2009). 
28 Australian Medical Association, AMA Code of Ethics - 2004 (at November 2006). 
29 Declaration of Geneva (1948).  Adopted by the General Assembly of World Medical Association at 
Geneva Switzerland, September 1948. 
30 World Medical Association, WMA International Code of Medical Ethics.  Adopted by the 3rd 
General Assembly of the World Medical Association, London, England, October 1949. 
31 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at 2009) [1.1]. 
 128 
Section 40 requires each National Board to consult widely about the contents of the 
registration standards and each code or guideline.  The MBA Code acknowledges 
the work of the Australian Medical Council and the input of many organisations 
including state and territory medical boards, plus the Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Ageing.32   
 
Section 41 of the National Law then provides that both registration standards and 
codes and guidelines approved by a National Board are admissible in disciplinary 
proceedings against a health practitioner registered under the provisions of the 
National Law ‘as evidence of what constitutes appropriate professional conduct or 
practice for the health profession’.  Because the MBA has exercised its discretion 
to prepare and promulgate the MBA Code, section 41 of the National Law invests 
that document with the enforceability of hard law, as if its specific provisions had 
been directly legislated.  Definitions of professional misconduct, unprofessional 
conduct or unsatisfactory professional performance under the National Law relate 
back to standards reasonably to be expected of a registered practitioner of 
equivalent training or experience in the circumstances of the practitioner before the 
relevant disciplinary body.  The disciplinary body has to call expert evidence from 
members of the profession as to what constitutes the specified level of training and 
experience before making a finding.  It is the finding, once made, that attracts any 
sanction.  Section D below analyses the disciplinary regime under the National 
Law and will illustrate this process by reference to a case before the Australian 
Capital Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT), Medical Board of 
Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 44. 
 
The MBA Code, is not only authorised under the National Law, but it is also a 
blueprint for professional conduct of medical practitioners in the sense of bringing 
together ‘standards that have long been at the core of medical practice’.33  Its 
provisions are to be used to provide a framework to guide professional judgement, 
to set standards against which professional conduct can be evaluated and to 
enhance the culture of medical professionalism.34  Consequently, registered 
medical practitioners must abide by the MBA Code as doing so is evidence of 
                                                      
32 The drafters also looked at similar documents from several countries, including Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand.  The 2014 review of the 2009 version of the MBA 
Code was performed ‘in house’ by AHPRA (Personal correspondence with AHPRA, 13 November 
2014). 
33 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at 2009) [1.1]. 
34 Ibid [1.2]. 
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appropriate professional conduct for them.  The MBA has also developed 
guidelines as follows: 
Sexual boundaries: guidelines for doctors; 
Guidelines for mandatory notifications; 
Guidelines for technology based patient consultations; 
Guidelines for advertising regulated health services; 
Guidelines – short-term training in a medical specialty for international medical 
graduates who are not qualified for general or specialist registration; 
Guidelines for registered medical practitioners who perform cosmetic medical and 
surgical procedures.35   
 
Therefore, section 41 of the National Law also confers on those guidelines 
enforceability like that of the MBA Code, that is, evidence that can support a 
disciplinary finding.   
 
4 Soft law Instruments 
The foregoing paragraphs outline the extent of the hard law regarding 
accreditation, registration and regulation of health practitioners.  The details of how 
these are to be achieved emerges in soft law instruments.36   
 
Health practice, particularly medical practice, is governed by a myriad of standards 
and guidelines not referred to in the National Law or drawn from it.  This is where 
the reach of other forms of soft law becomes clear.  Both the Commonwealth 
Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation and the Administrative Review 
Council have recognised that standards may be called upon by courts when 
determining whether an activity has been performed negligently.37  Similarly as 
Weeks observes, some soft law is useful to courts in determining the standard that 
can reasonably be expected within an industry, for the purposes of establishing 
negligence.38   
 
5 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC) 
ACSQHC acts with the Commonwealth Department of Health as a major 
regulatory actor in the Australian Health System and has prepared a wide range of 
                                                      
35 Medical Board of Australia web site <http://www.medicalboard.gov.au/Codes-Guidelines-
Policies.aspx>. 
36 For example, those that govern the curricula of training institutions and the way evidence for 
registration is to be supplied by the applicant. 
37 See eg, Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, 
Report (December 1997) xiii, 3, 47;  Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability 
in Business Areas Subject to Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) 10. 
38 Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (Hart Publishing, 2016) 52. 
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reports and guidelines.  The reports and standards prepared by ACSQHC have been 
developed ‘ ... to drive the implementation of safety and quality systems and 
improve the quality of health care in Australia’.39  ACSQHC was established as a 
‘corporate Commonwealth entity’ under the National Health Reform Act 2011 
(Cth) and is jointly funded by all Australian Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments.  Its board is appointed by the Minister (the Commonwealth Minister 
for Health) in consultation with state and territory Ministers for Health. 
 
ACSQHC has developed a wide range of instruments in its quest to implement 
safety and quality systems in medical practice.  The most important of these are the 
Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights and the National Safety and Quality 
Health Service Standards.  It has also developed the Australian Safety and Quality 
Framework for Health Care40 that ‘describes a vision for safe and high-quality 
care’ and sets out actions to achieve this vision.  The framework was endorsed by 
the Australian Health Ministers in 2010. 
 
 
6 The Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights 
As stated above and in keeping with its name, ACSQHC was established to ‘ ... 
lead and coordinate national improvements in safety and quality’.41  Its view was 
that ‘ ... a uniform articulation of patient entitlements — and appropriate 
obligations — is a basic requirement for a safe and high quality healthcare 
system’.42  In this context, quality implies a standard of excellence as formulated in 
Chapter I.  The Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights is the most fundamental of 
the soft law instruments underpinning a quality Australian health care system.  It 
clearly enunciates its rationale:  ‘These rights are essential to make sure that, 
wherever and whenever care is provided, it is of high quality and safe’.43 
 
                                                      
39 Web site of Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
<http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-work/national-standards-and-accreditation/>. 
40 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Australian Safety and Quality 
Framework for Healthcare (at December 2010). 
41 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Draft National Patient Charter of 
Rights (Consultation Paper, 22 January 2008) 2. 
42 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Draft National Patient Charter of 
Rights, (Consultation Paper, 22 January 2008) 2. 
43 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights. 
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The Charter prescribes a set of seven principles to guide the provision of 
healthcare in Australia.44  The Charter is an acknowledgement that a patient-
centred system of health care is associated with higher quality care and enhanced 
safety.45  It was developed during 2007 and 2008 and was endorsed in July 2008 by 
the Australian Health Ministers as applicable to all health environments in 
Australia, including public and private hospitals, general practice and community 
health services.46  ACSQHC also acknowledges that the Charter ‘ ... exists within a 
broader framework of human rights and the basic right to health care, as set out in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Australia is a signatory’.47 
 
The Charter identifies seven principles: 
Access – I have a right to health care.  ([2.1.3], [4.3], [4.5].) 
Safety – I have a right to receive safe and high quality care.  ([1.4], [3.10], [4.2.1], 
[4.3.3], [4.4.3], [6], [8.4].) 
Respect – I have a right to be shown respect, dignity and consideration.  ([1.4], 
[2.4.1], [2.1.5], [3.1], [3.2.1].) 
Communication – I have a right to be informed about services, treatment, options 
and costs in a clear and open way.  ([1.4], [2.2.5], [3.1], [3.2.5], [3.3], [3.8.1], 
[3.9.2],[3.11], [3.12.7], [3.12.10], [4.5.1].) 
Participation – I have a right to be included in decisions and choices about my care.  
([2.2.11], [2.3], [3.2.4], [3.6.3], [3.8.3], [3.9.1].) 
Privacy – I have a right to privacy and confidentiality of my personal information.  
([3.2.], [3.4.2], [3.4.5], [3.8.3].) 
Comment - I have a right to comment on my care and to have my concerns 
addressed.  ([3.10.8], [3.11], [8.10].) 
 
All these principles parallel the principles in the concept of patient-centred care as 
outlined in Chapter I.  The clauses in the MBA Code to which they relate are in 
square brackets after each of the rights.  
 
                                                      
44 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights. 
45 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2008, 5. 
46 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, web site < 
http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/national-priorities/charter-of-healthcare-rights/>. 
47 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Draft National Patient Charter of 
Rights, (Consultation Paper, 22 January 2008) 5.  Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights recognises a right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being and includes 
medical care and social services.  The right to health care is also in Article 12(d) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights where a right to creation of conditions to assure 
medical service and medical attention to all is specified. 
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However, as has been made clear in the 2008 consultation report when the Charter 
was being formulated, the Charter is not just about rights of patients or consumers.  
There is also a balance to be struck between the rights and responsibilities of both 
patients and providers.48 For example, in respect of Communication, the right to be 
informed also entails the obligation to be open and honest in disclosing medical 
history and treatments.49  Likewise, the right to Respect does not only entail health 
care providers’ respect for each patient’s culture, beliefs and values.  Patients must 
also respect staff and other health service personnel by treating them politely and 
considering their workload.50 
 
Notwithstanding, McCaffery et al reported that patients and consumers must 
recognise that there may be limitations on matters such as Access when patients 
live in rural or remote areas51 or are Indigenous.52  This comment arose in the 
context of implementing shared decision making, a fundamental aspect of patient-
centred care. They observe that shared decision-making is affected by such varied 
matters as health literacy,53 distance in rural and remote communities,54 cultural 
and linguistic diversity55 and Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islanders.56  Added to 
these drawbacks were internal organisational impediments such as lack of support 
for consumer input.57  Similar barriers could equally apply to the Charter Rights of 
Safety, Communication and Respect. 
 
Yet whilst the Charter has an aspirational element, it is required to be implemented 
in all health service organisations and accreditation of these bodies includes their 
adoption of the principles underpinning the Charter’s rights.  Therefore, patients 
can expect that their healthcare rights will be observed in all of their contacts with 
the health care system. 
 
 
                                                      
48 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Patient Charter of Rights 
(Consultation Report, June 2008) 24. 
49 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Patient Charter of Rights 
(Consultation Report, June 2008) 26. 
50 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Roles in Realising the Australian 
Charter of Healthcare Rights. 
51 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Patient Charter of Rights 
(Consultation Report, June 2008) 17. 
52 Kirsten J McCaffery et al, 'Shared Decision Making in Australia in 2011' (2011) 105 Zeitschrift für 
Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualität im Gesundheitswesen 234, 238. 
53 Ibid 236. 
54 Ibid 235. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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7 The National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards 
The National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards (the Standards)58 were 
promulgated by ACSQHC following an extensive consultation process and provide 
the benchmarks by which quality assurance must be implemented in hospitals and 
accreditation achieved.  The Australian Health Ministers endorsed the Standards in 
September 2011.59 
 
The ten standards require a total of 256 actions, each of which is a detailed 
protocol to ensure consistency and quality.  Proving compliance with each protocol 
requires the creation of appropriate checklists that must be signed off.60  Since 
January 2013, all hospitals and day procedure services in Australia have had to 
commence the processes to obtain accreditation under these standards.61  Many 
private services have also applied for accreditation under these standards.62  There 
is already evidence that adoption of the Standards is transforming health care 
across Australia.63  By the end of 2017, it is expected that most of the organisations 
requiring accreditation, will have achieved it.64 
 
The Standards were instituted to promote ways to protect the public from harm and 
to improve the quality of health care services.65  Medical practitioners are an 
integral part of health care delivery and favourable outcomes for implementing the 
Standards will depend, in good measure, on the adherence by medical practitioners 
to their requirements, whether in a health service organisation or in a private 
practice.   
 
 
 
                                                      
58 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012). 
59 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, web site 
<http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-work/accreditation-and-the-nsqhs-standards/>. 
60 I was the Quality Assurance Co-ordinator when Clayton Utz Canberra obtained its first quality 
certification. 
61 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Transforming the Safety and Quality 
of Health Care (October 2014) 2. 
62 Ibid 4. 
63 Ibid 2. 
64 Ibid 4. 
65 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012) 3. 
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Standards 1 and 2 are the bases upon which the remaining standards are 
grounded.66  The relevant texts are: ‘Standard 1 - Governance for Safety and 
Quality in Health Service Organisations that describes the quality framework 
required for health service organisations to implement safe systems’.  ‘Standard 2 - 
Partnering with Consumers that describes the systems and strategies to create a 
consumer-centred health system by including consumers in the development and 
design of quality health care’,67 that is, patient-centred medical practice 
emphasising partnership between patient and health care provider. 
 
(a) Standard 1 - Aspects of Governance in Health Care Institutions 
The process of governance specifies policies, procedures and structures that 
determine how an organisation functions.  It sets the goals to be achieved, develops 
structures to promote quality outcomes (such as observance of patient-centred 
medical practice) and establishes systems to minimise the occurrence of harm to 
patients.  For example, on its own, the estimated costs of the approximately 
190,000 iatrogenic (medically caused) admissions to hospitals in Australia in 2011 
was $660 million, the addition of about one dollar for every seven spent on hospital 
care.68   
 
One of the criticisms in the report of 31 July 2016 made by the Inquiry into the St 
Vincent’s Hospital Cancer scandal was that the hospital's response to the incident 
showed a lack of clinical governance.  As the Final Report stated: 
Clinical governance had a proactive responsibility to coach and guide the hospital 
and clinical leadership on the best response to such situations and the best approach 
to look back and open disclosure.  Such processes should be necessary only rarely, 
but have to be able to swing into place urgently when needed.69 
 
                                                      
66 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality  Health 
Service Standards (September 2013) 1.  Standards 3–10 are as follows: 
3  Preventing and controlling healthcare associated infections 
4  Medication safety 
5  Patient Identification and procedure matching 
6  Clinical handover 
7  Blood and Blood products 
8  Preventing and managing pressure injuries 
9  Recognising and responding to clinical deterioration in acute health care 
10 Preventing falls and harm from falls. 
67 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality  Health 
Service Standards (September 2013) 3. 
68 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2011, 2. 
69 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [156]. 
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It is clear from these findings that Standard 1 of the National Safety and Quality 
Health Service Standards, namely Governance for Safety and Quality in Health 
Service Organisations, had not been observed.   
 
The Final Report dated 31 July 2016 refers to patients of the same medical 
practitioner in the Western New South Wales Local Health District.  The terms of 
reference were expanded on 4 April 2016 to include these patients.  A report into 
their treatment was released on 16 September 2016 (the Western NSW Local 
Health District Report).70  As in the Final Report, the Western NSW Local Health 
District Report was critical of the Local Health District finding that ‘ ... there were 
governance issues in how cancer services were managed’.71 
 
The costs of poor clinical governance are reflected in both increased financial 
burdens on the health care system and the compromising of patient safety, together 
with institutional responses to safety lapses. 
 
(b) Standard 2 - Developing Partnerships between Patients, Carers and Health 
Service Organisations 
This standard recognises the need to involve patients and their carers in all aspects 
of their treatment, including design of systems for the provision of services and 
being involved in monitoring and evaluation of their effectiveness.  Patient 
involvement provides a basis for high quality health care.  Not only are clinical 
outcomes enhanced but there are business benefits in the reduction of treatment 
costs per patient, happier and more stable personnel and better experiences 
regarding liability claims.72   
 
However, the difficulty of achieving this standard is exemplified by a survey 
concerning multi-disciplinary teams where it was remarked that no surgeons 
involved in breast cancer treatment reported including the patient in discussions 
about the patient’s treatment.73 
 
Similarly, the report into St Vincent’s Hospital stated:  
                                                      
70 Inquiry under Section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Prescribing of Chemotherapy (Report 
on Patients Treated at Western NSW Health District, 16 September 2016). 
71 Inquiry under Section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Prescribing of Chemotherapy (Report 
on Patients Treated at Western NSW Health District, 16 September 2016) [61]. 
72 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2013, 23. 
73 Claire J Marsh et al, 'National Breast Cancer Audit: The Use of Multidisciplinary Care Teams by 
Breast Surgeons in Australia and New Zealand' (2008) 188 MJA 385, 388. 
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Almost all of the patients and next-of-kin reported that they did not recall Dr 
Grygiel discussing chemotherapy drug options with them but rather that they were 
told by Dr Grygiel which chemotherapy drug was recommended.74 
 
The value of this standard for the implementation of patient-centred care lies in its 
comprehensiveness.  It can only be effective if patients are treated as equals at all 
stages.  In this sense, equality does not mean having the technical expertise of the 
medical practitioner, but respect for the patient leading to greater equality of status 
in the discussions.  However, as the St Vincent’s Hospital report of 31 July 2016 
quoted above demonstrates, there still appeared to be a perception by the doctors 
that ‘doctor knows best’.75  
 
8 Soft Law in Codes and Guidelines of Professional Bodies 
Drawing up soft law regulatory directions is not limited to government bodies.  
This part also shows how guidelines from professional bodies influence medical 
practice.  Medical associations together with the learned specialty colleges 
supplement ‘official’ standards with a wide variety of codes of conduct, treatment 
guidelines and position statements.  
 
Guidance is found in codes and guidelines issued by medical professional bodies 
such as the Australian Medical Association (AMA) and the specialist medical 
colleges.  Failure to adhere to one of these codes or guidelines may constitute 
evidence that a practitioner has fallen short of professional norms.  Tribunals take 
these instruments into account during their deliberations for the purpose of 
deciding whether a disciplinary sanction is required.76 
 
The major specialist colleges like the RACP and the RACS are companies limited 
by guarantee and membership and termination of membership is in accordance 
with their constitutions.  Their primary function is to provide specialist training and 
to award advanced qualifications.  Each of these specialist colleges has a code of 
conduct for its members and issues guidelines.  For example, RACP is actively 
involved in policy and advocacy and publishes a wide range of guidelines, position 
statements and submissions on its web site.77  These vary from guidelines such as 
                                                      
74 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [101]. 
75 Ibid [101]–[102]. 
76 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] 
ACAT 44 [24]. 
77 Royal Australasian College of Physicians <https://www.racp.edu.au/advocacy/search>. 
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the Clinical Practice Guidelines for Dementia, to position statements such as the 
Immunisation Position Statement or The Health of Refugee Children Position 
Statement.  It also makes submissions to Commonwealth and state and territory 
governments, and governmental bodies like ACSQHC78 and the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA).79 
 
RACS also publishes a wide range of position papers80 including guidelines like 
Bullying and Harassment, Recognition, Avoidance and Management and 
Implications of Obesity for Outcomes of Non-Bariatric Surgery.  It also publishes a 
Surgical Safety Checklist.81 
 
Guidelines relate to specific medical conditions, for example the RACP National 
Guidelines for the Management of Haemophilia, and to situations related to 
particular groups of patients, such as AMA position statements on Care of Older 
People or Care of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Communities.  They 
also extend to guidelines for matters occurring in practice such as certifying illness 
for the purposes of school or employment.82 
 
9 Common Law Recognition of Soft Law 
Soft law standards, while ‘unenforceable’ in theory, have been recognised by 
courts.  Both the Grey Letter Law report83 and the Administrative Research Council 
report84 described the case of Anne Christina Benton v Tea Tree Plaza Nominees85 
where the court referred to a voluntary Australian standard on kerb height as a 
factor in determining negligence.  The question of the enforceability of soft law in 
the context of medical practice appears to be going through a transition stage.  
Whilst there has been no clear legal principle in Australia that always recognises as 
                                                      
78 See eg, Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Submission to Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care on Draft Clinical Care Standard for Delirium (16 July 2015);  Royal 
Australasian College of Physicians, Submission to Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care Draft Version 2 NSQHS Standards (2015). 
79 Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Budget Submission: Adverse Drug Event Reporting. 
80 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons <https://www.surgeons.org/policies-
publications/publications/position-papers/>. 
81 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Surgical Safety Checklist (Oct 09).  The efficacy of 
checklists will be explored in Chapter VI. 
82 Australian Medical Association, Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Certificates Certifying 
Illness 2011 
<https://ama.com.au/sites/default/files/documents/Guidelines_for_Medical_Practitioners_on_Certific
ates_Certifying_Illness_2011_0.pdf>. 
83 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey Letter Law, Report 
(December 1997) at xiii, 34, 36, 47. 
84 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) at 10 (fn 46). 
85 Anne Christina Benton v Tea Tree Plaza Nominees (1995) 64 SASR 494. 
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enforceable codes and standards other than those promulgated by the MBA, courts 
in the United Kingdom are endorsing some relevant codes of practice and this is 
also occurring in Australia as the following examples illustrate.  
 
In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, the UK Supreme Court pointed out 
that the days of medical practitioners dealing with ‘ignorant’ patients was over and 
that patients had rights that must be observed,86 including the provision of 
sufficient information so that the patient could make a properly informed choice 
about how to proceed.  This view was reinforced by guidelines issued by the GMC 
that specified the duty of the doctor to provide relevant information to the patient 
in a way that the patient can understand,87 thus permitting the patient to weigh 
benefits, risks and other options, including that of not acting at all.88  By 
acknowledging the GMC guidelines, the court was adopting its provisions as 
applicable to the circumstances, and against which the conduct of the medical 
practitioner could be evaluated. 
 
In Australia, as a result of section 41 of the National Law, there are numerous 
examples in tribunal cases of the conduct of a medical practitioner not being 
professional as measured against standards specified in the MBA Code.89  Courts 
also have acknowledged the MBA Code.  In Woollard v The Medical Board of 
Australia Sitting as a Performance and Professional Standards Panel,90 the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia specifically acknowledged that the MBA Code 
was relevant and appropriate to determine whether conduct of the medical 
practitioner had been professional.  In Nitschke v Medical Board of Australia,91 the 
medical practitioner had appealed against a decision of the Northern Territory 
Health Professional Review Tribunal to take immediate action to suspend him 
under section 156 of the National Law.  The reason was that he ‘ ... did not exercise 
the care and skill required of a registered health practitioner, in particular having 
regard to cl[ause] 1.4 ... of the MBA Code’ that provided that Dr Nitschke had ‘ ... a 
                                                      
86 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [75] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
87 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) [32]. 
88 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [77] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
89 See eg, Dr A v Health District (No 2) [2014] NSWIRComm 50;  Medical Board of Australia v 
Kanapathipillai [2016] ACAT 16;  Medical Board of Australia and Veettill [2015] WASAT 124;  
Alroe v Medical Board of Australia [2015] QCAT 482;  Crickitt v Medical Council of NSW (No 2) 
[2015] NSWCATOD 115;  Medical Board of Australia v Mbo [2015] ACAT 69. 
90 Woollard v The Medical Board of Australia Sitting as a Performance and Professional Standards 
Panel [2015] WASC 332. 
91 Nitschke v Medical Board of Australia [2015] NTSC 39. 
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responsibility to protect and promote health of individuals and the community’.92  
On appeal, the Northern Territory Supreme Court found that there was no evidence 
of any conduct by the medical practitioner that was proscribed by the MBA Code, 
implying that the MBA Code embodied appropriate principles of conduct for 
medical practitioners.  There is also acknowledgement in tribunals that codes and 
guidelines other than those specified in the MBA Code can be relevant to determine 
whether or not a medical practitioner’s conduct has complied with professional 
norms.93 
 
10 Soft Law Enforceability other than Legislation or Common Law 
In addition to the ‘enforceability’ of soft law through supporting statements by 
courts, compliance with soft law may be compelled by other means.  In the absence 
of any case law, the best example of this process is the enforceability of the 
National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards, against which every health 
service provider must be accredited.  As discussed above, the Standards have been 
endorsed by the Australian Health Ministers and are applicable to every health 
service provider, whether hospital or clinic, public or private.   
 
The enforceability of the Standards lies in the fact that, unless adopted, the health 
service provider will not be accredited and so will be prevented from operating.  
The Standards have been prepared based on empirical evidence of where the 
greatest number of adverse events occurs in medical practice.   
 
As the Administrative Review Council observed: ‘Government soft law is 
generally not subject to the range of administrative law mechanisms applicable to 
the “black letter” law that is ... administered by government agencies’.94  For an 
aggrieved health service provider to seek tribunal or court review may be difficult.  
The Standards do not meet the definition of a legislative instrument for the 
purposes of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth).95  They have not been made ‘under an 
enactment’ so any regulatory decision will not be relevant for the the purposes of 
                                                      
92 Nitschke v Medical Board of Australia [2015] NTSC 39 [62] that is quoting from the findings of the 
South Australian Immediate Action Committee. 
93 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Koniuszko [2016] VCAT 492 [56] (Guidelines issued by the 
Medical Practitioners’ Board of Victoria);  Medical Board of Australia v Curran [2015] SAHPT 4 
[28] (Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists Code of Ethics);  Bahramy v 
Medical Council of New South Wales [2014] NSWCATOD 116 [113] (Expert Code of Conduct - 
tertiary institutions). 
94 Administrative Review Council, Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to 
Complex and Specific Regulation (November 2008) xi. 
95 Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 8. 
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the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)96.  A breach by a 
health service provider would only be subject to review under section 39B of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) if the accrediting body were an ‘officer of the 
Commonwealth’.  This could mean that the only way to redress for a perceived 
adverse assessment by the accrediting instrumentality might be through the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
 
There have been no cases to date brought by a health service provider seeking 
review where an application for accreditation has not been granted.  If however the 
matter did come before a court, it is submitted that a court would find that the 
Standards and their matching actions to achieve implementation were relevant and 
applicable to all health service providers seeking accreditation.  Thus, health 
service providers will make sure that they comply with both the letter and the spirit 
of the Standards.  In this way, an apparently soft law instrument is both designed to 
achieve and will achieve compliance from all the bodies to which it is addressed. 
 
11 Conclusion 
Medical practitioners are regulated by some specific legislation.  However, most 
regulation of day-to-day conduct of medical practitioners or health service 
providers occurs by virtue of soft law instruments, both made under the authority 
of the National Law and by other regulatory bodies, the most important of which is 
the government-funded ACSQHC.  There are also state-funded bodies that issue 
important guidance.97  Added to soft law instruments issued by these bodies are 
those issued by professional bodies including the specialist medical colleges.  
There is clearly a high degree of observance of these instruments.  However, where 
there is not, failure to observe various codes and guidance documents has been 
regarded by disciplinary tribunals as evidence of conduct of a practitioner that falls 
below the standards of professionalism evidenced in these instruments.  What 
constitutes evidence of professional conduct as found in these guides is 
supplemented by evidence from relevant health professionals.  The justification for 
disciplinary proceedings lies in this failure to observe professional norms, and it is 
these processes that now demand analysis. 
 
 
                                                      
96 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3. 
97 See eg, Clinical Excellence Commission in New South Wales, the Victorian Centre of Excellence 
in Eating Disorders, and the Centre for Clinical Interventions in Western Australia. 
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D MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE 
 
1 Introduction 
In pursuit of its remit to legislate for the safety of members of the public in their 
interactions with health practitioners, the National Law makes express provision 
for the discipline of health practitioners.  It specifies a series of behaviours98 that 
health practitioner colleagues must report to the National Agency namely 
AHPRA,99 and details a number of grounds upon which a voluntary notification 
may be made by ‘any entity’.100  This section explores the outcomes of a sample of 
disciplinary decisions and notes the recurrence of themes identifiable as notifiable 
conduct.  Despite the publicity given to disciplinary proceedings, the recurrence of 
these themes suggests that some medical practitioners have not internalised the 
obligation to practise medicine in a patient-centred, that is, professional manner. 
 
Once AHPRA has made a preliminary assessment of the notification, it will 
determine whether the matter should be referred to a National Board to be subject 
to that board’s processes.  The relevant National Board may investigate a health 
practitioner if it has received a notification through AHPRA, or has some other 
reason to suspect impairment or unsatisfactory conduct or practice.  The National 
Board may require the practitioner to undergo a health101 or performance 
assessment102 through relevant special panels.103  A National Board can also 
determine whether the outcome of a panel determination should be referred to a 
tribunal. 
 
This section commences by describing the rationale for the disciplining of health 
practitioners.  The primary reasons for disciplining medical practitioners are 
advising members of the public about, and to protect them from, deficient practices 
and to apprise other health practitioners and the public as to what constitutes good 
medical practice.  The grounds for discipline are directly related to what is 
considered to be acceptable professional behaviour.  
 
                                                      
98 National Law s 140. 
99 National Law s 141. 
100 National Law s 145.  In accordance with s 5 of the National Law, ‘entity includes a person and an 
unincorporated body’. 
101 National Law s 169. 
102 National Law s 170. 
103 A health panel is authorised by National Law s 181 and a performance and professional standards 
panel is authorised by National Law s 182. 
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This section proceeds to scrutinise the behaviours identified by the legislation as 
notifiable conduct and notes the criticisms of the mandatory reporting regime that 
suggest over-reporting whilst other evidence implies under-reporting.  It examines 
arguments for and against legislation that exempts practitioners who are treating 
other practitioners with impairments from reporting their colleagues. 
 
This section then discusses the link between professional conduct and disciplinary 
proceedings and explores the four-stage process between referral to a tribunal and 
any sanction imposed.  As signalled earlier in this chapter, this exploration is 
exemplified by the Australian Capital Territory case of Medical Board of Australia 
v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 44. 
 
Even considering that a substantial share of these notifications will be dismissed, 
the number of notifications made is of concern.  This chapter surveys the outcomes 
of a sample of disciplinary decisions considered by tribunals and courts from the 
period 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2016.  Overwhelmingly, these cases reflect the 
behaviours identified as warranting a mandatory notification to AHPRA.   
 
2 The Rationale for Disciplining Medical Practitioners 
The rationale for disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public.  In 
disciplinary proceedings, where a determination on the balance of probabilities is 
to be made, the relevant standard is higher than the normal civil standard but below 
the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard required for criminal cases.104  As stated 
by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw: 
[r]easonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established 
independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved.  The 
seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a 
given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular 
finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the 
issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.  In such matters, 
‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite 
testimony, or indirect inferences.105 
 
The reason that the Briginshaw test is more demanding than the usual civil 
standard of proof is because the balance of probabilities test might be satisfied 
without adequate consideration of the ‘nature and consequences of the fact or facts 
to be proved’ such as the seriousness of allegations or the gravity of any 
consequences flowing from a particular finding.  Disciplinary proceedings are not 
                                                      
104 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 
105 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362 (Dixon J). 
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supposed to be a punishment106 but are a way of holding the professional to 
account, both for public safety and for the reputation of the profession.107  Any 
decision to suspend or deregister a medical practitioner is a function of the 
requirement for patient safety, and sends a message to members of the profession.  
It also signals to the public that the regulator is not prepared to tolerate sub-
standard performance.  As the New South Wales Court of Appeal stated: 
The objective of protecting the health and safety of the public is not confined to 
protecting the patients or potential patients of a particular practitioner from the 
continuing risk of his or her malpractice or incompetence. It includes protecting the 
public from the similar misconduct or incompetence of other practitioners and 
upholding public confidence in the standards of the profession. That objective is 
achieved by setting and maintaining the standards and, where appropriate, by 
cancelling the registration of practitioners who are not competent or otherwise not 
fit to practise, including those who have been guilty of serious misconduct. 
Denouncing such misconduct operates both as a deterrent to the individual 
concerned, as well as to the general body of practitioners. It also maintains public 
confidence by signalling that those whose conduct does not meet the required 
standards will not be permitted to practise.108 
 
When determining the appropriate orders, tribunals take into account a series of 
factors: 
1. protection of the public; 
2. the maintenance of professional standards in the eyes of the public; a weighing 
of the public interest in the practitioner continuing to practise against the public 
interest in protecting clients from any repetition of the conduct exhibited; 
3. evidence of insight and/or remorse, where relevant;  and 
4. the role of general and specific deterrence.109 
 
A finding that conduct has deviated from professional norms triggers relevant 
sanctions.  Section 5 of the National Law provides the definitions of professional 
misconduct, unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory professional 
performance.110   
                                                      
106 NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177, 183–184 (Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies 
and Owen JJ ). 
107 Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297 (GleesonCJ, Meagher JA 
and Handley JA) “Disciplinary proceedings against members of a profession are intended to maintain 
proper ethical and professional standards, primarily for the protection of the public, but also for the 
protection of the profession.” 
108 Health Care Complaints Commission v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 [35]. 
109 Medical Board of Australia v Fox [2016] VCAT 408 [58]. 
110 For example, the definition of professional misconduct is as follows: 
professional misconduct, of a registered health practitioner, includes—  
(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is 
substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health 
practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and 
 
(b) more than one instance of unprofessional conduct that, when considered together, 
amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a 
registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and 
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All these definitions in the National Law refer back to conduct being below a 
standard that might be reasonably expected, by the public or the practitioner’s 
peers, of a health practitioner of similar education and experience.  As in New 
South Wales,111 sanctions imposed by tribunals range, in a ‘pyramid’ depending on 
the practitioner’s conduct, from counselling and imposition of conditions, through 
fines, reprimands and cautions to suspension or cancellation of registration.112  New 
South Wales and Queensland have their own disciplinary procedures.   
 
(a) New South Wales 
New South Wales has not adopted the definitions in section 5 of the National Law 
and introduces its own definitions and disciplinary procedures in the Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW).113  Part 8 of the National Law 
(NSW) provides a detailed scheme for disciplinary action against health 
practitioners.  It has designated the Health Care Complaints Commission114 and the 
Medical Council of New South Wales115 to handle complaints and notifications 
about medical practitioners.  Determinations of these bodies may, depending on the 
perceived severity of the aberrant behaviour, refer matters to the Professional 
Standards Committee or to a tribunal.  Until 1 January 2014, cases were dealt with 
by the Medical Tribunal.  However, following the enactment of the Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 (NSW), the Medical Tribunal has been 
abolished and cases are dealt with by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal in its 
Occupational Division.116  The National Law (NSW) defines professional 
misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct.  Its definition of professional 
misconduct does not refer to standards reasonably expected of a health practitioner, 
for example, as in the National Law (ACT), but specifies that conduct, whether a 
single instance or a series of instances, must be ‘sufficiently serious’ to justify 
suspension or cancellation of registration.117  Unsatisfactory professional conduct 
includes a specification of conduct ‘significantly below’ the standard reasonably 
expected of a health practitioner of equivalent training or experience, but also 
                                                                                                                                         
(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the 
health practitioner’s profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a 
fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.  
111 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No 86a ss 149A, 149B and 149C. 
112 National Law s 196(2). 
113 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No 86a. 
114 Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) s 75. 
115 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No 86a s 41B(1). 
116 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s7, and cl 3 Schedule 1. 
117 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No 86a Section 139E. 
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includes details of other behaviour that amounts to ‘unsatisfactory professional 
conduct’.  It also introduces another level of disciplinary proceedings through the 
Professional Standards Committee, the findings of which are made public.   
 
(b) Queensland 
In Queensland, since 1 July 2014, disciplinary cases have been handled through the 
Office of the Health Ombudsman.  This office replaced the Health Quality and 
Complaints Commission and has taken over some of the functions previously 
carried out by AHPRA.  The Office of the Health Ombudsman is an independent 
statutory body established under the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld).  The 
Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) repealed the Health Quality and Complaints 
Commission Act 2006 (Qld) and two other acts relating to health practitioners.118  
The Director of Proceedings in the Office of the Health Ombudsman is responsible 
for taking proceedings against health practitioners before the Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal.119 
 
3 The National Agency – Australian Health Practitioner Regulation 
Agency (“AHPRA”) 
AHPRA has been established under the National Law.120  It operates under a series 
of state-based Medical Boards, part of the Medical Board of Australia and has 
state-based AHPRA staff.  AHPRA has a co-ordinating function, receiving 
mandatory and voluntary notifications about health practitioners and referring them 
to health, and performance and professional standards panels established under the 
National Board of each health profession.  Separate panels operate in each State 
and Territory.  AHPRA does not publish the names of health practitioners about 
whom panel decisions have been made.  Names of errant health practitioners only 
become public if they are referred to relevant tribunals in each jurisdiction.   
 
AHPRA has published on its web site, a list of decisions about health practitioners 
since the National Law came into effect, but does not include decisions under 
previous legislation even if the decision has been made after the date of 
                                                      
118 Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) s 321. 
119 Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) s 12. 
120 National Law s 23. 
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commencement of the National Law, 10 July 2010.121  AHPRA has also found 
itself, on occasion, the subject of suit.122   
 
4 Notifiable Conduct 
The National Law has provision for both voluntary and mandatory notifications of 
activities of health professionals who may overstep legal and professional 
boundaries.  Any entity may make a voluntary notification to AHPRA upon 
grounds specified in section 144.123  AHPRA must provide reasonable assistance to 
the notifier to make the notification124 and must then refer the notification to the 
National Board that has registered the health practitioner.125  Some cases are set in 
motion by complaints from patients through the voluntary notifications process.126  
 
5 Mandatory Notifications of Medical Practitioners by Other Medical 
Practitioners 
Under section 141 of the National Law, every health practitioner is obliged to 
notify AHPRA where, in the practice of the profession, the practitioner has formed 
a reasonable belief that another health practitioner has behaved in a way that is 
notifiable conduct.   
 
Section 140 defines mandatory notifiable conduct, meaning that the practitioner 
has:  
(a) practised the practitioner’s profession while intoxicated by alcohol or drugs;  
or 
(b) engaged in sexual misconduct in connection with the practice of the 
practitioner’s profession;  or 
(c) placed members of the public at risk of substantial harm in the practitioner’s 
practice of the profession because the practitioner has an impairment;  or 
(d) placed members of the public at risk of harm because the practitioner has 
practised the profession in a way that constitutes a significant departure from 
accepted professional standards.127  (emphasis added). 
 
                                                      
121 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency web site 
<http://www.ahpra.gov.au/Publications/Panel-Decisions.aspx>. 
122 See eg, Stanley-Clarke v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency [2012] QSC 250 
where a complaint against a medical practitioner was determined by AHPRA as disclosing no 
reasonable cause of action. 
123 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 23. 
124 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 147. 
125 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 148. 
126 See eg, Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2014/15 (November 
2015) 35. 
127 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 140 (italics added). 
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One case of failure to make a mandatory notification about an employed medical 
practitioner who was in a sexual relationship with a patient, earned the employing 
practitioner a finding of professional misconduct leading to a reprimand and 
conditions upon registration.128   
 
White, McDonald and Willmott maintain that mandatory reporting has been 
legislated in Australia because of the perception following several medical 
scandals that health professionals had become aware of deficient conduct or 
performance of colleagues but had failed to report it to relevant authorities.129  For 
example, evidence of a medical culture with a reluctance to criticise or comment 
upon the conduct of colleagues hampered The Canberra Hospital Inquiry into the 
activities of a neurosurgeon.130  Furthermore, the Inquiry into Off-protocol 
Prescribing in New South Wales131 found that ‘ ... the issue132 was inaccurately 
characterised ... and the response133 to it was internalised’134 leading to their 
assessment that ‘The overriding reason for this is cultural;  remembering that, in its 
purest sense, culture is about how things are done’.135 
 
AHPRA makes it clear that ‘ ... all registered health practitioners have a 
professional and ethical obligation to protect and promote public health and safe 
healthcare.’136  AHPRA has prepared guidelines under section 39 of the National 
Law to provide directions ‘ ... to registered health practitioners, employers of 
practitioners and education providers about the requirements for mandatory 
notifications under the National Law’.137  The threshold for reporting under section 
141 of the National Law is high, requiring a reasonable belief in the reporting 
                                                      
128 Medical Board of Australia v Al-Naser [2015] ACAT 15. 
129 Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott, Health Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2nd ed, 
2014) 625. 
130 Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: Lessons for 
Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44, 46. 
131 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016). 
132 The issue was the prescribing of identical doses of a chemotherapy drug irrespective of individual 
characteristics of the patients concerned. 
133 The response was the failure to identify or notify the affected patients or notify the public.  ‘No 
medical oncologist was providing input to the hospital’s executive team to inform and prepare the 
public statements, nor check their accuracy’. Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 
1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 
2016) [159]. 
134 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [160].   
135 Ibid [161]. 
136 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, website 
<http://www.ahpra.gov.au/Notifications/Who-can-make-a-notification/Mandatory-
notifications.aspx>. 
137 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Guidelines for Mandatory Notifications (March 
2014) 2. 
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practitioner that the conduct constitutes notifiable conduct.138  The risk of harm 
from an impaired health practitioner must be substantial139 and potential harm from 
the departure from accepted professional standards must be significant.140  Each of 
the four notifiable activities refers back to practice of the profession whilst sub-
section (d) also measures the activity against accepted professional standards.  
Where one practitioner is treating another practitioner with an impairment,141 the 
overriding principle is risk of harm to the public.  So long as a practitioner's 
‘impairment’ is controlled during treatment and there is no risk to patient safety, 
there is no obligation on the treating medical practitioner to make a mandatory 
notification.142   
 
Bismark et al observe that whilst mandatory reporting has also been legislated in 
New Zealand and some states in the United States, Australia’s legislation is 
unusually far-reaching in that it requires health practitioners to report both health 
impairments and performance deficiencies.  The legislation also does not 
specifically exempt a treating health practitioner from a requirement to report an 
impaired patient who is another health practitioner.143  
 
The mandatory obligation to report under section 141 of the National Law has been 
criticised on the basis that it may deter some health practitioners from seeking 
professional help to overcome some of the specified problems.144  Parker argues 
that any practitioner who is aware of having an impairment that might pose a 
substantial risk should feel ethically obliged to self-report.  Similarly, medical 
practitioners who consider that the health professional they are treating poses a 
substantial risk to the public, should also feel ethically obliged to report.  He also 
observes that if impaired doctors and their treating physicians feel deterred by the 
                                                      
138 Ibid 3. 
139 National Law s 140(c). 
140 National Law s 140(d). 
141 Impairment is defined in s 5 of the National Law and includes ‘ ... a physical or mental 
impairment, disability, condition or disorder (including substance abuse or dependence) that 
detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect ... ’for a registered health practitioner, ‘ ... the 
person’s capacity to practise the profession ...’. 
142 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Guidelines for Mandatory Notifications (March 
2014) 9. 
143 Marie M Bismark et al, 'Mandatory Reports of Concerns about the Health, Performance and 
Conduct of Health Practitioners' (2014)  MJA 399, 24.e4. 
144 See eg, Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott, Health Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 
2nd ed, 2014) 625;  Nick Goiran et al, 'Mandatory Reporting of Health Professionals: The Case for a 
Western Australian Style Exemption for all Australian Practitioners' (2014) 22 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 209, 212. 
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mandatory reporting requirements, we should be able to conclude that there has 
been and continues to be considerable under-reporting.145   
 
Parker’s observation seems to have been confirmed by recent research carried out 
by Bismark et al who examined 846 mandatory reports to AHPRA, finding that 
only 8% of reports had been made of medical practitioners by medical 
practitioners, that is 64 medical practitioners.  Of these, only 14 of the 64 were 
made by the medical practitioner’s treating physician.  The authors concluded that 
mandatory reports by treating practitioners were rare and they speculate that, far 
from ‘opening the floodgates’ to over-reporting, the infrequency of the reports led 
to a conclusion that under-reporting was more likely.146  Earlier research from the 
same lead author and others had concluded that some of the harms predicted for 
mandatory reporting as well as anticipated benefits were, so far, not occurring.147  
 
In Hocking v Medical Board of Australia, Murrell CJ referred to section 141 of the 
National Law as  
designed to require practitioners to make complaints that may, upon further 
investigation, be shown to be warranted and to ensure that practitioners do not 
adhere to a code of silence in relation to significant misconduct by other 
practitioners. The provision gives effect to the s 3(2)(a) objective of protection of 
the public.148 
 
In the case of Health Care Complaints Commission v Orr, the New South Wales 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal suggested that a ‘code of silence’ was operating 
in this case that was detrimental to the health of the practitioner concerned and the 
practitioner’s professional standing.  It criticised all the health practitioners who 
had come into contact with this impaired pharmacist as  
[p]roof ... that a failure to notify actually inhibited this impaired practitioner from 
being provided the supervision, monitoring and treatment that could have helped 
him, and may even have prevented the events that ultimately led to these 
disciplinary proceedings.149 
 
The mandatory reporting system has also been criticised on the basis that medical 
practitioners are sometimes subjected to vexatious reports by other medical 
                                                      
145 Malcolm Parker, 'Embracing the New Professionalism: Self-Regulation, Mandatory Reporting and 
their Discontents' (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 456, 461. 
146 Marie M Bismark et al, 'Reporting of Health Practitioners by their Treating Practitioner under 
Australia's National Mandatory Reporting Law' (2016) 204(1) MJA 24.e1, 24.e4. 
147 Marie M Bismark et al, 'Mandatory Reports of Concerns about the Health, Performance and 
Conduct of Health Practitioners' (2014) MJA 399, 402. 
148 Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2014] ACTSC 48 [148]. 
149 Health Care Complaints Commission v Orr [2015] NSWCATOD 124. 
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practitioners as a method of bullying and harassment.150  This allegation was 
investigated as part of a Senate inquiry into bullying and harassment in the medical 
profession.151   
 
In order to avoid the criticism that some practitioners may be deterred by the 
mandatory reporting regime from seeking treatment, Western Australia took 
another approach.  When legislating the National Law (WA), Western Australia 
added an exemption for a health practitioner from making a mandatory notification 
where another practitioner is being treated by the first health practitioner for an 
impairment that may otherwise be reportable.  Section 4(7) of the Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law (WA) inserts an additional exemption in 
section 141(4) as paragraph (da) as follows: 
(da) the first health practitioner forms the reasonable belief in the course of 
providing health services to the second health practitioner or student; 
 
Goiran et al contend that the National Law has created a perception of a barrier to 
health access, and that the Western Australian amendment removes this perception 
while still fulfilling the professional requirement to make sure that patient safety is 
being enhanced.152  However, the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council 
does not favour the adoption of the Western Australian legislation in the absence of 
relevant evidence.153 
 
The ‘ethical’ obligations concerning the promotion of public health and safe health 
care are fundamental to the principles of patient-centred care and a hallmark of the 
good medical professional.  Practising while intoxicated, or engaging in sexual 
                                                      
150 Tessa Hoffman, 'Doctors Share Harrowing Bullying Stories at Conference' Australian Doctor 
(Online) (11 April 2016) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/doctors-share-
harrowing-bullying-stories>. 
151 Tessa Hoffman, 'Inquiry to Investigate Doctors' Vexatious Claims'  Australian Doctor (Online) (18 
March 2016) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/inquiry-to-investigate-doctors-
vexatious-claims>.  However, in response to the Senate findings, AHPRA announced that it would 
crack down on vexatious complaints by other doctors, though its belief was that vexatious complaints 
were on a relatively small scale. (Antony Scholefield,'AHPRA to Crack Down on Vexatious 
Complaints', Australian Doctor (Online) (2 December 2016) 
<https://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/ahpra-to-crackdown-on-vexatious-
complaints>.  Researchers at University of Melbourne had identified only 6 complaints (including 
those from patients) that appeared to be vexatious out of a total of 850. 
152 Nick Goiran et al, 'Mandatory Reporting of Health Professionals: The Case for a Western 
Australian Style Exemption for all Australian Practitioners' (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 
209, 216. 
153 Paul Smith, 'Ministers Say No to Mandatory Reporting Revamp' Australian Doctor (Online) (11 
August 2015) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/ministers-say-no-to-mandatory-
reporting-revamp>.  Yet there is a recent report that New South Wales may be moving to amend 
legislation in respect of mandatory reporting. (Rachel Worsley, 'NSW Looks Set to Ditch Mandatory 
Reporting of Colleagues', Australian Doctor (Online) (27 April 2017) 
<https://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/nsw-set-to-ditch-mandatory-reporting>). 
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misconduct cannot, almost by definition, be patient-centred.  The remaining two 
categories specify harm as the trigger for the mandatory notification, thus falling 
into the category of promotion of public health and safe health care, that is, the 
duty to practise medicine safely.  The stipulation respecting patient safety is also 
reflected in the MBA Code that states it is the duty of all medical practitioners ‘ ... 
to make the care of patients their first concern and to practise medicine safely ... 
’.154   
 
6 Professionalism as the Yardstick in Disciplinary Proceedings against 
Medical Practitioners 
As the definitions of deficient professional conduct, spelled out in the National 
Law make clear, discipline of medical practitioners refers back to aspects of what 
constitutes professional conduct.  As foreshadowed, a four-step process of 
disciplining medical practitioners can be demonstrated by an analysis of the ACAT 
decision in Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of 
Australia [2015] ACAT 44.  ACAT also made reference to provisions of the MBA 
Code and the RACS Code of Conduct.  This case also illuminates the definitions of 
professional misconduct, unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory professional 
performance. 
 
The four steps are firstly, that allegations are referred to the relevant tribunal by 
AHPRA.  The tribunal then listens to expert evidence about what constitutes 
professional conduct in the circumstances, and then makes a finding of no case to 
answer or that the medical practitioner has been guilty of professional misconduct, 
unprofessional conduct or unsatisfactory professional performance.  A finding 
having been made leads to the fourth step, a decision whether to impose any 
sanction. 
 
Three matters were considered by the two-member Tribunal - one each concerning 
Patients A and B, and an appeal against the continuation of conditions imposed by 
the Medical Board of Australia in respect of an earlier matter.  Under section 193 
(1) of the National Law (ACT), the Medical Board of Australia had referred the 
matter toACAT.  The most comprehensive and complex matter related to Patient 
B, for whom there were three allegations against the medical practitioner, treatment 
                                                      
154 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
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of the patient that was not indicated by her medical condition, failure to advise the 
mother of Patient B that there were restrictions on the medical practitioner’s 
registration from a complaint regarding an earlier matter and producing a second 
report — several months after the event — of the original operation on Patient B ‘ 
... which on its face purported to be a contemporaneous account of the operation ... 
’.155 
 
The Tribunal considered detailed evidence from a number of witnesses, all medical 
experts in some aspect of orthopaedic practice.  On each allegation, the Tribunal 
reached a conclusion.156  The Tribunal commented on the definitions in section 5 of 
the National Law that relate to findings that can be made, professional misconduct, 
unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory professional performance.  The Tribunal 
noted that the definition of professional misconduct is inclusionary — for example, 
it includes unprofessional conduct — and is not an exhaustive statement of the 
term.157  The Tribunal also commented on the declaration by McLure P in Bernadt 
v Medical Board of Australia that: 
Professional misconduct has both a performance aspect (conduct that is substantially 
below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an 
equivalent level of training and experience) and a conduct component (conduct 
whether occurring in connection with the practice of the practitioner’s profession or 
not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold 
registration in the profession).158  
 
The Tribunal went on to observe that the definition of unprofessional conduct was 
an exhaustive statement of the term159 that had both a performance element and a 
conduct element.160  However, when the definition of unsatisfactory professional 
performance was considered, the Tribunal noted that it is also exhaustive but only 
has a performance component.161 
 
The Tribunal then reviewed the evidence and found that the medical practitioner’s 
‘ ... conduct in relation to allegation 1 was unsatisfactory professional performance, 
                                                      
155 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [41]. 
156 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [116], [142–143], [178–185]. 
157 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [193]. 
158 Bernadt v Medical Board of Australia [2013] WASCA 259 [23]. 
159 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [199]. 
160 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [200]. 
161 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [201]. 
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that allegation 2 was also unsatisfactory professional performance, and that his 
conduct in relation to allegation 3 was unprofessional conduct.’162 
 
The Tribunal also considered evidence in relation to Patient A and, following a 
similar procedure as that which related to Patient B, found that  
Dr Hocking had no case to answer from his use of PRP [Platelet Rich Plasma], that 
his failure to refer was unsatisfactory professional performance, but that he did not 
knowingly misrepresent the safety of the treatment to patient A’s mother, and there 
is insufficient evidence for the Tribunal to be satisfied that her consent was not 
informed.163 
 
The fourth stage in the process was the determination of sanctions.  The Tribunal 
had to decide whether the conditions imposed on Dr Hocking in respect of an 
earlier matter should be maintained or removed.  Section 126(3)(a) of the National 
Law provides that a condition may not be changed until any review period has 
passed and then only if the tribunal believes that ‘ ... there has been a material 
change in the health practitioner’s ... circumstances ... ’.  The Tribunal considered 
the evidence including reports from  ‘ ... supervisors, mentors and experts ... ’164 but 
noted that Dr Hocking had been the subject of 44 complaints though only a small 
number had led to an ‘adverse finding’.165  However, the Tribunal had received 
evidence that Dr Hocking had learned from his mistakes.166  He had undergone 
extensive retraining and close supervision167 and that there was ‘evidence of a 
significant improvement in Dr Hocking’s performance’.168  The Tribunal then 
ordered that previous conditions be lifted but substituted an order providing for a 
new set of conditions as recommended by expert witnesses.169  It also accepted an 
undertaking from Dr Hocking ‘ ... that he no longer practises or intends to practise 
in paediatric surgery, other than trauma surgery, where he is supported by a 
team’.170  The Tribunal, although urged to do so, did not deregister the practitioner. 
                                                      
162 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [229]. 
163 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [311]. 
164 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [344]. 
165 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [347]. 
166 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [349]. 
167 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [363]. 
168 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [365]. 
169 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [369]. 
170 Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 
44 [370]. 
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The same procedure is undertaken by tribunals throughout Australia when matters 
have been referred to them by the relevant Medical Board.  The following section 
now looks at outcomes rather than processes. 
 
7 Survey of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Having described the process by which one administrative tribunal came to a 
decision, this section makes a broader survey of cases that have come to the 
attention of AHPRA and the New South Wales Health Professional Councils 
Authority.  The purpose of this scrutiny is to determine patterns of medical 
practitioner conduct that have found their way through preliminary processes into 
the tribunal system.  Once recurring unprofessional behaviours have been 
identified through this section, this thesis will propose possible methods by which 
each of those identified might be addressed.  Eliminating recurring misbehaviours 
may never be possible, but the proposals aspire to reduce their incidence, or 
perhaps merely modify their worst impacts on patients.  Behaviours of individual 
practitioners will have been dealt with by orders of the relevant tribunal in 
accordance with the range of options available under section 172(2) of the National 
Law.  171 
 
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reports that in 2015 there were 102 
805 medical practitioners registered in Australia of whom, 88 040 were employed.  
This web site does not provide a specific date.  Of this total 95.1% worked in a 
clinical role.172  However, the MBA reports that, as at 31 December 2015, 103 044 
medical practitioners were registered in Australia.173  Of these, 32 037 were in New 
South Wales, 25 037 in Victoria and 20 018 in Queensland.  As stated below, 
AHPRA reported that in 2014/2015, there were 4541notifications whilst in 
2013/2014 there were 5585, a high proportion of the total number of registered 
medical practitioners in clinical practice.  The Annual Report for AHPRA for 
                                                      
171 Katie J Elkin et al, 'Doctors Disciplined for Professional Misconduct in Australia and New 
Zealand, 2000–2009' (2011) 194(9) MJA 452 at 455 reported for the first time the frequency of 
specific types of misconduct of medical practitioners in Australia and New Zealand.  The figures 
related to the years 2000 to 2009 and the number of cases surveyed over the ten year period was 485.  
The article categorised the conduct subject to disciplinary proceedings slightly differently from the 
categories in Appendices IIIA, IIIB and IIIC.  However, sexual misconduct, inappropriate prescribing 
and inappropriate medical care were identified.  There were no separate figures for impairment or 
inadequate record keeping. 
172 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare web site 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/workforce/medical/>. 
173 Medical Board of Australia, Registrant Data, (Reporting Period: October 2015 - December 2015) 
4. 
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2015/2016 stated that there were 5371 notifications.174  Whilst there were many 
occasions that there was more than one complaint or notification against a single 
medical practitioner, the total numbers of notifications still provide a substantial 
proportion of the total cohort of registered medical practitioners. 
 
A survey of substantive proceedings175 in Tribunal and Supreme Court decisions 
from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 relating to medical practitioners revealed a total 
of 49 medical practitioners who were subject to disciplinary proceedings, the 
largest number of proceedings occurring in New South Wales, followed by 
Queensland.  From 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 there was a total of 59 medical 
practitioners registered or previously registered in Australia who were the subject 
of disciplinary proceedings.  Once again the largest number of proceedings 
occurred in New South Wales, followed by Queensland.  In the period from 1 July 
2013 to 30 June 2014, there were 57 disciplinary proceedings, nearly half of which 
came from Queensland, with New South Wales having almost half of the 
Queensland number.  As Appendices IIIA, IIIB and IIIC show, in the same periods 
there were significantly fewer proceedings in Victoria, the second most populous 
state.  The survey for 2013–2014 appears as Appendix IIIA, the survey for 2014–
2015 appears as Appendix IIIB, whilst the survey for 2015–2016 is in Appendix 
IIIC.  It is interesting to speculate as to whether the way disciplinary proceedings 
are handled by the different disciplinary arrangements in New South Wales and 
Queensland has led to a more thorough process and more proceedings, rather than 
more medical practitioners who do not abide by ethical codes.  It is not clear from 
most of the substantive cases whether the particular action was initiated following 
a mandatory notification, though AHPRA keeps raw figures of mandatory and 
voluntary notifications.   
 
As the tables below show, in addition to deficient clinical practice, there is a 
substantial number of boundary violations, particularly inappropriate sexual 
conduct.  A boundary violation includes not only inappropriate sexual activities but 
other overstepping of boundaries such as borrowing money from patients.  There 
are cases concerned with inappropriate prescribing of drugs to drug dependent 
persons and occasionally, self-administration of addictive or restricted drugs, or 
                                                      
174 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2015/16 (November 2016) 48.  
At page 3, the report also stated that 53.3% of notifications were about medical practitioners who 
only make up 16.3% of total practitioners.  There was an increase of 17.7% in mandatory 
notifications against health practitioners and an increase of 18.3% in notifications about medical 
practitioners. 
175 Procedural questions, duplications, vexatious matters were not included. 
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alcohol.  Many of the latter have led to findings of impairment against the medical 
practitioner concerned.  In many cases, there has been more than one finding so the 
numbers do not tally.  Some cases show that the medical practitioner has been 
found guilty of both professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct (or the 
equivalent finding in New South Wales).   
 
Annual Reports of AHPRA tabulate all notifications made against health 
professionals.  The highest numbers were made against medical practitioners 
followed by notifications concerning nurses.  Relevant figures from AHPRA 
Annual Reports for 2015/16, 2014/2015 and 2013/2014 are reproduced below. 
 
The numbers of notifications involving medical practitioners for 2015/2016 are as 
follows:176 
Table N2: Notifications Received 2015/16 by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2015/16 
105 54 1058 379 131 953 382 2282 5371 
 
 
Notifications involving medical practitioners for 2014/2015 are as follows:177 
Table N1: Notifications Received 2014/15 by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2014/15 
92 90 439 324 134 1016 419 2027 4541 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
176 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2015/2016 (November 2016) 
(Table N2) 49.  The figure for New South Wales is the sum of the figures for matters managed by 
AHPRA where the conduct occurred outside New South Wales, together with the figure for matters 
handled by theHealth Professional Councils Authority (HPCA) in New South Wales. 
177 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2014/15 (November 2015) 
(Table N1) 37. 
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Comparable figures for 2013/2014 are:178 
Table N2: Notifications Received 2013/14 by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2013/14 
166 109 1361 421 173 1125 457 1773 5585 
 
 
Mandatory notifications for 2015/2016 were as follows:179 
Table N9: Mandatory Notifications Received by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2015/16 
12 0 6 43 11 72 37 88 269 
 
 
Mandatory notifications for 2014/2015 were as follows:180 
Table N8: Mandatory Notifications Received by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2014/15 
8 1 7 42 7 57 37 53 212 
 
 
Mandatory notifications for 2013/2014 were as follows:181 
Table N8: Mandatory Notifications Received by State or Territory 
ACT NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA NSW TOTAL 
2013/14 
5 2 134 51 17 39 27 76 351 
 
 
                                                      
178 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2013/2014 (November 2014) 
(Table N2) 130. 
179 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2015/2016 (November 2016) 
(Table N9) 55.  Once again the NSW figure is a total of AHPRA and HPCA figures.  In addition there 
were 4 matters where there was no principal place of practice, including an overseas address. 
180 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2014/15 (November 2015) 
(Table N8) 43. 
181 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2013/2014 (November 2014) 
(Table N17) 145. 
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As can be seen from the numbers of cases for Victoria in Appendices IIIA, IIIB 
and IIIC, it is noteworthy that the raw numbers of notifications for Victoria has not 
translated to tribunal or court attention.  However, it is impossible to relate the raw 
numbers of notifications to specific outcomes.  Grounds for mandatory 
notifications (Tables N10, N9 and combined Tables N21 & N22 below) show that 
the highest numbers relate to standards, that is section 140(d) of the National Law.  
Thus, notifications reflect the reasonable belief of the person making the 
notification that the medical professional ‘ ... has practised the profession in a way 
that constitutes a significant departure from accepted professional standards’.182   
 
Grounds for mandatory notifications for 2015/2016 are reproduced below:183 
Table N10: Grounds for Mandatory Notification - (2015/2016) 
Standards Impairment Alcohol or 
Drugs 
Sexual 
Misconduct 
Not 
Classified 
Total 
2015/16 
183 58 12 15 4 272 
 
 
Figures for 2014/2015 are as follows:184 
Table N9: Grounds for Mandatory Notification - (2014/2015) 
Standards Impairment Alcohol or 
Drugs 
Sexual 
Misconduct 
Not 
Classified 
Total 
2014/15 
116 61 13 20 2 212 
 
 
Figures for 2013/2014 follow:185 
Table N21 & N 22: Grounds for Mandatory Notification - (2013/2014) 
Standards Impairment Alcohol or 
Drugs 
Sexual 
Misconduct 
Not 
Classified 
Total 
2013/14 
221 86 10 28 6 351 
                                                      
182 National Law s 140(d) - ‘ ... placed the public at risk of harm because the practitioner has practised 
the profession in a way that constitutes a significant departure from accepted professional standards’. 
183 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2015/2016 (November 2016) 
(Table N10) 56.  Instead of a separate figure for New South Wales, the AHPRA and HPCA figures 
have been combined. 
184 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2014/15 (November 2015) 44.  
Separate figures for AHPRA and NSW have been totalled. 
185 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2013/2014 (November 2014) 
147–148.  Figures for AHPRA from Table N21and NSW from Table N 22 have been totalled. 
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Appendices IIIA, IIIB and IIIC have selected some recurring grounds in the cases 
surveyed.  As noted above, they may or may not have arisen from a mandatory 
notification.  For example, Queensland no longer keeps figures separately for 
mandatory and voluntary notifications.  Also, figures have been extracted where, in 
addition to the other ground for discipline, the court or tribunal has commented 
upon inadequate record keeping that, especially in 2014/2015 and 2015/2016, has 
attracted the relevant tribunal’s attention. 
 
Figures gleaned from Appendix IIIA are summarised as follows:  
Appendix IIIA - Total Figures and Percentages of Total Disciplinary Cases - 
(2013/2014) 
Deficient 
Clinical 
Standards 
Impair 
ment 
Alcohol 
or Drugs 
Boundary 
Violations 
Inade-
quate 
Record 
Keeping 
Improper 
Prescrib-
ing 
Total 
cases 
2013- 
2014 
20 7 1 14 7 7 57 
35.1% 12.3% 1.8% 24.6% 12.3% 12.3% 100% 
 
 
Similarly, figures and percentages from Appendix IIIB are tabulated below: 
Appendix IIIB - Total Figures and Percentages of Total Disciplinary Cases - 
(2014/2015) 
Deficient 
Clinical 
Standards 
Impair-
ment 
Alcohol 
or Drugs 
Boundary 
Violations 
Inade-
quate 
Record 
Keeping 
Improper 
Prescrib-
ing 
Total 
cases 
2014- 
2015 
27 13 10 11 16 17 59 
45.8% 22% 16.9% 18.6% 27.1% 28.8% 100% 
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Figures and percentages from Appendix IIIC are provided below: 
Appendix IIIC - Total Figures and Percentages of Total Disciplinary Cases - 
(2015/2016) 
Deficient 
Clinical 
Standards 
Impair-
ment 
Alcohol 
or Drugs 
Boundary 
Violations 
Inade-
quate 
Record 
Keeping 
Improper 
Prescrib-
ing 
Total 
cases 
2015- 
2016 
13 7 3 17 19 14 49 
26.5% 14.3% 6.1% 34.7% 38.8% 28.6% 100% 
 
 
It is unlikely that any of the notifications in the tables above relates to the 
disciplinary cases referred to in each Appendix as there is usually a lapse of time 
between the original notification and a disciplinary hearing.  Consequently, it is not 
possible to relate a particular notification to a specific outcome.  However, whilst 
the total figures in Appendices IIIA and IIIB are almost identical, the breakdowns 
differ.  New South Wales seems to have a particular concern with adequacy of 
records, especially in 2013/2014 compared with the other jurisdictions though in 
2014/2015 and 2015/2016, nearly all jurisdictions commented about records.  The 
numbers of cases finding deficient clinical standards was 50% higher in 
2014/2015, a matter for serious concern.  This figure had dropped back in 
2015/2016.  The 2015/2016 year also showed a total of fewer cases before 
tribunals. 
 
The Annual Report of AHPRA for 2014/2015 reported raw figures for mandatory 
notifications during the 12 month period from 1 July 2014.  Because New South 
Wales and Queensland are co-regulatory jurisdictions, complete figures for 
Australia are not readily available.  AHPRA is dependent on those jurisdictions to 
provide relevant figures and notes that there were 61% fewer notifications reported 
by Queensland.  This fact was unusual considering that Queensland normally has 
the second highest number of notifications after New South Wales.186  The case 
summaries in Appendices IIIA and IIIB also show a substantial drop in tribunal or 
court cases for Queensland between the two periods, 2013/2014 and 2014/2015.  
The number of Queensland cases in Appendix IIIC is almost the same as in 
2014/2015. 
                                                      
186 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Annual Report 2014/15 (November 2015) 36. 
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8 Summary — Maintaining Professional Discipline 
Disciplining of medical practitioners following notification is one of the matters 
that is specifically legislated in the National Law.  The grounds for both mandatory 
and voluntary notifications are prescribed.  However, these grounds can only be set 
out in general terms.  How those grounds are interpreted by AHPRA influences 
whether the notification is proceeded with or not.  Those that are to be investigated 
are passed on to the MBA for referral to appropriate health or performance panels 
or directed by the board to a tribunal.  New South Wales and Queensland have 
their own provisions for discipline and figures are not necessarily provided to 
AHPRA to give a national picture of what is reported, nor their outcomes.  
 
However, it is clear that the bulk of court and tribunal cases shows recurring 
patterns of behaviour from year to year though it is not possible to eliminate the 
behaviours that lead to disciplinary cases.  Nevertheless, a profession that 
proclaims its trustworthiness and professionalism should be held to a high standard 
and efforts should be made to minimise deviation from professional ideals.187 
 
The continuing numbers of cases concerning the keeping of inadequate records is a 
major concern.  This is particularly worrying as Australia moves to a centralised 
national system of electronic medical records.188  The rationale for centralised, 
electronic medical records is to assist safe and effective care by giving access by 
treating health practitioners to all relevant data concerning each patient.  This 
chapter now examines, in Section E, the question of the adequacy of medical 
records and makes some suggestions to improve this critical aspect of medical 
practice.  Problems that may arise when a medical practitioner has to try to treat a 
patient without any knowledge of the patient’s background has been exemplified in 
a report of a coroner’s findings concerning a woman travelling around Australia 
who became ill in an outback town.  Despite evaluating various symptoms, the 
general practitioner did not consider serious cardiac failure, of which she died.189   
 
                                                      
187 Margaret Brazier and Emma Cave, Patients, Medicines and the Law (Penguin Books, 2007) 54. 
188 ‘The My Health Record (previously known as the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record) 
was launched on 1 July 2012. A My Health Record is a secure online summary of an individual’s 
health information.’ <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/ehealth-record>. 
189 Tessa Hoffman, 'Rural GP Should not be Blamed for Woman's Death: Coroner', Australian 
Doctor(online) (22 April 2016) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/rural-gp-
should-not-be-blamed-for-womans-death>. 
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Boundary violations that are mostly sexual indiscretions, self-medication with 
addictive drugs and prescribing drugs to known addicts are recurring problems.  
These problems might be addressed by enhanced training in medical ethics as  
Chapter II has suggested.  However, a large number of cases involves deficient 
clinical treatment practices.  The answer to this problem may be the introduction of 
a process of revalidation in Australia.  Revalidation is designed to make sure that 
medical practitioners remain up-to-date and fit to practise.  The question of 
whether a revalidation requirement should be introduced into Australian regulatory 
processes will be explored in Section F. 
 
E IMPROVING THE PREPARATION AND MAINTENANCE OF 
MEDICAL RECORDS — ADOPTION OF COMPUTERISED 
MEDICAL RECORDS 
 
1 Introduction 
The importance of good medical records is hard to overestimate.  Good records can 
provide greater safety for the patient.  They can also protect the doctor in the event 
of any suggestion that an adverse event has occurred, or when medical negligence 
is alleged.  In addition, presenting good records is an obligation to professional 
colleagues, to provide all necessary information for a change in treating personnel.  
Forty-two of the 651 cases summarised in Appendices IIIA, IIIB and IIIC 
explicitly referred to inadequate record keeping.  One of the requirements of good 
medical practice is that full and complete records of contacts between any medical 
professional and the patient be maintained.190  
 
Good medical records show that the patient is truly the medical practitioner’s first 
priority.  The professionalism that leads to patient-centred care demands that the 
patient be shown due respect and inadequate records suggest a lack of concern for 
the patient.  The National Law does not prescribe the specifics of what medical 
records must contain.  Rather, it has left details of how medical records are to be 
kept to be dealt with by the MBA.  Consequently, the MBA Code specifies the 
importance of medical records and how they are to be maintained 
 
Paragraph 8.4 of the MBA Code provides:  
                                                      
190 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [8.4]. 
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8.4 Medical Records 
Maintaining clear and accurate medical records is essential for the continuing 
good care of patients. Good medical practice involves: 
8.4.1 Keeping accurate, up-to-date and legible records that report relevant details 
or clinical history, clinical findings, investigations, information given to 
patients, medication and other management in a form that can be understood 
by other health practitioners. 
8.4.2 Ensuring that your medical records are held securely and are not subject to 
unauthorised access. 
8.4.2 Ensuring that your medical records show respect for your patients and do not 
include demeaning or derogatory remarks. 
8.4.4 Ensuring that the records are sufficient to facilitate continuity of patient care. 
8.4.5 Making records at the time of the events, or as soon as possible afterwards. 
84.6 Recognising patients’ right to access information contained in their medical 
records and facilitating that access. 
8.4.7 Promptly facilitating the transfer of health information when requested by the 
patient. 
 
Similar requirements are specified by the GMC Code in the United Kingdom in 
paragraphs 19–21.191  Both the MBA Code and the GMC Code stipulate that clinical 
records should include relevant clinical findings, information given to patients and 
medication prescribed and treatment to be undertaken, and that records must be 
kept securely.  In addition, records must be made at the time of the events being 
recorded and in a form that can be understood by other health practitioners. 
 
New South Wales has been most concerned to specify the detail that must be 
entered into a patient’s medical records.  From the Medical Practice Regulation 
1998 (NSW) to the Medical Practice Regulation 2003 (NSW), each made under the 
Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW), regulations designated what records should be 
kept and when they must be made.  Now, the Health Practitioner Regulation (New 
South Wales) Regulation 2016 (NSW) made under the Health Practitioner 
Regulation National Law (New South Wales) has, in similar terms to the 1998 and 
2003 regulations, minutely specified requirements for record keeping by health 
practitioners.  Clauses 6(1) and 7(4) of the 2016 regulations draw attention to 
Schedule 4 that specifies the NSW requirements.   
                                                      
191 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013). 
19 Documents you make (including clinical records) to formally record your work must be clear, 
accurate and legible.  You should make records at the same time as the events you are 
recording or as soon as possible afterwards. 
20 You must keep records that contain personal information about patients, colleagues or others 
securely, and in line with any data protection requirements. 
21 Clinical records should include: 
a relevant clinical findings 
b the decisions made and actions agreed, and who is making the decision and agreeing 
the actions 
c the information given to patient 
d any drugs prescribed or other investigation or treatment 
e who is making the record and when. 
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2 Code Deficiencies 
(a) Treatment Outcomes 
Whilst the MBACode provides an outline of what basic record keeping should 
contain, there is some misalignment between the code and the regulations in New 
South Wales.  Not only are the code requirements sketchy, they are deficient in one 
important respect.  Arguably, one of the most important aspects of a medical record 
is precision regarding the outcome of each intervention — required by clause 
1(4)(f) of the Health Practitioner Regulation (New South Wales) Regulation 2016 
(NSW).  Clause 1(4)(f) is in the following terms: 
1(4) A record must include the following particulars of any medical treatment 
or other medical service that is given to or performed on the patient by the medical 
practitioner who is treating the patient: … 
 (f) the results or findings made in relation to the treatment. 
 
A crucial oversight in the MBA Code is that this obligation does not appear in 
paragraph 8.4.  Outcomes of treatments are very important in patient-centred 
medical practice.  Unless outcomes are documented, any record will be incomplete.  
Failure to detail results or findings will risk repetition of a treatment that is either 
ineffective, or minimally effective.  In the worst case, failure to document a 
treatment outcome may be positively dangerous.  Subsequent treatment may lead 
to harmful drug interactions or an adverse event if crucial information is not in the 
record. 
 
(b) Lack of Detail 
The requirements in paragraph 8.4 of the MBA Code should be more specific.  
Considering how many cases find that medical records are inadequate, the MBA 
could follow New South Wales192 and mandate the detail of the form of medical 
record to be used, to be set up as part of the computerised medical records of the 
practitioner.  Yet, as Appendices IIIA, IIIB and IIIC show, even under the highly 
detailed requirements of the New South Wales regulation, up to one-third of the 
cases from New South Wales still reveal inadequate record-keeping.   
 
 
 
                                                      
192 Online research into hansard, explanatory memoranda and second-reading speeches did not 
provide information about a reason for the stringency required in New South Wales record keeping 
obligations. 
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(c) Computerised Records 
Not only should the MBA mandate stringent record-keeping and monitor 
compliance for ongoing registration, it could reasonably require evidence that 
computerised record-keeping, in a form approved by the MBA, is being practised.  
Not only would an appropriate and approved computer program act as an aide 
memoire for the practitioner, it would protect the patient and, by showing exactly 
why some particular medication, test or procedure was adopted, it would protect 
the medical practitioner.  It would also provide crucial information for any 
practitioner taking over treatment of that patient. 
 
Some medical practitioners are already using computerised records.  However, a 
standardised format is necessary for medical records to be most efficiently 
computerised and centralised.  The medical press reports that the implementation 
of the My Health Record centralised computerised record-keeping system is being 
limited by poor quality of electronic medical records.193  The article recommends 
that the government should introduce minimum standards for electronic records in 
medical practices and suggests that TGA could license computer programs as a 
therapeutic device.194  Whether licensed by TGA or not, the MBA has the power to 
mandate acceptable computerised record-keeping systems for medical 
practitioners.  Any suggestion that some practitioners are not adequately computer 
literate must be met with the response that it is now the 21st Century and an ‘up-to-
date and fit to practise’ medical practitioner must demonstrate familiarity with 
computers.   
 
To the extent that some older practitioners cannot change, it could be assumed that 
they will soon no longer seek to maintain registration.  As pointed out by Choudry, 
Fletcher and Soumerai, there is evidence from several jurisdictions that the longer a 
                                                      
193 As mentioned in Chapter III, ‘The My Health Record (previously known as the Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record) was launched on 1 July 2012. A My Health Record is a secure 
online summary of an individual’s health information.’ 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/ehealth-record>. 
194 Antony Scholefield, 'Quality of GP e-Records Limiting MyHealth Record'  Australian Doctor 
(Online) (2 August 2016) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/myhealth-record-
limited-by-quality-of-gps-e-record>.  The article also observed that the United Kingdom introduction 
of accreditation of computer programs had led to culling the market from twenty programs to about 
three and the United States was working on gradually working towards a high level of 
standardisation. 
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practitioner has been in practice, the less likely is that practitioner ‘to deliver high 
quality care’.195  They go on to observe that 
[a]lthough it is generally assumed that the tacit knowledge and skills accumulated 
by physicians during years of practice lead to superior clinical abilities, it is also 
plausible that physicians with more experience may paradoxically be less likely to 
provide technically appropriate care.196 
 
 
 
 
(d) Currency of Records 
Both the MBA Code197 and the GMC Code198 mandate that records must be made 
concurrently or as soon as possible after the events being recorded.  The 
practitioner has an ethical duty both to the patient and to professional colleagues to 
find time to make complete records.  Where there is an emergency, records should 
be completed at the first opportunity after the urgency has passed and while the 
decisions made are still fresh in the practitioner’s memory.  However, whilst 
paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation (New South 
Wales) Regulation 2016 (NSW) specifies that each entry in a record must be dated 
and clearly identify the person making the record, what is missing is a requirement 
that the record be made contemporaneously, or as nearly as possible after the 
events being recorded.  Contemporaneity means the record being made is more 
likely to be correct.  Leaving the making of a record too long risks inaccuracies as 
matters can be forgotten or the record may be ambiguous. 
 
(e) Conclusion 
Better computerised records would also provide a defence if sub-standard 
professional practice were alleged.  A good quality computer program would act as 
a checklist.  It would provide evidence of the reasons for a specific diagnosis and 
any proposed treatment.  Greater use of checklists in all aspects of medical practice 
are not an affront to the technical expertise of the medical practitioner.  Rather, 
                                                      
195 See eg, Niteesh K Choudhry, Robert H Fletcher and Stephen B Soumerai, 'Systematic Review: 
The Relationship between Clinical Experience and Quality of Health Care' (2005) 142 Annals of 
Internal Medicine 260, 260;  Liam J Donaldson et al, 'Identification of Poor Performance in a 
National Medical Workforce Over 11 Years: An Observational Study' (2014) 23 BMJ Quality and 
Safety 147, 150. 
196 Niteesh K Choudhry, Robert H Fletcher and Stephen B Soumerai, 'Systematic Review: The 
Relationship between Clinical Experience and Quality of Health Care' (2005) 142 Annals of Internal 
Medicine 260, 260. 
197 Paragraph [8.4.5]. 
198 Clause 19. 
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they provide timely prompts.  Many adverse events occur when the very simple 
things are either not done, or not done at the right time.  The use of checklists is 
explored in more detail in Chapter VI.   
 
Related, but equally amenable to the use of computer templates, are referral letters 
by general practitioners to emergency departments.  Researchers have shown that 
much vital information is omitted from handwritten referrals.  They recommend 
use of a comprehensive computerised template.  They also suggest that any 
proposed template should be disseminated to GPs for feedback to make sure that it 
complies with the realities of medical practice.199  Where a computerised referral is 
used, based on a template, the information is likely to be more comprehensive.200   
 
As comprehensive centralised computerised records become the standard, patient 
safety should be enhanced, especially if the records are to be accessed by different 
health professionals.  One of the slated benefits of centralised computerised 
medical records is ease of identification of patient morbidities, drug allergies and 
treatments.  The existence of important documents could also be part of the 
computerised record: 
 a Do Not Resuscitate Order and its terms; 
 an enduring power of attorney and by whom it is held; 
 an advance directive detailing patient wishes for treatment to be provided or 
withheld. 
 
F REVALIDATION: QUESTIONING HOW REGULATORS 
DETERMINE WHETHER MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS ARE ‘UP-
TO-DATE AND FIT TO PRACTISE’ 
 
There are many problems and difficulties in the education of a medical student, but 
they are not more difficult than the question of the continuous education of the 
general practitioner.  Over the one we have some control, over the other none.  The 
university and the state board make it certain that the one has a minimum, at least, of 
professional knowledge, but who can be certain of the state of that knowledge of the 
other in five or ten years from the date of his graduation?201 
                                                      
199 Emily Nash, Charlotte Hespe and Dane Chakley, 'A Retrospective Audit of Referral Letter Quality 
from General Practice to an Inner-City Emergency Department',  Emergency Medicine Australasia 
(online) 20 May 2016 DOI: 10.1111/1742 page 4. 
200 Michael Woodhead,  '6 Vital Points GPs Omit from Handwritten ED Referrals' Australian Doctor 
(Online) (24 May 2016)  <https://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/6-vital-points-gps-
omit-from-ed-referral-letters>. 
201 William Osler, Aequanimitas With Other Addresses to Medical Students, Nurses and Practitioners 
of Medicine (Blakiston, 1904) 347. 
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The question of the ongoing competence of medical practitioners is not new.  The 
above quote comes from a speech made by Sir William Osler on the occasion of 
the Centennial Celebration of the New Haven Medical Association, at New Haven 
in the United States on 6 January 1903.202  This section explores the rationale for 
introduction of a revalidation process in Australia, and progress being made 
towards its implementation. 
 
Whilst there had been references in the GMC from about the 1970s to the need for 
the introduction of periodic reassessment of practitioners’ fitness to practise,203 it 
was not until 1998 that the proposal was considered seriously.  Action in the 
United Kingdom was triggered by the findings of the Inquiry into the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary and the erasure204 from the register, of medical practitioners such as 
Rodney Ledward, a gynaecologist who had injured many of his patients.  About the 
same time, Harold Shipman was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Mrs 
Kathleen Grundy.205   
 
Reaccreditation was originally envisaged by the GMC President at the time, Sir 
Donald Irvine, as only required for unsupervised medical practitioners.  However, 
by early 1999, the GMC had decided that all medical practitioners should be 
subject to a revalidation process.206   
 
As Sir Donald Irvine noted, the fact of registration should indicate to members of 
the public that the medical practitioners whose names are on the register are up-to-
date and fit to practise.207  As is the current situation in Australia, prior to 
revalidation, the name on the register in the United Kingdom was merely a 
historical record that the medical practitioner had passed certain examinations and 
paid an annual fee.  There had been no way of judging whether the practitioner had 
maintained his or her education and was otherwise fit to practise.  
 
                                                      
202 Ibid 345. 
203 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [26.6]. 
204 In the United Kingdom, the term ’erasure’ appears to be used rather than ‘striking off’ or 
‘cancellation’. 
205 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [26.7] & [26.9]. 
206 Ibid [26.10]. 
207 Donald Irvine, The Doctors' Tale (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 159. 
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Discussing a Prospectus issued by the GMC in April 2003,208 Dame Janet Smith 
reported that revalidation would be analogous to the formal periodic reassessment 
undertaken by airline pilots.  The Prospectus promoted the idea firstly, of regular 
confirmation of fitness to practise.  Secondly, the purpose of reassessing pilots was 
not to find that they were bad pilots, but to ensure they remained good pilots and 
this motivation should apply to medical practitioners too.  Finally it was suggested 
that no airline would rely solely on these periodic assessments because, in addition, 
each airline had its own local management procedures to assess their pilots’ 
suitability for specific work.  Dame Janet remarked:  
In one respect, this comparison between doctors and pilots is particularly apposite;  
both doctors and airline pilots take our lives in their hands when working.  I can see 
also that there may be other similarities between the revalidation of doctors and the 
formal assessments undergone by pilots.  However, the answer in the Prospectus did 
not mention an important distinction between the two processes, namely that pilots 
have to undergo a series of competence tests in the course of their periodic 
assessment, whereas revalidation, as proposed in the prospectus, would not involve 
any such testing.209 
 
Gaba has advocated a systems approach to reducing errors in anaesthetics.  He 
observes that anaesthetists have used engineers, and examined safety models used 
in other hazardous industries like aviation.  He has advocated the use of simulators 
as a way of training anaesthetists in many settings, including uncommon but 
critical situations where a rapid response is required.210  As Gawande reports, Gaba 
‘ ... points out , pilot experience is recognised to be invaluable but insufficient: 
pilots seldom have direct experience with serious plane malfunctions anymore.  
They are therefore required to undergo yearly training in crisis simulators.  Why 
not doctors too?’211 
 
Re-accreditation or revalidation of medical practitioner registration is generating a 
great deal of discussion in Australia.  Breen reports that medical practitioners in the 
United Kingdom have reluctantly accepted that revalidation is necessary.212  
Following the United Kingdom’s introduction of mandatory five-yearly 
revalidation from 3 December 2012, the subject is clearly on the agenda in 
Australia.  Following its introduction in the United Kingdom, the MBA’s Chair, Dr 
                                                      
208 Dame Janet Smith, 'The Shipman Inquiry' (Fifth Report Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the 
Past – Proposals for the Future 9 December 2004) [26.57]. 
209 Ibid [26.66]. 
210 David M Gaba, 'Anaesthesiology as a Model for Patient Safety in Health Care' (2000) 320 BMJ 
785, 786. 
211 Atul Gawande, Complications (Metropolitan Books, 2002)68. 
212 Kerry J Breen, 'Revalidation — What is the Problem and What are the Possible Solutions?' (2014) 
200 MJA 153. 
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Joanna Flynn, flagged the introduction of revalidation for medical practitioners 
within a few years.213 
 
The United Kingdom revalidation process commenced in December 2012 and was 
gradually rolled out with the intention of completing, by March 2016, the 
revalidation of all medical practitioners who were on the General Medical 
Council’s register in 2012/2013.214   
 
The King’s Fund was commissioned to write a report on the impact, to October 
2013, of the revalidation system on practitioner behaviour.  It surveyed seven case 
study sites where medical revalidation had been completed.  The report detailed 
both positive and negative consequences.  Some of the positive outcomes identified 
in the report were: 
 a structure for learning215 – simply going through the actions brought a more 
formalised process to their existing behaviours, such as reflection on their 
learning, developing new knowledge, and continuing professional development 
(CPD); 
 increased accountability,216 such as greater self-regulation and self-scrutiny; 
 increased communication around errors and earlier identification of problems217 – 
some doctors felt more able to raise concerns about colleagues on the ground that 
they were confident that action would be taken;218 
 more cognisant of patient views219 – awareness of patient feedback and need to 
see complaints as part of the appraisal process. 
 
Negative responses included  
 the time and emotional cost of revalidation220 – some saw the collection of the 
necessary data as ‘obsessional’, others saw the process as a distraction from 
clinical practice; 
 tick-box behaviour221 – unthinkingly following a regimented process was leading 
to complacency and abrogation of responsibility; 
 reduced willingness to share more serious errors222 – less likelihood of discussing 
errors during appraisal for ‘fear of being reported to the General Medical 
Council’.   
 
 
                                                      
213 Antonio Bradley, 'Revalidation Won't Add to GPs' Burden : Board' Australian Doctor (Online) (20 
September 2013) <http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/revalidation-won-t-add-to-
gp-s-burden-board?t=635478594538288721>. 
214 Vijaya Nath, Becky Seale and Mandip Kaur, Medical Revalidation (The King’s Fund, March 
2014) 4. 
215 Ibid 12. 
216 Ibid 13. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid 14. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid 15. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid 16. 
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One positive outcome was that 
[M]any doctors expressed the potential for revalidation to lead to more reflective 
practice. While this wasn’t yet widespread, there were signs of some doctors 
becoming more reflective as a result of revalidation. Few doctors (appraisers or 
appraisees) felt that revalidation had yet prompted true reflection among those who 
weren’t already inclined. However, for those who were, the appraisal form had the 
effect of prompting reflection: ... .223  
 
The need for more reflection in medical practice as canvassed in Chapter II, has 
been emphasised in the United Kingdom’s revalidation requirements.224  The 
King’s Fund report comments that ‘ ... those who resist the most are the ones who 
will benefit the most’ and that ‘[m]ore vexing perhaps were those in a senior 
position whose attitude and behaviour was felt to be regularly inappropriate but 
rarely challenged’.225  These comments echo the sentiments reported in Chapter II 
about bad behaviour among some senior practitioners in their interactions with 
both patients and medical trainees.226  Another benefit of revalidation seen by some 
medical administrators was the encouraging of a more patient-centred service,227 a 
follow up from patient feedback’s being part of the revalidation process. 
 
One of the outcomes of the King’s Fund report on revalidation was identified by it 
as an unintended consequence that could be either positive or negative.  The report 
noted that some older medical practitioners had left medical practice because of 
either a failure or an unwillingness to complete the revalidation process.  That was 
seen by some as a positive outcome because it removed practitioners who were ‘ ... 
not inclined to participate in continual medical education and statutory 
processes’.228  However, there was a risk that the experience of good doctors would 
be lost.229 
 
Audet, Davis and Schoenbaum report that in the United States, the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education has endorsed a set of six competencies, 
four of which are patient-centred care practices.  Professional recognition, 
                                                      
223 Ibid  20. 
224 General Medical Council, The Good Medical Practice Framework for Appraisal and Revalidation 
(March 2013) 1. 
225 Vijaya Nath, Becky Seale and Mandip Kaur, Medical Revalidation (The King’s Fund, March 
2014) 21. 
226 See eg, Lynn V Monrouxe and Charlotte E Rees, '"It's Just a Clash of Cultures": Emotional Talk 
within Medical Students' Narratives of Professionalism Dilemmas' (2012) 17 Advances in Health 
Science Education 671; Andrew H Brainard and Heather C Brislen, 'Learning Professionalism: A 
View from the Trenches' (2007) 82 Academic Medicine 1010;  Wendy Levinson et al, Understanding 
Medical Professionalism (McGraw Hill, 2014). 
227 Vijaya Nath, Becky Seale and Mandip Kaur, Medical Revalidation (The King’s Fund, March 
2014) 24. 
228 Ibid 16. 
229 Ibid 17. 
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licensing and accreditation now also include patient-centred criteria.  In addition, 
the American Board of Internal Medicine and the American Board of Medical 
Specialties require evidence of patient-centred practices.230 
 
There is also much discussion within Australian health departments and medical 
practitioner organisations as to whether revalidation is necessary.  The MBA 
sought information from overseas to determine whether revalidation is working to 
provide greater safety in medical practice.231  The Final Report on evidence and 
options prepared by a team from the Collaboration for the Advancement of 
Medical Education Research and Assessment (“CAMERA’) at Plymouth 
University Peninsula Schools of Medicine and Dentistry232 outlined revalidation 
processes in several other countries, and having examined them and relevant 
current research, suggested three models that could be adopted in Australia, 
together with their advantages and disadvantages.  However, it appears that the 
three models suggested by CAMERA were rejected.  Following receipt of the 
CAMERA report, and with the aim of developing how revalidation in Australia 
could be implemented, the MBA then decided to appoint an expert advisory group 
and a consultative committee, and to commission ‘ ... social research into what the 
profession and the community expect that medical practitioners should do to 
demonstrate ongoing competence and fitness to practise’.233 
 
The MBA published in August 2016 an Interim Report from the Expert Advisory 
Group on Revalidation, a discussion paper, Options for Revalidation in Australia, 
and an Executive Summary of the Interim Report.  The Expert Advisory Group 
proposed  
1. maintaining and enhancing the performance of all doctors practising in 
Australia through efficient, effective, contemporary, evidence-based continuing 
professional development (CPD) relevant to their scope of practice 
(‘strengthened CPD’), and 
2. proactively identifying doctors-at-risk of poor performance and those who are 
already preforming poorly, assessing their performance and when appropriate 
supporting the remediation of their practice.234 
 
                                                      
230 Anne-Marie Audet, Karen Davis and Stephen C Schoenbaum, 'Adoption of Patient-Centred Care 
Practices by Physicians' (2006) 166 (April 10) Archives of Internal Medicine 754, 758. 
231 Medical Board of Australia, 'Board Commissions Research on Revalidation' (Media Statement, 24 
March 2015). 
232 Collaboration for the Advancement of Medical Education and Assessment, The Evidence and 
Options for Medical Revalidation in the Australian Context (Final Report, 10 July 2015). 
233 Medical Board of Australia, Expert Advisory Group on Revalidation (Interim Report, August 
2016) 14. 
234 Medical Board of Australia, Options for Revalidation in Australia (Discussion Paper, August 
2016) 5. 
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The Expert Advisory Group also proposed that the following guiding principles be 
applied to all recommended approaches to revalidation under the first limb: 
 smarter not harder: strengthened CPD should increase effectiveness but not 
require more time and resources for participants 
 integration: all recommended approaches should be integrated with — and draw 
on — existing systems where possible and avoid duplication of effort, and 
 relevant, practical and proportionate: all recommended changes should be 
relevant to the Australian healthcare environment, feasible and practical and 
proportionate to public risk.235 
 
All recognised CPD activities would be evidence-based and involve: 
 performance review 
 outcome measurement, and  
 validated educational activities.236 
 
The second limb of the revalidation process would involve identifying ‘at-risk’ 
medical practitioners.  National and international research suggests that the main 
factors are 
 age (from 35 years, increasing into middle and older age) 
 male gender 
 number of prior complaints, and 
 time since last prior complaint.237 
 
Some studies have also suggested other factors like lack of response to feedback 
and unrecognised cognitive impairment.  In the United States, Papadakis et al 
found that there was a high correlation between disciplinary proceedings and 
unprofessional behaviour in medical school.  Medical students who showed 
unprofessional behaviour were three times as likely as the control group to become 
the subject of disciplinary proceedings.238  However, as the Expert Advisory Group 
observes:  
Not all individuals in at-risk groups will be underperforming.  Some practitioners 
who are identified as underperforming will return to safe practice simply through the 
process of being assessed and receiving feedback.239 
 
Whilst international research suggests that ‘ ... about six percent of medical 
practitioners are poorly performing at any one time’, identifying under-performing 
                                                      
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid 8. 
237 Ibid 9. 
238 Maxine A Papadakis et al, 'Disciplinary Action by Medical Boards and Prior Behaviour in Medical 
School' (2005) 353 NEJM 2673, 2679. 
239 Medical Board of Australia, Expert Advisory Group on Revalidation (Interim Report, August 
2016) 10. 
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medical practitioners in Australia will require future research specific to the 
Australian context.240  Processes for remediation will also have to be developed.241 
 
An opinion piece by Michael Woodhead in Australian Doctor referred to reports 
that some general practitioners in the United Kingdom complained that the process 
is time-consuming with a ‘limited scope for professionalism’ and ‘overemphasis on 
legalism and managerialism’.  The opinion piece concluded that ‘a badly designed 
revalidation system leads to poor morale and an exodus of doctors from 
practice’.242  Woodhead hoped that the MBA was taking notice. 
 
Many Australian medical practitioners are sceptical about revalidation.243  They 
consider that their CPD obligations are adequate to ensure that doctors are keeping 
up-to-date with current medical trends and procedures.  However, as previously 
noted, there is evidence that it can take up to 17 years for doctors to adopt new 
techniques and processes for at least half of American patients.244   
 
As reported in Section E above, there is also evidence that older medical 
practitioners deliver a lower quality of clinical care.245  CAMERA describes how in 
Canada, the revalidation system randomly chooses physicians under 70 years of 
age to undergo peer assessment.  Once they reach the age of 70 every physician 
must undergo peer assessment every five years.246 
 
As has been suggested earlier in this thesis, incorporating matters that should be 
second nature to medical practitioners into the revalidation process, is a practical 
method of enforcing their adoption by individual medical practitioners who wish to 
                                                      
240 Ibid 11. 
241 Ibid 12. 
242 Michael Woodhead, 'Revalidation is Driving GPs Out the Door' Australian Doctor (Online) (16 
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243 See eg, Edwin Kruys, 'Competency Checks Could Become a Costly Mistake' Australian Doctor 
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retain registration to practise.  The proposed emphasis on CPD processes for 
revalidation is designed to answer this criticism. 
 
As the Kings Fund report remarks: 
What leads to culture change is when behaviour is internalised so that doctors are 
motivated to improve the quality of patient care – when no one is watching.247  
 
 
G CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has surveyed the legal underpinnings for regulation of medical 
practitioners in Australia.  It has discussed the modern regulatory reliance on soft 
law instruments to supplement specific legislation.  Because of the intricacies of 
the regulatory environment, specific legislation cannot provide for every 
circumstance or nuance of activity and it is this that has led to the proliferation of 
soft law instruments.  Research has also shown that regulation is best achieved by a 
system that includes the relevant industry in determining what regulation is 
required and how it can be achieved and, where possible, permitting the industry to 
self-regulate.248 
 
What is apparent from the information in this chapter is that Australia has made a 
considerable effort to set in place a system of laws and regulations aimed at 
providing high quality medical care for its citizens.  Traditionally, the preference of 
the medical profession has been to regulate itself.  However, total self-regulation 
by the medical profession in Australia has been shown to be deficient.249  This 
conclusion has been reached following a series of high-profile medical scandals, 
thus leading to more stringent regulation.250   
 
In Australia, the provisions of the National Law are backed up by an array of soft 
law instruments (codes, guidelines, charters, standards, frameworks and directions) 
that are intended to influence behaviour in the directions required by government 
regulators.  Ultimately however, it is for governments to determine whether the 
                                                      
247 Vijaya Nath, Becky Seale and Mandip Kaur, Medical Revalidation (The King’s Fund, March 
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existing regimes are adequate.  As further medical scandals have become public, 
the question is how many medical scandals is too many.   
 
The catalogue of grounds upon which disciplining of health practitioners can be 
initiated is also directed towards ensuring patient safety in a system of great 
complexity.  The National Law has specified the grounds for notifications to 
regulatory bodies of deficient behaviours of health practitioners. 
 
Ultimately however, regulation refers to what is perceived to be professional 
behaviour.  The adoption by courts and tribunals of codes and guidelines as 
evidence of what constitutes professional behaviour is both authorised by section 
41 of the National Law and by court and tribunal endorsement and application of 
their provisions.  The story has been similar in the United Kingdom,251 showing 
that courts and tribunals in both countries are prepared to accept these instruments 
when determining whether or not there has been negligent behaviour. 
 
Despite the move away from government acknowledgment of self-regulation as the 
only way to regulate medical practitioners, to requiring more stringent supervision, 
there are aspects of the structure of the law that have subjugated the interests of 
patients to those of the medical practitioner.  For many years courts endorsed the 
perspective of a medical profession that did not recognise that it could be prone to 
error.  Medical and insurance lobbies co-opted legislators, and sometimes stoked 
media and public concern to secure legislative change in favour of the medical 
profession.  To a certain extent, the courts have moved towards a patient-centred 
perspective but there are still features of the law relating to medical practice that 
favour medical practitioners and these will be considered in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV: THE LAW AND ITS DEFERENCE TO 
THE CONCERNS OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
As the MBA Code asserts, good medical practice is patient-centred, involving 
partnerships between doctors and their patients, and is at the heart of medical 
professionalism.  Professional medical bodies emphasise ‘ ... the assumption that at 
the heart of good medical care is a set of values, attitudes and behaviours called 
medical professionalism’,1 and that ‘ ... it is medical professionalism that underpins 
the trust the public has in doctors’.2  
 
However, despite the recognition of good medical practice as patient-centred, this 
chapter highlights the tensions between practitioner interests and the duty of 
doctors ‘ ... to make the care of patients their first concern’.3  It argues that, whilst 
the patient is, according to the rhetoric, the doctor’s first concern, there are 
structural biases in the law in favour of the medical practitioner that have led to 
some doctors being protected from the full force of the law despite a finding of 
negligence.  The purpose of this chapter is to show, through three examples, how 
the competing interests of practitioner and patient, the paradox of the conflict4 
between self-interest and altruism, have been treated by the courts and by statute.  
It focuses on how adherence by some medical practitioners to the ideals of patient-
centred care can be disregarded, on occasion, in favour of professional concerns 
such as peer reputation5 and the defence of clinical autonomy.6 
 
                                                      
1 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) v. 
2 Ibid xi. 
3 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia (at 
March 2014) [1.4]. 
4 Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1532. 
5 See eg, Lucian L Leape, 'Reporting of Adverse Events' (2002) 347 NEJM 1633, 1633;  Judith Healy, 
Improving Health Care Safety and Quality (Ashgate, 2011), 109;  Mary Dixon-Woods, Karen Yeung 
and Charles L Bosk, 'Why Is UK Medicine No Longer a Self-Regulating Profession?  The Role of 
Scandals Involving "Bad Apple" Doctors' (2011) 73 Social Science and Medicine 1452, 1454. 
6  See eg, The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary 1984–1995, Learning from Bristol, Report CM 5207(1) (July 2001) 62 [4];  Royal College 
of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World (Report of a 
Working Party, December 2005) [2.11];  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 
[46] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
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The three examples chosen for analysis are interlinked — firstly, the interpretation 
of a doctor’s duty of care by reference to the professional or Bolam standard;  
secondly, the requirement for patient consent before any medical treatment is 
initiated; and the way that legislation has constrained patient rights to 
compensation when negligence has been established.  Any negative impacts on 
patients where professional interests have overwhelmed patient interests have 
implications for social justice, particularly where injured patients are denied 
adequate redress for substantiated negligent behaviour.  Examination of these 
questions is best understood through the prism of tort law, particularly the action 
for negligence.  Therefore, before commencing it is constructive to provide an 
outline of the matters that are considered by courts when determining whether or 
not an action by a medical practitioner has been shown to have been negligently 
performed.  
 
Finally, the chapter investigates whether a ‘no fault’ injury compensation scheme 
should be adopted into Australia.  Whilst there would be powerful lobbies against 
such a scheme, there are valid arguments that expense and waste in the current tort 
system could be diverted to providing life-long care for those injured, whether 
through the health system or otherwise. 
 
B KEY FACTORS IN THE ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE 
 
The key elements to be shown in the modern action for negligence are that: 
 there is a duty owed by one person to another, and  
 that duty has been breached, and  
 the breach has caused damage that was foreseeable.   
 
The duty of care not to injure another arises in circumstances where there is a close 
relationship such that the person owing the duty should foresee that a failure to 
exercise reasonable foresight may cause injury to the person to whom the duty is 
owed.  Duty of care is an essential element of the law of negligence.7 
 
As outlined in Chapter I, the idea of the duty of care has been captured in the 
famous dictum by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson: 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour;  and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour?  receives a 
restricted reply.  You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which 
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.  Who, then, in 
                                                      
7 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 431 (McHugh J). 
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law is my neighbour?  The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called in question.8 
 
Common law establishes that cases that give rise to a duty of care are grounded in 
the relationship between the parties, not the conduct by which the injury was 
caused.9  For instance, in Vairy, the court recognised that the relationship between 
doctor and patient is an example of an established category ‘ ... in which the 
common law imposes a duty on the former ... to take care of the latter.’10   
 
Not only must a duty of care be shown but the court then has to determine the 
standard of reasonable care applicable to the circumstances.  In the context of 
medical practice, medical practitioners rely on the standard as determined by the 
Bolam case.11  As discussed below, the courts had been moving to circumscribe the 
Bolam test particularly in the context of provision of information and advice. 
 
Having established the existence of a duty and the standard by which it is to be 
judged, the plaintiff must then show that a reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant should have foreseen that the injury would occur.12  Finally, the plaintiff 
must show that the breach of the duty has caused damage to the person injured.13  
Damage is an essential ingredient in the action for negligence.14 
 
C THE BOLAM OR PROFESSIONAL STANDARD 
 
The first question to be explored is based on the common law surrounding the 
Bolam15 or professional standard.  The determination of the content of the doctor’s 
duty of care toward a patient, including the doctor’s perception of the patient’s 
‘best interests’, has been linked to a standard referable to the opinion of a body of 
responsible medical practitioners who are appropriately skilled in the applicable 
aspect of medical practice.  Whilst courts must, of necessity, be guided by evidence 
from medical practitioners about what is acceptable conduct or treatment in the 
circumstances, they have also recognised that technical concerns are not the only 
                                                      
8 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
9 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 434 (McHughJ). 
10 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 433 (McHugh J). 
11 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
12 See eg, Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 [74], [85] (Lord Hope). 
13 See eg, Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52 [40] (Kirby J). 
14 See eg, Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52 [160] (Hayne J); [276] (Crennan J). 
15 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
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factors to be considered.  For example, the court in Montgomery recognised that 
what the medical practitioner sees as in the patient’s ‘best interests’ and what the 
patient sees as important, may differ substantially: 
The doctor’s advisory role cannot be regarded as solely an exercise of medical skill 
without leaving out of account the patient’s entitlement to decide on the risks to her 
health which she is willing to run (a decision which may be influenced by non-
medical considerations).16   
 
Thus the courts have modified the Bolam standard to recognise that there are more 
considerations in play, when determining the doctor’s duty of care to advise a 
patient about risks, than strictly technical clinical matters.  A patient’s choice about 
whether or not to undergo a particular risk includes a range of matters of which the 
doctor cannot be aware. 
 
The Bolam principle is invoked by medical practitioners when questions arise 
concerning the standard of care to be provided to a patient.  Medical practitioners 
call on the Bolam standard despite its extensive modification over the years.  
Courts have moved from unquestioning acceptance of a body of responsible 
medical opinion to recognition of patient autonomy in decision-making.  As Lord 
Walker commented in Chester v Afshar:  
The surgeon’s duty to advise his patient (and in particular to warn of unavoidable 
risks of surgery) is a very important part of his professional duty.  In Sidaway v 
Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 
[1985] AC 871, 88, Lord Scarman described the patient’s right to make his own 
decision as a basic human right.  Lord Scarman was delivering a dissenting speech, 
but the whole House recognised this right ... and during the 20 years which have 
elapsed since Sidaway’s case the importance of personal autonomy has been more 
and more widely recognised.17 
 
Likewise, Lady Hale observed: 
It is now well recognised that the interest which the law of negligence protects is a 
person’s interest in their own physical and psychiatric integrity, an important feature 
of which is their autonomy, their freedom to decide what shall and shall not be done 
with their body ... 18 
 
Yet, despite these endorsements of the patient’s autonomous right to choose 
whether or not to accept a medical intervention, the Bolam standard subjugates the 
patient’s autonomy to a majority professional opinion. 
 
This discussion commences with the case of Bolam and describes the propositions 
for which it is noted.  It proceeds with an account of its influence on subsequent 
                                                      
16 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [83]. 
17 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, 163 (Lord Walker). 
18Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [108] (Lady Hale). 
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cases up to the English case of Sidaway19 that started to recognise that there was a 
distinctive aspect to each of a doctor’s three main obligations toward the patient, to 
diagnose, to treat and to provide advice.  Providing advice includes the doctor’s 
duty to brief a patient concerning risks and benefits of any proposed treatment 
together with information about what having no treatment might entail.   
 
This section then contrasts the English point of view with Australian cases that had 
taken a stronger position on the patient’s right to information and finally refers to 
Montgomery,20 a case of the United Kingdom Supreme Court.  Montgomery has 
overturned Sidaway and adopted a position that mirrors the principle laid down in 
the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker.21  This analysis charts the way patient 
interests were first supplanted by practitioner interests.  However, the strong court 
endorsement of the patient’s right to make autonomous choices based on 
comprehensive information about what is acceptable treatment in the patient’s 
particular circumstances has downgraded the relevance of the Bolam standard.  
 
 
1 Bolam and its Aftermath 
The Bolam standard derives from a direction to the jury by McNair J in the English 
case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee.22  This was a case 
brought by an injured plaintiff whose hip had been impacted by convulsions caused 
by electro-convulsive therapy.  The patient had not been warned that convulsions 
were possible, nor was he sedated during the procedure.  In putting to the jury the 
question as to whether the medical practitioner had been negligent, McNair J’s 
directions stated that: 
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have 
that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well 
established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary 
competent man exercising that particular art.23   
 
Having put the standard required as ‘the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent 
man’, he continued: ‘ ... he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance 
                                                      
19 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871. 
20 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
21 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
22 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] WLR 582. 
23 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586. 
 182 
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in 
that particular art’.24 
 
Lord Denning was a strong advocate for the medical profession in several cases, as 
exemplified by his view in Whitehouse v Jordan that ‘ ... in a professional man, an 
error of judgement is not negligent.’25  In the House of Lords appeal, Lord Fraser 
was at pains to modify that view by saying that Lord Denning must have meant 
that an error of judgement is not necessarily negligent.  The assertion as it stood 
was not an accurate statement of the law.26   
 
Lord Denning’s lack of concern for the patient was epitomised in his final remarks 
in Whitehouse v Jordan.  The plaintiff had been born grossly brain-damaged, 
unable to sit up or speak, and was doubly incontinent.  Lord Denning commented 
that the actions of the surgeon were at worst an error of judgment but not negligent.  
Whilst it was a dreadful outcome for the child, people would sympathise with the 
mother.   
Everyone will rally round to help her as they have already done during these last ten 
years.  She should be grateful for all that has been done for her without laying blame 
on the doctors.27 
 
Bolam was called upon in many cases as the standard by which a medical 
practitioner’s duty to his or her patient should be evaluated.28  However, Sidaway 
was the first time that the medical practitioner’s standard of care came before the 
House of Lords.   
 
2 The Doctor’s Multiple Duties 
In Sidaway,29 the court was faced with an attempt by the plaintiff to argue that there 
was a difference between the doctor’s duty in respect of diagnosis and treatment, 
and a separate duty to inform the patient about relevant risks.  Lord Diplock did not 
agree: 
In English jurisprudence the doctor’s relationship with his patient which gives rise 
to the normal duty of care to exercise his skill and judgement ... has hitherto been 
treated as [a] single comprehensive duty covering all the ways in which a doctor is 
called upon to exercise his skill and judgement ... [t]his general skill is not subject to 
                                                      
24 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587. 
25 Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650, 658 (Lord Denning). 
26 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246, 263 (Lord Fraser). 
27 Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650, 658 (Lord Denning). 
28 See eg, Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634;  Gold v Haringey 
Health Authority  [1988] 1 QB 481. 
29 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871. 
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dissection into a number of component parts to which different criteria of what 
satisfy the duty of care apply, such as diagnosis, treatment, advice ... 30 
 
He continued: 
[n]o convincing reason has in my view been advanced ... that would justify treating 
the Bolam test as doing anything less than laying down a principle of English law 
that is comprehensive and applicable to every aspect of the duty of care owed by a 
doctor to his patient ... 31 
 
However, he was prepared to make an exception for judges:   
[w]hen it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and experience that a 
judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it natural for him to say (correctly) it is 
my right to decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to be 
informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am not already aware from 
my general knowledge as a highly educated man of experience, so that I may form 
my own judgment as to whether to refuse the advised treatment or not.32 
 
In Sidaway, the court was trying to determine whether the surgeon concerned had 
been negligent in his failure to warn the patient of the risks inherent in the 
proposed treatment.  In his judgement, Lord Scarman summarised the Bolam case 
by saying:   
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he 
acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible 
body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice.  In 
short, the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of 
medical judgement.33   
 
However, Lord Scarman was not prepared to accede to the idea that the standard of 
care as a matter of medical judgment by ‘a responsible body of professional 
opinion’, was the only criterion for determining whether the doctor was under a 
duty to warn his patient of possible risks in the treatment being suggested to the 
patient.  In his view, this idea was concerning in that it would leave ‘ ... the 
determination of a legal duty to the judgement of doctors’. 
Responsible medical judgement may, indeed, provide the law with an acceptable 
standard in determining whether a doctor in diagnosis or treatment has complied 
with his duty.  But is it right that medical judgement should determine whether there 
exists a duty to warn of risk and its scope?  It would be a strange conclusion if the 
courts should be led to conclude that our law, which undoubtedly recognises a right 
in the patient to decide whether he will accept or reject the treatment proposed, 
should permit the doctors to determine whether and in what circumstances a duty 
                                                      
30 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 893 (Lord Diplock). 
31 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 893 (Lord Diplock). 
32 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 895 (Lord Diplock). 
33 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
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arises requiring the doctor to warn his patient of the risks inherent in the treatment 
which he proposes. 34 
 
Similarly, as Gleeson CJ observed in Rosenberg v Percival when referring to Lord 
Scarman’s dissenting judgement in Sidaway: 
[t]he relevance of professional practice and opinion was not denied;  what was 
denied was its conclusiveness.  In many cases professional practice and opinion will 
be the primary ... basis upon which a court may reasonably act.  But, in an action 
brought by a patient, the responsibility for deciding the content of the doctor’s duty 
of care, rests with the court, not with his or her professional colleagues.35 
 
Montgomery comments that in the past, many judges and legislators have been 
reluctant to take from doctors the power to make medical decisions for their 
patients in the guise of best interests.36  However, from the high point of the Bolam 
case, courts have gradually scaled back the almost unquestioned acceptance that 
the medical practitioner’s decision will be correct if it is based on ‘ ... practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular 
art ... ’.37  Lord Woolf describes the Bolam test as the ‘any responsible group of 
doctors knows best’ test.38  Even so, when faced in a disciplinary case with 
determining what is the standard of conduct reasonably expected of a professional 
of equivalent training or experience the court or tribunal will, of necessity, be 
thrown back upon hearing and choosing whether to accept evidence from different 
medical practitioners as to what a ‘responsible body of medical men’ would have 
done in the circumstances.39  Yet, as the majority held in Rogers:40   
[w]hile evidence of acceptable medical practice is a useful guide for the courts, it is 
for the court to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care after giving 
weight to “the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to make his own 
decisions about his life”.41 
 
Deference to the Bolam test has meant that some medical negligence cases have 
been dismissed on the grounds that the medical practitioner being sued conformed 
to accepted practice by one or other group of medical practitioners, it did not 
matter which.  For example, in Maynard, Lord Scarman refused to distinguish 
between different opinions provided they were ‘..truthfully expressed, honestly 
                                                      
34 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 882 (Lord Scarman). 
35 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 [7] (Gleeson CJ). 
36 Jonathan Montgomery, 'Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine' (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185. 
37 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] WLR 582, 587 (McNair J). 
38 Lord Woolf, 'Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?' (2001) 9 Medical 
Law Review 1, 5. 
39 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 [7] (Gleeson CJ). 
40 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh JJ). 
41 The words in quotes are from F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 193 (King CJ). 
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held ... ’.42  Similarly, in Sidaway, Lord Diplock, speaking about the court, stated 
that ‘ ... it is no part of its task of evaluation to give effect to any preference it may 
have for one responsible body of professional opinion over another ... ’.43  Yet by 
not accepting evidence of differing practices brought by a patient’s medical 
experts, under the guise of ‘not choosing’, the courts in fact were making a choice 
in favour of the medical practitioner. 
 
 
3 The Professional Standard and the Duty to Inform 
In Sidaway, the plaintiff had been left severely disabled following an operation on 
her spine.  The surgeon had not warned her about the risks of the proposed 
operation that included possible damage to spinal column and nerve roots nor that 
the operation was a matter of choice not necessity.  The medical evidence was that 
a decision about whether and how much to warn the patient was a matter of 
medical judgement: 
[i]t being accepted that a doctor acting in the best interests of his patient would be 
concerned lest a warning might frighten the patient into refusing an operation which 
in his view was the best treatment in the circumstances.44 
 
The Court of Appeal had followed a strict Bolam line in holding that the provision 
of information about risks and alternatives was a matter for ‘ ... professional 
judgement, to be exercised in the context of the doctor’s relationship with a 
particular patient in particular circumstances’.45  Observing that the ‘doctrine of 
“informed consent” forms no part of English law’, Dunn LJ commented:   
I confess that I reach this conclusion with no regret.  The evidence in this case 
showed that a contrary result would be damaging to the relationship of trust and 
confidence between doctor and patient, and might well have an adverse effect on the 
practice of medicine.46  
 
Likewise, Browne-Wilkinson LJ declared that, in his judgement, ‘there is no 
ground in English law for extending this limited doctrine of informed consent 
outside the field of property rights in which it is established’.47  Kennedy observed 
                                                      
42 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, 639. 
43 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 895. 
44 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 883 (Lord Scarman). 
45 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1984] 1 
QB 493, 512 (Sir John Donaldson). 
46 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1984] 1 
QB 493, 517 (Dunn LJ). 
47 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1984] 1 
QB 493, 519, (Browne-Wilkinson LJ). 
 186 
that the Court of Appeal had been anxious to make sure that the American 
‘horrors’ of defensive medicine, a flood of litigation and the undermining of 
patients’ trust in their doctors were not imported into England.48  The Court of 
Appeal thought that this could only be achieved if the ‘professional standard,’ that 
is, Bolam was confirmed so the plaintiff’s case was dismissed.  Kennedy has been 
critical of the Court of Appeal’s anxieties as hyperbole and ‘shroud waving’.49   
 
Lord Scarman remarked that over the years since Bolam,50 the House of Lords had 
affirmed the Bolam test as applicable to treatment51 and to diagnosis.52  In 
Sidaway,53 the majority of the House of Lords, Lord Scarman dissenting, approved 
the Bolam test, as the ‘professional standard’ applying to treatment, diagnosis and 
to the duty to inform.54  Despite that, Lord Bridge (with whose reasoning and 
decision Lord Keith concurred) observed: 
[e]ven in a case where ... no expert witness in the relevant medical field condemns 
the non-disclosure as being in conflict with accepted and responsible medical 
practice, I am of the opinion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to 
the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an 
informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man 
would fail to make it.55 
 
Similarly, Lord Scarman concluded that: 
English law must recognise a duty of the doctor to warn his patient of risk inherent 
in the treatment he is proposing: and especially so if the treatment be surgery.  The 
critical limitation is that the duty is confined to material risk.  The test of materiality 
is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court is satisfied that a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk.56 
 
The law was therefore settled for many years in England despite some 
modifications in cases such as Bolitho57 and Pearce.58  Sidaway remained the 
leading case until Montgomery59 which overturned Sidaway and introduced a test 
                                                      
48 Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Clarendon Press, 1988) 186–187. 
49 Ibid188–190. 
50 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 881. 
51 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 
52 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634. 
53 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871. 
54 See eg, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 
[1985] 1 AC 871, 895 (Lord Diplock). 
55 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 900 (Lord Bridge). 
56 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 889 (Lord Scarman). 
57 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
58 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR 53. 
59 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
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of materiality in similar terms to that laid down in the case of Rogers v Whitaker60 
in Australia, to which we now turn. 
 
4 The Patient’s Right to Information — the Australian Way 
While United Kingdom courts had been concentrating on principles laid down in 
Bolam and Sidaway, in Australia the law had been taking a different tack from the 
House of Lords majority in Sidaway, commencing with the case of F v R.61  King 
CJ in F v R determined that the law imposes a duty on each medical practitioner to 
exercise care and skill in providing medical advice and treatment, the standard of 
care being that of an ordinary careful and competent practitioner.  The scope of the 
duty includes a duty to disclose information about real risks inherent in the 
treatment proposed and extends to matters that will impact on the decisions of a 
reasonable person in the position of the patient, especially where a drastic 
intervention is proposed.62  However, he warned about practices that may develop 
in the medical profession that are more concerned with the interests and 
convenience of medical practitioners than those of the patient.63   
It is for the Court to decide what a careful and responsible doctor would explain to 
the patient in the circumstance, and I do not regard as decisive the opinions of the 
medical witnesses on the point or the existence of a practice of non-disclosure in a 
section of the profession.  If the Court thought that that practice involved a failure to 
exercise reasonable care towards the patient, I would regard it as its duty to give 
effect to that view.64 
 
The High Court in Rogers v Whitaker65 approved the approach taken in F v R and 
was in substantial conformity with Lord Scarman’s judgement in Sidaway.  Mrs 
Rogers had a childhood injury that had left her almost totally blind in one eye.  She 
had received advice from an ophthalmic surgeon that an operation would improve 
the appearance of the injured eye and would probably restore some of her sight.  
However, a rare condition called sympathetic ophthalmia had intervened leading to 
inflammation and a total loss of sight in the ‘good’ eye. 
 
The High Court’s judgement in the case moved away from unqualified acceptance 
of medical opinion in terms of the Bolam test.  Determination of whether a medical 
practitioner has breached the requisite standard of care will depend on different 
factors, depending on whether the question involves diagnosis, treatment or 
                                                      
60 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
61 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189. 
62 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 192 (King CJ). 
63 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 194. (King CJ). 
64 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 196 (King CJ). 
65 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
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provision of information to the patient.66  There is a difference between diagnosis 
and treatment on the one hand and provision of information on the other.  The 
necessity for the patient to consent before undertaking some procedure is 
dependent on the patient’s choice to do so, and a choice is only valid if the patient 
has been provided with all relevant information and advice.67  The law recognises 
this as a duty of the doctor to warn of all material risks attaching to any proposed 
treatment: 
[a] risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance 
to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.68 
 
There was an argument that there was a body of medical opinion that was of the 
view that the rare condition of sympathetic ophthalmia should only be disclosed to 
a patient who specifically asks about it.  Yet, as Sedley LJ has subsequently stated 
in Wyatt v Curtis, ‘ ... there is arguably something unreal about placing the onus of 
asking upon a patient who may not know that there is anything to ask about’.69  In 
Rogers, this particular patient had made clear her concern that the operation on her 
injured eye should not affect the vision in the other eye, making clear that any risk 
to her ‘good’ eye was a significant event, and thus material to the patient.70  
Consequently, when the injury to the ‘good’ eye occurred, the defendant was liable 
to Mrs Whitaker for damages. 
 
In a separate judgement, Gaudron J agreed with the reasons for judgment of the 
majority but went on to comment that whilst evidence of medical practice in 
diagnosis and treatment may be relevant, even then there was no legal basis to limit 
the liability of medical practitioners based on the Bolam test.71  The information to 
be provided to this particular patient or the ‘hypothetical prudent patient’ does not 
involve evidence of the practice of medical practitioners.72  The duty to warn of 
risks is no different from any other duty to warn of real and foreseeable risks.73 
                                                      
66 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
67 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
68 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
69 Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779 [19] (Sedley LJ). 
70 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 491 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
71 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 493 (Gaudron J). 
72 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 493 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
73 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 494 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
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5 Montgomery 
The United Kingdom case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board74 
resoundingly overruled Sidaway and adopted a position in line with Reibl v 
Hughes75 in Canada and Rogers v Whitaker76 in Australia.  In a unanimous 
judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, the previous endorsement of the 
Bolam test in respect of medical advice was cast aside.  The court noted that, whilst 
lower courts had been bound by Sidaway, many had found tacit ways of not 
following it.77 
 
The patient was a small pregnant lady with diabetes mellitus.  It was well known 
that diabetic women would have larger babies than normal.  The medical 
practitioner did not warn the patient of the possibility of shoulder dystocia — that 
the baby’s shoulders could become stuck in the birth canal.  The patient was 
obviously anxious about facing vaginal delivery, but the medical practitioner 
considered that the risk of grave consequences from shoulder dystocia was so small 
that no warning was necessary.78  Yet the possibility of shoulder dystocia being a 
factor in diabetic mothers was as high as 10%.79  The doctor also gave evidence 
that if she were to mention to every diabetic mother that there was a small risk of 
injury to the baby, then every such woman would ask for a caesarian section, and it 
was not in the interests of women to have caesarians.80  
 
In the event, almost everything went wrong with the vaginal delivery;  the 
umbilical cord was trapped between the baby and the mother and the baby was 
starved of oxygen for several minutes, sufficient time for him to be born brain 
damaged.  The lower courts had followed Sidaway in deciding that the medical 
practitioner had not been negligent in not informing the mother of the possibility of 
shoulder dystocia and that a caesarian delivery was an alternative.81  In the 
                                                      
74 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
75 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3rd) 1. 
76 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
77 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [63] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
78 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [17] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
79 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [13] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
80 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [13] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
81 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [26] -  It was not clear why the 
responsible body of medical opinion on behalf of the defendant was more acceptable than the 
responsible body of opinion from the plaintiff’s experts.  Perhaps, as in Maynard, the judge was 
declining to choose.  Yet that of itself was a choice in favour of the defendant’s experts. 
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plaintiff’s appeal to the Scottish Inner House of the Court of Session,82 she ‘ ... 
again argued that she ought to have been informed of the risk of shoulder dystocia, 
and should have been offered, and advised about, the alternative of delivery by 
caesarian section.’83  Lord Eassie dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments and her 
repeated expression of concerns about the size of her baby as ‘of a general nature 
only’ commenting:   
Too much in the way of information ... may only serve to confuse and alarm the 
patient, and it is therefore very much a question for the experienced practitioner to 
decide, in accordance with normal and proper practice, where the line should be 
drawn in a given case.84 
 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the days of medical practitioners dealing with 
‘ignorant’ patients were over and that patients had rights that must be observed,85 
including the provision of sufficient relevant information so that the patient could 
make a properly informed choice about how to proceed.  The court stated that this 
view was reinforced by guidelines issued by the General Medical Council that 
specified the duty of the doctor to provide relevant information to the patient in a 
way that the patient can understand,86 thus permitting the patient to weigh benefits, 
risks and other options, including that of not acting at all.87  As Chapter III 
explained, recognition by the court that the content of the doctor’s duty can be 
evidenced by reference to a ‘soft’ law guideline has the effect of bestowing on that 
guideline the enforceability of ‘hard’ law.  The General Medical Council’s 
guidelines have therefore become enforceable. 
 
The court accepted the judgement of Lord Scarman in Sidaway as correctly stating 
the law, a test of materiality in similar terms to that declared in Rogers v Whitaker.  
The court approved the two limbed approach in that the doctor not only had to 
provide information that the patient would consider material, the doctor also had to 
provide relevant information if he or she knew or ought to have known that the 
information would be considered to be material by the patient.88  The only reason 
that a doctor could choose not to inform the patient is the ‘therapeutic privilege’ 
that permits a doctor to withhold information if, in his or her professional clinical 
assessment, informing the patient would pose a serious threat to the patient’s 
                                                      
82 The Inner House of the Court of Session is the supreme civil court in Scotland, both a court of 
appeal and a court of first instance. 
83 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [30] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
84 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [33] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
85 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [75] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
86 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) [32]. 
87 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [77] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
88 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [73] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
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physical or mental health.  But courts have warned that any defence of failing to 
inform on the grounds of the therapeutic privilege is limited.   
[I]t is not intended to subvert [the right of the patient to decide whether to undergo a 
treatment] by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an informed 
choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers to be 
contrary to her interests.89 
 
There is no question in this case of Dr McLellan’s being entitled to withhold 
information about the risk because its disclosure would be harmful to her patient’s 
health ... the “therapeutic exception” is not intended to enable doctors to prevent 
their patients from taking an informed decision.90 
 
In addition, Lady Hale in a ‘footnote’ judgement that also supported the other 
justices, was scathing of the medical practitioner as having made a moral 
judgement about the desirability of caesarian births, and using that moral stance as 
a reason to deny the patient the information required to make a rational choice. 
Whatever Dr McLellan may have had in mind, this does not look like a purely 
medical judgement.  It looks like a judgement that vaginal delivery is in some way 
morally preferable to a caesarian section: so much so that it justifies depriving the 
pregnant woman of the information needed for her to make a free choice in the 
matter.  Giving birth vaginally is indeed a unique and wonderful experience, but it 
has not been suggested that it inevitably leads to a close and better relationship 
between mother and child than does a caesarian section.91 
 
The court in Montgomery commented that: 
because the extent to which a doctor may be inclined to discuss risks with a patient 
is not determined by medical learning or experience, the application of the Bolam 
test ... is liable to result in the sanctioning of differences in practice which are 
attributable not to divergent schools of thought in medical science, but merely to 
divergent attitudes among doctors as to the degree of respect owed to their patients.92   
 
6 Conclusion 
In F v R, King CJ remarked that: 
In many cases an approved professional practice as to disclosure may be decisive.  
But professions may adopt unreasonable practices.  Practices may develop in 
professions, particularly as to disclosure, not because they serve the interests of the 
clients, but because they protect the interests or convenience of members of the 
profession.93 
 
King CJ’s statement and the above analysis have shown that unconditional 
adherence by courts and the law to the Bolam standard could be subjugating the 
patient’s interests to those of the doctor, thereby undermining the duty of the 
                                                      
89 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [91] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
90 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [95] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reid). 
91 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [114] (Lady Hale). 
92 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [84] (Lord Reid and Lord Kerr). 
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doctor to make the care of the patient the doctor’s first concern.94  Rogers and 
Montgomery particularly have confirmed that failure to provide a patient with 
details of relevant risks and appropriate alternatives is no longer acceptable as a 
denial of the patient’s autonomous right to choose whether or not to undergo a 
particular treatment.  Similarly, Montgomery has endorsed the principle that 
reliance on the therapeutic privilege is no excuse for an omission to fully advise the 
patient.95  Invoking therapeutic privilege as a reason to take decision-making away 
from the patient is paternalistic and should only rarely occur,96 and when it does, 
the medical practitioner must be prepared to justify the decision to call upon it.97   
 
Having provided evidence of the law’s early predisposition to support the position 
of the medical practitioner in how much information is provided to a patient, it is 
now instructive to examine how the law has dealt with the related question of the 
medical practitioner’s obligation to seek consent before initiating any treatment or 
procedure. 
 
C THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENT 
 
1 Introduction 
The requirement that the patient consent before any medical treatment is 
commenced is relevant to a number of legal principles.  The common law confirms 
that any unjustified touching of another without consent may be a trespass in tort or 
a criminal act of battery.98  There is no general exception for medical 
practitioners.99  However, consent provides a defence to those charges.100  The 
courts have also determined that the obligation for medical practitioners to seek 
consent before undertaking any medical intervention arises from respect for the 
patient’s autonomy.101  Respect for autonomy implies providing sufficient 
information to patients so they can be aware of risks, and take responsibility for the 
                                                      
94 See eg, Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam);  Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
95 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [95] (Lord Reid and Lord Kerr). 
96  Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 [16] (Lord Steyn). 
97 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 
AC 871, 889 (Lord Scarman). 
98 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 882 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
99 In re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 30 (Neill LJ).  Neill LJ stated:  ‘ ... the 
general rule that the patient’s consent must be obtained before an operation can be carried out ... ’. 
100 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177 (Goff LJ). 
101 See eg, Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [108] (Lady Hale);  Chester v 
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choices made, thereby reducing the prospect of a negligence action.102  However, 
despite the existence of the fundamental right of a competent adult patient to accept 
or refuse medical treatment, the patient’s legal capacity may be questioned where a 
patient’s decision does not accord with that of the medical team.103  Practitioner 
and patient interests may conflict leading to a requirement for judicial intervention 
to resolve the matters in dispute. 
 
As Neill LJ observed: ‘The fact that as a general rule the consent of the patient 
must be obtained before any operation or other treatment on his body is carried out 
means that the patient has the right to refuse’.104  Even if a refusal of treatment may 
endanger the patient’s life, it is a well-established principle that an adult of sound 
mind is entitled to refuse that treatment.105  Lord Keith stated the principle: 
The first point to make is that it is unlawful, so as to constitute both a tort and the 
crime of battery, to administer medical treatment to an adult, who is conscious and 
of sound mind without his consent ... [s]uch a person is completely at liberty to 
decline to undergo treatment, even if the result of his doing so will be that he will 
die.106 
 
However, a refusal in face of medical opinion may suggest to the medical team that 
the patient is not mentally competent to make a decision of that type, especially if 
it may lead to the death of the patient.  There is evidence that where the patient 
accepts recommended medical treatment, no question of the patient’s competence 
arises.  As Kennedy observed when commenting about the case of Re MB,107 
‘[n]otice, and this has been said before, that it is when a patient does not accede to 
the doctor’s advice that the question of capacity arises.’108  The law accepts that the 
patient’s choice need not be rational, yet courts have, on occasion, overridden 
patient decisions, thus discounting the patient’s autonomy in the face of a 
practitioner’s assessment of the patient’s ‘best interests’. 
 
The legal requirement that the patient consent is also a reflection of respect for the 
patient’s autonomy.  As Judge LJ said in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S:  
Even when his or her life depends on receiving medical treatment, an adult of sound 
mind is entitled to refuse it.  This reflects the autonomy of each individual and the 
right of self-determination.109 
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104 In re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 29 (Neill LJ). 
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Respect for patient autonomy is embedded in patient-centred care principles as 
discussed in Chapter I and is the first of the principles of biomedical ethics as part 
of medical professionalism as considered in Chapter II.  Respect for autonomy is 
exemplified by this requirement that patients must consent before the medical 
practitioner embarks on any medical treatment or procedure.  As the court in 
Montgomery remarked, patients must be treated  
[a]s far as possible as adults who are capable of understanding that medical 
treatment is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for 
the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of 
their choices.110   
 
This section will show that, despite the requirement for the patient to consent 
before any medical treatment is commenced, the patient’s right can be undermined 
in practice.  The patient’s right to determine what happens to his body has an 
intimate connection with the principles of self-determination.  As stated above, the 
right to consent also implies the right to refuse consent, or to demand the 
withdrawal of treatment.  However, having refused consent or demanded treatment 
withdrawal, the consequence of which being that the patient might die, the question 
then can arise as to whether the particular patient has the mental capacity to make 
that decision, especially in the face of contrary medical opinion.  There is evidence 
that acceptance of recommended medical treatment does not trigger a question of 
the patient’s competence, the question usually arising where the doctor’s instinct to 
save life runs up against a patient’s choice to refuse recommended treatment.111  As 
Kennedy points out: 
Everything turns on the capacity of the patient and, just as important, who makes the 
final determination as to that capacity.  My position is that the law is so constructed 
that in all probability, only the lucid, self-assertive patient who has a sympathetic, 
understanding doctor is able in most circumstances to have his way, and be left 
alone, free from further interference.112 
 
This section will show that despite carefully formulated tests for mental 
competence, sometimes it is the nature of the refusal that triggers an assessment 
that the patient is mentally incompetent, rather than accepting the patient's 
autonomy to make that particular decision.  Autonomy or self-determination is 
lauded by the courts as a prime value for the rational individual.113  Yet, exercise of 
                                                      
110 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [81] (Lord Reid and Lord Kerr). 
111 See eg, Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam);  NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297;  Social Development Committee, Parliament of 
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112 Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Clarendon Press, 1988) 336. 
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that autonomy by refusing treatment, especially that which may prolong life, can 
lead to subjecting a patient to an assessment of mental competence. 
 
2 Self-Determination 
The requirement for medical practitioners to obtain the patient’s consent before any 
medical procedure is instituted, is a recognition by the law of the individual 
autonomy and self-determination of the person that will be upheld almost 
invariably.114  The House of Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, confirmed that 
the right to self-determination is paramount and overrides other ethical principles 
such as the ‘sanctity of life’.115  As Judge LJ commented in St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust v S, quoting several of the Law Lords from Bland, their speeches ‘ ... 
did not establish the law, but rather underlined the principle found in a series of 
authoritative decisions.’116 
 
The courts have confirmed that provided the threshold conditions of competence, 
voluntariness and informed consent have been satisfied, they will not step in to 
override a decision, no matter how foolish, illogical, or unreasonable it may appear 
to the medical treatment team or any dispassionate observer.  Referencing Sidaway, 
Lord Donaldson had stated in In re T:  
This right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible.  
It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent.117   
 
In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss reviewed the cases 
that confirmed the fundamental legal principle of the right of a person ‘of full age 
and capacity’ to determine what should be done with his or her body.118  She went 
on to observe that:  
Unless the gravity of the illness has affected the patient’s capacity, a seriously 
disabled patient has the same rights as the fit person to respect for personal 
autonomy.  There is a serious danger ... of a benevolent paternalism which does not 
embrace recognition of the personal autonomy of the severely disabled patient.119 
 
                                                      
114 See eg, St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, 43 (Judge LJ). In addition, Medical 
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In the case of In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),120 the court found that a 
paranoid schizophrenic was entitled to refuse to have a gangrenous foot amputated.  
The court considered that the presumption of the patient’s right to self-
determination had not been displaced as he understood the nature, purpose and 
effects of the treatment being refused, despite his schizophrenia. 
 
In order for a consent to be valid, the patient must be supplied with all information 
necessary to make a genuine choice and that includes the risks and benefits of each 
option presented, together with risks and benefits of not undertaking any treatment 
at all.121  As Kirby J in Rosenberg v Percival confirmed, ‘ ... to some extent, the 
legal obligation to provide warnings may sometimes help to redress the inherent 
inequality in power between the professional provider and the vulnerable patient ... 
’.122  Kennedy claims that informed consent flies the flag of self-determination 
against the otherwise ever-present paternalism of the doctor.123 
 
However, despite the rhetoric that the right to self-determination is paramount, the 
reality is that, as Jones comments, too often the requirement for consent is seen as a 
medico-legal formality rather than as an acknowledgement of the patient’s 
autonomy in choosing whether or not to submit to medical treatment.124   
 
3 The Right to Refuse and Mental Capacity 
As noted above, the requirement that the patient consent before any medical 
procedure or treatment is instigated also has the corollary that the patient has the 
right to refuse treatment.  As Neill LJ has commented: ‘ ... the right to refuse exists 
even where there are overwhelming medical reasons in favour of the treatment and 
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probably even where if the treatment is not carried out the patient’s life will be at 
risk.’125 
 
However, a leading example of the readiness to equate a refusal with lack of 
mental capacity was the English case of Ms B.126  Following a medical history that 
included a collection of abnormal blood cells in the brain or spinal column, Ms B 
became a quadriplegic.  Following surgery that minimally improved her condition, 
she asked for her ventilator to be turned off, repeating the request a few days later.  
After a formal request through her solicitors, she was assessed by two consulting 
psychiatrists who eventually concurred that she did not have capacity.  She agreed 
to a rehabilitation plan, but following a lung collapse, she wished for ventilation to 
be discontinued.  An independent psychiatrist certified that, at that time, she had 
capacity.  Whilst she had made it clear that she wished no more ventilation to be 
provided, the clinicians were not prepared to turn it off. 
 
Ms B’s evidence confirmed ‘ ... that she had never changed her view that she 
wanted the ventilator withdrawn.’127  The court found that Ms B had been treated 
unlawfully and that she had been placed in an impossible position by the treating 
clinicians who refused to remove the ventilation.  Ms B testified that, whilst 
accepting the right of a medical practitioner to refuse, she was angered by their 
arrogance and refusal to refer her to a medical practitioner who would accede to 
her request.128  In light of the finding of unlawful treatment, the trust was ordered to 
pay damages.129 
 
In the case of NHS Trust v T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment),130 a 
woman who used to cut herself causing blood loss to a dangerous level, refused a 
blood transfusion.  The question of the patient’s capacity arose.  The court 
disregarded the refusal on the basis of a ‘borderline personality disorder’ 
considering that it was in the patient’s best interests to treat her. 
                                                      
125 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 29 (Neill LJ).  For example, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses will usually refuse blood transfusions, even if the lack of access to additional blood may 
lead to the patient’s death and the courts generally accept such a decision.  In both HE v A Hospital 
NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 [4] and Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] 
NSWSC 761 [42], the Jehovah’s Witness patient had purported to make an advance directive 
refusing, on religious grounds, transfusions of blood or any blood products.  In Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] AC 789 at 827, Lord Hoffman refers to the Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a blood 
transfusion. 
126 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
127 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [39] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
128 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [50] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
129 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [99] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
130 NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297. 
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The finding of a ‘borderline personality disorder’ as the justification for overriding 
refusal of treatment contrasts with the outcome in both In re C131 and Wye Valley 
NHS Trust v B132 where the refusal of amputation of a gangrenous foot by a patient 
diagnosed as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic and one with a long-standing mental 
illness respectively, was upheld by the relevant court.  The court in In re C 
determined that the patient’s capacity was not so impaired that he did not 
understand the nature, purpose and effects of the proposed treatment. In the Wye 
Valley case, the court recognised that the patient did not have decision-making 
capacity, but he had made his feelings abundantly clear.  Consequently, it would 
not be in the patient’s ‘ ... best interests to take away his little remaining 
independence and dignity ... ’ by enforcing treatment on him.133 
 
An illustration closer to home where refusal of treatment was equated with lack of 
mental capacity was provided by the Victorian Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity.  A former waterski champion, John McEwan who died in April 1986 had 
been rendered quadriplegic by a swimming accident.  He was totally dependent on 
life support that he found intolerable.  He refused food and some medication and 
signed a document saying that he did not want to be resuscitated if he became 
unconscious for any reason.  He had also put himself on hunger strike.  Therefore, 
he was certified insane at the Austin Hospital because of having made a plea to 
die.134  He was subsequently determined to be mentally stable, both by his medical 
practitioner and a psychiatrist.135 
 
As the above cases show, where a patient does not agree with the advice of the 
medical team and where the patient’s life is at risk from the refusal, a question of 
mental capacity can arise.  This, in turn, raises the issue of how competency is 
assessed.  One common law test for competency was prescribed by Thorpe J in Re 
C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) as follows: 
(i) could the patient comprehend and retain the necessary information; 
(ii) was he able to believe it; and 
(iii) was he able to weigh the information, balancing the risks and needs, so as to 
arrive at a choice.136 
                                                      
131 In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. 
132 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60. 
133 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60 [45] (Peter Jackson J). 
134 Social Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity (1987) 16. 
135 Social Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity (1987) 102. 
136 In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 292 (Thorpe J). 
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In the later case of Re MB (an adult: medical treatment),137 Butler-Sloss LJ 
discussed the relevant tests for mental capacity as follows: 
(1) Every person is presumed to have the capacity to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment unless and until the presumption is rebutted. 
(2) A competent person with capacity, may for any reason, whether rational or 
irrational, choose to consent to or refuse medical intervention and the court does not 
then have the jurisdiction to substitute its own decisions for those of the patient in 
deciding his or her own best interests. 
(3) An irrational decision is one that no person who applied his or her mind to it, 
could possibly have reached.  The decision may be coloured by panic, fear, or 
indecision but these are only symptoms or evidence of incompetency. 
(4) A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning 
renders the person unable to make a decision. 
(5) Temporary facts such as confusion, shock, fatigue, pain or drugs, may operate to 
render a patient unable to decide. 
(6) Panic induced by fear may also paralyse the will and make it impossible for the 
patient to make a decision.138 
 
The court in MB took as the test for the question of capacity to refuse, the 
formulation of Thorpe J in Re C.139  The court did not equate outcome and 
rationality of a decision with incompetence.  The judge recognised the conflict 
between respect for patient autonomy and the medical team’s conception of what 
would be in the best interests of the patient.  Further, the court connected 
incompetence to mental impairment but also recognised, that mental incapacity 
may be temporary and may be induced by external factors such as fear, pain or 
fatigue.  In addition, ‘ ... the graver the consequences of the decision, the 
commensurably greater the level of competence is required to take the decision.’140     
 
Yet, these tests can themselves be subverted.  They are not necessarily in step with 
Lord Donaldson’s judgement in In Re T,141that any decision made need not be 
made for rational reasons.  They are not crafted for the protection of the patient’s 
autonomy that is inherent in Lord Donaldson’s judgement.  The apparently 
absolute principle that the competent, adult patient is entitled to refuse treatment 
has been hemmed in with conditions that detract from its categorical certainty.  To 
reiterate, in referencing Sidaway, Lord Donaldson stated:  
                                                      
137 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093. 
138 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [30] (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
139 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [20] (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
140 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [30.3];  This principle is also stated in In re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 112 (Donaldson MR);  HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 
[24]. 
141 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
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This right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible.  
It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent.142   
 
Kennedy takes up this theme when he argues that there are two aspects to 
determination of competency, the patient making the decision and the decision 
itself that is set up as a manifestation of the lack of competency of the patient if the 
medical practitioner does not agree with it.  As Kennedy contends:   
The two, the patient and the decision, are inextricably intertwined.  The trouble is 
that the moment we admit this, that the content of a patient’s decision is relevant in 
the determination of capacity, we face the problem of autonomy simply being 
overwhelmed by paternalism.  Disagree with your medical adviser and ipso facto 
you are incompetent, at which point, well meaning ... others will decide for you.143 
 
Thus, it is possible that at any one time, the patient can be both competent and 
incompetent depending on the nature of the decision made and the court’s view as 
to the rationality of the patient.   
 
A further dimension of the problem is the care that must be taken to ensure that the 
value system and cultural background of the assessor of a person’s competency 
does not bias the assessment in favour of a decision that would be accepted by and 
comprehensible to the assessor, rather than that of the person being assessed.144  
This danger of personal values and beliefs of an assessor impinging upon a 
competency assessment was expressed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss as follows: 
If there are difficulties in deciding whether the patient has sufficient mental 
capacity, particularly if the refusal may have grave consequences for the patient, it is 
most important that those considering the issue should not confuse the question of 
mental capacity with the nature of the decision made by the patient, however grave 
the consequences. The view of the patient may reflect a difference in values rather 
than an absence of competence and the assessment of capacity should be approached 
with this firmly in mind. The doctors must not allow their emotional reaction to or 
strong disagreement with the decision of the patient to cloud their judgment in 
answering the primary question whether the patient has the mental capacity to make 
the decision.145 
 
The imposition of an objective test based upon the demonstrated rationality of the 
patient flies in the face of the common law doctrine that the patient’s decision need 
not be rational at all.  As McDougall J remarked in the Hunter case:   
It cannot be correct to recognise, on the one hand, an individual’s right of self-
determination;  but, on the other, effectively to undermine or take away that right by 
over-nice or merely speculative analysis.146   
                                                      
142 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102 (Lord Donaldson). 
143 Ian Kennedy, ‘Consent: Adult, Refusal of Consent, Capacity’ (1997) 5 Medical Law Review 317, 
321. 
144 Michael Gunn, 'The Meaning of Incapacity' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 8, 21. 
145 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [100]. 
146 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
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4 Conclusion 
The requirement for the doctor to seek consent from a patient before any medical 
treatment is instigated is based on two legal principles.  Firstly, it is a reflection of 
the ancient common law principle that touching of another without consent is 
unacceptable and may be considered a criminal act of battery or a tortious act of 
trespass.  However, the courts have never related this principle to the activities of 
doctors.  Rather, they base their insistence on patient consent upon the human right 
of self-determination and the entitlement of the patient to determine what should be 
done with his or her body.  Long gone are the days when medical practitioners 
could presume to make all decisions for a patient on the practitioner’s perception of 
the patient’s ‘best interests’.  The ethical value of patient self-determination runs 
up against medical assessment of ‘best interests’.  As Kennedy argues: 
[t]he basis of paternalism—that decisions concerning a particular person’s fate are 
better made for him than by him, because others wiser than he are more keenly 
aware of his best interests than he can be — conflicts with the notion of a right to 
self-determination, whereby a person is deemed entitled to make his own decisions 
concerning himself ... free from the interference of others.147 
 
The common law emphasis on recognition of patient autonomy conflicts with the 
practical problems that arise when a theoretically independent, competent adult 
makes a decision that, not only medical practitioners but, sometimes the courts 
consider, is evidence of lack of mental capacity.  The principles of patient-centred 
care give precedence to the patient’s right to respect for his or her autonomy.  Yet, 
the medical practitioner’s perspective on prioritising the patient can lead to 
paternalistic attitudes to best interests that override patient self-determination. 
 
Having considered how the common law has elevated practitioner concerns above 
patient interests when interpreting the Bolam standard, or when adjudicating on 
patient capacity to refuse medical treatment, it is now time to scrutinise the clearest 
case of a statutory bias away from patient concerns towards those of medical 
practitioners.  Civil liability legislation is designed to impede access to 
                                                      
147 Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Clarendon Press, 1988) 333. 
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compensation for negligently caused injury, including where negligence is alleged 
against medical practitioners.  
 
 
 
 
D CIVIL LIABILITY LEGISLATION 
 
The common law action for professional negligence has been extensively modified 
by statute to restrict the access by injured patients to full compensation.  Pressure 
on the law from professional liability insurers and medical practitioner lobbies has 
led to civil liability legislation that affects and constrains claims for personal 
injuries.  These modifications have meant that many patients who have been 
injured by the alleged negligence of their medical practitioners are either prevented 
from access to compensation, or any compensation awarded is strictly limited.  
 
Civil liability legislation exemplifies the dichotomy between patient and 
professional interests.  Despite the insistence in medical codes that good medical 
practice is patient-centred, 148 a prime example of the law’s involvement in the 
discounting of patient concerns lies in its deference to medical practitioner interests 
where patients have been injured in the course of medical treatment.  Legislation in 
all Australian jurisdictions has been enacted to limit claims for personal injury 
including medical mishaps.149 
 
Civil liability legislation was adopted in response to a perception promoted by the 
media, following the collapse of the biggest professional indemnity insurer, that 
professional indemnity insurance was too expensive.  The reason given was that 
courts had awarded to large payouts for negligence to ‘unworthy’ plaintiffs.  
Therefore, this section evaluates the Ipp Panel’s influence on changes in the law in 
New South Wales intended to reform the law of negligence. 
 
The following changes to the law are analysed: 
1. the Ipp Panel’s interpretation of the Bolam or professional standard as the 
standard of care; 
                                                      
148 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [1.4]. 
149 See Appendix IVA. 
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2. the requirement for the injury to have been ‘caused’ by the alleged negligence; 
3. the question of the foreseeability of harm; 
4. constraints on awards of damages from time limits on commencing action;  and  
5. quantum of damages if negligence is proven.   
 
The discussion then proceeds to a consideration of the fairness of the reforms and 
concludes that the main result of these changes has been to shift the burden of care 
from the insurance company of the person alleged to be negligent to the 
community-funded health system.  Yet, whilst the legislation relieves many doctors 
from liability for negligent conduct, there is no evidence that fewer patients are 
being injured.150   
 
1 Background 
In March 2001, HIH Insurance Company collapsed.  At the time it was Australia’s 
largest general insurer.  One of its subsidiaries, United Medical Protection, was the 
professional liability insurer for many professional groups, including many medical 
practitioners.  As was stated in the Report of the HIH Royal Commission,151 the 
collapse caused great hardship for many and left thousands of people and 
businesses exposed to liability.  In the wake of the collapse, professional liability 
insurance was difficult for professional people and community groups to obtain, 
leading to proposals for tort law reform.   
 
2 The Insurance ‘Crisis’ 
Historically, doctors took out their professional indemnity insurance through 
mutual medical defence organisations, run by and for doctors.  As these were 
mutual funds they were not regulated at that time by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) the way insurance companies were.152  The cover 
provided was on a ‘claims incurred’ basis, that is, any incident that occurred during 
the year for which the medical practitioner had paid the contribution was covered, 
no matter when the claim was actually made.153 
                                                      
150  Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 
87 ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 62. 
151 Commonwealth of Australia, The HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH Insurance (2003) 
(The Hon Justice Owen). 
152 Peter Cashman, 'Tort Reform and the Medical Indemnity "Crisis"' (2002) 25 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 888, 890. 
153 Fiona Tito Wheatland, 'Medical Indemnity Reform in Australia: "First Do No Harm"' (2005) 33 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 429, 430. 
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Owing to competition between these medical defence organisations, premiums 
were kept relatively low.  Depending on jurisdiction, every medical practitioner 
paid the same premium despite specialty and the greater risks attaching to some 
specialties.  While times were good, the investment income of these organisations 
was making up any shortfall between income received and outgoings for claims.  
This feature was assisted by the fact that money was coming in sometimes many 
years before any potential claim had to be paid.  Consequently, medical defence 
organisations were not making any provision for those claims that had been 
incurred but not reported.  When investment income was reduced in the early 
1990s because of lower investment returns generally,154 the shortfall started to 
become apparent.  
 
Mutual organisations cannot simply raise capital.  They either have to raise 
premiums or make a call on their members.155  As the unfunded liabilities became 
more glaring, many of these organisations did either or both to generate sufficient 
income to create adequate reserves.  In the mean time, some smaller commercial 
insurers came into the market offering ‘claims made’ products.156  These products 
were priced more cheaply as the cover applied to claims actually made in the year 
the premium was paid.  There was no provision for future claims.  If the insurer did 
not continue in the market, medical practitioners were left with no cover for those 
claims that had been incurred but not yet notified and had to take out additional 
insurance for security. 
 
When some practitioners realised that they were cross-subsidising specialists who 
were earning considerably higher incomes and incurring greater risks, they argued 
that this situation was unfair.  Thus, as the large pool of undifferentiated medical 
practitioner risks began to crumble, those in higher risk specialties were faced with 
substantially increased premiums.157  The previous relatively-stable and loyal 
membership of medical defence organisations started to break down as members 
changed to try to obtain cheaper cover.158  
 
                                                      
154 Peter Cashman, 'Tort Reform and the Medical Indemnity “Crisis”’ (2002) 25 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 888, 891. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Fiona Tito Wheatland, 'Medical Indemnity Reform in Australia: "First Do No Harm"' (2005) 33 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 429, 432. 
158 Fiona Tito Wheatland, 'Medical Indemnity Reform in Australia: "First Do No Harm"' (2005) 33 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 429, 432. 
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United Medical Protection was the major insurer for medical practitioners in New 
South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory.  It had pursued an aggressive 
strategy aimed at increasing its market share including undercutting the premiums 
of other insurers159 before revealing to its members the extent of its unfunded 
liabilities.160  Several medical defence organisations had been using HIH insurance 
as a reinsurer.  When HIH collapsed in March 2001, the extent of exposure by 
United Medical Protection was revealed.  In 2002, United Medical Protection 
collapsed.  Because these collapses were seen as a pressing problem, and as a result 
of lobbying by the medical profession, the Commonwealth Government stepped in 
to cover the unfunded liabilities of medical defence organisations,161 of which 
United Medical Protection was the largest. 
 
3 The Ipp Panel 
Frantic lobbying by the medical profession and the insurance industry, plus 
hysteria generated by newspaper reports about undeserving plaintiffs, was 
instrumental in convincing parliamentarians.162  The public alarm goaded the 
Commonwealth Government into being seen as ‘doing something’ to enable 
reforms.  A review panel (the Panel) was established by the Australian Treasury 
under the leadership of Justice Ipp, ‘to undertake a “principles-based” review’ of 
the law of negligence.163  At the time, Justice Ipp was an Acting Judge of the New 
                                                      
159 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, Responding to the Medical Indemnity Crisis: An 
Integrated Reform Package (2002) [3.48]. 
160 Fiona Tito Wheatland, 'Medical Indemnity Reform in Australia: "First Do No Harm"' (2005) 33 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 429, 432. 
161 Peter Cane, 'Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective' (2003) 27 Melbourne 
University Law Review 649, 656.  The influence of the medical profession on government policy was 
manifest in that it convinced the government to pay out taxpayer funds to prop up the medical defence 
organisations, whose ‘problems’ were largely of their own making.  It also provided premium support 
for medical practitioners when professional indemnity insurance was expensive and hard to obtain.  
That paying to maintain insurance of medical practitioners out of taxpayer funds was successful is 
reflected in the fact that the Commonwealth had still been providing money in respect of claims, over 
ten years after the medical indemnity ‘crisis’ was revealed.  The National Commission of Audit 
Report reflected the ongoing nature of Commonwealth Government support in subsidising premiums 
for medical practitioners and providing financial assistance to medical indemnity insurers and 
medical practitioners in respect of high cost claims.  This report noted that players in the medical 
defence industry had been making substantial profits.  It recommended that the premium support 
scheme be ceased.  Whilst in 2012–3, the scheme supported fewer than 2000 medical practitioners to 
the tune of over nine million dollars, in addition the Commonwealth paid out nearly two and a half 
million dollars in administration costs.  (National Commission of Audit, Towards Responsible 
Government, Appendix Volume 2 (February 2014) [10.16 Medical Indemnity] 
<http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/appendix_volume%202.pdf>) 
162 Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 64. 
163 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report) [1.27]. 
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South Wales Court of Appeal.164  The Panel, which reported in 2002, made wide-
ranging recommendations for legislation to be enacted to include substantial 
reform of the law of torts and limitation of the size of damages awards.165  The 
Panel recognised that its recommendations may shift the burden to injured people 
from those who injured them.  Some who might have been compensated under the 
current system would not be so compensated under a system legislated following 
their recommendations.166  Whilst the Panel substantially adopted ‘principles-
based’ review, by its own admission some recommendations chose arbitrary 
figures.  As the Panel stated: ‘The choice of a long-stop period is necessarily 
arbitrary’.167  It also stated: 
The problem of ‘arbitrariness’ is not so great when ... limitations are imposed by 
statute because they can be justified on grounds of distributive and social justice to 
which the courts are wary of appealing.  But this may not remove the perception that 
... limitations are essentially arbitrary, and to that extent, unfair.168 
 
The terms of reference for the inquiry recited: ‘The award of damages for personal 
injury has become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of 
compensation for those injured through the fault of another.’169  As Faunce relates, 
the Panel was not permitted to examine the true nature of the insurance market nor 
the reasons for the so-called insurance crisis.  It could not inquire into the insurance 
industry to determine whether the difficulties being experienced by some 
companies were not, in fact, due to increasing civil liability litigation and the size 
of damages awards.  The difficulties may have been the result of poor investment 
and financial decisions being made by the companies themselves.170   
 
All states and the Australian Capital Territory passed legislation171 to amend the 
common law so as to limit liability for death or personal injury caused by 
negligence.172  Whilst in most of the jurisdictions the legislation referred to all 
professionals, rather than just medical practitioners, at the time it was the medical 
                                                      
164 Spigelman CJ and the Judges of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Farewell Ceremony for 
The Honourable Justice Ipp AO upon the Occasion of his Retirement as a Judge of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales (13 November 2009) [12]. 
165 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report) 1–24. 
166 Ibid [1.20]. 
167 Ibid [6.36].   
168 Ibid [9.24]. 
169 Ibid ix. 
170 Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 62. 
171 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld), Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA).  Northern Territory legislated some aspects of the Ipp Review but not others 
eg there is no reference to standard or duty of care, causation. or burden/onus of proof. 
172 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia, The Laws of Australia [27.2]. 
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practitioners who were being heard most clearly and who wanted their liability 
capped.     
 
 
4 Tort Law ‘Reform’ 
In consequence of the Ipp Panel’s recommendations, tort law ‘reform’ has led to 
extensive changes to civil liability legislation that has had the effect of constraining 
patient access to adequate injury compensation, including for medically caused 
injury.  In consequence, patient interests appear to have been pushed aside from 
their position as the core of patient-centred care in favour of interests of medical 
practitioners.  The actual legislation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, despite 
the wishful thinking of the Panel that uniform, or at least consistent legislation 
should be enacted in all Australian jurisdictions.173  Far from making personal 
injury practice more uniform throughout Australia, the legislative changes have 
made it much more complicated than it already was. 
 
Because New South Wales is the most populous state, some sections of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) as passed in response to the Ipp recommendations, will 
be analysed to show how valid claims of some injured patients can be discounted 
in the face of medical practitioner concerns.  Those sections chosen particularly 
exemplify the dichotomy between patient and professional interests.  However to 
provide a fuller picture of the civil liability changes, Appendix IVA lists how 
legislation for some specified matters differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
(a) The ‘Professional’ Standard of Care 
Whilst content to accept the common law principles for the existence of a duty of 
care, the Panel spent a substantial amount of time looking at what the standard of 
care should be.  The question was whether the court should be the final arbiter of 
the standard required or whether the Bolam formulation174 should be accepted.  
Under the law in force at the time of the Panel’s deliberations, it was clear that the 
courts will never be required to defer to a reasonable body of expert opinion as 
                                                      
173 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report) [2.2]. 
174 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587. 
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such but could accept that opinion in the circumstances unless there was a good 
reason to reject it.175 
 
The Panel debated several ideas about how a court should determine between 
views of groups of expert medical opinion, those that are widely accepted, those 
that are generally held or should the court make its own decision.  The Bolam test 
gave too much opportunity for irrational views to prevail, even though this was 
rare.  Which body of opinion represented best practice could not be determined 
under the classic Bolam formula but the principle may be acceptable if the test 
were redefined.176  The Panel therefore determined that the Bolam test as the 
measure for determining the standard of care where a medical practitioner has been 
alleged to be negligent should be: 
A medical practitioner is not negligent if the treatment provided was in accordance 
with an opinion widely held by a significant number of respected practitioners in the 
field, unless the court considers that the opinion was irrational.177 
 
This formulation does not take into account the substantial modification of the 
reach of the Bolam standard, particularly by Rogers and Montgomery. 
 
Kirby J has criticised the legislation passed in New South Wales in the wake of the 
Ipp recommendations.  In Harriton v Stephens, he observed: ‘[T]he legislation is 
fundamentally restrictive.  The obstacles for plaintiffs seeking damages in tort, 
especially where the damages are sought in respect of personal injury, have been 
considerably increased’.178  According to Kirby J: ‘[t]his Court's decision in Rogers 
v Whitaker has been partly confined.  The principle in Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee has been resurrected in a modified form’.179 
 
The Bolam standard has been criticised on many fronts.  Firstly, it gives too much 
weight to extreme opinions. 180  The case of Hucks v Cole181 was provided as an 
example where the court was given evidence that a body of opinion would not have 
prescribed penicillin.  However, the court determined that the medical practitioner 
                                                      
175 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report), 35. 
176 Ibid 40. 
177 Ibid 1 (Recommendation 3). 
178 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52 [138] (Kirby J). 
179 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52 [138] (Kirby J). 
180 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report) [3.8]. 
181 Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med L Rev 393. 
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was negligent in that he could have been provided penicillin cheaply and easily 
and, if so, the plaintiff’s problems would not have arisen.182   
 
Secondly, the ‘opinion widely held by a significant number of respected 
practitioners’ may well be out-of-date.  Healy and Braithwaite argue that medical 
practitioners are slow to translate evidence into practice.183  Similarly, as mentioned 
in Chapter III, Gawande reports a US study that found that it took 17 years for 
doctors to adopt new treatments for half of American patients.184  Therefore, the 
opinion of a group of practitioners about a certain treatment may well be wide of 
the mark without being irrational as required by the Bolam formulation 
recommended by the Ipp Panel.  
 
Thirdly, the Bolam test would be inconsistent with any move to evidence-based 
care.  The majority of members of the Australian Health Ministers Advisory 
Council (AHMAC) Legal Process Reform Group was against reintroduction of the 
classic Bolam test.185  They were adamant that the Bolam test should not be 
reintroduced. 
A move back towards Bolam would be inconsistent with the move to improved 
quality and safety through systemic change based on data and more evidence based 
care.  It could lead to the unacceptable result that a practice favoured by a small 
body of doctors would not be regarded as negligent, even if a substantial majority of 
doctors were [sic] critical of that practice.186   
 
The group had observed that even in the United Kingdom, the cases had been 
moving away from the strict Bolam standard187 toward the Australian view 
exemplified by Rogers v Whitaker.188  This move has now been concluded through 
the case of Montgomery.189 
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The Victorian Law Reform Committee had earlier recommended that ‘[t]he 
common law standard of reasonable care in medical negligence cases is appropriate 
and should not be replaced by a statutory standard ... ’.190  It had received 
submissions that argued that a return to the Bolam standard provided the ‘ultimate 
sanction of peer review’.  Otherwise health care providers were being judged on 
inappropriately high standards of care.191  Nevertheless, the AMA Victoria Branch 
had accepted that the profession recognised that it was accountable to patients ‘not 
by reference to a body of peer opinion but by reference to a reasonable person in 
the patient’s position’ in accordance with Rogers.192 
 
The New South Wales legislation has gone further than the Ipp recommendation.  
Section 5O of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is in the following terms: 
(1) A person practising a profession (a professional) does not incur a liability in 
negligence arising from the provision of a professional service if it is 
established that the professional acted in a manner that (at the time the 
service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia by peer professional 
opinion as competent professional practice. 
(2) However, peer professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of 
this section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational. 
(3) The fact that there are differing peer professional opinions widely accepted in 
Australia concerning a matter does not prevent any one or more (or all) of 
those opinions being relied on for the purposes of this section. 
(4) Peer professional opinion does not have to be universally accepted to be 
considered widely accepted. 
 
Sub-sections (3) and (4) particularly are additions to the Ipp formulation and, given 
the criticism of Healy and Braithwaite, and Gawande above, leaves the court with a 
choice among many ‘widely accepted’ opinions that may, in the light of scientific 
evidence, no longer be good medicine, but yet are not irrational.193  It is submitted 
that failure by medical practitioners to be conversant with the latest scientific 
evidence, is itself negligent.  The evidence of slow uptake of new treatments is 
supported by the fact of the introduction in 2013 in the United Kingdom of a 
system of revalidation of medical practitioners designed to ensure that each is up-
to-date and fit to practise.  The idea and process of revalidation was explored in 
more detail in Chapter III. 
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Report (May 1997) Recommendation 1 [2.40]. 
191 Ibid [2.37]. 
192 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
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(b) Causation 
Even when a claimant has provided evidence that has shown that the conduct of the 
defendant has been negligent, the claimant must overcome a further hurdle by 
showing that the conduct in question actually caused the injury being complained 
of.  In its consideration of Causation and Remoteness of Damage, the Ipp 
Committee commented that  
[t]here appears to be a perception amongst various groups that courts are too willing 
to impose liability for consequences that are only “remotely” connected with the 
defendant’s conduct.  In other words, there is a feeling that the net of responsibility 
for the consequences of negligence is being cast too widely.194 
 
The whole issue of determination of causation is complex.  The first matter that a 
claimant must show is that the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the conduct 
of the defendant, that is that the conduct was a necessary condition for the harm.  
In Chester v Afshar, Lord Bingham summarised the problems with the ‘but for’ test 
as follows: 
It is now ... generally accepted that the “but for” test does not provide a 
comprehensive or exclusive test of causation in the law of tort.  Sometimes, if rarely, 
it yields too restrictive an answer ... [m]ore often, applied simply and mechanically, 
it gives too expansive an answer.195 
 
Stapleton’s analysis of the principles of causation was undertaken because of the 
cumulative effect of vague terminology that had plagued this area of the law.  She 
reflected on the American Law Institute’s examination of Liability for Physical 
Harm and noted that it had separated the factual issue of cause from the question of 
scope of liability.  In her view there were two questions to be determined, the 
factual historical question of whether the tortious conduct of the defendant led to 
the injury sustained by the claimant, and whether the defendant should be held 
liable for those consequences.196   
 
Stapleton’s analysis was adopted by the Ipp Panel.197  The Panel resolved that the 
law surrounding causation should be clarified and recommended that the two 
aspects of causation, factual causation (entirely factual198) and scope of liability 
(entirely normative199), should be spelled out in legislation.  It was relevant to 
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consider the circumstances in which liability should be imposed or whether the 
circumstances meant that the harm and damage should lie where it fell.   
 
The normative question leaves wide scope for the court to deny liability for 
admittedly negligent conduct.  In both Chappel v Hart200 and Chester v Afshar,201 
the relevant courts held that, if the patient had been properly warned, neither would 
have undertaken the operation at the time when it did occur.  Consequently, the 
medical practitioner in each case was liable for the injury that occurred, even 
though injury would be unlikely to be sustained on another occasion.  As Skene 
and Luntz comment: 
Essentially the normative judgement is that it is necessary to modify the ordinary 
rules of causation in order to reinforce the obligation which the law places on the 
doctor to take reasonable care in disclosing material risks.202 
 
Yet in Rosenberg v Percival203 a failure to warn did not lead to a finding that it 
caused the injury, as the court decided that the patient would have proceeded 
anyway. 
 
The NSW Parliament has legislated the two pronged analysis in its section 5D(1).  
Section 5D(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides: 
(1) A determination that negligence caused a particular harm comprises the 
following elements:  
(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the 
harm (factual causation), and 
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to 
extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability). 
 
In applying section 5D, the court in Wallace v Kam spelled out how the Stapleton 
analysis clarified the law: 
[a] determination inevitably involves two questions: a question of historical fact as 
to how a particular harm occurred;  and a normative question as to whether legal 
responsibility for that particular harm occurring in that way should be attributed to a 
particular person.  The distinct nature of those two questions has tended ... to be 
overlooked in the articulation of the common law.  In particular, the application of 
the first question, and the existence of the second, have been obscured by traditional 
expressions of causation for the purposes of the common law of negligence in the 
conclusory language of “directness”, “reality”, “effectiveness” and “proximity”.204 
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The court in Wallace v Kam found that, despite the fact that the surgeon had failed 
to disclose two risks, one more potentially catastrophic than the other, the claimant 
could only establish causation if the actual injury was caused by the undisclosed 
risk.  Mr Wallace had argued that he would not have proceeded if the potentially 
catastrophic risk had been disclosed.  However, the less damaging risk was the one 
that occurred, and so Mr Wallace could not succeed. 
 
Faunce was highly critical of the outcome of this case.  He argued that  
[t]he final tragic irony may be that the structures of the modern medico-legal system 
are so obsessed with the pursuit of individual blame and the increasingly dominant 
private corporate architecture so focussed on risk and liability minimisation and 
profit maximisation, that those working within it ... continue to suffer a systemic 
blindness ... concerning their ability to change them to better reflect a genuine 
commitment to upholding ... foundational professional virtues ... [i]t is unlikely that 
such a situation will long be tolerated.205 
 
(c) Foreseeability of Harm 
In Wyong Shire Council v Shirt, the High Court had specified that, to be real, a 
foreseen risk must not be ‘far-fetched or fanciful’.206  The fact that a risk is 
foreseeable does not necessarily justify a finding of negligence against a person 
who failed to take action to avoid the risk.207  Even where a risk is foreseeable, a 
reasonable person might disregard it.208  Once the foreseeability of the risk has 
been established then the action that a defendant should have taken is subject to the 
‘negligence calculus’,209 formulated by Mason J in the Shirt case, that has four 
elements: 
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care was not taken; 
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm; 
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the harm;  and 
(d) the social utility of the risk-creating activity.210 
 
The court does not consider these elements separately but asks what would be 
obvious to the ‘reasonable person’ in the position of the defendant.  The fact that a 
risk is foreseen does not necessarily make the defendant liable and similarly, a 
defendant cannot be held liable for unforeseen consequences when it would have 
been reasonable for the defendant not to have actually foreseen what, in the result, 
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occurred.  As the Panel observed:  ‘The fact that a risk is foreseeable (even as a not 
insignificant possibility) does not, by itself, justify the conclusion that the 
reasonable person would have taken precautions against it.’211 
 
The Panel was concerned that the ‘far-fetched or fanciful’ test might be followed 
by lower courts to hold a defendant responsible where he or she had not taken 
precautions to prevent the risk from occurring.  The Panel therefore suggested that 
the test be modified to one of a ‘not insignificant’ risk212 though the Panel warned 
that all limbs of the ‘negligence calculus’ should be taken into account in 
determining the liability of a defendant.213  The panel therefore proposed that 
legislation for the test for foreseeability should not only embody the ‘not 
insignificant’ formula but should also repeat the four elements of the ‘negligence 
calculus’.214  The Ipp modification of the test for foreseeability means that 
defendants are only liable where the foreseeability of the risk is not insignificant.  
Yet, a comparatively insignificant risk could have devastating consequences. 
 
Spigelman had suggested that, rather than legislate to prescribe the test for 
foreseeability, what may be appropriate in respect of modification of the tests for 
foreseeability was  
[l]egislation that permits reappraisal and future development of the common law, 
rather than a code that prescribes a test.  A provision which states that, in 
determining whether a duty of care was breached, a court must always have regard 
to the remoteness of a risk irrespective of how readily it could be avoided, would 
probably be enough.215 
 
However, despite that, New South Wales has legislated the Ipp formulation as 
section 5B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).  Section 5B(1) is as follows: 
(1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm 
unless: 
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or 
ought to have known), and 
(b) the risk was not insignificant, and 
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would 
have taken those precautions. 
 
Once again, the formula will be applied relying on ‘expert’ evidence to decide 
what was ‘foreseeable’, whether a risk was ‘significant’ and what a ‘reasonable’ 
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person would have determined in the circumstances.  This is exchanging one set of 
vague terms for another and it is not clear whether these interpretations will have 
made any difference to the determination of negligent conduct.  
 
(d) Damages 
Even if an injured patient has shown that, not only was a duty of care owed, the 
defendant’s standard of care was inadequate, that the conduct had caused the injury 
and that the defendant should have foreseen its occurrence, there still may be no 
right to be adequately compensated.  Recovery of damages is limited in accordance 
with civil liability legislation some of which was in existence prior to the report of 
the Panel — certainly in New South Wales.  The Panel had recognised that, in the 
context of awards of damages for injury, the most important aspect is to obtain 
adequate funds for necessary ongoing support and assistance for the most seriously 
injured and that the basic principle for assessment of damages should be the ‘full 
compensation principle’.216 
 
The second term of reference for the Ipp Panel was: ‘Develop and evaluate 
principled options to limit liability and quantum of awards for damages’.  The 
Panel noted that, despite this term of reference, it did not think that change should 
be ‘recommended merely for the sake of reform or to reduce liability’.217   
 
This part of the Panel report must have been a nightmare for the panelists.  Each 
jurisdiction had its own tariffs, thresholds and caps both in statute and through 
court decisions.218  The fact of jurisdictional differences causes great difficulties 
both for lawyers advising clients in different jurisdictions and for insurers who are 
trying to set prices for insurance premiums.219  These prices are difficult to 
determine when each jurisdiction is so different from the next, and within some 
jurisdictions where the damages that can be obtained will depend on whether the 
injury has been caused by a medical mishap, a motor vehicle accident or an 
accident at work.220  Other injuries caused by negligence may be treated very 
differently again.  The Panel had expressed support for the aspiration that the law 
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relating to negligence should be nationally consistent,221 especially with regard to 
the quantum of damages.  Despite this observation, the consequent legislation has 
only served to make the jurisdictional variations in damages awards more 
disparate.   
 
Tariffs can be developed for death or loss of a limb, or a percentage of loss of 
function, but damages for pain and suffering are impossible to specify.  People 
have differing thresholds for pain and the way inconvenience affects their 
amenity.222  Similarly how does a court assess a loss of expectation of life.  The 
Panel has recommended that a set of guidelines should be developed and updated 
at regular intervals so that some sort of guidance can be given to the courts.223 
 
Not only are there tariffs for the various injuries, but there are also thresholds 
below which compensation for general damages may not be awarded and caps on 
the amount of general damages.  The Panel chose to adopt the New South Wales 
threshold on the grounds that ‘it is now well-understood in practice and is regarded 
as reasonably fair’.224  Similarly, with respect to caps, the Panel chose a cap that is 
in the middle range of caps payable in various state and territory jurisdictions.  As 
Spigelman wrote before the Panel reported: 
[w]here proposed schemes such as a cap on recovery for a head of damage such as 
general damages, with a statutory deeming of this amount to be a fictional worst 
case to which all cases must be adjusted.  There is no principle in such a cap.  
Similarly, thresholds, as variously expressed, are said to be based on a policy to 
refuse small claims, but it is hard to discern any principle in determining the cut-off 
point.225   
 
As the above analysis shows, the Panel’s recommendations have little to do with 
principle and are based on what seems to be fair choice among jurisdictional 
offerings.  An examination of relevant state and territory legislation shows that the 
Panel’s recommendations concerning harmonisation of legislation have been 
ignored and each state and territory has continued to determine its own level for 
thresholds and caps on general damages.   
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(e) Limitation of Actions 
Another area where the Panel appears to have departed from principle is in respect 
of time limits for initiation of actions for compensation for negligently caused 
injury.  As the Panel stated, limitation periods should not be considered as arbitrary 
cut off points totally unrelated to justice or the society in which they operate.  The 
choice of the time limit must be applied to both plaintiff and defendant and justice 
is best served if litigation is conducted as close as possible to the occurrence of the 
event that has led to the litigation.226  The longer the time goes, the more difficult it 
is for both parties, but particularly for defendants.227  Witnesses may die and 
reliable evidence may be difficult to obtain the longer the time delay.  And there is 
a justice issue for professional people to be able to say that they are no longer 
liable to be sued for something that happened a long time ago.228  This is 
particularly important if claims made cover is all that protected a professional and 
the question is then how long a retired professional should have to maintain run-off 
cover.  Yet, the Panel clearly stated that its choice of a long-stop time limit was 
‘necessarily arbitrary’.229   
 
The next question is to determine the date from which the time period should run.  
There are several choices: 
(a) The date of the incident resulting in the damage 
(b) The date when the damage occurs 
(c) The date when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues 
(d) The date when the plaintiff becomes aware or should have become aware that 
some damage has been caused.230   
 
In the interests of justice between the parties, the Panel suggested that the time 
period should run from the date of discoverability of the damage.231  This choice 
would take into account circumstances where injuries had taken many years to be 
discovered.  The Panel also specified a time limit of three years in accordance with 
the Terms of Reference.232  Whilst this time limit was arbitrary, it seemed to the 
Panel that it gave adequate time for the plaintiff and was more fair to the 
defendant.  The Panel also suggested that there should be no discretion in the court 
to extend the period as three years from the date of discoverability was more than 
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adequate time to initiate an action.233  However, it is incongruous that a time limit 
of six years applies to suing for a debt, whereas the more serious action to obtain 
care for a person who has been injured, particularly by the negligence of another, 
should be limited to three years. 
 
Given the fact that some damage does not manifest itself until many years later, the 
Panel recommended that there should be a long stop period beyond which the 
plaintiff should not be able to initiate litigation.  The Panel chose a figure of 12 
years as the most just between the parties.234  However, in some circumstances 
where the condition could not be found for many years, the court should be given a 
discretion to override the long stop provision in the interests of justice, also 
recognising that the wider the time gap from the original damage, the more 
difficult it will be for both parties.  In this circumstance, the court will take into 
account the extent of loss to the plaintiff and the seriousness of the lapse in the 
conduct of the defendant.235 
 
The setting of limitation periods to apply nationwide is one area of the ‘reforms’ 
that appears to have been adopted fairly consistently throughout the country.  There 
is no compulsion on any jurisdiction to fall into line but the reasoning of the Panel 
seems to have been accepted by the legislators in each jurisdiction. 
 
In New South Wales, limitation periods are governed by the Limitation Act 1969 
(NSW) and reflect the Panel’s recommendations.  Section 50C(1) provides: 
(1) An action on a cause of action to which this Division applies is not 
maintainable if brought after the expiration of a limitation period of 
whichever of the following periods is the first to expire: 
(a) the 3 year post discoverability limitation period, which is the period of 3 
years running from and including the date on which the causes of 
action i discoverable by the plaintiff, 
(b) the 12 year long-stop limitation period, which is the period of 12 years 
running from the time of the act or omission alleged to have resulted 
in the injury or death with which the claim is concerned. 
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5 Criticism of Tort Law ‘Reforms’ 
The reforms to the law of torts have been criticised by many commentators.  
Justice Ipp himself commented that in many ways the reforms had gone much 
further than those recommended by the Panel.236  The Australian reported Justice 
Ipp as saying that tort reform had gone too far and that he intended to take the 
message to the insurance industry.237  Toomey Pegg, writing in Findlaw Australia, 
commented that tort reform had not been approached in a comprehensive and 
principled way.   
Governments wanted the quickest fix for skyrocketing premiums without looking at 
the other side of the equation: what compensation do victims of negligence need and 
how best can that need be met?238   
 
The requirement to find ways to reduce insurance premiums was one of the terms 
of reference for the Ipp panel and was referred to in the Introduction to the Ipp 
Report where the interaction between the law of negligence and insurance was 
noted.  The Panel commented that the assertion in a communiqué from a meeting 
of Ministers from the Commonwealth, states and territories that there was a 
relationship between the law at that time and rises in insurance premiums, was not 
investigated and the Panel made no finding about it.239 
 
Faunce has criticised both the composition of the Panel and its findings.  He argued 
that the members of the Panel were on the insurers’ ‘wish list’.  Because the Panel 
was not permitted to examine the work of APRA, it was not possible to investigate 
whether in fact there had been an insurance crisis at the time of the change to 
legislation.  If there had been a crisis, then APRA was responsible for failing to 
check the management and investment decisions of the insurers.240    
 
Chief Justice of Queensland, Paul de Jersey and president of the Australian 
Lawyers Alliance, Tom Goudkamp both were reported as stating that, in their 
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view, tort law reform had gone too far.241  Faunce tells of an extra-curial speech of 
Chief Justice Paul de Jersey remarking that the fundamental right to personal safety 
and the patient’s right to receive compensation for injury had been compromised 
by legislation enacted following the Ipp recommendations.242  Justice Anthony 
Whealy, reviewing the law of negligence, had commented that there was a gap 
between the rhetoric of law reform and the substance of the reform in fact 
achieved.243   
 
As Faunce observes: 
[t]he tragedy for patients and their relatives involved in disclosure of material risk 
cases has been compounded by a raft of recent legislation in Australian States that 
has resulted in fewer claims and more profits for medical indemnity insurers, but not 
fewer patients being injured as a result of adverse events.244 
 
The fact that the insurance industry is making profits while the taxpayer is 
responsible for looking after the majority of injured persons suggests that the tort 
law ‘reforms’ have been a method of throwing these obligations onto the public 
purse.  To the extent that insurers do pay some damages, the taxpayer is also 
subsidising the insurance industry through the taxation system because premiums 
for professional liability insurance are fully deductible from the taxation of the 
professional person paying them.245 
 
6 Conclusion 
According to Spigelman, one of the motivations for the tort law reforms was that 
plaintiffs were receiving unnecessarily high payouts, partly because the defendant 
was insured, and partly because people in the general population were not taking 
responsibility for their actions.246  Whilst these ideas may well apply to some 
actions alleging negligence, those arguments do not apply to injury caused by 
medical practitioners.  Firstly, whilst medical practitioners are insured, that should 
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not be a motivating factor to reform the law as all professionals must have 
professional liability insurance.  Secondly, when allegedly negligent activities of 
medical practitioners occur, it is in the context of medical treatment to which 
patients have consented.  Agreeing to a medical procedure is outside the context of 
people taking responsibility for their own actions unless they have been provided 
with full and relevant information in order to decide to consent or not.  Yet, 
patients have placed themselves in the care of medical practitioners and are entitled 
to expect that all conduct of the medical practitioner and all treatments to which 
they have agreed will be undertaken with due care.   
 
There are just as many injuries to patients from negligent conduct by medical 
practitioners as before the statutory changes.247  It has been estimated that 10% of 
admissions to acute care hospitals in Australia are linked to adverse events that are 
probably preventable.248  Yet, as this section has shown, access to adequate 
compensation has been compromised by the changes to civil liability legislation.  
The Bolam standard has been reintroduced partly because the courts had 
downgraded its ambit.  Whilst clarification of the law respecting causation and 
foreseeability of damage has been beneficial, the apparently arbitrary time limits 
on initiating legal actions for compensation and the similarly arbitrary caps on 
quantum of damages has meant that fewer injured patients are compensated 
through the tort system.  Consequently, injured patients have to seek care through 
the publicly-funded health system.   
 
In light of the above, the question arises as to whether many of the problems 
associated with tort actions in personal injury negligence could be eliminated by 
moving away from them.  It is to an exploration of arguments concerning the 
possibility of ‘no fault’ liability for personal injury to which this thesis now turns. 
  
E ‘NO FAULT’ INJURY COMPENSATION — HAS THE TIME 
COME? 
 
The system is now out of alignment with other policy initiatives on quality and 
safety: in fact it serves to undermine those policies and inhibits improvements in the 
safety of the care received by patients. Ultimately, we take the view that it will not 
be possible to achieve an environment of full, open reporting ... when, outside it, 
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there exists a litigation system the incentives of which press in the opposite 
direction. We believe that the way forward lies in the abolition of clinical negligence 
litigation, taking clinical error out of the courts and the tort system.249 
 
1 Introduction 
As the analysis in Chapter VI will show, a significant barrier to implementation of 
open disclosure of medical errors is the failure to disclose a possible adverse event.  
Fear of being blamed and subject to litigation, or embarrassment over being seen 
by colleagues as clinically and personally deficient, lead to reluctance to report 
adverse events.  Consequently, as the aviation industry has demonstrated,250 
introduction of a blame-free culture may lead to better reporting and the 
consequent opportunity to learn from the error and improve the system.251  As 
Studdert and Brennan observe: ‘Fear of blame among those individuals closest to 
errors ... poses a major obstacle to design and implementation of patient safety 
initiatives’.252 
 
2 Goals of ‘No Fault’ Systems of Injury Compensation 
Notwithstanding, the opportunity for regulators, health service organisations and 
medical practitioners to learn through increased reporting is not the only argument 
in favour of a ‘no fault’ medical injury compensation scheme.  Whilst that is 
certainly one goal for ‘no fault’ systems, it is not the only one.  Studdert and 
Brennan list five goals to ‘ ... address the need to prevent medical errors and 
efficiently compensate medical injuries once they occur’.253  
 the program should encourage physicians and other health care providers to report errors, 
especially those that cause medical injury; 
 the program should strive to send strong quality improvement signals (including with 
financial incentives - or enterprise liability254); 
 mechanisms must be in place even in a ‘no fault’ compensation system for those rare 
occasions where patients are harmed by physicians who are incompetent, dangerous, or 
malevolent; 
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 the compensation program should reinforce rather than undermine the honesty and 
openness of the patient-physician relationship;  
 where appropriate, patients should be compensated in a manner which is speedy, 
equitable, affordable, and predictable.255 
 
The educational value of reporting, appropriate compensation, the doctor-patient 
relationship, the ability to discipline the incompetent and quality improvement are 
all goals of patient-centred care as outlined in Chapter I.   
 
3 Other ‘No Fault’ Injury Compensation Systems 
One observation made by the Ipp Review was that there may be an argument for 
developing a no-fault system to deal with personal injuries including medical 
injuries.  As the report states: 
[i]t needs to be said that many of the people and organisations we consulted and who 
have made submissions to us argued that there is a strong case for a no-fault system 
of compensating injured persons.  This is clearly not an issue within our Terms of 
Reference, and we make no comment on it save to draw attention to the fact that 
there is a significant body of opinion that supports the implementation of such a 
system.256   
 
There is experience in other countries in various types of no-fault schemes.  New 
Zealand has the most comprehensive scheme but there are also comprehensive ‘no 
fault‘ schemes for medical injury operating in the Nordic countries, Sweden having 
implemented its system first.257  However, there are also no-fault schemes for 
workers compensation in all Australian jurisdictions, and motor vehicle injuries of 
people resident within the jurisdiction, are covered by no-fault schemes in New 
South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania.   
 
The 2011 Productivity Commission Report into care and support for people with a 
disability258 recommended the establishment of a National Disability Insurance 
Scheme.  The report also raised the possibility of a National Injuries Insurance 
Scheme to deal with all sorts of physical injuries caused by accident whether in the 
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home or elsewhere.  This would include medical injuries.259  It could be funded by 
agreement between the Commonwealth and the various States and Territories that 
have some type of no fault scheme for injuries.260  Funds from existing mandatory 
insurances plus contributions from insurance arrangements for hospitals, levies on 
passenger carrying vehicles and rail tickets, and criminal injuries compensation 
schemes could also be included.261  In whatever way an injury is sustained, any 
system should focus on making sure that the needs of every injured person are 
provided for without the additional cost and stress of proving negligence.262 
 
 
4 Universal ‘No Fault’ Injury Compensation in New Zealand 
The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) in New Zealand provides personal 
injury cover to all people, including visitors, who are injured in that country.  Both 
physical and mental injuries can be compensated.  As the web site of the ACC 
advises: 
Everyone in New Zealand is eligible for comprehensive injury cover: 
 no matter what you’re doing or where you are when you’re injured, eg 
driving, playing sport, at home, at work 
 no matter how the injury happened, even if you did something yourself to 
contribute to it 
 no matter what age you are or whether you’re working – you might be 
retired, a child, on a benefit or studying.263 
 
The New Zealand system’s focus is on long term care.  It was established after an 
investigation and report by Sir Owen Woodhouse in 1967.264  Over the years it has 
been modified to take account of some problems that have become clear but its 
original focus is still in place.  A person coming under the scheme has strictly 
limited rights to pursue litigation through the courts.  Ongoing care is the most 
important aspect of the scheme, though income replacement is also dealt with.265  
There are also rules about the fact that in some circumstances, the incentive to 
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return to work is adversely affected.266  Regulations are in place to make sure that 
abuse of the system is minimised. 
 
Whilst some ideological concerns have been brought to bear to criticise the system 
and to suggest that it should be dismantled or privatised, it remains popular.  It 
would be a brave government that would seriously curtail the system that has 
generally worked well over the past forty years.  The scheme provides necessary 
care and also adopts processes to make sure that the injured person can achieve as 
much independence as possible.267  There will always be people who abuse 
publicly funded systems, but eventually most of those who do are found out.268     
 
As Bismark and Paterson comment, in light of the extended period of time during 
which the New Zealand scheme has been operating, together with the rise of ‘ ... 
systems thinking about the causes of adverse events, the tort system is looking 
increasingly anachronistic’.269 
 
5 Costs and Wastage in the Current Fault-Based System 
Luntz observes that; ‘[t]he purposes of tort law are said to be to pass moral 
judgement on the wrong committed, respond to the victim’s needs, and encourage 
future safety.’  He goes on: ‘Instead of trying to fulfil all three of these purposes in 
a single tort action, that often results in none of them being achieved, it would be 
better to separate these three functions.’  He concludes: ‘Determining whether a 
patient is entitled to compensation in these cases takes an inordinate time and is 
horribly expensive.’270 
 
The tort-based compensation system has been built on a philosophy of ‘full 
compensation’ of all costs associated with the injury.271  Income replacement plus 
care costs and the costs of rehabilitation calculated over actuarially determined 
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expectancy of life can mean that an insurer may face many millions of dollars in 
compensation costs, especially when a young person is injured. 
 
The current fault-based system of compensation for personal injuries is highly 
inefficient.272  A great deal of money is spent on the investigation process 
undertaken by an insurer when a claim is made.273  Those costs are passed on to the 
community through higher premium costs for insurance.  It also makes the whole 
tort system slow as it is in the interests of some insurers to dispute every aspect of a 
claim.274   
 
Legal costs have been estimated to consume up to 40% of any pay out275 whereas 
administrative costs in the New Zealand system only amount to 10%.276  These 
legal costs include payment of court costs, legal costs of each party and 
employment of expert witnesses for each side of the action.  A cost that is well-
known but less able to be quantified is the stress on injured plaintiffs caused by the 
court proceedings.  All these costs are largely unnecessary when the tort fault-
based system is bypassed in favour of no fault liability. 
 
Some commentators have raised concerns about the fairness and operation of civil 
liability legislation passed in wake of the Ipp Report recommendations.  Personal 
injury compensation through tort negligence actions in the court has now been 
altered by this legislation that aims to reduce the amount of compensation that a 
person can receive.  Not only is this unfair to the injured person, but it means that 
the full costs of a negligent act are not borne by the body or person responsible for 
the injury.  The argument is that the awarding of costs provides a deterrent so that 
people will be more careful.277  In fact, because the costs are actually paid by the 
insurer, this direct influence on behaviour is minimal.  In recommending limits on 
quantum of damages, the Ipp committee took into account that few negligence 
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claims are brought in actions through the courts and that the bulk of injuries is 
compensated through the social security system that is much less generous.278 
 
An important aspect of wastage in tort law compensation is the fact that awards of 
damages can, even with the best actuarial information, be inadequate to provide 
compensation, care and where possible, rehabilitation for the life of the patient.  
However, if the patient dies earlier than anticipated, the family or other 
beneficiaries may make a windfall.  In a no-fault system, because there is 
reimbursement of the actual costs of care, there is less wastage. 
 
Other factors can cause an award to be inadequate.  The actuarial calculations can 
only marginally take account of economic factors and government policies that will 
affect the amount of money available to provide ongoing care and rehabilitation.  
In addition, some people are just not good managers or are profligate with the 
money so it is dissipated.279   
 
Ultimately, any shortfall comes back to a community cost.  Where an injured 
person has insufficient funds for care costs, that person will be forced into the 
public medical system and have to be maintained by the social security safety net.  
Considering the costs that are borne by the community in this way it becomes 
sensible to look at how the systems for caring for injured people could be 
streamlined.  The most important factor is that the injured person should receive 
proper care for the whole of life.280  Proper care includes nursing assistance, other 
personal help, various aids to make life more acceptable and where possible, to 
provide a degree of independence.  
 
6 Equity of Access to Compensation 
Under the current profusion of laws and regulations that deal with injured people 
there are many discrepancies.  Depending on the jurisdiction, a person who has 
been injured by a motor vehicle accident, a workplace accident ,or a medical injury 
in a hospital, may be treated in a dramatically different fashion281 even though the 
injuries may be comparable.  Disabilities caused by accident are going to be the 
same and require the same amount of care whatever their cause.  Similarly, there is 
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a large number of people who cannot access any compensation for an injury.  
Accidents in the home are a prime example.  If there is no-one to sue, or if there is 
no scheme to which to apply, the social security system is the only way that these 
people can survive and have their care needs recognised.   
 
The money currently wasted in the tort system, as outlined in the previous section, 
could be available to fund public care services.  Luntz bemoans the fact that there 
was a missed opportunity to ‘ ... achieve a comprehensive administrative 
compensation scheme that would have freed medical practitioners from the fear of 
being sued [that] was presented by .. the Woodhouse Committee Report in 
1974’.282  The Australian Medical Association at the time vigorously opposed the 
introduction of such a scheme.283 
 
Cane also criticises the fault-based tort system by suggesting that: ‘ ... the evidence 
we have about the positive regulatory impact of tort law is patchy and 
inconclusive’ and suggests that dissatisfaction in the community with the current 
tort system could be mobilised to demand legal change.284  Of course, there will be 
strong opposition from various lobby groups.  For example, the Australian Plaintiff 
Lawyers Association285 and insurers will probably be resistant to change.  
Currently the insurers collect premiums knowing that their liability for large 
payments to injured people is limited by the civil liability legislation.  Whilst 
premiums have stabilised, it may well be due to improved prudential oversight 
from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority as well as the limits on 
liability for payments of compensation to injured plaintiffs.  Either way, profits of 
insurers have increased.286  Insurance companies thus have an incentive to still 
insure in the fields where personal injuries compensation is a cost. 
 
So long as there is no political appetite for legal review to introduce a no fault 
system for injury compensation in Australia, nothing is going to change.  This is 
particularly the case given pressure from lobby groups, such as those mentioned 
above, opposing any attempt to alter the current system.  Any move to rectify this 
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situation would require vocal community pressure on parliamentarians.  It would 
be necessary to convince legislators that the costs of the current (fault-based tort) 
system are unsustainable. — the very motivation for instigating the Ipp Review in 
the first place, and reflected in its Terms of Reference.287 
 
7 Social Justice 
What is apparent is that the current patchwork of negligence litigation, no fault 
schemes and social security leads to a sort of compensation lottery.288  This 
outcome has social justice implications.  There is no logical or principled reason 
for the differences in consequences for the injured people concerned.  
Implementation of a National Injuries Insurance Scheme would mean that similar 
injuries would lead to comparable care for the injured person.  However, such a 
scheme would be dependent on getting the states and territories to agree that it is in 
their interests to divert money currently available for their limited no fault schemes 
towards funding the national scheme.  There is also the parochial attitude that 
protects existing state and territory fiefdoms.  Having a scheme centrally 
administered would possibly not be acceptable to many jurisdictions perhaps 
depending on political alignment of the state or territory concerned.289  
 
8 Fault as a Behaviour Modification Incentive 
A fiction in the law of the tort of negligence is that the prospect of being subject to 
legal liability will make practice more safe.  As Vincent comments: 
the likelihood of being sued is supposed to inject a certain caution into clinical 
practice and decision making which is supposed to improve patient care.  If this 
were so, one might think that countries operating tort systems would have a lower 
level of adverse events.290   
 
However, Davis et al suggest that ‘ ... the underlying level of serious risk to patient 
safety is relatively uniform across medicolegal systems’.291 
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Cane comments that there are two views of the function of ‘ ... tort law as a 
regulatory mechanism to promote health and safety’, downplaying its ‘regulatory 
potential’ and attribution to it of ‘a significant regulatory role’.292  Luntz observes 
that ‘ ... moral judgement is withheld when the clearest cases of medical negligence 
are quickly settled on confidential terms’.293  For almost the whole period of 
independent practice, professional people have been able to insure against 
professional liability.  This means that the prospect of having to pay out huge sums 
of money is not a concern.  More likely to modify behaviour is the publicity, the 
stress, the possibility of being named as uncaring, let alone incompetent before 
one’s peers, loss of career prospects and sometimes livelihood294 together with the 
prospect of disciplinary proceedings rather than fear of having to pay out money.   
 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
The adoption of no fault schemes for compensation for personal injury has many 
more arguments in favour than against.  The costs to the community of the existing 
matrix of the fault-based tort of negligence determined through the court system 
and various schemes to compensate victims of workplace accidents and motor 
vehicle accidents, are not going to be any greater than from rejigging the moneys 
washing through those systems to create a more equitable system of care for 
injured people.  The inherent inequity of some injured people being treated 
differently depending on the source of the injury, and others having no access at all 
to any compensation scheme and depending on social service, suggests that access 
to a no fault system should be available for all injured people.  If adopted, a 
National Injury Insurance Scheme would ensure that the care needs of those 
injured were the primary community concern.  The social security system could be 
enlisted to provide some income support for injured people.  Like New Zealand, 
access to a no fault scheme should mean that the person concerned would be 
limited in the opportunities for taking action through the courts.  It could even be 
argued that once the statutory no-fault scheme was accessed, litigation through the 
court system should be curtailed or prohibited. 
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Another advantage of a no fault scheme, particularly for medically-caused injuries 
is the ability of the system to provide information about the incidence and reasons 
for an injury.295  This information can then be used as an additional learning tool to 
feed into recommendations for modification of some procedures and the 
elimination of others.  To the extent that an adverse medical event might not have 
been reported, the application by a claimant provides accurate relevant 
information.   
 
Yet, it has been argued that the scheme operating in New Zealand has been no 
more effective in reducing the incidence of adverse events than the tort systems in 
place in Australia and the United States.296  Similarly, Vincent suggests that there is 
little evidence to support the view that ‘no fault’ systems encourage reporting of 
errors.297  On the other hand 
the most important criterion for assessment of any compensation system should be 
its impact on injured patients ... not just in providing appropriate financial 
recompense where necessary but in ensuring that explanations, apologies, and long 
term support and care are regarded as the expectation rather than the exception’.298   
 
The fact that some medical practitioners fail to report adverse events or that the 
incidence of medical errors is no less in New Zealand under a ‘no fault’ system is 
no argument against introducing such a scheme.  It is the patient-centred aspects of 
a good ‘no fault’ system of liability upon which attention must be focussed.  
 
Whilst there are constitutional and political barriers to introduction of an overriding 
National Injury Insurance Scheme, it would be far more sensible and equitable to 
have a national system provided for in Federal legislation, even if administered by 
the various states and territories.  Trying to get ‘matching’ legislation for general 
no fault schemes through the eight parliaments of the different jurisdictions is not 
an easy task.  Australia’s federal system has some advantages, but in matters where 
uniformity between jurisdictions would be most efficient, it can act as a barrier. 
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F CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown how the professional obligation to practise patient-centred 
care that is at the heart of laws that endorse respect for patient autonomy can be 
undermined by some case law and statute.  The doctor-patient relationship is one 
that requires ‘high standards of professional conduct’ including being courteous, 
respectful, compassionate and honest299 as a way to minimise the inherent power 
balance between medical practitioner and patient.   
 
Firstly, by insisting that proposed medical treatment must always be based on the 
judgement of a ‘responsible body of medical opinion’, medical practitioners are 
ignoring the fact that, for every patient, there are non-medical factors that a patient 
will be weighing up when making a decision about what treatment to accept or 
reject.300  The days when paternalistic attitudes and decisions were invoked by 
doctors have long gone and the courts have firmly rejected any suggestion that 
‘Doctor Knows Best’.301  Patients are much better informed and they also assert the 
right to be involved in decision-making, that is required not only by codes,302 but 
also by Standard 2—Partnering with Consumers— in the  National Safety and 
Quality Health Service Standards.303  Over the years since the Bolam standard was 
first adopted, courts have gradually scaled back its reach, but it is still asserted by 
the medical profession as determining the patient’s best interests. 
 
Secondly, the responsibility of medical practitioners to obtain consent before 
initiating any medical procedure is dependent on providing sufficient information 
so that the patient can make an informed choice about whether to proceed or not.  
Seeking consent is not a mere formality that protects the medical practitioner from 
litigation, it is a way of recognising the patient’s right to self-determination.304  A 
consent is not effective if the patient’s decision is made on incomplete information 
about relevant risks and benefits.  The patient’s choice must also be respected 
whether or not the medical practitioner agrees, as the patient may have conflicting 
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193 (King CJ). 
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moral and ethical constraints on what is proposed.  However, the tendency to query 
the patient’s mental capacity when the patient chooses a course of action not 
recommended by the medical practitioner305 has been assisted by courts that have 
carefully formulated detailed tests to determine mental capacity.  These tests ignore 
the declaration by Lord Donaldson in In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), that 
the decision of the patient should be respected whether it appears rational or not, an 
endorsement of the overriding principle of self-determination. 
 
This chapter has also shown how valid claims by injured patients have been 
deflected by provisions of civil liability legislation.  Legislators reacted to a ‘crisis’ 
mentality generated by difficulties in obtaining professional indemnity insurance at 
a reasonable rate and perceptions that courts were being overgenerous to plaintiffs 
at the expense of the doctor’s insurer.  Substantial impediments lie in the way of 
patients seeking compensation for negligent treatment by a medical practitioner 
meaning that many patients can no longer obtain appropriate compensation for 
their injuries through the fault-based tort system and have to be supported by the 
social service safety net.  Rather than a set of principled changes, many proposed 
changes are arbitrary as the Ipp Panel acknowledged.306  In addition, there are no 
rational reasons for the differences between general limitation periods and those 
imposed for personal injury. 
 
Finally, this chapter raised the question of whether the time has come to institute a 
system of ‘no fault’ injury compensation.  The limiting factors of Civil Liability 
legislation criticised in Section D above, suggest that many such problems could be 
overcome by a National Injuries Insurance Scheme. 
 
The values of integrity, truthfulness, dependability and compassion are promoted 
by medical practitioner bodies and their codes as being as important as technical 
competence.307  However, the paradox of the medical profession’s conflict between 
its ethical commitment to altruism and its self-interest has been a constant theme in 
this chapter.  The courts have insisted that patient autonomy be respected but the 
                                                      
305 James Munby, 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Limitations of Patient Self-Determination in 
Contemporary English Law' (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315, 326. 
306 As previously mentioned, The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final 
Report (September 2002) (the Ipp Report) [6.36], [9.24]. 
307 See eg, Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in 
Australia (at March 2014) [1.4];  General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) 
[1];  Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) xi;  ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation and 
European Federation of Internal Medicine, Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A 
Physician Perspective (2002). 
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evidence in this chapter has revealed resistance by medical practitioners where they 
have perceived that their clinical discretions are being curtailed.  As Sir Donald 
Irvine has observed:  ‘The obvious question is why a profession with so many 
conscientious people could act so defensively.  How does this behaviour fit with a 
profession committed to putting patients first?’308
                                                      
308 Donald H Irvine, 'Everyone Is Entitled to a Good Doctor' (2007) 186 MJA 256, 257. 
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CHAPTER V: ADVANCE DIRECTIVES — WISHES FOR 
FUTURE CARE 
 
A INTRODUCTION  
 
The gap between the rhetoric of patient-centred care and the reality of medical 
practice can be on display if patients’ validly created advance directives are not 
observed by medical practitioners.  A desideratum of patient-centred care centres 
on satisfying patients’ needs, wants and values.  Satisfying the patient’s needs, 
wants and values is accomplished in the context of a partnership between patient 
and medical practitioner, in an atmosphere of open communication where the 
patient is treated with dignity and respect — in other words, a convergence of 
patient-centred care principles.  This chapter documents the frustrations and 
dissatisfaction experienced by some mentally competent patients who, having 
made decisions about their preferred medical treatment in the future, find their 
wishes, as expressed in the form of a valid advance directive, overridden or 
ignored. 
 
It is a primary task of this chapter to suggest ways in which validly-created 
advance directives might be more fully honoured in medical practice.  As a step in 
this direction, the chapter explores reasons commonly given for disregarding 
validly-created advance directives.  The requirement for consent by a patient 
before any medical or surgical treatment is administered is a reflection of respect 
for patient autonomy, a pillar of patient-centred care and an ethical obligation for 
medical practitioners.  In principle, if a competent adult’s right to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment is accepted for contemporaneous decisions, it should be 
acceptable for a competent adult to give directions for a future time in anticipation 
of being then unable to exercise that right.  This principle has been recognised by 
the law, both in legislation1 and by the common law.2  Recognition of this principle 
                                                      
1 See eg, Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld);  Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA). 
2 See eg,NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297 [21];  
Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761[40(6)]. 
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has also provided the rationale for encouragement by governments of advance care 
planning.3 
 
Buchanan reports that there are two answers usually given when the value of an 
advance directive is queried.  Firstly, an advance directive is supposed to protect 
the individual from unwanted medical treatment that may be futile and burdensome 
and that ‘may prolong a miserable or meaningless existence’.  Secondly, as an 
advance directive allows self-determination, it is valuable in itself. 4 
 
The Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council recognises that ‘[m]any people 
fear a loss of autonomy, dignity and the ability to make their preferences known 
when crucial health and other personal decisions are required after they have lost 
decision-making capacity’.5  Thus advance directives provide evidence of patient 
wishes when medical practitioners are unclear as to what course of action the 
patient would want in the circumstances.   
 
Section B explores the legal arrangements that establish the validity and aims of 
advance directives.  A description of the requirements for creation of advance 
directives at common law is followed by an examination of statutory schemes that 
have been legislated in order to bolster a patient’s common law rights to give 
directions about desired future health care.  These legislated arrangements are 
intended to provide clarity to the law that underpins them and to provide some 
directions to health professionals who must comply with their instructions.   
 
Even accepting the putative value of advance directives for specifying patient 
wishes for treatment, some voices have expressed concerns about their 
defensibility.  Thus, Section C investigates some practical difficulties in the 
implementation of the directions set out in advance directives.  In addition, some 
more philosophical objections have been aired and these will be explored.   
 
                                                      
3 See eg, Department of Health, Advance Care Planning: Have the Conversation (A Strategy for 
Victorian Health Services 2014-2018) 11;  Department of Health and Human Services, Simplifying 
Medical Treatment Decision Making and Advance Care Planning (January 2016) 14;  Australian 
Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care Directives (at 
September 2011) 5. 
4 Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 277. 
5 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care Directives 
(at September 2011) 1. 
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Section D suggests some future directions for the systematic management of 
advance directives consistent with patient-centred care principles.  At the very 
least, communication of one’s wishes for future care is essential, whether it be by 
having discussions with family or with medical practitioners, preferably all 
together.  Documenting those wishes in an advance directive formalises the process 
and underlines the significance of those wishes to the person expressing them. 
 
Section E provides the summary of and conclusions to the chapter.  It recapitulates 
several ways that wishes recorded in advance directives might be better honoured 
in practice.   
 
B THE LAW UNDERPINNING CREATION AND USE OF ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES 
 
1 What Are Advance Directives? 
An advance directive is a notice, usually in writing, that is made whilst a person is 
competent and is intended to give instructions for a future care.  Where the person 
is no longer able, whether through unconsciousness or mental incapacity, to give 
directions regarding treatment choices, it aims to provide suggestions to guide the 
person’s management by medical practitioners, hospitals and other health 
professionals.  Many directives also make provision for non-medical preferences, 
such as whether to refuse to go into a hospital or care facility.  
 
2 Other Less-Controversial Mechanisms for Managing Future Care 
(a) Surrogate Appointments by Patient 
Whilst this chapter is primarily concerned with advance directives, the other main 
method for giving directions for medical treatment in a future contingency of 
losing consciousness or competence is to appoint a surrogate decision-maker.  
Each jurisdiction has statutory provisions for enduring powers of attorney or 
guardianships that are intended to remain valid even though the donor of the power 
has become ‘of unsound mind’.  At common law, a general power of attorney 
authorises the attorney to act under the conditions specified if the donor of the 
power is absent but it is automatically revoked upon the ‘unsoundness of mind’ of 
the donor.  This fact was not generally known by the members of the public who 
were surprised when a power of attorney was invalidated precisely at the time 
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where it was most needed.6  This problem has now been remedied by the 
enactment of legislation that provides that these appointments, if made in the way 
specified by the relevant legislation, will remain valid following the unsoundness 
of mind of the donor.  Each jurisdiction now also recognises the validity of an 
enduring power of attorney or equivalent made under the legislation of another 
Australian jurisdiction.7   
 
(b) Surrogate Appointment by Court or Tribunal 
Each jurisdiction also has provision for appointment of a guardian by a court or 
tribunal.That court or tribunal also has supervisory powers to make sure that 
directives and appointments are validly made by the appointor and properly 
exercised by any appointee.  In addition, these bodies can step in if there is any 
question as to the validity of an advance directive or enduring power of attorney, or 
if someone questions decisions being made or proposed under their terms.   
 
(c) The Supreme Court’s Parens Patriae Jurisdiction 
As a final point of decision or appeal, the Supreme Court in each State and 
Territory has an inherent parens patriae jurisdiction that can be exercised when 
necessary.8  The parens patriae jurisdiction may arise in circumstances where 
resolution of disputes has not been achieved through the lower level judicial 
processes or where there has been no other provision made for an appointment of a 
surrogate in the circumstances of the particular patient.9  
 
However, this chapter is primarily concerned with advance directives that do not 
appoint another person to make necessary treatment decisions.  This is because 
there are problems that relate to advance directives, such as relevance and 
applicability of the medical decision, that only arise when there has been no 
appointment of a competent, contemporaneous, surrogate decision-maker or the 
matter has not gone to the Supreme Court for a decision.   
 
 
                                                      
6 See eg, Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 October 1997, 3686 ( Hon D 
E Beanland). 
7 See eg, Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 34;  Powers of Attorney Act 2003 (NSW) s 25;  Powers 
of Attorney Act 2006 (ACT) s 89. 
8 This jurisdiction is the court’s power to act in the sovereign’s stead, as a type of caring parent of 
citizens.  
9 Courts in England have bemoaned the fact that their parens patriae jurisdiction for incompetent 
adults has been taken away.  See eg, In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 51 (Lord 
Bridge).  This jurisdiction remains in Australian Supreme Courts. 
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3 Why are Advance Directives Required? 
The circumstances under which the powers conferred under advance directives will 
normally arise are in three medical situations: 
 where a treatment is being offered – the power to consent to or refuse treatment, 
or, when treatment has already commenced, whether it should be withdrawn; 
 where the only proposed treatments would be futile in not providing even a 
minimum of benefit to the patient; 
 in an emergency, where the patient is unable to make a decision as to whether 
life-sustaining treatment should be withheld or withdrawn.10 
 
Notwithstanding, refusal of consent to commencement of treatment or a demand 
for its withdrawal after commencement may, on occasion, run up against the 
principle of the ‘sanctity of life’.11  Respect for the sanctity of life is the rationale 
behind the state interest in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens.  
However, when this conflict between two ethical principles has come to be 
resolved before the courts, the principle of respect for individual autonomy should 
outweigh that for preserving the sanctity of life.  As Hoffman LJ in Bland affirmed: 
But the sanctity of life is only one of a cluster of ethical principles which we apply 
to decisions about how we should live.  Another is respect for the individual human 
being and in particular for his right to choose how he should live his own life.  We 
call this individual autonomy or the right of self-determination.12 
 
In Bland, Lord Goff approved the words of Hoffman LJ and added: ‘To this extent, 
the principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-
determination.’13 
 
4 Self-Determination  
The Australian Medical Association (AMA) has issued a policy that states that 
advance care planning has an important role to play in the recognition of patient 
                                                      
10 Ben White et al, 'The Legal Role of Medical Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw 
Life-sustaining Treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales)' (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 498, 
503. 
11 There does not appear to be any judicial discussion of what is involved in the concept of the 
sanctity of life, courts merely referring to the principle without comment.  Life has not always been 
seen as inviolable but Christian ideas of human life as precious, holy and sacred lie behind the 
attitude in Western legal traditions towards protection of human lives against being ‘wrongfully’ 
terminated.  The two main bases for the principle lie in the belief that all human life is inviolable, and 
that all human lives have equal value. (Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine 
(Clarendon Press, 1987) 6). 
12 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 826 (Hoffman LJ). 
13 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff). 
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self-determination, a goal of medical practice in the 21st Century,14 and one of the 
pillars of patient-centred care.  The policy documents an awareness that, as the 
Australian population ages, the likelihood of the occurrence of some unfortunate 
medical emergency increases.15  It also recognises the process of preparing an 
advance care plan as involving ‘ ... reflection, discussion and communication ... in 
an environment of shared decision-making ... ’ between patient and medical 
practitioner.16 
 
Currently the law governing advance directives varies between jurisdictions and it 
can be difficult for medical professionals in one jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of an advance directive from another jurisdiction.17  The AMA policy call 
for Australia’s states and territories to enact legislation ensuring legal 
enforceability of interstate advance directives18 has been realised in most 
jurisdictions.  In New South Wales where there is no specified form, forms from 
interstate can be used19 and guidance issued by NSW Health advises that interstate 
advance directives can be recognised in New South Wales.20  A New South Wales 
directive in whatever form it takes should be recognised in most jurisdictions, 
certainly where specific recognition legislation applies.21  Tasmania has no 
legislation governing advance directives but the Tasmanian government endorses a 
form to be used when making advance care decisions.22   
 
The Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council (AHMAC) in its ‘A National 
Framework for Advance Directives’ has also called for the varying regimes relating 
to advance directives within the Australian States and Territories to be aligned23 but 
there are notable differences between each jurisdiction. 
 
                                                      
14 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006. 
15 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [1.2]. 
16 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [3.4]. 
17 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 1. 
18 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [1.4]. 
19 NSW Health, Using Advance Care Directives New South Wales (22 March 2005) 7. 
20 NSW Health, Using Advance Care Directives New South Wales (22 March 2005) 10. 
21 NSW Health, Using Advance Care Directives New South Wales (22 March 2005) 10. 
22 Advance Care Directive for Care at the End of Life. 
23 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 1. 
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The recognition of patient self-determination as exemplified in the AMA Policy 
and the National Framework for Advance Directives together with the legal 
requirement of patient consent to medical treatment, also an aspect of patient 
autonomy and self-determination, may be challenged, both by decisions of medical 
practitioners who fail to honour an advance directive and by the provisions of 
statutes.  The weakening of patient autonomy in this way may also be practised by 
courts when adjudicating on interpretations of patient refusals of treatment, 
provisions of advance directives or relevant legislation governing these situations.  
Between them, the United Kingdom and the eight Australian jurisdictions show 
instances of limitations to the theoretical primacy of patient self-determination 
when patient wishes are not honoured.24  On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged that some failures to comply with advance directives relate to lack 
of understanding about their validity or relevance or indeed, to inability to know 
whether or not an advance directive exists. 
 
Similarly, the AMA Policy on Advance Care Planning appears to significantly 
restrain patient autonomy in the name of clinical discretion.  The policy 
recommends that each state and territory enact legislation to protect medical 
practitioners who comply with advance orders.25  Some states and territories have 
done so.26  The policy also recommends that the legislation should protect medical 
practitioners who do not comply on the grounds that the patient’s decision is 
inconsistent with good medical practice or advances in medical science, thereby 
preserving the clinical judgement and discretions of medical practitioners.27  
Queensland has obliged by authorising medical practitioners to refuse to follow 
provisions in an advance directive where they consider that the direction is 
contrary to ‘good medical practice’.28   
 
 
                                                      
24 For example, New South Wales Supreme Court overrode a decision by a Jehovah’s Witness 
teenager, just a few months short of his eighteenth birthday, refusing a blood transfusion.  Despite 
finding that the boy was highly intelligent and a mature minor, Gzell J called on the ‘sanctity of life’ 
as being more powerful than the dignity of the individual and required the making of the order to 
authorise giving a blood transfusion.  Antonio Bradley and AAP, 'Court Allows Transfusion for 
Religious Teen', Australian Doctor (Online) (30 September 2013) 
<http://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/courtallowstransfusionforreligiousteen>. 
25 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [1.4]. 
26 See eg, Advance Care Directives Act 2013 (SA) s 9(f);  Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 
(WA) s110ZL(2);  Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT) s 45;  Medical Treatment Act 1988 
(Vic) s 9. 
27 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [1.4]. 
28 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
 242 
5 Advance Directives under the Common Law 
At common law, a competent adult person is entitled to refuse medical treatment 
even if that treatment is necessary to maintain the person’s life.29  Similarly, the 
competent adult can decide in advance what treatment he or she wishes to accept, 
or to refuse for the future when otherwise unable to choose, even if that treatment 
is life-sustaining.30   
 
No formal requirements exist for creating a common law advance directive and it 
can be revoked at any time while the donor of the power is competent.31  However, 
when capacity is lost, any advance directive will ‘ ... in effect become ... 
irrevocable’ unless or until the patient regains capacity.32  There is no statutory 
provision for advance directives in New South Wales or Tasmania, but they have 
been recognised as valid under the common law.33  The common law requirements 
for validity of an advance directive are:34 
1. The person making the directive must be an adult with mental capacity at the 
time the directive is made;35 
2. There must be no undue influence or other vitiating factor;36 
3. The person must have intended the directive to continue to operate in the 
medical circumstances which have arisen.37 
 
The question of the validity of a common law advance directive in New South 
Wales was examined in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A.38  This 
case will be considered further later in this chapter.  Some cases suggest that there 
are judges who are reluctant to uphold advance refusals of treatment on the 
grounds that a vulnerable patient will die.39  However, as held by McDougall J in 
Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A: 
[t]he analysis should start by respecting the proposition that a competent 
individual’s right to self-determination prevails over the State’s interest in the 
preservation of life even though the individual’s exercise of that right may result in 
his or her death.40 
 
 
 
                                                      
29 See eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff). 
30 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [40(6)] (McDougall J). 
31 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017, [37] (Munby J). 
32 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017, [38] (Munby J). 
33Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88. 
34 Lindy Willmott, 'Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: A Comparative Australian 
Statutory Analysis' (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 556, 562. 
35 See eg, In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. 
36 See eg, In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
37 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
38 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88. 
39 See eg, W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) [7] (Baker J). 
40 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [36]. 
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6 Statutory Schemes 
(a) Australia 
All jurisdictions in Australia, other than New South Wales and Tasmania, now 
have statutory recognition of advance directives, whatever called, and prescribe 
some formalities.  Several of the Australian jurisdictions have suggested that the 
object of their particular legislation was to enshrine the common law in statute and 
rights under the common law were to be preserved.41  There is no reference in the 
Advance Care Directives Act 2013 (SA) to preserving the common law, but as this 
act expands on the Natural Death Act 1983 (SA) that confirmed the common law 
right to refuse treatment, it is submitted that common law rights are preserved.42  
Because of conflicting legislation in Queensland, it is possible that the Queensland 
legislation ousts the common law, whilst it has been preserved in Victoria, Western 
Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory.43  It is not 
clear how the preservation of common law rights will interconnect with advance 
directives legislation.44  
 
Despite the deference to patient dignity and autonomy stated by courts, some of the 
legislated systems hinder this in various ways.  Similarly, England has common 
law and statutory arrangements that are supposed to bolster patient dignity and 
autonomy but that can, on occasion, frustrate clear directions made by competent 
adults.  England is included in this examination as an additional common law 
                                                      
41 Lindy Willmott, 'Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: A Comparative Australian 
Statutory Analysis' (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 556, 557. 
42 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 17 October 2012, 990 (The Hon S J 
Baker). 
43 Lindy Willmott, 'Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: A Comparative Australian 
Statutory Analysis' (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 556, 566.  In an earlier article, Willmott 
(Lindy Willmott, 'Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the 
Courts Practise What They Preach?' (2009) 38 Common Law World Review 295, 305) writes that 
Western Australia and Queensland expressly preserve the common law.  In fn 47, she quotes Stewart 
(Cameron Stewart, 'The Australian Experience of Advance Directives and Possible Future Directions' 
(2005) 24 Australasian Journal on Ageing S25) as sharing this view.  He certainly appears to do so 
on page S26.  Yet Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart (Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, 
Ethics and Law for the Health Professions (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 267) on the other hand 
say that all jurisdictions except Queensland and South Australia preserve common law advance 
directives.  Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 48, however, advises that the Queensland legislation expressly 
preserves common law advance directives.  On the other hand, in Lindy Willmott, 'Advance 
Directives to Withhold Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Eroding Autonomy through Statutory 
Reform' (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 287, she states that despite s 39 of the Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) which expressly reserves common law rights, s 66(1) of the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) precludes its recognition.  Thus it seems that whilst the 
preponderance of opinion is that the common law is preserved in Queensland, it may be that the 
question will not be settled until courts have pronounced on it. 
44 For example, will an unwritten common law advance directive be acceptable when a statute 
specifies a particular form?  
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jurisdiction particularly as its cases and legislative directions amount to persuasive 
common law authority in Australia.  
 
(b) Legal Restrictions on Patient Autonomy 
(i) Terminal Illness 
Northern Territory, ACT, South Australia and Western Australia do not impose 
any restriction on when an advance directive can function.  Section 36(2)(a)(i) of 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) clearly places the power to access the Act’s 
provisions into the hands of the treating medical practitioner.  The patient must 
have a terminal illness and ‘ ... in the opinion of a doctor treating the principal and 
another doctor, the principal may reasonably be expected to die within 1 year’.  
When the bill went to committee, the 1 year time limit was specified.45  The only 
reference to terminal illness in the Queensland Second Reading debate was to the 
‘terminal phase of a terminal illness’.46  In neither the committee nor the debate 
was any reason given for the limitation.  This restriction means that a person who 
is not suffering from an illness that is likely to cause death within the defined 
period of time may have to endure indefinitely.  This situation is exemplified by 
dementia where the patient can live on healthily, if not mentally engaged, for many 
years before a terminal illness arises.  Similarly, if the patient is afflicted with 
something like multiple sclerosis or motor neurone disease, the inexorable advance 
of the deterioration may still mean sustained suffering as patients can live for some 
time after diagnosis.  Where the patient is incompetent and suffering from that type 
of condition, a prior order by the patient refusing antibiotic treatment for any 
intervening infection could not be observed by medical staff. 
 
(ii) Good Medical Practice 
Queensland permits a medical practitioner to override the wishes of a patient 
expressed in an advance directive where, in the judgement of the medical 
practitioner, complying with the patient’s wishes would be inconsistent with good 
medical practice.47  This provision is intended to prevent a person from giving a 
direction to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment where the 
                                                      
45 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1988, 1019 (Hon D E 
Beanland). 
46 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 October 1997, 3687 (Hon D E 
Beanland). 
47 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
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person’s health could be restored by ‘ ... simple medical procedures.’48  Yet section 
103 of the Act was also ‘ ... designed to enable a patient to indicate that he or she 
does not wish the natural course of the dying process to be impeded.’49  These 
purposes as enunciated are contradictory.  The Queensland Parliamentary Debates 
correctly state that it is a fundamental principle that a ‘ ... doctor can never be 
required to carry out medical treatment that would be contrary to good medical 
practice.’50  However, there was no reference to this provision in the Second 
Reading Debate.  There was also no provision in the legislation for what ‘good 
medical practice’ in this context encompasses. 
 
Permitting a medical practitioner, on the grounds of inconsistency with good 
medical practice, to override an advance directive takes away from the patient the 
right to determine what he or she would want to be done to his or her body.  It 
places the decision squarely within the clinical discretion of the medical 
practitioner, ignoring the whole rationale for permitting patients to make advance 
directions about their medical treatment in the first place.  If the advance care 
directive has been prepared in partnership with the medical practitioner in 
accordance with the AMA Policy concerning Advance Care Plans,51 overriding an 
advance directive is also a derogation from the shared decision-making that is 
fundamental to the ideal of patient-centred care.52  It is submitted that the rhetoric 
of a patient-centred partnership must exclude the right of the medical practitioner 
to override the patient’s directions about proposed future care, particularly if the 
medical practitioner has been involved in the discussions concerning advance care 
planning. 
 
(iii) Current Condition 
Victoria has a restriction in section 5(1)(c) of its Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) 
that requires medical information to be sought and provided for the patient’s 
condition before the advance directive can be signed.  The information must relate 
                                                      
48 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1988, 1020 (Hon D E 
Beanland).  There is no explanation of the concept ‘simple medical procedures’ in the Act nor was it 
discussed in the Legislative Assembly. 
49 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1988, 1020 (Hon D E 
Beanland). 
50 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1988, 1025 (Mrs 
Cunningham). 
51 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [3.4]. 
52 It is also contrary to Standard 2 of the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards as 
discussed in Chapter III. 
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to that condition only.  Thus, in Victoria, an advance directive can only be made 
for a ‘current condition’.53   
 
It was declared during the second reading debate that the right to refuse medical 
treatment should not be in the form of an advance declaration made while the 
patient was healthy about what the patient wished if he or she became ill.54  This 
provision was in response to the findings of the Social Development Committee 
that considered that advance declaration legislation in Victoria was neither 
appropriate nor necessary.55  The Social Development Committee was concerned, 
following submissions, that a healthy person could not possibly know in advance 
what he or she would wish at some future time if incompetence intervened.56 
 
However, the 2016 report of the Victorian Legislative Council’s Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices noted that:  
[t]he Committee believes that the complex end of life care legal framework in 
Victoria needs to be simplified and clarified’. 
 
There are several aspects to the end of life legal framework in Victoria that are 
confusing, unclear and need to be updated.  In particular the enforceability of 
advance care plans, the limitation in refusal of treatment certificates to current 
conditions and substitute decision making framework. 
 
The Medical Treatment Act 1988 was introduced in response to the Social 
Development Committee’s final report on the Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity (19887), nearly 30 years ago. 
 
A refusal of treatment certificate was favoured at the time due to concerns that 
allowing for treatment conditions relating to future conditions would lead to 
uninformed decisions. 
 
The narrow scope of the Medical Treatment Act 1988, however, has since become 
apparent, with concerns that the Act does not adequately support the community’s 
belief in the principle of individual autonomy and the human right to self-
determination.‘57 
 
On 15 September 2016, the Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Bill 2016 
was tabled in the Victorian Legislative Assembly by the Minister for Health, Ms 
Hennessy, who also moved that the bill be read a second time.  Debate was 
adjourned.  At the time of writing, the bill had not been passed into law.  
 
                                                      
53 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1). 
54 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 May 1988, 2167 (Mr McCutcheon). 
55 Social Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity (1987) 122. 
56 Social Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with 
Dignity (1987) 121. 
57 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End of 
Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 155–156. 
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The Minister’s second reading speech on 15 September 2016 acknowledged ‘ ... 
that health practitioners do not understand their legal obligations ... ’ and that the 
bill was intended to ‘ ... remedy this by providing a single definition of medical 
treatment and clarifying the obligations of health practitioners’.  The Minister went 
on to state that:  
[t]he bill allows a person with capacity to make an advance care directive.  An 
advance care directive will only come into effect if the person loses capacity to 
make a medical treatment decision’.58 
 
(c) Summary 
Patient autonomy can be compromised by restrictions present in some legislative 
schemes.  Any restriction on withdrawal of treatment limits the autonomy of the 
conscious and competent person who executed an advance directive or refusal of 
treatment certificate in anticipation of later incompetence.   
 
The power of a medical practitioner, in his or her assessment of patient ‘best 
interests’, to override patient wishes as expressed can be a constraint on patient 
autonomy and appears to be inconsistent with the patient-centred principle of 
shared decision-making.  Overriding patient wishes can also occur in jurisdictions 
that do not have the legislative backing existing in the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld).  For example, the Social Development Committee of Victoria noted that 
there is a general lack of knowledge by people in the community about their rights, 
particularly in their most vulnerable situation at the end of life.  Many people feel 
powerless to refuse treatment or even to disagree with their medical practitioner.59  
The autonomy of the patient expressed in an advance directive does not imply the 
right to demand a particular treatment in the face of the expertise of a medical 
practitioner60 who determines that the proposed treatment is either not indicated, or 
is futile.  But this is a different situation from an advance direction that consents to 
or refuses a specified proposed treatment whether or not the medical practitioner 
was involved in the discussion leading to the preparation of the directive. 
 
(d) England 
In England, there is an absolute right for a competent adult patient to refuse 
medical treatment.  The patient must have been provided with information about 
the proposed procedure, there was no undue influence or other vitiating 
                                                      
58 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 September 2016 (Proof) 32. 
59Social Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity 
(1987) 99. 
60 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [1249] (Smith J). 
 248 
circumstance at the time the advance directive was made and the refusal was 
intended to apply in the circumstances that ultimately arose.61   
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), has introduced formal requirements where 
the donor of the power wishes to give directions about life-sustaining treatment.  
Where life-sustaining treatment is to be refused, it is necessary for the advance 
decision to explicitly state this in writing, and also to specify that the refusal is to 
be valid even if the life of the patient is at risk.  The advance decision must then be 
signed and witnessed.62   
 
A provision in an advance directive is no longer valid if the donor has withdrawn 
the provision when he or she has capacity to do so.63  This implies that an advance 
directive is irrevocable once the donor has lost capacity.64  As Munby J declared: ‘ 
... this is not because the advance directive as such either is or has become 
irrevocable — it has not. It is simply because there is now no-one who is able to 
revoke it’.65  Revocation also occurs if the donor has done anything that is clearly 
inconsistent with the terms of the advance decision.66  There is no requirement that 
the donor have mental capacity at that time. 
 
Advance directives should be correctly interpreted as valid or not, as some patients 
may be subjected to unwanted treatment that prolongs an intolerable existence, 
whereas others may be denied life-sustaining treatment.67  However, any doubt as 
to what alternative is to apply is resolved, both by the common law68 and by 
statute,69 by a presumption to preserve life.  This may be based on a ‘best interests’ 
                                                      
61 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
62 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) ss 25(5)–(6). 
63 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 25(2)(a). 
64 See also, HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 [38] (Munby J).   
65 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 [38] (Munby J). 
66 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 25(2)(c). 
67 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 959. 
68 See eg, W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) [230] (Baker J);  R (on the application of Nicklinson) v 
Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38 [90] (Lord Neuberger), [199] (Lord Wilson);  HE v A NHS 
Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [23] (Munby J). 
69 For example,  Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s25(5) has special provisions where the outcome of 
following an advance directive may be that the patient will die. 
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assessment made by the medical practitioner on behalf of the patient in accordance 
with the principle of necessity as in Re F.70   
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) provides that a person is ‘ ... assumed to have 
capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.’71  On the other hand, there 
is some inconsistency in the way liability for continuing treatment is assessed, 
compared with liability for withholding treatment.  Avoiding liability for 
continuing treatment only requires that the person be satisfied that a valid advance 
decision is not in existence.72  However, avoiding liability for withholding or 
withdrawing treatment requires a reasonable belief that a valid and applicable 
advance direction is in existence,73 a more stringent test, leading to a possible bias 
against advance refusals of life-saving treatment.74 
 
Michalowski argues against the interpretation by courts of advance refusals of 
treatment through the lens of the sanctity of life.  She criticises the interpretation by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,75 that’ ...  an erroneous decision in favour of 
continued treatment merely upholds the status quo ... ’ and that a wrong decision ‘ 
... will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated.’76  She contends that the 
usual reason that an advance directive is made is because the patient fears, more 
than dying, an application of burdensome life-sustaining treatment and wishes to 
give advance instructions for it to not be applied in the first place, or withdrawn in 
circumstances where it has become patently intolerable.77  Rather than an incorrect 
decision to treat being corrected, violation of an autonomous decision to refuse 
                                                      
70 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.  The principle of necessity, where touching 
of another without consent is not unlawful is explained by Lord Goff at 75 as ‘the basic requirements, 
applicable in these cases of necessity, that, to fall within the principle, not only (1) must there be a 
necessity to act when it is not practicable to communicate with the assisted person, but also (2) the 
action taken must be such as a reasonable person would in all the circumstances take, acting in the 
best interests of the assisted person.’  At 77, he continues:  ‘[b]ut where the state of affairs is 
permanent or semi-permanent, as may be so in the case of a mentally disordered person, there is no 
point in waiting to obtain the patient's consent. The need to care for him is obvious; and the doctor 
must then act in the best interests of his patient, just as if he had received his patient's consent so to 
do. Were this not so, much useful treatment and care could, in theory at least, be denied to the 
unfortunate.’ 
71 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(1).  Clause 4(2) of the Medical Treatment Planning and 
Decisions Bill 2016 (Vic) also provides that ‘ ... an adult is presumed to have decision-making 
capacity unless there is evidence to the contrary’. 
72 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 26(2). 
73 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 26(3). 
74 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 960. 
75 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S Ct 2841 (1990). 
76 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 961. 
77 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 961. 
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life-sustaining treatment by treating in disregard of clearly expressed wishes not to 
be kept alive, is irreversible.  The patient may well have to endure sustained 
suffering that would have otherwise been avoided. 
Thus, while an erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment which 
results in the patient’s death is obviously irreversible and not susceptible to 
correction, this does not justify the conclusion that an error in favour of life is 
reversible and therefore always less harmful than an error resulting in death.78 
 
Michalowski comments that she agrees with the dissent of Justice Brennan in 
Cruzan that an error either way is irrevocable, and even a later decision to comply 
with the patient’s wishes cannot undo the harm that may have occurred in the mean 
time.79 
 
Michalowski’s argument continues that the law has given the patient the right to 
decide, in his or her own best interests, whether to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment so it is then inconsistent for the state to argue that the principle of the 
‘sanctity of life’ should prevail over the patient’s autonomous decision.  Once such 
a decision has been made, the interest in preservation of life ceases and the state 
should only be interested to ensure that this is what the patient really wants, and 
that it is evidenced by the existence of a validly made advance directive.80 
 
Where there is no doubt about validity of an advance refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment, the patient’s autonomy should trump the state’s interest in preservation 
of life.  Where there is doubt, consideration of best interests should be made by 
taking a disinterested approach, with no bias either way, taking into account the 
patient’s ‘ ... known values and preferences ... ’ and being aware that  
it might be as harmful to disregard the autonomous decision of a patient not to have 
life-sustaining treatment as not to administer such treatment if the patient did not 
make an autonomous treatment refusal.81 
 
Furthermore, Munby maintains that the ‘so-called’ right of self-determination can 
be cramped by the tendency of English judges to downplay the amount of 
information a patient requires and a tendency to impose an unrealistically stringent 
test of capacity.   
                                                      
78 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 961. 
79 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 961. 
80 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 962. 
81 Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of 
an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 962. 
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In short, English law in practice tends to “talk down” the patient’s need for 
information, while at the same time paradoxically tending to “talk up” the patient’s 
need for capacity.  The practical effect in both cases is to weigh the balance against 
the patient in favour of the doctor.82 
 
He further considers that  
[t]he patient whose decision in a potentially life-threatening situation is felt to be 
unwise [or] unreasonable ... may find himself ... categorised by the doctor and the 
court as incompetent;  and consequently subjected to the treatment that the doctor, 
or the court feels, or chooses to assert, is the patient’s best interests83 
 
and goes on to suggests that: ‘Where the obstacle in the doctor’s way is the 
existence of an apparent “advance directive” the court can be ... astute to find 
reasons for declining to give effect to it’.84 
 
The question of how to best respect the autonomy and dignity of a demented 
patient who has changed his or her mind where there exists a clear and 
unambiguous advance directive is a highly contentious one and will be explored 
later in this chapter.  Whatever decision is reached will not satisfy everybody.  
Michalowski concludes that the apparently unlimited protection of patient 
autonomy in refusals of treatment specified in advance directives only exists as a 
matter of legal principle.85 
 
This brief survey of the English situation bolsters the arguments concerning 
Australian advance refusals of treatment.  Patient autonomy, whilst absolute in 
theory,86 can be undermined both by restrictions on advance directives in 
legislation and on their interpretation by the courts.  The upholding of an advance 
directive where possible is in keeping with recognition of patient autonomy.  
However, the courts are not infrequently swayed by arguments and predispositions 
that have the effect of invalidating advance directives.  Maclean comments that 
advance directives are only upheld where the judge considers that this result would 
be reasonable.87  Where the medical practitioner does not consider an advance 
directive is valid and applicable, he or she is protected by the Mental Capacity Act 
                                                      
82 James Munby, 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Limitations of Patient Self-Determination in 
Contemporary English Law' (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315, 323. 
83 James Munby, 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Limitations of Patient Self-Determination in 
Contemporary English Law' (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315, 323. 
84 James Munby, 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Limitations of Patient Self-Determination in 
Contemporary English Law' (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315, 328. 
85 Sabine Michalowski, 'Trial and Error at the End of Life — No Harm Done?' (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 257, 266;  Sabine Michalowski, 'Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute Right' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 981. 
86 In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102 (Lord Donaldson). 
87 Alasdair R Maclean, 'Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making' 
(2008) 16 Medical Law Review 1, 22. 
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2005 (UK) that neither requires the medical practitioner’s decision to be reasonable 
nor that an application to a court for a ruling must be made.88 
 
(e) Comparison of Legislation 
A comparative table of the law in the Australian jurisdictions and the United 
Kingdom is attached as Appendix VA.  It outlines similarities and differences in 
several major categories.  Whilst most Australian jurisdictions have legislation 
establishing the validity of advance directives, provisions in some of the legislation 
also place limits on what they can require.  The Victorian requirement that use of a 
refusal of treatment certificate is only triggered by a current condition, the 
Queensland requirement that an advance directive can only be used in the terminal 
phase of a terminal illness and the Queensland provision that permits the medical 
practitioner to override a directive on the basis of a conflict with ‘good medical 
practice’ all restrict the patient’s right to make comprehensive advance treatment 
decisions.  It should be noted that until 2013, when the Advance Care Directives 
Act 2013 (SA) was passed, South Australia restricted the use of an advance 
directive to the terminal phase of a terminal illness.89  Until the Northern Territory 
passed the Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT), the Natural Death Act 1989 
(NT) required the patient to be suffering a terminal illness and for death to be 
imminent before an advance directive could be implemented.90    
 
7 Cases 
Though not all advance directives are overridden, cases from both Australia and 
England show that judges have, on occasion, disregarded clear and unambiguous 
patient directions.  Medical practitioners and hospitals bring cases where they are 
unsure of the law.  Patients bring cases where the medical authorities do not 
comply with a valid advance directive. 
 
                                                      
88 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 26(2);  See eg Alasdair R Maclean, 'Advance Directives and the 
Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making' (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 1, 21;  Sabine 
Michalowski, 'Trial and Error at the End of Life — No Harm Done?' (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 257, 264;  LindyWillmott, 'Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of 
Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?' (2009) 38 Common Law World Review 295, 
318. 
89 Department for Health and Ageing, Advance Care Directives Bill 2012 and Related Amendments 
(Explanatory Guide, October 2012) – the bill was designed to ‘ ...preserve the right of individuals to 
direct in advance what quality of life means to them ... ’ (at page 2) and ‘ ... supports a person-centred 
model of decision-making ... ’. (at page 3). 
90 The Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT) was enacted to fill in gaps in Northern Territory 
whereby it was not possible to appoint a medical attorney or to make a binding advance health 
directive.  Department of the Attorney-General and Justice, Advance Personal Planning Bill 2013 - 
Issues Paper (June 2013) 6. 
 253 
(a) Australia 
The question of the validity of a common law advance directive in New South 
Wales arose for determination in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v 
A.91  The patient had been admitted to hospital unconscious and in a serious 
condition and was transferred to intensive care where he received artificial 
ventilation and kidney dialysis treatment.  It was discovered that he had signed a 
common law advance directive specifying that he did not wish to receive kidney 
dialysis.  The Health Service sought a declaration in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales that it could legally comply with the patient’s wishes.  McDougall J 
surveyed several Australian and international cases that confirmed that the 
individual has a general right to determine what should be done with his body or 
life.92  He concluded that if there is a conflict between the individual’s right of self-
determination and any state interest in the preservation of life, the individual’s 
interests must prevail.93  McDougall J held that the directive did reflect the 
patient’s wishes and made a declaration that the Health Authority could comply 
with those wishes even though the outcome would be the death of the patient.94 
 
A contrary result was reached in the Victorian case of Qumsieh v Guardianship 
and Administration Board.95  In that case, a Jehovah’s Witness had signed a 
consent to anaesthetic and also an advance medical directive, in both cases making 
it clear that under no circumstances was she to be given a blood transfusion or any 
blood products.  She had also signed an enduring power of attorney, appointing a 
Mr Ibrahim but this document was held invalid as it was not in compliance with 
section 5A(2) of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic).96  This invalid enduring 
power of attorney was produced to the Board, but not the advance medical 
directive nor the consent to anaesthetic.  The Board, reminding itself that the best 
interests of the patient were the overriding factor to be considered, appointed the 
Public Advocate to take over protection of the patient.97  The patient’s husband 
asked to be appointed as the delegate of the Public Advocate.  The order was 
made98 and the husband gave consent for a blood transfusion to be given.99  A 
subsequent application by the patient to review the orders of the Board and declare 
                                                      
91 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
92 See eg, F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 193 (King CJ);  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487 
(Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
93 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [17] (McDougall J). 
94 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [60] (McDougall J). 
95 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45. 
96 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [8].  
97 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [7]. 
98 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [9]. 
99 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [10]. 
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them invalid was refused at first instance by the Supreme Court of Victoria.100  On 
appeal by the patient to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the 
decision of the first instance judge was upheld.  The fact that the patient had made 
a direction that she did not want a blood transfusion in different circumstances 
from the present situation was not a reason to deny jurisdiction in the instant 
case.101  However, there was ample evidence that the patient was adamant about 
refusing blood products in all circumstances.  A further reason given by the court 
was that making an order that held the Board’s original decision invalid would 
bring the patient into dispute with her husband.102  This is clearly not a factor 
required by either the relevant statutes or the common law.  Subsequently, the High 
Court refused leave to appeal.103 
 
(b) England 
In the English case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment),104 a man who 
was a paranoid schizophrenic, serving a prison sentence for a stabbing offence, 
refused amputation of his foot that had become gangrenous.  He stated that he 
would prefer to die with two feet than to live with only one.105  Despite the mental 
condition of the applicant and the fact that he exhibited certain delusions, he was 
held to be capable of making the decision and his application for an injunction was 
approved.  His refusal was held by the court to be a valid advance directive.106  
Whilst this appears to be an endorsement of the patient’s self-determination, 
Maclean proposes an alternative explanation.  The patient was a dangerous 
schizophrenic.  Therefore a cynic might suggest that since it did not matter to 
anyone other than the patient whether he lived or died, he should be permitted to 
make an irrational decision.107 
 
A more recent case with similar facts was similarly determined in England where a 
man with a gangrenous foot, but also a long-standing mental illness, was found to 
                                                      
100 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [11]. 
101 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [17] (Winneke P). 
102 Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 [19] (Winneke P). 
103 Qumsieh v Pilgrim [2000] HCATrans 34.  As McHugh held:  The decision in a case of this nature 
depends, as would any future case affecting the applicant, on its own facts.  This consideration and 
the fact that the events are in the past militate against the grant of special leave.  The Court of Appeal 
gave a number of reasons for refusing the decision.  It is unnecessary for us to say anything about 
them.  It is sufficient to say that having regard to the facts of the case, nothing about it warrants the 
grant of special leave to appeal.  The application is dismissed. 
104 In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. 
105 In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 291 (Thorpe J). 
106 In re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 295–296 (Thorpe J). 
107 Alasdair R Maclean, 'Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making' 
(2008) 16 Medical Law Review 1, 5. 
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have sufficient capacity to refuse amputation even though the outcome would be 
almost certain death.  Peter Jackson J spoke to the patient himself and was satisfied 
that the patient’s arguments refusing amputation were clear and unequivocal.  He 
therefore ordered that an amputation would not be in the best interests of the 
patient as any other order would take away what remaining dignity and 
independence the patient had.108 
 
Another case where an advance directive was upheld was that of a young man, AK, 
suffering from motor neurone disease.109  His only form of communication was 
blinking one eyelid.  He wished for ventilation to be removed, meaning his death, 
two weeks after he had lost any ability to communicate.  The doctors asked 
whether it was lawful for them to comply with the patient’s wishes.  The court 
determined that AK was of full capacity and had let it be known that he would 
refuse treatment and also confirmed that any continuation of treatment after the 
refusal took effect would be positively unlawful.110 
 
A further English case where the court upheld the patient’s advance directive was 
that of Ms B.111  The patient was a quadriplegic who required ventilation to be kept 
alive.  Despite the terms of her advance directive, and despite requests from the 
patient, the hospital refused to discontinue mechanical ventilation.  Ms B applied to 
the court for a declaration that the hospital comply with her wishes even though the 
outcome would be her death.  The court determined that the patient was competent 
and that she had been treated unlawfully for at least the previous six months.112  It 
also made a small award of damages against the hospital.113 
 
Despite the declarations of the House of Lords in Bland114 concerning the supposed 
pre-eminence of patient self-determination over the sanctity of life, some courts 
have found ways to question the validity of advance directives on the basis that the 
directive does not deal with the circumstances that have arisen.115  When this 
question occurs, the courts have on occasion applied a presumption in favour of 
                                                      
108 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60 [45]. 
109 Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129. 
110 Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1FLR 129, 135 (Hughes J). 
111 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
112 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [95] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
113 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [99] (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss). 
114 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
115 Sabine Michalowski, 'Trial and Error at the End of Life — No Harm Done?' (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 257, 261. 
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life.  This is despite the confirmation in Re T116 that a competent adult patient may 
refuse medical treatment on any grounds, whether rational or not.  Lord Donaldson 
stated: ‘ ... for if the individual is to override the public interest he must do so in 
clear terms;’.117   
 
The court did not agree with the self-determination manifest in the patient’s 
advance directive and chose the presumption in favour of life in the English case of 
HE v A Hospital NHS Trust.118  The patient had signed an advance directive 
refusing blood transfusions.  She had also purported to make the directive 
irrevocable unless any revocation was in writing.  About 18 months after having 
signed the directive she had seen a medical practitioner whose notes recorded that 
the patient was a Jehovah’s Witness and that an alternative treatment to blood 
transfusion was to be provided for planned future surgery.  Six months after that, 
the patient was admitted to hospital, and despite aggressive treatment, it was 
determined that a blood transfusion was necessary to save her life.  The hospital 
said that it could not override the advance refusal without court order.  The 
patient’s father brought the action to override the refusal because of the rapidly 
deteriorating condition of the patient.  Her mother, a Jehovah’s Witness was 
adamant that the advance directive should be obeyed.  It was clear that the patient 
had been competent at the time the directive was made.   
 
Munby J surveyed the many cases where the validity of refusing life-sustaining 
treatment had come to a court.  He endorsed the following propositions:119 
1. a competent adult patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to medical 
treatment; 
2. a competent adult’s advance refusal remains binding notwithstanding the 
subsequent incompetence of the person; 
3. an adult is presumed to have capacity and the burden of proof is on those who 
assert that capacity has been lost. 
 
Munby J confirmed that there are no formal requirements for the validity of an 
advance directive.120  An advance directive can be made informally and equally can 
be revoked informally.  He was adamant that there was no possibility of making an 
irrevocable advance directive as this was contrary to public policy.  However, he 
was concerned that any advance directive was still the considered view of the 
                                                      
116 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
117 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 112 (Lord Donaldson). 
118 HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017. 
119 HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [20] (Munby J). 
120 HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [33] (Munby J). 
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patient and stated that any doubt must be resolved in favour of life.121  He therefore 
threw the burden of proof onto those asserting the continuing validity of the 
advance directive122 despite his earlier endorsement of the principle that the onus of 
proof should fall on those asserting invalidity.  He was persuaded by the father’s 
evidence that the patient was no longer a Jehovah’s Witness, and considering the 
probability that she would die without the blood transfusion, ordered that the 
advance directive be overridden.  This decision was made despite having been 
presented with a valid advance directive and the words of Lord Goff that sanctity 
of life should yield to the principle of autonomy.123  Unlike Burke’s case,124 Munby 
J’s judgment in HE v A NHS Hospital Trust was not appealed so there was no 
comment by a higher court on this clear inconsistency. 
 
The court was also not moved to support an advance directive refusing blood 
transfusions in the case of NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment).125  The patient was diagnosed with a borderline personality disorder.  
She harmed herself by cutting and blood letting to the extent that her haemoglobin 
levels would fall to dangerous levels requiring emergency blood transfusions.  She 
refused blood transfusions so the hospital applied to the court for a declaration that 
it could provide treatment when needed.  The patient opposed the grant of the 
declaration. The court held that the patient lacked capacity to make this advance 
directive and gave permission for the hospital to give transfusions if required. 
 
(c) Conclusion 
Cases that make their way to the courts invariably have difficult and contentious 
issues to be determined.  What the above analysis shows is that, on occasion, there 
can be a discrepancy between some principles of patient-centred care and the 
reality.  The principle that autonomy trumps sanctity of life issues has been 
continually endorsed by the courts126 as has the principle that a competent adult 
patient can direct what treatment to accept or refuse, and that this principle is valid 
when the directions are in an advance directive.127  Recognition of the patient’s 
                                                      
121 HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [23] (Munby J). 
122 HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [42] (Munby J). 
123 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff). 
124 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424. 
125 NHS Trust v T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297. 
126 See eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff);  Hunter and New England 
Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [17]. 
127 See eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff);  Hunter and New England 
Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [4], [40(6)];  In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 
[1993] Fam 95, 102 (Lord Donaldson);  HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [20];  In re C 
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 294;  Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [17(2)]. 
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right to make a choice in advance is an acknowledgement by the courts of the 
patient’s dignity and autonomy  Where the medical practitioner has been involved 
in the decision-making process, it is an acknowledgment of the partnership aspect 
of the doctor-patient relationship.128   
 
Michalowski argues that there appears to be a predisposition to make these vexed 
decisions with a bias towards ‘sanctity of life’ considerations rather than take a 
more disinterested approach and look at all evidence including evidence of the 
patient’s beliefs and values.  However, whilst not necessarily a deliberate policy by 
courts to override advance directives, when faced with an emergency with the 
possible death of the patient in issue, it is perhaps difficult for courts not to be 
swayed by the idea that death is irrevocable, whereas continuing life is not.  
However, as Michalowski contends, either decision is irrevocable, so courts should 
be more prepared to uphold validly made advance directives that refuse life-
sustaining treatment.   
 
C PRACTICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
 
Good end-of-life care that primarily respects the dignity and autonomy of the 
individual patient can reduce suffering by both patient and family.129  Whilst 
advance directives are in increasing use and have been promoted by medical 
professionals, health administrators, social workers and aged-care advocates, their 
utility and validity has been questioned on many grounds.  A ‘vignette study’ in 
Scotland found that, even when the medical practitioners surveyed knew an 
advance directive was in existence and its terms, only half of them were prepared 
to abide by its provisions though none was prepared to ‘ ... withhold treatment in 
the absence of the advance directive’.130   
 
 
 
                                                      
128 Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning - 
2006 [3.5]. 
129 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 4. 
130 Trevor Thompson,  Rosalie Barbour and Lisa Schwartz, 'Adherence to Advance Directives in 
Critical Care Decision Making : Vignette Study' (2003) 327 BMJ 1011, 1012.  Data were generated 
through interviews with 12 participants, and six focus groups involving 34 participants.  Participants 
were given a hypothetical advance directive and then provided with a hypothetical clinical vignette 
that was ‘ ... designed to create dissonance between the ethics of beneficence and respecting 
autonomy’.  ‘Opinion was also equally divided between and within focus groups’. 
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1 Practical Problems 
Medical practitioners do not always simply ignore advance directives.  There is a 
series of practical problems that must be addressed to achieve the ideal of having 
an advance directive that will ensure that the individual’s needs, wants and 
preferences will be honoured.131  These practical problems can mean that, even 
without any conscientious reason in the health professional not to comply, an 
advance direction is not actually followed. 
 
(a) Rarity 
The first problem in the practical use of advance directives is that so few people 
have prepared them.  Thus, hospital staff and medical practitioners are not used to 
making sure that they check that there is one in existence, where it is and its 
provisions.132  Even where the patient has prepared one and left copies with the 
general practitioner or specialist, even a lawyer or a family member, the overriding 
demands of an admission under emergency conditions can also mean that searching 
for any advance directive is subordinated to other priorities.  Where a common law 
oral advance directive is in existence it is even more difficult for medical staff to be 
aware of its provisions.  Therefore, the likelihood of treatment being provided that 
is contrary to the expressed wishes of the patient is high.133   
 
(b) Completion of Legal Requirements 
Lack of completion of advance directives also causes problems for their 
implementation.  Whilst common law advance directives do not need writing and 
have no formal requirements, it is still necessary to make sure there is no 
invalidating factor and that the directive is applicable to the circumstances that 
have arisen.   
 
This problem becomes more acute if a statutory advance directive has been 
prepared as all formal requirements such as dating, witnessing and execution must 
be correct.  Some jurisdictions prescribe detailed forms that must be completed.  
These may specify that the maker has received particular advice, or has chosen not 
                                                      
131 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 5. 
132 Clause 50(1)(a) of the Medical Treatment Planning and Care Bill 2016 (Vic) requires a medical 
practitioner, before giving any treatment to a person without decision-making capacity, to make 
reasonable efforts in the circumstances to ascertain whether the patient has an advance care directive. 
133 This problem may well diminish as computerisation and centralisation of patient medical records 
becomes established.  The existence and terms of any advance directive can be entered onto the 
patient record and readily accessed by all personnel dealing with that patient. 
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to seek advice at all.  Witnessing is another minefield as statutory schemes may 
require special or qualified witnesses.  Witnesses may have to be independent.  
Some forms require certification by a legal practitioner and others require the 
signature of a medical practitioner.  Sometimes the formal requirements are so 
stringent that people require legal and/or medical help to prepare directives.  That 
necessity may make advance directives expensive.  On the other hand, too much 
informality may leave directives incomplete.   
 
Another difficulty is the lack of education of medical practitioners and healthcare 
staff.  Few know the conditions under which they are valid.134  Making sure that 
medical practitioners and health care staff are educated in the formal requirements 
for advance directives for their particular jurisdiction may reduce this problem. 
 
(c) Specificity 
A substantial problem with many advance directives is that they are not specific 
enough to be of practical use to medical staff.  Simply saying ‘no life support’ or 
‘no heroic measures’ does not give any real guidance to medical practitioners or 
hospital staff.  Case law135 confirms that the directions where an advance directive 
is to be used must be clear, must be applicable to the circumstances that have 
arisen and expressed in language understandable enough for there to be no doubt 
about what the patient requires.136  If life-sustaining medical treatment is to be 
withheld or withdrawn the patient must specify that this is to apply even if the 
outcome may be the death of the patient.  For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses who 
decline blood transfusions must be clear in spelling out whether or not this 
direction applies even in cases where death is possible.137   
 
Whilst it is not possible for every contingency to be documented, it is possible to 
lay down some principles and guidelines that could apply to a wide range of 
                                                      
134 Ben White et al, 'The Legal Role of Medical Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw 
Life-sustaining Treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales)' (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 498, 
499. 
135 See eg, In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95;  HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] 
EWHC1017. 
136 Similarly, on page 6 of AHMAC, A National Framework for Advance Care Directives (at 
September 2011) one of the identified problems is that ‘decision-makers try to interpret written 
medical directions that are uninformed, too specific to account for new treatments or too non-specific 
to guide medical decisions’. 
137 On the other hand, the necessity for a blood transfusion usually implies some sort of emergency 
where the patient’s life will be threatened if the transfusion does not proceed which means that death 
is possible.  See also eg, HE v A NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017. 
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medical circumstances.138  South Australia has prepared a kit to assist people in 
completing their advance directives, and makes provision for the person to set out 
general values and wishes.139  Proposed Victorian legislation is also designed for 
people to be able to document their values.140  In addition, medical practitioners 
faced with making a treatment decision when the patient is unable to give 
directions should no longer necessarily use the subjective ‘best interests’ test.  
Where there is no advance directive, the medical practitioner should consider 
preferences expressed by the person, or if none have been expressed, must consider 
the patient’s values.141 
 
(d) Capacity 
The question of whether the person had full legal capacity at the time the advance 
directive was made may lead to doubt as to whether a directive presented on 
admission to hospital should be honoured.  On the other hand, every person is 
presumed to have mental capacity unless the presumption is rebutted.142  
Differences in views as to what medical treatment is acceptable may relate to 
differences in values between clinicians and the patient, rather than the incapacity 
of the patient.143 
 
(e) Patient Understanding 
A further question arises as to whether the patient, at the time the advance directive 
was made, had sufficient information about possible future contingencies to make 
the decisions concerning acceptance or rejection of particular proposed 
treatment.144  For example, a cancer sufferer may not understand the efficacy of 
proposed treatment such as a bone marrow transplant, and have specified that no 
invasive procedures should be undertaken.  This problem is compounded by the 
fact that lay persons are not necessarily able to understand and integrate the 
information that has been provided to them by a medical practitioner.  Much 
                                                      
138 Norman L Cantor, Advance Directives and the Pursuit of Death with Dignity (Indiana University 
Press, 1993) 25. 
139 The Advance Care Directive DIY Kit is available on 
<https:/’www.advancecaredirectives.sa.gov.au/upload/home/Current_ACD_Guide.pdf>. 
140 Department of Health and Human Services, Simplifying Medical Treatment Decision Making and 
Advance Care Planning (January 2016) 9. 
141 Department of Health and Human Services, Simplifying Medical Treatment Decision Making and 
Advance Care Planning (January 2016) 11. 
142 See eg, Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [28] ( Butler-Sloss LJ);  HE v A 
NHS Hospital Trust [2003] EWHC1017 [20] (Munby J);  Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [23 (McDougall J);  Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Bill 
2016 (Vic) cl 4(2);  Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(2). 
143 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) [100] (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
144 NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] 3 FCR 297 [59] (Charles J);  
Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C [2015] EWCOP 80 [74] (Macdonald J). 
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medical information is highly technical and may not even be fully understood by 
medical practitioners who are not specialised in the relevant field, let alone lawyers 
or other advisers. 
 
 
(f) Conclusion 
The above catalogue of possible problems shows the difficulties that are faced by 
both patients and medical practitioners when the validity of an advance directive is 
in question.  Neither medical practitioners nor patient relatives want to be having to 
consult courts to determine whether or not a particular direction should be 
observed.  However, most of the problems detailed can be gradually overcome as 
the preparation and use of advance directives becomes better established.  The 
ageing population wants its wishes to be followed and advance directives are 
recommended by aged persons organisations and other bodies who are confronted 
with demented patients who can no longer express their wishes.  Centralised, 
computerised patient records will also reduce the possibility that the existence of 
an advance directive goes unnoticed. 
 
2 Moral Authority of Advance Directives 
As outlined above, the law permits a competent adult to make an advance directive 
specifying the sorts of medical treatment that are acceptable if the individual 
becomes incompetent.  The law lays down that valid advance directives are binding 
to the extent that they refuse various forms of medical treatment provided they 
apply to the medical circumstances that have arisen.  For example, refusal of life-
sustaining treatment will not be honoured unless it is clear that the patient has 
specified that the refusal applies even if death may be the result.145   
 
Advance directives also respect the individual’s right to self-determination.  
However, advance directives cannot be used to demand any particular form of 
treatment.  This barrier is in conformity with the existing legal position where the 
courts will not impose on an unwilling medical practitioner any duty to provide a 
treatment that the medical practitioner considers is futile, or is not in conformity 
with proper medical practice.146 
 
                                                      
145 See eg, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 25(5)–(6). 
146 See eg, Isaac Messiha (By His Tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061;  
Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Bill 2016 (Vic) cl 8. 
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However, there is a body of academic work that disputes the legal principle that the 
autonomous wishes of the competent adult must be honoured and it is these that 
this section reviews.  It is submitted that these arguments must be rejected.  Not 
honouring the wishes of a competent adult patient is a rejection of the patient-
centred principle of respect for autonomy.  In any case, this argument is academic 
only.  The only jurisdiction where the medical practitioner has the legal right to 
override wishes in a valid advance directive is Queensland.  Elsewhere in 
Australia, the legal obligation is to comply with advance directives.  As this 
chapter has emphasised however, compliance with legal advance directives may be 
avoided.  The concern is that some of the following arguments will gain traction 
among those doctors who are reluctant to comply with a directive where the 
consequence is that the patient will die.  
 
(a) Relationship between Competent and Incompetent Person 
Notwithstanding the lawfulness of advance directives, questions have been raised 
by some bioethicists and philosophers as to whether the autonomous competent 
individual who makes an advance directive has the authority to bind the future 
incompetent individual, especially to the extent of refusing life-sustaining 
treatment.  These commentators argue that the binding nature of an advance 
directive will be imposing on the incompetent, the wishes of the previously 
competent person.  For example, Buchanan forcefully argues that the legal 
principle, that a competent individual has the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment and that individual can make that decision for the future through an 
advance directive, is dubious as it overlooks several morally significant 
asymmetries.147  He contends that the very conditions that bring an advance 
directive into play are those where the conditions necessary for the existence of 
personal identity have been impaired, thus undermining the moral authority of the 
advance directive.148  Thus an advance directive, even if validly prepared by a 
competent adult would be giving directions as to the treatment of a different person 
as the original person no longer exists.149 
 
Kuhse contends that the argument that the issue of whether one person has been 
replaced by another is vague.  She maintains that so long as strong psychological 
                                                      
147 Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 277, 278.   
148 Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 277, 280. 
149 Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 277, 281. 
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connections continue to exist, there is little reason to doubt that the maker of an 
advance directive and the patient are the same person.  Where the maker of the 
directive is irreversibly incapable of experiencing a state of consciousness, then he 
or she is not the same person.  However, the reason is not that the person is 
different, but where the degree of incompetence is so severe as to deprive the 
individual of any cognitive facilities, there is no longer a person.150   
 
(b) Precedent or Prospective Autonomy 
The question of whether the autonomy of the previously competent patient should 
take precedence over any interests of the subsequent incompetent, though 
biologically identical, person is particularly vexed.  Dworkin insists that the 
competent person’s directions should take precedence.  He maintains that a change 
once the patient has lost mental capacity is not valid as it is not a true reflection of 
the autonomous choice of the original directive.  Whilst there is no connection of 
memory or personality between the demented person and the formerly competent 
person,151 Dworkin champions the right to individual autonomy.  Not only does the 
individual know best what he or she wants for the future, but also each person as a 
moral agent has an interest in coherently shaping his or her life in accordance with 
that person’s character, values, commitments, convictions, critical and experiential 
interests.152  He sees the competent and the demented person as stages in a single 
life where the value of the autonomy of the individual as expressed in an advance 
directive is in respecting the person’s integrity and choice.153 
 
Cantor, similarly, contends that respect for the person’s prospective autonomy 
requires that advance directives be honoured as a demonstration of the individual’s 
concern to be remembered consistently with character.  This concern includes 
ensuring that remembrance by others is not deflected by memory of a demented 
individual existing in a demeaned or undignified state.154 
 
 
 
                                                      
150 Helga Kuhse, 'Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood and Personal 
Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 347, 355;  see also HE v A Hospital NHS Trust 
[2003] EWHC 1017 [38] (Munby J). 
151 Ronald Dworkin, 'Autonomy and the Demented Self' (1986) 64, Suppl. 2 The Milbank Quarterly 
4, 6. 
152 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (Alfred A Knopf, 1993) 224. 
153 Ronald Dworkin, 'Autonomy and the Demented Self' (1986) 64, Suppl. 2 The Milbank Quarterly 
4, 8. 
154 Norman L Cantor, Advance Directives and the Pursuit of Death with Dignity (Indiana University 
Press, 1993) 105. 
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(c) Psychological Continuity 
Kuhse contends that psychological continuity derives from the idea that 
personhood is exhibited by a competent, rational human being who is self-
conscious and purposive and sees himself or herself as existing over time.155  
Locke’s famous quote reflects the same concept of rationality and purpose and a 
consciousness of existing over time. 
This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider 
what person stands for; — which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in 
different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is 
inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible 
for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.156 
 
Therefore the argument runs, in order for an advance directive to be observed, 
there must be some sort of psychological continuity between the person who has 
made the advance directive and the person who is being treated in accordance with 
its directions.  The person who has no memory or connection with the former 
competent person lacks this psychological continuity.157  Quante argues that the 
incompetent is a different person and the advance directive should be treated as if it 
had never been made.158  This reasoning applies even if the competent person has 
specified that withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment is to be 
observed in full knowledge that death may ensue.   
 
Dresser argues that while autonomy and control are important values, they are not 
the only values at stake when a competent individual purports to direct, by an 
advance directive, the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment.159  She claims that demented persons have experiential interests that 
should be respected over the interests of the former competent person.  She 
maintains that physicians and families should make the sort of decision that if the 
demented person were given the opportunity for one brief lucid moment to express 
his or her interests, the person would make.160   
                                                      
155 Helga Kuhse, 'Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood and Personal 
Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 347, 356. 
156 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (George Routledge and Sons, Lubbock 
1897 ed, first published 1689) 246. 
157 Ronald Dworkin, 'Autonomy and the Demented Self' (1986) 64, Suppl. 2 The Milbank Quarterly 
4, 6. 
158 Michael Quante, 'Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 365, 373. 
159 Rebecca Dresser, 'Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients' (1994) 46 Rutgers 
Law Review 609, 628. 
160 Rebecca Dresser, 'Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity' (2003) 
81 Texas Law Review 1823, 1841.  This argument is inevitably speculative so is not a sound argument 
for denying the validity of a correctly executed advance directive. 
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Dresser further asserts that the incompetent person is so different from the 
competent person who originally made the advance directive that the parens patriae 
jurisdiction of courts must be exercised to protect the vulnerable, incompetent 
person who is at the mercy of the directions of the previously competent person.161  
The courts should make a ‘best interests’ or objective judgement to oust the 
individual’s previously declared demands about future treatment.  Dresser 
considers that, because of scientific advances combined with observations made by 
caregivers grafted onto the literature about dementia, the court will know best what 
the patient feels and can make its decision accordingly.162   
 
Dresser’s claim flies in the face of the reality articulated by Nagel, that no-one can 
ever possibly know precisely what is is like to be some-one else as no-one can be 
party to the conscious experiences of anyone else.163  Even twins cannot have 
precisely the same experiences as each other.  Dresser goes so far as to say that the 
courts should not permit the competent person to exercise tyranny over the 
incompetent164 and that individuals should not have the authority to alter 
longstanding conventions governing the practice of medicine, such as the duty of 
the physician to protect the patient from the physician’s conception of harm.165   
 
(d) Irrevocability of Advance Directives 
The relationship between the competent and incompetent individual comes into 
particular focus when an advance directive comes to be implemented.  As an 
advance directive is designed to take effect upon the future contingency of 
incompetence,166 it necessarily becomes irrevocable upon the contingency being 
realised.  Once the maker becomes incompetent, he or she is no longer in a position 
to make any other advance directive or to revoke the one in existence.167  As 
Dworkin has argued, the wishes of the incompetent person should not be permitted 
to override the rationally made choices of the competent person.168 
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(e) Provision for Future Contingencies 
The individual person is not a stable conception as each person changes subtly over 
time, experience shaping attitudes and desires.169  Thus the person who has made 
the advance directive today is different from the person who will be subject to any 
advance directive tomorrow.  If the arguments for denial of legitimacy of the 
wishes of the person for the future are accepted, it is almost impossible to conceive 
of any situation where a competent, rational, adult person would be permitted to 
make plans for future contingencies.  That sort of interpretation contradicts the 
reality of societal and legal expectations.  A person’s obligations and duties can be 
later enforced because of a ‘contract’ or agreement made.  The right to enforce 
these obligations can also be exercised against the person’s estate so endure after 
death, let alone after loss of mental capacity.  If this were not so, every will, 
contract, insurance policy or other agreement intended to take effect now or at 
some future time, would be invalid, an unthinkable consequence in modern society.  
 
Many interests of the competent individual must survive the intervention of mental 
incapacity including financial provisions.  The competent person is also concerned 
about how that person’s property will be dealt with, how his or her mortal remains, 
whether living or dead, will be treated and what burdens will fall on the family.170  
If the competent person cannot bear the prospect of being viewed with pity, or as a 
burden or even as a nuisance because the competent individual is no longer in 
existence, the competent person will wish to direct what will be acceptable or 
unacceptable medical treatment.  The imposition of medical treatment in patient 
‘best interests’ may be a paternalistic concern for welfare, but may also condemn 
the person to suffering that that person is powerless to stop.  As Cantor observes, 
any suffering is subjective and can be attenuated.171  
 
                                                      
169 Alasdair R Maclean, 'Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-Making' (2006) 14 Medical 
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170 Allen Buchanan, 'Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem' (1988) 17 Philosophy & 
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Quante’s argument that incompetent patients who can feel pain and suffer should 
be treated as ethically neutral172 and that complying with advance directives may 
imply causing pain and suffering to an incompetent person cannot be maintained.  
Complying with a request not to be kept alive with life-sustaining technologies, 
such as intravenous antibiotics or artificial hydration and nutrition, does not 
condemn the patient to suffer.  The general principle of beneficence would 
mandate that suffering be minimised in all circumstances.  Subjecting a 
permanently incompetent person to indefinite kidney dialysis in contravention of a 
specific advance directive is not treating the patient as ethically neutral. 
 
Experiential interests of the incompetent patient should be irrelevant when 
considering whether to comply with an advance directive.  Despite these 
experiential interests, the incompetent patient cannot consent to or refuse any 
treatment so any treatment may be on the instructions of some medical practitioner 
determining the best interests of the patient.  Any paternalistic determination by a 
doctor in these circumstances could undermine the wishes of the competent 
individual who originally made the decisions communicated in the advance 
directive.173 
 
D FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
1 Introduction 
Advance directives are used to express individual wishes and values.174  
Knowledge that one has made provision for any situation where one can no longer 
express one’s wishes or desires, is a comfort to many people.  These people like to 
be in control of their lives and to take responsibility for themselves and their loved 
ones.175  Under these conditions, arguments as aired above, that competent patients 
should not be able to prescribe, in an advance directive, treatment for the 
contingency of that patient becoming demented but still having experiential 
interests, are contentious. 
 
                                                      
172 Michael Quante, 'Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity' (1999) 9 Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 365, 372. 
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The existence of the practical problems with advance directives, also as detailed 
above is not an argument for their abandonment.  More to the point, sustained 
efforts could be made to reduce the impact of these problems.  The following 
sections make simple proposals of ways to increase knowledge about how and why 
advance directives should be used and will lead to better understanding for both 
patients and health practitioners. 
 
2 Communication 
The mere fact of thinking about death or incapacity makes it easier to talk to one’s 
family, and legal and medical advisors.176  Providing well-considered directions 
indicates that the difficult questions have been faced so future wishes are more 
likely to be honoured.  It also means that the patient is more likely to have been 
informed of relevant future options. 
 
Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia (the MBA 
Code) specifies that, in the context of end-of-life care, good medical practice 
involves medical practitioners in ‘[f]acilitating advance care planning.’177  This 
obligation is a recognition of the value of good communication between medical 
practitioner and patient. 
 
Among other recommendations, the Victorian Legal and Social Issues Committee 
proposed that there should be Commonwealth and State government public 
awareness campaigns concerning end-of-life choices including advance care 
directives.178  It also proposed education for health care practitioners to facilitate 
their undertaking conversations with patients about end of life choices. 179 
 
3 Compulsion and Education 
As stated earlier, the AMA’s policy, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in 
Advance Care Planning recognises the importance of advance directives in the 
                                                      
176 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 4.  In its issue of 27 April 2017, The Economist argues for more 
conversations about people’s wishes as death approaches, as a way to make the dying process less 
traumatic for most patients. 
177 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [3.12.8]. 
178 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 146. 
179 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 152. 
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acknowledgement of patient self-determination.  There have even been calls to 
make them compulsory.180  Whilst these calls from the medical fraternity are 
encouraging, what happens in reality as surveyed above suggests that more needs 
to be done to educate the medical practitioners ‘on the ground’ about their 
obligations.181  Education can be undertaken both at medical schools and as part of 
continuing medical education.   
 
The Victorian Legal and Social Issues Committee recommended that the adequacy 
of compulsory teaching in medical schools concerning substitute decision-making 
should be examined by the Australian Medical Council and that the Victorian 
Government should require doctors and nurses to ‘undertake continuous 
professional development in advance care planning’.182 
 
4 Harmonisation 
It would be of great benefit to both medical practitioners and their patients for the 
laws covering the creation and implementation of advance directives and enduring 
powers of attorney be harmonised among the varying jurisdictions in Australia.183  
One of the substantial benefits is that health practitioners in different jurisdictions 
would be less confused about their obligations respecting advance directives so that 
patient wishes are more likely to be honoured.184  It is another question as to how 
harmonisation can be achieved in a federated polity where state fiefdoms exert 
such influence.  
 
5 Practical Steps on Admission to Health Care Institutions 
Centralised, electronic medical records, as examined in detail in Chapter III, may 
assist by making the fact of the existence of advance directives or other wishes for 
                                                      
180 Editorial, 'At the Very Heart of Life and Death', The Sydney Morning Herald (Online) (26 October 
2013) <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/at-the-very-heart-of-life-and-death-20131025-2w7a2.html>. 
181 Ben White et al, 'The Legal Role of Medical Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw 
Life-sustaining Treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales)' (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 498, 
499;  see also, Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, 
Inquiry into End of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 152. 
182 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 152.  There is no reason why the Medical Board of 
Australia should not implement this recommendation on a national basis. 
183 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 1. 
184 Ben White et al, 'The Legal Role of Medical Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw 
Life-sustaining Treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales)' (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 498, 
498. 
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future care and their terms readily searchable.  As the Victorian Legislative 
Council’s Inquiry into End of Life Choices reported: 
The National Lead Clinicians Group has noted that the My Health Record can 
enable advance care plans to be easily accessible across hospital, community and 
residential aged care settings. Using the My Health Record for advance care plans 
allows for the development of a system of alerts that indicate to health staff and 
ambulance officers when an advance care plan exists and how it can be accessed.185  
 
However, it would also be helpful to make the existence of any future care 
documents part of the admission process for hospitals and for new patients in 
health practitioner surgeries.  A question about the existence of an enduring power 
of attorney is currently part of the admission process for aged care facilities and 
could be extended to the existence of any advance care directive.   
 
Whether future care documents have been prepared should be as standard a 
question for hospitals and general practitioner surgeries186 as that of the question 
about next-of-kin in all contacts between the individual and the health system.  
Where possible, copies should be made available at the same time.  Not only would 
the importance of having prepared one of these documents be brought home to 
people of all ages and provide an opportunity to discuss the difficult questions of 
life and death, the health practitioners or hospital administrators would also be put 
on notice about what is required in an emergency.  Making this question routine 
would make it less confronting for both patient and health service providers to 
commence a conversation.  Those who do not want to have the conversation or 
whose religious or ethnic predispositions avoid these questions can simply answer 
the question about the existence of future care documents in the negative. 
 
 
E CONCLUSION 
 
The principle of patient autonomy confirmed by judicial declarations can be, on 
occasion as outlined above, limited by medical, common law and legislative 
obstacles to the observance of instructions given in advance directives.  The 
requirement for consent of the competent patient before any medical treatment is 
commenced is well-understood by health practitioners.  Processes to permit 
                                                      
185 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 154. 
186 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) 24. 
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competent individuals to direct choices when no longer competent have been 
recommended by the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council and have been 
endorsed by parliaments throughout Australia and the United Kingdom.  The 
requirements for validity of advance directives have been laid down through the 
cases.187  Prima facie, there should be no difficulty in adhering to directions for 
future health care as specified in a valid advance directive.  However, the principle 
of the ‘sanctity of life’ has, as Munby and Michalowski have reported, from time to 
time been called in aid to justify overriding of advance directives.188  Lord 
Donaldson in In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)189 acknowledged the conflict 
between the patient’s right to self-determination and the society’s interest in 
upholding the idea of the sacredness of human life.  Whilst recognising that the 
right of the individual is ‘paramount’, the way that the right is exercised calls for 
careful examination and ‘[i]n case of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in 
favour of the preservation of life for if the individual is to override the public 
interest, he must do so in clear terms’.190   
 
As outlined above, legislation, that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, can 
incorporate barriers to implementation of advance directives.  Whilst new 
legislation in Australian jurisdictions is gradually becoming less restrictive, there 
are still barriers in Queensland and Victoria, though Victorian legislation is being 
liberalised following a parliamentary report.191  Likewise, the wide-ranging Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (UK) in the United Kingdom, whilst mostly clarifying the law, 
still exhibits a subtle bias towards the sanctity of life in the differing provisions 
whereby persons are relieved of liability for either treating or not treating in 
accordance with valid advance directions.192 
 
Ways of making the consulting of advance care documents part of all medical 
practice have been proposed in Section D above.  They include making these 
documents compulsory and including details of them in medical records especially 
                                                      
187 See eg, In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 115–116 (Lord Donaldson). 
188 James Munby, 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Limitations of Patient Self-Determination in 
Contemporary English Law' (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315, 328–
329. 
189 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
190 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 112.  The ‘strong presumption in favour of 
taking all steps which will prolong life’ has been confirmed in by Munby J in R (Burke) v General 
Medical Council [2005] QB 424 at 465;  See eg also, W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) [222] (Baker 
J);  Sue Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of British Columbia [1993] 3 
SCR 519 [10];  R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 AC 800 [109]. 
191 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016). 
192 See Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) section 26(2)–(3).  
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centralised, electronic records that will be readily searchable.  Whether or not any 
directions for future care are in existence, and if so their terms, should be as 
common a question in admissions to health care institutions or any medical 
practitioner’s surgery, as the identity of the next-of-kin.  Ethics education in 
medical schools should include information about advance directives and their 
legal underpinnings.  Requiring familiarity with advance directives through 
continuing professional development could also be part of any re-registration or 
revalidation process for medical practitioners and can be monitored by the Medical 
Board of Australia.  As noted above, this idea has already been proposed in the 
Final Report of the Victorian Legislative Council’s Inquiry into End of Life 
Choices as Recommendation 41:  ‘That the Victorian Government require doctors 
and nurses to undertake continuous professional development on advance care 
planning.’193  
 
As the population ages it is more important than ever before that people are not 
being maintained needlessly, particularly where they have specified otherwise, in 
situations where they have experiential interests only and have no realistic contact 
with the outside world.  This is distressing to families and other carers.  It is also a 
needless waste of financial and medical resources.  According to an estimate by the 
American Hospitals Association made in an amicus curiae brief in the Cruzan 
case,194 70% of all deaths in the United States appear to be preceded by a decision 
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment.195  There is no reason to 
suspect that similar conditions do not apply in Australia.  Thus, there is no cogent 
reason for failure by health practitioners to abide by properly made and executed 
advance directives on the ground of deference to the ‘sanctity of life’ or a differing 
view of patient ‘best interests’ from what is specified in the advance directive.  
 
One further case study remains to be considered.  The all-too-frequent problem of 
medical error and how its aftermath is handled by medical practitioners and health 
service organisations is the subject of Chapter VI.  Failure to properly acknowledge 
and deal with medical error is a prime example of insufficient observance by some 
health practitioners of the tenets of patient-centred care. 
                                                      
193 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End 
of Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 152. 
194 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S Ct 2841 (1990). 
195 Marcia Angell, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands - Good News or Bad' (1996) 335(22) NEJM 1676, 
1677. 
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CHAPTER VI: MEDICAL ERROR AND PATIENT 
EXPERIENCE 
 
 
A INTRODUCTION  
 
Until Ivan Illich’s iconoclastic work,1 written in the mid-1970s, the frequency of 
the occurrence of iatrogenic injury, and its costs to patients and practitioners alike, 
was not widely recognised.  The word, iatrogenic, is derived from two Greek 
words, iatro meaning physician and genesis meaning origin.2  
 
Injuries to patients caused by health practitioners, whether in a hospital or any 
other establishment, are referred to generally and in the literature as adverse events 
and also as iatrogenic injuries.  Near misses are also referred to and are understood 
as a safety incident that did not reach the patient.  Sometimes a blanket term such 
as medical mishap may be used. 
 
This chapter recounts the incidence of adverse events in medical practice and 
proposes ways that these can be avoided.  Where this is not possible, adoption of 
the principles of open disclosure can minimise the harmful clinical, psychological 
and financial consequences of their occurrence.  This chapter also suggests 
possible ways of reducing the resistance by medical practitioners to making an 
open and honest admission to the patient of the occurrence of an adverse event, 
honesty with patients being an element of patient-centred care.  The originality in 
this chapter is the focus.  Rather than an emphasis on pure safety aspects, this 
chapter underlines where quality, as exemplified by adherence to patient-centred 
care principles, has been compromised in both the incidence of adverse events and 
in the responses to them.  This thesis has argued that patient-centred care aligns 
with professionalism, and professionalism in turn is represented by the terms of the 
MBA Code. 
 
                                                      
1 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine (McClelland and Stewart, 1976). 
2 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine (McClelland and Stewart, 1976) 3. 
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Medically-caused injury can often be identified as being the result of inadequate 
management processes rather than the disease process.3  Injury caused to patients 
by medical practitioners and the medical system has always occurred, but its 
magnitude was not realised.  What has changed in recent years is a greater 
acceptance of the idea that the injury must be acknowledged and immediate action 
taken to minimise any harmful aftermath.  Unfortunately however, patient-centred 
care following a medical mishap stands to be all-too-readily disregarded if the 
concerns of the injured patient conflict with the interests of a health practitioner or 
health service organisation. 
 
Section B documents the observation that the incidence of medical injury in 
Australia is high and compares the situation in several overseas jurisdictions.  What 
is apparent is that the incidence of adverse events is not an isolated problem but 
occurs in all countries.  Makary and Daniel estimate that medical error is the third 
leading cause of death in the United States, and that it is under-recognised in many 
other countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada.4   
 
The most recent figures from Australia in The Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study were reported in the Medical Journal of Australia in 1995.5  If comparison is 
made with other dangerous industries like aviation or engineering where safety is 
the first priority, the extent of incidence of iatrogenic injury in health care services 
is unacceptable. 
 
Section C shows that, an injury having occurred, there is a series of responses that 
must be initiated, as promptly as possible, to minimise the harm caused.  The most 
pressing concern is to deal with the immediate aftermath of the injury.  The first 
response should be to commence necessary treatment to minimise the extent of 
damage to the patient if possible.  But once this has been undertaken, patients or 
their families have a series of needs that should be addressed.  However, it is also 
important that lessons are learned from the occurrence and that steps are taken to 
find ways to prevent a similar incident in future.  Reporting both adverse events 
and near misses is essential to the effectiveness of the learning process. 
 
                                                      
3 Eric J Thomas et al, 'Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and 
Colorado' (2000) 38 Medical Care 261, 263. 
4 M A Makary, and Michael Daniel, 'Medical Error-the Third Leading Cause of Death in the US' 
(2016)  BMJ (Online) <http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139>. 
5 Ross McL Wilson et al, 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study' (1995) 163 MJA 458. 
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Section D describes the principles of open disclosure that are detailed in the 
Australian Open Disclosure Framework.  The framework has been prepared by the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) 
following wide and extended consultation with medical and hospital bodies and 
patient advocacy groups.  It presents and elaborates the argument that optimal 
management of any adverse event lies in prompt inclusion of the patient and, 
where relevant, the patient’s family in the conversation about appropriate 
responses.  This chapter demonstrates that involvement of the patient, in 
accordance with the principles outlined in the Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework,6 is at the heart of patient-centred care. 
 
In light of the ongoing problems created by the incidence of medical error and the 
sometimes inadequate responses to it, Section D asks whether some of the 
difficulties might be mitigated if apportionment of blame could be reduced and the 
threat of litigation eliminated or, at least, minimised.  Adoption of no fault 
compensation for injury would go a long way toward making sure that injured 
patients were satisfactorily cared for and any blame culture discontinued.  Has the 
time come to institute a national no fault compensation system?  This question was 
explored in more detail in Chapter IV. 
 
The conclusion in Section E acknowledges that the subject of medical error is 
complex, stemming from many factors, some of which cannot be anticipated.  
Human beings are not like aeroplanes where there is a relatively predictable 
response to each operation of controls or weather event.  Responses of human 
beings to treatments are not invariably predictable, as allergies and other reactions 
may occur.  But ‘sentinel’ events caused by neglect of due care in performance, or 
systems failures should never arise.   
 
Notwithstanding, medical authorities acknowledge that the hazardous nature of 
much medical treatment inevitably leads to some errors.  Given that medical errors 
cannot be totally eliminated, what is more important is that the response of the 
relevant medical practitioner or health care institution is immediate and 
appropriate.  What is not acceptable is failure to face and deal with medical errors 
when they do occur.  The Inquiry into Off-protocol Prescribing at St Vincent’s 
Hospital found that the culture lacked: 
                                                      
6 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework (2013). 
 277 
 leadership that provided insight, direction and urgency; 
 a patient-centred approach; 
 analytical rigour, or the necessary questioning scepticism for an accurate 
characterisation of the issue; 
 training for clinical leaders in leadership and in policy and process;  and 
 demonstration of adherence to values at a time when they were most needed.7 
 
The Inquiry went on to conclude: 
As a result, the attempts to characterise the issue and follow policy, were 
unsuccessful: instead of acting in the best interest of the patient, the organisation’s 
response to the issue was inadequate, drawn out, internalised and defensive.8 
 
As this chapter will show, an inadequate response to a medical adverse event 
suggests a dichotomy between practitioner and patient interests and a discounting 
of the ethical obligation to make the care of the patient the first priority of the 
medical professional.   
 
B MEDICAL ERRORS — TYPES AND INCIDENCE 
 
1 Adverse Events 
(a) Definition 
An adverse event in the medical context includes where a person, following 
medical treatment whether in a hospital or not, has to spend unplanned time in 
hospital or is discharged with a serious disability, or who dies as a consequence of 
a medical procedure,9 that is, where harm of some degree is caused to the patient.  
Even a simple error may still cause unacceptable harm.10  What is imperative is that 
the occurrence is acknowledged at once so that prompt action may be taken to 
remedy or, at least, minimise harmful consequences.   
 
 
 
                                                      
7 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [148]. 
8 Inquiry under section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Final Report (31 July 2016) [149].  The issue was the 
prescribing of identical doses of a chemotherapy drug irrespective of individual characteristics of the 
patients concerned.  The response was the failure to identify or notify the affected patients or notify 
the public.  ‘No medical oncologist was providing input to the hospital’s executive team to inform 
and prepare the public statements, nor check their accuracy’. [159]. 
9 W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 
2000) 8. 
10 The occurrence of an adverse event is often a traumatic experience for both the patient and the 
health practitioner concerned.  The health practitioner may question whether his or her competence is 
adequate.  Patients may wonder whether they have been the recipients of careless advice or the 
subject of a negligent procedure.  
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(b) Sentinel Events 
Sentinel events are those severe events that should never under any circumstances 
occur.11  Compulsory reporting of sentinel events was agreed by the Health 
Ministers in 2004.12  The sentinel events agreed to by the Health Ministers for the 
purposes of reporting were: 
 procedures involving the wrong patient or body part; 
 suicide of a patient in an inpatient unit; 
 retained instruments or other material after surgery requiring re-operation or 
further surgical procedure; 
 intravascular gas embolism resulting in death or neurological damage; 
 haemolytic blood transfusion reaction resulting from ABO incompatibility; 
 medication error leading to the death of a patient reasonably believed to be due to 
incorrect administration of drugs; 
 maternal death or serious morbidity associated with labour or delivery; 
 infant discharged to the wrong family.13 
 
Sentinel events are those adverse medical events that result in death, permanent 
harm or severe temporary harm that require intervention to save life.  Sentinel 
events signal a failure in the health care system so must be subjected to strict root 
cause analysis to determine causes and in order to prevent recurrence.14  Loss of a 
limb or paralysis would be sentinel events though are not specifically mentioned by 
the Health Ministers.  Other adverse events that do not result in these outcomes 
may be considered to be sentinel in that immediate investigation is required.  
Similar events occurring in a doctor’s surgery would also be considered sentinel.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
11 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2009 62;  David C Classen et al, ''Global Trigger Tool' Shows that Adverse Events in 
Hospitals may be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured' (2011) 30 Health Affairs 581. 
12 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2009 62;  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into 
Safety and Quality in Health Care 2011 4. 
13 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, Sentinel Events in Australian Public Hospitals 2004–05 (July 2007)3–4.  Identification 
of these broad categories did not include supporting documentation and were considered by the 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (“AIHW”) report on Sentinel Events as ‘not unambiguous’.  
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, Sentinel Events in Australian Public Hospitals 2004–05 (July 2007) 1. 
14 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2009 62;  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into 
Safety and Quality in Health Care 2011 3. 
15 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 2009 64;  Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Windows into 
Safety and Quality in Health Care 2011 5. 
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(c) Near Misses 
A near miss is a patient safety event that did not reach the patient.  It is just as 
important to report near misses as any other sort of patient safety incident.  Medical 
practitioners can be reluctant to report near misses as they may reflect on the 
competence of the practitioner involved.  However, their importance should not be 
underestimated.  Even though a ‘near miss’ did not lead to harm, information about 
it is valuable in identifying possible future accidents in the health system.16  The 
way the near miss occurred in avoiding a full adverse event is as important in 
modifying practices as an adverse event that caused harm.17  The process of 
reporting near misses can also be used as a way of developing communication 
skills for disclosure of adverse events.18  However, most physicians are opposed to 
reporting near misses on the grounds that they are impracticable and diminish 
patient trust.19  Some patients do not want to know about them.20 
 
However, reporting of near misses is obligatory under the terms of the MBA 
Code.21  Yet, in New South Wales, the Open Disclosure Handbook directs that a 
near miss must be reported to the incident management system but provides that 
disclosure to the patient is discretionary.  It depends on whether it is in the patient’s 
interest to know of its occurrence, such as where there may be an ongoing safety 
issue.22   
 
Garbutt observes that near misses reported in other hazardous industries have often 
been used more than actual adverse events because of their more frequent 
occurrence and because many have similar latent causes to other accidents that 
may occur.23   
 
 
 
                                                      
16 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, Sentinel Events in Australian Public Hospitals 2004–05 (July 2007) 1. 
17 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Open Disclosure Standard Review 
Report (June 2012) 32. 
18 Ibid 32. 
19 Thomas H Gallagher et al, 'Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical 
Errors' (2003) 209 JAMA 1001, 1004. 
20 Jane Garbutt et al, 'Reporting and Disclosing Medical Errors Pediatricians' Attitudes and Behaviors' 
(2007) 161 Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 179, 182 
21 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [6.2.3]. 
22 Clinical Excellence Commission, Open Disclosure Handbook (2014) 15. 
23 Jane Garbutt et al, 'Reporting and Disclosing Medical Errors Pediatricians' Attitudes and Behaviors' 
(2007) 161 Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 179, 183. 
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2 Incidence 
Injury caused by medical practitioners is far more prevalent than generally 
appreciated in the community.  One estimate has the injury rate at one in ten of all 
acute-care hospital admissions.24  According to Runciman and Moller, the risk of 
dying by simply being a patient in an acute care hospital in Australia is 40 times 
that of dying in a traffic accident.25  Another survey estimated that of 14,000 
admissions into 28 hospitals in New South Wales and South Australia, one in six 
was associated with an adverse event.  Of those, 51% were considered 
preventable.26  The incidence of deaths from medical adverse events in Australia as 
reported in the Quality in Australian Health Care Study has been likened, by 
Richardson and McKie, to a Bali bombing every 3 days,27 or 13 jumbo jet crashes 
each year.28   
 
In the United States, the Harvard Medical Practice Survey,29 carried out in 1984, 
reviewed medical records of patients from 51 randomly selected hospitals in the 
State of New York.  By comparing these results with population estimates, results 
were extrapolated to give an idea of the incidence of medical injury in New York 
state at that time.  Negligence was found to be more frequent in patients where 
severe adverse events occurred.30  This research is many years old now but recent 
research in the United States extrapolating national figures from smaller samples 
estimates that the original research underestimated the incidence of medical 
errors.31  However, even if there has been a decrease in the intervening years, there 
still appears to be inadequate awareness in the health care system that one injury is 
too many. 
 
                                                      
24 W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 
2000) 4. 
25 W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 
2000) xiii. 
26 Ross McL Wilson et al, 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study' (1995) 163 MJA 458, 458.  
Wilson et al reported:  ‘In 77.1% the disability had resolved within 12 months but in 13.7% the 
disability was permanent and in 4.9% the patient died.’ 
27 Jeff Richardson and John McKie, Reducing the Incidence of Adverse Events in Australian 
Hospitals: An Expert Panel Evaluation of Some Proposals (Centre for Health Economics Monash 
University, 2007) 2. 
28 Jeff Richardson and John McKie, Reducing the Incidence of Adverse Events in Australian 
Hospitals: An Expert Panel Evaluation of Some Proposals (Centre for Health Economics Monash 
University, 2007) 15. 
29 T A Brennan et al, 'Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results 
of the Harvard Medical Practice Survey' (2004) 13 Quality and Safety in Health Care 145. 
30 T A Brennan et al, 'Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results 
of the Harvard Medical Practice Survey' (2004) 13 Quality and Safety in Health Care 145, 146. 
31 M A Makary, and Michael Daniel, 'Medical Error-the Third Leading Cause of Death in the US' 
(2016)  BMJ (Online) <http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139>. 
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In 1992, a survey was carried out in Utah and Colorado, two smaller states than 
New York, but using similar processes as had been applied in the New York state 
survey.32  Two articles published in 2000 followed this survey, one reporting the 
incidence of iatrogenic injuries33 and the other investigating whether or not 
iatrogenic injuries to patients led to litigation against the medical professionals 
involved.34   
 
Comparative figures for iatrogenic injuries in Australia, Utah/Colorado and New 
York are tabulated in Appendix VIA.  The discrepancy in the incidence is notable, 
a factor of about five to one. 
 
Following questions about the reasons for the disparity in figures between 
Australia and the United States, further research was undertaken.  In the original 
Quality in Australian Health Care Study, Wilson et al had noted that whilst the 
Australian study was modelled on the Harvard study with some modifications, the 
same methods were used.  The substantial difference was that a measure of 
preventability was applied,35 a less confronting option for health care professionals, 
rather than the estimate of malpractice and negligence used in the Harvard study.   
 
More formal research was undertaken by Thomas et al to try to identify the 
different factors that had led to the discrepancy.  When the Australian figures were 
analysed in a similar way to those in Utah/Colorado, the incidence figures changed 
for Australia to 10.6% and revised the Utah/Colorado figures to 3.2%, still a factor 
of three to one.36  A second article attempted to account for the three-fold 
difference having adjusted for five differences in methodology.37  Major disabilities 
and death had similar rates but the rate for minor disability was six times greater in 
Australia.  The researchers suggested that the disparities were consistent with the 
                                                      
32 Eric J Thomas et al, 'Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and 
Colorado' (2000) 38 Medical Care 261, 268. 
33 Eric J Thomas et al, 'Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and 
Colorado' (2000) 38 Medical Care 261. 
34 David M Studdert et al, 'Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado' 
(2000) 38 Medical Care 250. 
35 Ross McL Wilson et al, 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study' (1995) 163 MJA 458, 470.  It 
is noted that in Nordic countries, access to ‘no fault’ compensation relies on a determination of 
avoidability. 
36 Eric J Thomas et al, 'A Comparison of Iatrogenic Injury Studies in Australia and the USA I: 
Context, Methods, Casemix, Population, Patient and Hospital Characteristics' (2000) 12 International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care 371, 371. 
37 William B Runciman et al, 'A Comparison of Iatrogenic Injury Studies in Australia and the USA II: 
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differing aims of each study but there were no observable divergences in quality of 
care.38   
 
This epidemic of adverse events cannot be ignored and there have been attempts to 
establish processes for dealing with the adverse events and the injuries caused to 
patients by their occurrence.  As Faunce has commented, many injuries are not 
caused so much by the individual medical practitioner as by system error.  He goes 
on to observe that efforts have been made to introduce quality assurance and 
incident reports but these have made little impression on the jurisprudence 
surrounding patient injuries.39  Any effort to resolve these difficulties has to take 
system error into account.40  Figures from the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study show that 53% of adverse events are a result of system error, failure to use 
policy or the absence of policy.41  The efforts to prevent recurrence indicated that 
failure of communication was a factor in 81% of those matters reported.42  Yet, 
Christakis comments that blaming the system can, on occasion, look like an 
excuse.43  
 
 
C MANAGING ADVERSE EVENTS 
 
Makary and Daniel have remarked that: 
Human error is inevitable. Although we cannot eliminate human error, we can better 
measure the problem to design safer systems mitigating its frequency, visibility, and 
consequences. Strategies to reduce death from medical care should include three 
steps: making errors more visible when they occur so their effects can be 
intercepted; having remedies at hand to rescue patients; and making errors less 
frequent by following principles that take human limitations into account.44 
 
Medical adverse events are an ongoing and important concern for medical 
regulators and health service providers.  The existence of the Open Disclosure 
                                                      
38 William B Runciman et al, 'A Comparison of Iatrogenic Injury Studies in Australia and the USA II: 
Reviewer Behaviour and Quality of Care' (2000) 12 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 
379, 379. 
39 Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 61. 
40 W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 
2000) 17. 
41 Ross McL Wilson et al, 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study' (1995) 163 MJA 458, 469. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Nicholas A Christakis, 'Don't Just Blame the System' (2008) 336 BMJ 767. 
44 M A Makary, and Michael Daniel, 'Medical Error-the Third Leading Cause of Death in the US' 
(2016)  BMJ (Online) <http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139>. 
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Framework promulgated byACSQHC,45 is supplemented by directions of state 
health authorities.  In New South Wales, the Clinical Excellence Commission 
supports the advice of the Open Disclosure Framework with its own handbook.46  
Western Australia’s Department of Health has published a guide to open 
disclosure47 as has Victoria,48 and ACT Health has issued an Open Disclosure 
Policy.49 
 
Similar directions are emphasised by all the policies and guides and these will be 
analysed below.  However, recognition of iatrogenic injuries as an ongoing 
problem has been slow in the past and is only now being given the detailed 
attention that was previously lacking.  Yet dealing with adverse events is clearly an 
obligation of medical practitioners as is evidenced by its inclusion in the MBA 
Code.50 
 
This section commences by documenting the slow path to the realisation that 
medical errors must not be ignored but must be faced.  Procedures must be 
developed to mitigate harm to both the individual concerned and to those who were 
answerable (whether to blame or not).  The section continues by exploring the 
responses most important to the injured patient and family and why they are critical 
to management of adverse events.  It then moves on to a discussion of the benefits 
to both patients and health professionals where effort is put into using the incidence 
of medical errors and near misses as a learning tool.  Minimising recurrence by 
modification of systems and by finding ways to adapt to human limitations would 
appear to be the most effective responses. 
 
1 Dealing with Iatrogenic Injuries 
In 1987, Sir Frederick Lawton commented that attitudes of courts and the legal 
profession to medical injuries were gradually changing and reflected what the 
public was, at that time, expecting of courts and lawyers.  In the United Kingdom, 
until about 1950, litigation was conducted in accordance with the Rules of the 
                                                      
45 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework (2013). 
46 Clinical Excellence Commission, Open Disclosure Handbook (2014). 
47 Government of Western Australia, WA Open Disclosure Policy: Communication and Disclosure 
Requirements for Health Professionals Working in Western Australia (May 2009 (amended July 
2012)). 
48 Victorian Government, Open Disclosure for Victorian Health Services (2008). 
49 ACT Health, Open Disclosure Policy (February 2010). 
50  Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [3.10] and [6.2.1]. 
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Supreme Court that permitted documents that came into existence for the purpose 
of litigation to be privileged from production or inspection. 
This covered all medical reports obtained for the purposes of actions for personal 
injuries and alleged acts or omissions in the course of medical treatment.  The latter 
kind of actions were then rare because of the difficulty of proof.  In those days 
finding a doctor who was willing to testify that another doctor had been negligent 
was difficult.51 
 
Runciman and Moller point out that, to some extent, this attitude still persists in 
medical negligence litigation.  ‘Patients have had, and still have in the private 
sector, difficulty in obtaining access to their medical records in the event of a 
dispute.’52  However, the frequency with which iatrogenic injuries occurs is a 
matter that should be of great concern to the medical establishment.  Until 
relatively recently, little information was available to either health care 
professionals or the general public.  The necessity to track adverse events became 
apparent in the perception by public authorities that patient safety was under threat 
from preventable human error or system failure.53  The Quality in Australian Heath 
Care Study was instituted to determine the incidence of adverse events in 
admissions to Australian hospitals54 because, without this information, it would be 
difficult for preventive action to be taken.   
 
Runciman and Moller comment that there has in the past been a general reluctance 
to acknowledge that adverse events have occurred and that they should be properly 
documented.55  Medical practitioners who are involved in an adverse event have 
numerous concerns about acknowledging those errors, both to themselves and to 
their patients.  The perception by medical practitioners that they are at risk of 
litigation, that their reputations will suffer, that their authority will be questioned, 
that their patients will no longer trust them and that any admission of guilt will dent 
self-esteem and confidence has led to secrecy and a reluctance to admit any 
responsibility.  Several commentators have remarked that many medical 
practitioners have attempted to hide their errors, or shift the blame onto some-one 
else including the patient.56   
                                                      
51 Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353, 365 (Sir Frederick Lawton). 
52 W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 
2000) 6. 
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2000) 6. 
56 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine (McClelland and Stewart, 1976) 249;  Lucian L Leape, 'Error in 
Medicine' (1994) 272 JAMA 1851, 1852;  W B Runciman and J Moller, Iatrogenic Injury in Australia 
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Where adverse events have occurred, other hazardous industries have made a 
determined effort to find out what has happened and why.  For example, the 
aviation industry has taken the view that a 1% error rate is unacceptable and has 
worked to modify its procedures accordingly.57  In medical practice, anaesthetists 
have made an effort to learn from past errors.  Among other activities, anaesthetists 
have negotiated with manufacturers to engineer safety devices to prevent errors in 
connection of lines, and to ensure that a minimum proportion of oxygen is always 
available.58   
 
Atul Gawande recounts the story of a surgeon who introduced a checklist of five 
essential procedures to reduce the incidence of central line infections.  Following 
the dramatic reduction in infections because the check list reduced the number of 
missed necessary steps in the process, the hospital convinced one of the largest 
manufacturers of central lines to include necessary drapes and antiseptics with their 
central line kits.59 
 
It is an indictment of the health system if medical practitioners seek to deflect 
attention from responsibility and to avoid reporting all relevant information.  As 
Healy and Braithwaite observe, any other industry that took the same attitude 
would become the object of greater public and regulatory attention for attempting 
to put the interests of the individual practitioner above those of members of the 
public who entrust themselves to the system in question.60  No-one doubts that 
some errors are unavoidable or unexpected, but analysing their occurrence can 
reveal system errors that can be rectified or minimised.61  But incidents cannot be 
analysed unless they are reported, the value in reporting being to provide 
information so that responses can be prioritised.62  Prevention of future similar 
occurrences demands that all adverse events be reported. 
 
Attempts are now being made to rectify this situation.  The recognition in 
paragraph 3.10 of the MBA Code that acknowledgement of medical errors is a 
                                                      
57 Lucian L Leape, 'Error in Medicine' (1994) 272 JAMA 1851, 1851. 
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responsibility of medical practitioners has been bolstered by the development of 
the Australian Open Disclosure Framework and its release in 2013 following many 
years of pilot studies and consultations.63  Paragraph 3.10 and the Open Disclosure 
Framework will be analysed later in this chapter. 
 
2 What Patients and Their Families Are Seeking 
Almost all the literature about patient reactions to medical error has emphasised 
that patients have several basic requirements.  They want  
(a) to know what happened and why;  
(b) to find out who or what is responsible;   
(c) to make sure that what has befallen them will not cause a similar injury to 
some-one else in the future;64   
(d) a sincere apology;   
(e) to know the short- and long-term consequences of the event.65 
 
The reason why many patients have turned to litigation is because they have not 
had satisfactory explanations about what occurred and litigation has been a way of 
finding out the facts.66  Patients have reported that their medical practitioners have 
ignored them and left it to hospital administrators to handle the matter:   
No doctor actually spoke to me ... and the office person or floor person or whatever 
her title, when she seen me [sic] come that day she didn’t even have the decency to 
look at me and say I’m sorry for your loss, she turned and looked away from me ...67 
 
Patients have been provided with evasive answers to questions.68  They have been 
stonewalled for years by physicians, lawyers and administrators.69  Frequently the 
passive voice has been used as a way of deflecting attention from the responsibility 
of the medical practitioner involved:70 
                                                      
63 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
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He was worried, I’m certain, of what was going to happen, what the outcome ... 
what he was going to say to us, what he could say to us. Everything he did say was 
very carefully worded.71 
 
The principles of open disclosure that will be examined later in this chapter 
commence with the focus on these patient-centred objectives.  Open disclosure will 
not achieve its desired result of minimising harm to patients if patient needs and 
wants are not integral to the process.  Just using the data to change defective 
procedures is only part of the story.  Involving the patient in the decisions 
concerning desired outcomes may reduce resort to negligence litigation. 
 
(a) What Happened and Why 
If a patient has been the subject of an adverse event, the first reaction of the patient 
is to try and understand the facts, to find out what happened.72  Without 
understanding the reason why this situation has occurred, patients cannot begin to 
process its ramifications for them and their families:73   
[a]nd they called us up and they say, the investigation’s complete. Nobody at the 
hospital made any mistakes. None of their doctors, none of their nurses, none of 
their janitors, nobody made any mistakes.74 
 
I actually got to ask, and they answered ... because [health service staff] only look at 
a medical reason. You only look for medical [things]. You don’t look for the actual 
facts around and what led to it. You only look at what it is when you walked into 
that room, what you saw, or what you had to treat. You don’t look at okay, what 
happened before you got to that room ... It’s only through them understanding the 
full story ... [that] you can only bring about change.75 
 
They seemed to talk above your head somehow. Even though they’re trying to say it 
simply ... “I feel as though I’m, er, just, er, a subject rather than a person, if you 
know what I mean ... ” ell [sic], I had to press for it, to get the information I wanted. 
See, my question was, if I was given this, er, injection, why wasn’t it checked and 
double checked before it was administered.76 
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As several writers have commented, instead of being told what happened, patients 
and carers have been pushed aside, disbelieved or avoided.77  
 
(b) Who or What is Responsible 
The next requirement for the patient is to know who was responsible.78  Duclos 
reports the trauma of an adverse event where the harm was caused by someone 
trusted by the patient: 
I’m extremely hurt just because I’m still having complications. I’m going to get cut 
open again ... Just the fact that he has no idea what I’m going through. And he’s just 
moved on with his life and never called me. That really hurts. It really bothers me.79 
 
The fear of facing a patient who may be angry and emotional keeps some medical 
practitioners from facing up to the results of their activities.  Though as Wu says, 
until the medical practitioner does face up, he or she is not going to have the 
opportunity for the patient to forgive.  Being forgiven by an injured patient allows 
both patient and responsible health practitioner to better deal with the aftermath of 
an adverse medical event.80  More recent research suggests that when an offender 
makes a sincere effort to make amends, such as by apologising, an injured person 
is more likely to see the offender as deserving of forgiveness.81  The act of 
forgiving itself can be beneficial to injured persons by enhancing well-being and 
giving them the feeling of being valued.82  
 
Not being treated seriously by the person who caused the problem can arouse anger 
and the feeling of wishing to seek revenge.83  Where a hospital administrator is 
substituted for the person responsible, the patient can feel slighted.  The patient’s 
dignity is compromised where it appears that no respect is being paid to the 
                                                      
77 Rick Iedema et al, 'Patients' and Family Members' Experiences of Open Disclosure Following 
Adverse Events' (2008) 20 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 421;  Rick Iedema et al, 
'Patients' and Family Members' Views on How Clinicians Enact and How They Should Enact 
Incident Disclosure: The "100 Patient Stories" Qualitative Study' (2011) 343 BMJ d4423 doi: 
10.1136/bmj.d4423;  Christine W Duclos et al, 'Patient Perspectives of Patient-Provider 
Communication after Adverse Events' (2005) 17 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 
479, 482. 
78 Nancy Berlinger, After Harm (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 24. 
79 Christine W Duclos et al, 'Patient Perspectives of Patient-Provider Communication after Adverse 
Events' (2005) 17 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 479, 481. 
80 Albert W Wu, 'Medical Error: the Second Victim' (2000) 320 BMJ 726, 727. 
81 Peter Strelan, Ian McKee and N T Feather, 'When and How Forgiving Benefits Victims: Post-
Transgression Offender Effort and the Mediating Role of Deservingness Judgements' (2016) 46 
European Journal of Social Psychology 308, 318. 
82 Peter Strelan, Ian McKee and N T Feather, 'When and How Forgiving Benefits Victims: Post-
Transgression Offender Effort and the Mediating Role of Deservingness Judgements' (2016) 46 
European Journal of Social Psychology 308, 318. 
83 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Open Disclosure Standard Review 
Report (June 2012) [4.2.1]. 
 289 
feelings of the patient concerned.  Slights to one’s dignity are one way for the 
patient to feel devalued and consider resorting to litigation. 
I don’t think he gave me the respect he should have given me, and I wouldn’t give 
him another chance. He didn’t listen to me.84 
 
(c) System Correction 
The patient will also be concerned to make sure that a similar mishap will not 
occur to any other person.85  The patient must be reassured that the experience of 
the adverse event is taken seriously as a way of learning from the error, and that 
systems will be modified to take account of the occurrence.86  Patients are more 
likely to forgive if they are satisfied that system changes will prevent a similar fate 
befalling anyone else:87 
At the end of the day, you know, when an unfortunate accident happens like that, 
that [inappropriate disclosure communication] could be avoided in the future ... It 
would be good to know that my dad’s death, you know, sort of prompted some 
changes in that area, you know, and I’m sure that if he was around, he would like to 
know that as well.88 
 
(d) Apologies 
Research suggests that patients are less likely to sue when they have been given a 
complete explanation of how the adverse event arose, and a full and sincere 
apology.89   Failure to apologise contributes to anger which can lead to litigation.90 
That’s what the meeting was supposed to be about, but it was just a big defense 
mechanism for them. There wasn’t much admission of anything that went wrong ... 
it was a lot like talking to a politician, it felt like, you know? He would answer 
questions in a long and roundabout sort of way?91 
 
Er, I mean ... from what I can remember, I was quite sort of upset at the time. They 
were basically ... the whole thing it seemed like they were covering their tails, 
basically. They haven’t ... The doctor at the time did apologise but no-one’s really 
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taken responsibility for it. I would like to have an apology ... a sincere apology, that, 
“yes, we shouldn’t have put you in that position”.92 
 
I just wanted him to take responsibility for it. ‘Look, I’m sorry I did this and I’ll do 
whatever it takes to make things right’. Just own up to what happened.93  
 
The value of apologies is scrutinised in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
(e) Possible Long-Term Consequences 
Lat but not least, the patient needs to know what the short- and long-term 
consequences will be.94  
I was on antibiotics for four weeks and they discontinued it because the antibiotics 
were affecting my kidneys. And it’s like, well, what else is going to happen to me 
now? It just seemed like one thing after another after another after another.95 
 
The injury may be a simple matter that can be rectified comparatively easily.  
However, many adverse events result in long-term consequences that may mean a 
drastic reduction in the quality of life previously enjoyed.  Where a death has 
occurred, the long-term consequences may include finding ways for a bereaved 
partner to cope with what has happened and to move on. 
 
3 Learning from Adverse Events 
No-one, whether medical practitioner or patient, wants an adverse event to occur.  
Reporting of adverse events and near misses is an obligation on medical 
practitioners and health care organisations96 to assist in managing incident 
resolution.  It also throws up those sentinel events that must be subjected to root 
cause analysis to determine how to modify systems to minimise recurrence.97  
Identification of those factors that have caused a sentinel event is necessary for any 
monitoring system.98 
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The National Quality Forum endorsed a list of Serious Reportable Events in 
Healthcare to provide a set of events upon which to base a national reporting 
system.  Whilst this purpose is still being fulfilled, this list is increasingly also 
being used ‘ ... with the goal of illuminating such events to facilitate learning and 
improvement’.99  Rather than using reporting to apportion blame, all health service 
organisations should be accountable for the quality of care they are providing, 
accountability including 
1. diligent effort to discover vulnerabilities that could lead to adverse events; 
2. focused review and analysis of events that do occur to determine causal or 
contributing factors; 
3. applying what is learned to consciously improve quality; 
4. public reporting to enable other organisations to apply lessons learned and take 
actions to prevent recurrence.100 
 
However, reporting is not always an optimum method of obtaining accurate, 
timely, credible and useful information.  Over time, participants can be afflicted 
with inertia.101  If the outcome of reporting is a perception that blame will be laid, 
motivation to report may be minimal.  Yet, when reporting of near misses in the air 
traffic system was disconnected from blame, the rate of reporting increased 
dramatically.102  It is also essential that those reporting should see that valid 
remedial action is taken in response to reports or reporting will be seen as a waste 
of time.103   
 
(a) Safety 
As reported earlier in this chapter, the incidence of iatrogenic injury in Australia is 
still unacceptably high.  For example, the report by Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, Admitted Patient Care 2014–015: Australian Hospital Statistics 
shows a total of 569 418 separations104 with an adverse event.105  Of these, a total of 
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33 496 related specifically to patient falls.106  Despite the recognition over many 
years that adverse events in the medical context occur, patients still expect their 
intersections with the medical system will not result in injury or death.   
 
(b) Patient-Centred Care 
The adoption of the principles of patient-centred care has led to a particular focus 
on those aspects of medical practices that have led to patterns of adverse incidents.  
Standards 3 to 10 of the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards deal 
with specific problems that cause injuries to patients. 
Standards 3 to 10 are as follows: 
3  Preventing and controlling healthcare associated infections 
4  Medication safety 
5  Patient Identification and procedure matching 
6  Clinical handover 
7  Blood and Blood products 
8  Preventing and managing pressure injuries 
9  Recognising and responding to clinical deterioration in acute health care 
10 Preventing falls and harm from falls. 107   
 
The example of patient falls shows that simple failures to adhere to procedures can 
result in catastrophic consequences, especially for older people.  Yet falls are still 
occurring regularly in medical settings.  Making the patient’s needs, wants and 
values the essence of patient interactions with the medical system means that 
patient safety and the quality of health services must be emphasised above all 
factors.  Developing the safety systems to minimise adverse events is a patient-
centred activity. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Given the necessity to manage adverse events in a way that provides the optimum 
outcomes for both patients and health professionals involved, it is clear that, 
despite some objections, the essential information required before any inroads can 
be made into the high incidence of iatrogenic injuries, is a reliable and robust 
system of reporting.  Failing to face and deal with the event is a recipe for 
litigation. 
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D MEDICAL ERRORS AND OPEN DISCLOSURE —AN ETHICAL 
OBLIGATION FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS? 
 
1 Introduction 
The term ‘open disclosure’ is increasingly being used to describe, in summary 
form, the ‘best’ way to deal with iatrogenic injuries.108  The principles of open 
disclosure emphasise the necessity for involvement of the patient in all responses 
to an adverse event, the partnership aspect of patient-centred care.  Putting patients 
first involves subordinating personal interests to patient interests.  It also 
acknowledges those matters that are important to patients who have suffered an 
adverse event, as detailed in Section C above. 
 
In 2003, the Australian Health Ministers Advisory Group developed the Open 
Disclosure Standard that outlined procedures for dealing with the aftermath of 
adverse events.  This standard was the subject of a review report by ACSQHC that 
recommended amendments to take account of accumulated experience and 
changing views of the best way to conduct the process.109   
 
In 2008, the Health Ministers resolved that open disclosure should be implemented 
in health care organisations throughout Australia,110 and in December 2013 the 
Framework was formally endorsed by them.111  
 
 
The Framework specifies the guiding principles for open disclosure as follows: 
1 Open and timely communication; 
2 Acknowledgement; 
3 Apology or expression of regret; 
4 Supporting, and meeting the needs and expectations of patients, their families 
and carers; 
5 Supporting, and meeting the needs and expectations of those providing health 
care; 
6 Integrated clinical risk management and systems improvement; 
7 Good governance; 
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Professional and Legal Obligations, and the Way Forward for Regulation' (2013) 198 MJA 445, 445. 
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8 Confidentiality.112 
 
The MBA Code outlines how medical practitioners should deal with the business of 
providing care and treatment to patients.  It acknowledges that risk is inherent in 
the practice of medicine and advises that medical practitioners should be aware of 
risks and work to minimise their occurrence.113  It also advises that medical 
practice must be conducted safely.    
 
Paragraph 6.2 specifies what good medical practice in relation to risk management 
involves:  
6.2.1 Being aware of the importance of the principles of open disclosure and a 
non-punitive approach to incident management; 
6.2.2 Participating in systems of quality assurance and improvement; 
6.2.3 Participating in systems for surveillance and monitoring of adverse events 
and ‘near misses’, including reporting such events; 
6.2.4 If you have management responsibilities, making sure that systems are in 
place for raising concerns about risks to patients; 
6.2.5 Working in your practice and within systems to reduce error and improve 
patient safety, and supporting colleagues who raise concerns about patient 
safety; 
6.2.6 Taking all reasonable steps to address the issue if you have reason to 
think that patient safety may be compromised.  
 
These stipulations are reinforced by the terms of paragraph 3.10 that states that 
when adverse events occur, the medical practitioner has a responsibility to be open 
and honest in all communications with the patient, to review what has occurred and 
to report appropriately.  When something goes wrong the medical practitioner 
should seek advice from colleagues and the medical indemnity insurer.114  Good 
medical practice involves: 
3.10.1 Recognising what has happened; 
3.10.2 Acting immediately to rectify the problem, if possible, including seeking 
any necessary help and advice; 
3.10.3 Explaining to the patient as promptly and fully as possible what has 
happened and the anticipated short-term and long-term consequences; 
3.10.4 Acknowledging any patient distress and providing appropriate support; 
3.10.5 Complying with any relevant policies, procedures and reporting 
requirements; 
3.10.6 Reviewing adverse events and implementing changes to reduce the risk of 
recurrence; 
3.10.7 Reporting adverse events to the relevant authority; 
                                                      
112 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework (2013) 12–13. 
113 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [6.1]. 
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3.10.8 Ensuring patients have access to information about the processes for 
making a complaint (for example, through the relevant healthcare 
complaints commission or medical board).115 
 
However, the MBA Code is silent about any obligation to apologise.  Paragraph 
3.10 did not take into account the provisions of the National Open Disclosure 
Standard that had been promulgated in 2003, six years before the publication in 
2009 of the first edition of the MBA Code.  This silence contrasts with the United 
Kingdom’s Good Medical Practice that specifies that when things go wrong an 
apology should be offered.116  Notwithstanding, the obligation in paragraph 6.2.1 to 
be aware of the principles of open disclosure suggests that an apology should be 
offered. 
 
The obvious conclusion is that failure to be guided by open disclosure principles in 
contravention of the MBA Code must be seen as an ethical shortcoming, quite apart 
from the risk of legal and disciplinary action against health practitioners.  
 
2 Patient Experience 
The way open disclosure is conducted will have a profound effect on the outcome 
after a patient has endured an adverse event and will determine whether the patient 
will make the best recovery.   Therefore it is essential that the response to adverse 
events is practised in accordance with the Australian Open Disclosure Framework 
commencing with open and honest, good communication to help the patient 
understand what has happened.117  The patient must be encouraged to become 
involved in the investigation process as well as the development of the plan for 
ongoing care and counselling.  For example, reimbursement of immediate out-of-
pocket expenses and arrangements for ongoing care are vital for the patient’s 
continued well-being. 
And it’s almost to the point where ... well, if the problem persists for two or three 
years, how long can it be before I sue the people who were involved to help pay for 
the problem. I mean, it’s bad enough that I have to physically deal with it, but then 
to have to financially deal with it is a totally different situation.118  
 
 
                                                      
115 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [3.10]. 
116 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (at 22 April 2013) Clause 55b. 
117 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework (2013) [4.1]. 
118 Christine W Duclos et al, 'Patient Perspectives of Patient-Provider Communication after Adverse 
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3 Implementation 
According to Finlay, Stewart and Parker, despite compelling professional 
obligations and common law developments, Australian doctors have generally 
avoided open disclosure119 even following its endorsement by the Health Ministers.  
The promulgation of the Australian Open Disclosure Framework and the 
recognition in Lamb’s editorial in the journal, Quality and Safety in Health Care, 
that owning up to and facing the consequences of an adverse event is an ethical, 
moral and professional imperative,120 both underline the importance of the adoption 
of open disclosure practices throughout the Australian health system.  Having 
acknowledged open disclosure as ethically mandated, the law should enforce the 
clear statutory obligations.121  Brazier and Cave point out that ethics demands a 
higher standard from the medical practitioner than what is stipulated by the law.122  
 
All levels of management must be involved in developing open disclosure 
protocols.  However, once the protocols have been developed, the senior person in 
the medical team together with a senior management person must implement each 
open disclosure action following an adverse event.123  Involving senior personnel 
makes the patient feel that the occurrence of the adverse event is being taken 
seriously and that the problem will not be repeated for any other person,124 prime 
needs for injured patients as outlined in Section B.   
 
(a) Timely Acknowledgement 
The first aspect of open disclosure is the necessity for both complete openness and 
for communication of the perceived error to be made to the patient and the 
patient’s family at the earliest opportunity — when it is clear something has gone 
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wrong.125  The temptation to say nothing is strong, especially if the patient does not 
appear to be aware of what has occurred.  Prompt disclosure of medical error 
avoids many problems that can occur later.126  The fact that the information is not 
complete is no excuse for delaying the communication.127  Even if all information 
is not known at the beginning, it can be provided as further meetings occur.128   
 
A prime example of delay has been provided in the Interim Report into Off-
protocol Prescribing of Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, the St 
Vincent’s Hospital revelations.  Both paragraphs 29 and 62 found that no affected 
patients were contacted for open disclosure until after a media report was aired on 
18 February 2016.129  There was no recognition that what was occurring was a 
serious incident.  As the report states in paragraph 42: 
[42] There appeared to be no effective executive sponsorship of the incident. There 
was no sense of urgency about the internal or external reviews that were undertaken. 
It was assumed that because an early decision (although not clear by whom) was 
made that there was no further treatment that could be offered and the practice had 
ceased, there was no urgency to review affected patients. There is no single time 
point or person who is responsible for the lack of urgency: it appears to have come 
about from the way the incident was framed – an ‘error’, ‘under-dosing’ or as a 
‘protocol variation’ by a senior clinician rather than characterising it as someone 
unilaterally prescribing ‘off-protocol’ with flat dosing.  
 
(b) Apology 
One of the more important requirements for any healing process following an 
adverse event is a sincere apology.130  Doctors have been reluctant to apologise on 
the grounds that an apology may mean an admission of liability.131  However, 
unless the injured patient hears at least the words ‘I am sorry’, the patient is 
unlikely to be convinced that the apology is more than mere window-dressing.132  
Face-to-face meetings between the patient and support person and the medical staff 
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involved will be more beneficial than an apology delivered by a member of 
management or a clinician who has not been involved in the actual adverse 
event.133  Research suggests that health care professionals want to apologise and 
seek forgiveness for any patient harmed while in their care but are constrained by 
fear of litigation.134 
 
Medical practitioners are advised to express regret for the event but to avoid 
acknowledging fault or making any apology.135  Doctors must not state that anyone 
is liable for the event, nor agree that someone should be held liable.  This direction 
exemplifies a diffusion of accountability that is a function of modern social 
organisation.136  Harms are separated from responsibility for them.137  Affected 
patients may be unable to pin down the responsibility for the occurrence of the 
adverse event.138  
 
Precisely what is meant by a sincere apology?  Definitions play around with 
apology as an expression of regret but do not acknowledge open and honest 
communication between doctor and patient.  As they stand, sincere expressions of 
regret for patient injury can adopt a defensive position that is incompatible with the 
comprehensiveness of acknowledging responsibility and expressing remorse.  As 
Berlinger observes, without these two aspects, an apology is hollow and will not 
serve to provide patients with the comfort and healing that they need.139   
 
No apology is going to be acceptable to an injured patient unless it is clear that the 
person making the apology is accepting responsibility even if that person is not to 
blame for the occurrence.140  Recent research shows that implementation of open 
disclosure might also be improved if apology laws were broadly consistent across 
jurisdictions.141 
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As Vines points out, an apology is more than mere regret;  a real apology does 
acknowledge responsibility.142  Allan argues that legislators developing legislation 
to encourage apologies in litigation by protecting them from implication of 
liability, rely on five grounds: 
Moral – the harm in tort law is negligence caused by lapses in concentration or 
judgment such that most victims and offenders think an apology to be appropriate in 
the circumstances 
Intangible loss – money cannot undo the harm caused by intangible injuries like pain 
and suffering. 
Economic – the questionable argument that tort litigation in Australia is increasing 
and is not sustainable.  
Efficacy – offenders do not engage directly with their victims because they fear that  
they may, if apologising, admit liability.143 
Therapeutic jurisprudence – there is evidence that victims obtain physical and 
mental health advantages from receiving an apology.144  
 
Berlinger reports a focus study of physicians’ attitudes towards disclosure finding 
that physicians choose their words carefully which can have the effect of 
concealing a mistake rather than admitting it.145  Use of the passive voice and 
technical language serve to shield medical practitioners from facing responsibility 
for injuries caused to patients.  Berlinger reports a conversation from a book 
written by the wife of a man whose hand and forearm had to be amputated after 
two catheters were put in the hand, blocking circulation: 
[t]he neurosurgeon met me in the hall.  He seemed very angry.  “There was a 
mistake,” he said.  “The catheter used to measure arterial gases became clogged, and 
a new catheter was placed on the same hand instead of the other hand.  You never 
put two sticks in one hand.  When the catheter became clogged, circulation was 
blocked through his hand”  He then said, “It wasn’t noticed for twenty-four hours,” 
the passive voice subtly deflecting responsibility from a human agent ...146 
 
Failure to take responsibility derogates from the requirement of truthfulness stated 
in the MBA Code,147 though it should be noted that the MBA Code itself has no 
reference to giving of an apology in its required responses to medical mishaps.148   
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There is also compelling evidence that sincere acknowledgements of responsibility 
and genuine apologies reduce the resort by patients or their families to litigation.149  
As Lord Woolf explained, most times the patient or family member merely wants a 
sincere apology and an assurance that the same adverse event will not happen to 
another patient in the future.150  Non-disclosure of adverse medical events increases 
the likelihood of resort to litigation when a failure to apologise and accept 
responsibility leads to a threat to the trusting relationship between medical 
practitioner and patient.151  Without acknowledgment of the harm caused, 
restoration of the trust violated by the occurrence cannot occur.152  Parker 
comments that sincere apologies are in everyone’s interest.153  
 
Parker reports that examination of the open disclosure policies of the states adopted 
following the National Open Disclosure Standard shows that they are all careful to 
advise medical practitioners to avoid making any apology imply an admission of 
error.154  Whilst these policy statements treat apologies as having a sense of 
expressing sorrow for the patient’s situation, none accepts responsibility.155  To a 
certain extent, this advice is a response to policies of professional indemnity 
insurers that require practitioners to desist from acknowledging any responsibility 
for error.156  There is a fear among medical practitioners and medical indemnity 
insurers that an apology or expression of regret can be used as an admission of 
negligence but this appears to be not necessarily the case.157   
 
This view is supported in a non-medical context by the case of Dovuro v Wilkins158 
where a company had made several apologies to farmers to whom weed-
contaminated seeds had been supplied.  As Kirby J said:  ‘The various apologies, 
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statements of regret and promises of improvement do not, as such, establish the 
claim of negligence against Dovuro.’159  Similarly, Gummow J stated:  ‘The so-
called “admissions” of officers of Dovuro ... provide no basis for a finding of 
negligence in this case.’160  Gleeson CJ agreed with Gummow J about the care that 
should be taken in identifying the precise significance of an admission, especially 
in a situation where the maker of the statement was seeking to retain the goodwill 
of the persons to whom the statement is made.161  As Vines comments, a statement 
made by a party as to a legal conclusion does not establish that conclusion as 
determination of legality is the function of the court.162   
 
In any case, liability for apologies is denied by section 69(2) of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW).  This provision is reflected in varying terminology in the civil 
liability legislation of the ACT,163 Western Australia,164 Victoria165 and 
Tasmania.166  Queensland has provision for both expressions of regret167 and 
apologies168 and provisions confirming that they are not admissible in evidence 
against the person or any organisation.  South Australia has no provision for 
apology but does mention expressions of regret in the context of non-admission of 
liability or fault.169  Similarly, Northern Territory legislation only applies to 
expressions of regret.170  Whilst the legislation is supposed to be uniform, 
differences in expression mean that the consequence for litigants varies between 
jurisdictions.171  The differing provisions have been tabulated in Appendix IVA. 
 
According to Khouri, inadmissibility of apology evidence in litigation is of 
significant benefit to insurers.172  Apology laws predated the civil liability 
legislation that applies in various guises around Australia.  However, as Gallagher 
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et al point out, the predisposition of medical defence insurers to require that the 
people they insure should not ever apologise can cause more trouble than it is 
supposed to prevent, by making it more probable that an injured patient will resort 
to litigation.173 
 
(c) Dealing with Reasonable Expectations of Patients 
Open disclosure is also a means of recognising what the reasonable expectations of 
an injured patient are.174  Letting the patient and the patient's support person know 
what has happened and why, together with a fulsome apology does not deal fully 
with the patient’s needs.  Simple things like ex gratia reimbursement of immediate 
costs is an important indicator that the problem is being taken seriously by 
management and clinical personnel.175  Reasonable expectations of the patient also 
include having a care plan put into place at once to try to reverse or, at least, 
minimise the damage caused by the adverse event and includes offers of 
counselling.176 
 
(d) Communication 
ACSQHC declares that complaints about medical care are, more often than not, the 
result of poor communication between medical practitioner and patient.177  
Therefore, the communication must be made in an empathetic and compassionate 
atmosphere where the patient feels respected and treated with dignity.178  
According to Liang, if the reaction to an adverse event is casual or discourteous, an 
already injured person may be tempted to complain to management, to report to 
disciplinary bodies or to attempt to find ways of wreaking revenge on any person 
who has caused the injury and made it appear as though no-one cares what has 
happened.179 
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Opportunities must also be provided for the patient to ask questions.180  Information 
must be provided in a way that the patient understands and be delivered by the 
most senior medical practitioner involved.181  It is not acceptable to hide behind a 
more junior practitioner.  Phillips-Bute observes that not only is this damaging to 
the young person concerned, it is one way of ensuring that the patient will be so 
emotional and angry that litigation is commenced or at least contemplated.182  The 
most senior person involved is also best able to deal with the ramifications of the 
adverse event and to start to develop a care plan for the future.183  Where a patient 
has nominated a support person, that person must also be present as there may be 
questions that can be dealt with by the senior medical practitioner.  Plans for the 
future may include counselling and support for the support person as well as the 
patient.184    
 
(e) Dignity and Autonomy 
The open disclosure process will not work properly unless it is conducted in full 
recognition of the dignity, autonomy and personhood of the patient.185  An injured 
plaintiff needs disclosure as an indicator of being accorded corrective justice and as 
a way of having dignity restored.186  The inherent hierarchies of medical practice 
may militate against the necessity to show compassion and humility for what has 
occurred.  Adoption of open disclosure practices can provide a way to equalise the 
power imbalance and restore patient dignity.187  People can detect insincerity and 
less than genuine contrition will be more likely to inflame the situation than to 
allow its resolution.188   
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(f) Safety Culture 
Dealing with medical adverse events requires a change in culture within the 
organisation.189  With the wholehearted adoption of open disclosure by 
management must come the embrace of a safety culture.190  This prioritising of 
safety from the top down makes all members of the staff conscious of the necessity 
for safety in all their activities.191  A safety culture must permeate to all levels 
especially clinical staff.192   
 
(g) Endorsement by Learned Colleges 
As the Open Disclosure Standard states, professional associations and learned 
colleges are ideal enablers of principles and practices of open disclosure.193  The 
ideal is reflected in inclusion of open disclosure requirements in their official 
charters, the making of open disclosure a part of clinicians’ responsibilities to their 
patients, and making open disclosure part of ongoing certification and mandatory 
continuing professional development obligations of the learned colleges.194   
 
The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners was a partner with 
ACSQHC in development of the Open Disclosure Standard.195  The Royal 
Australasian College of Physicians has supported mandating the reporting of 
adverse drug reactions to the Therapeutic Goods Administration that is responsible 
for identification of problems with medications.  It advises that the value of 
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reporting lies in the ability to identify previously unknown risks so that necessary 
urgent action can be taken. 196 
 
(h) Good Governance197 
As with Standard 1 of the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards, 
adoption of open disclosure processes requires good governance within the health 
care organisation.198  Good governance will also imbue the open disclosure 
approach with an ethical aspect that should reinforce all processes put in place to 
minimise risk and embrace safety.  From prompt and transparent communication 
and timely acknowledgement to immediately dealing with problems, any adverse 
event can be turned to positive advantage for education.  
 
Key staff within the organisation must be trained in open disclosure processes as 
their involvement in the resolution of any adverse event will be necessary.199  
These staff will be responsible for contact with patient and family but also will be 
pivotal in the development of new safety systems and modification of old ones in 
light of the experience.  The function of these key staff members must also include 
ongoing monitoring of the implementation of open disclosure process and 
reviewing their successes and failures with an eye to change where required.200 
 
(i) Barriers to Implementation of Open Disclosure Principles 
Studdert, Piper and Iedema maintain that fear of medico-legal consequences and 
inadequate education and training are leading barriers to achieving optimal 
outcomes from the adoption of open disclosure processes.201  Lamb adds that, in 
addition, fear of adverse publicity and concern about damage to career and 
reputation among one’s peers are potent barriers to disclosure of adverse events.202  
Studdert and Richardson observe that embarrassment at acknowledging error, and 
uncertainty as to how much information should be disclosed point to the disparity 
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between ethical obligations to report and poor uptake in practice.203  Open 
disclosure is patient-centred and, according to Brazier and Cave, it is necessary to 
put the patient first even if it conflicts with the personal interests of the medical 
practitioner.204   
 
Garbutt et al found that accepted barriers to reporting such as insufficient time, fear 
of punishment, and fear of malpractice litigation did not appear to affect self-
reported reporting behaviours of paediatricians in USA.  They were more likely to 
report when they saw evidence of system improvements.  But the culture of 
medicine itself including the expectation that medical practice must be free of 
errors, tends to put blame on the individual who does not perform perfectly.  When 
these paediatricians felt to blame they were more likely to institute informal 
responses like discussion with colleagues than to report, sometimes appearing to 
think that reporting is unnecessary.205 
 
(j) Non-Threatening Process 
In order to minimise possible emotional harm to good and competent staff, the 
process must be conducted in an atmosphere of support.206  ACSQHC reports that, 
apart from the implications for any person involved in the adverse event, the 
prospect of a blame free process may encourage the reporting of incidents and near 
misses.207  But even a ‘no blame’ culture should incorporate a degree of personal 
accountability.208  In rare cases there will be criminal behaviour or reckless and 
negligent conduct.  But patient harm is usually unintentional rather than the result 
of individual malevolence.209  Making sure that the clinician implicated is 
supported by the system is a helpful strategy because the clinician’s self-belief will 
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be dented.210  Many give up practice rather than face this feeling again, doubting 
their own competence.211 
 
(k) Legal and Insurance Implications 
The aftermath of an adverse event includes not simply the immediate clinical 
requirements, but there are also legal and insurance implications.212  Insurers are 
always insistent that any possible situation that has led to a real or suspected 
adverse event and that might have ramifications for the insurer must be notified at 
the earliest opportunity.213  On the other hand, Lamb warns that care must be taken 
to ensure that the process of timely notification to the insurer does not detract from 
the more important obligation of timely and open communication to the patient.214  
Also, notification to the insurer must not take the place of notification to relevant 
regulatory authorities, but be concurrent with it.215 
 
There are also legal implications to be handled.  If the patient has died then the 
coroner may have to be notified.  There are also possible privileges for information 
obtained during the investigation process, information that cannot be divulged 
because of legal professional privilege.  Documents that come into being for the 
dominant purpose of legal advice may be subject to this privilege.216   
 
4 Duty to Disclose 
Medical practitioners have an ethical obligation to disclose any medical mishap.217  
Failure to disclose an adverse event is the primary barrier to implementation of 
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open disclosure processes.  There may be relatively minor implications of an 
error218 and occasions where the medical practitioner will consider that it is not 
necessary to report, either to the patient or to the health care institution.219  The 
patient might not even have noticed.  But failure to report or disclose leads to 
several outcomes.  Firstly, the data available will be deficient as the figures for 
incidence of adverse events will be skewed and look as though the problem is 
smaller than it is in reality.  Secondly, if there is silence and the patient does 
become aware of a problem, then there will be a devastating blow to the trust of the 
patient, not only in the clinician concerned but in the whole medical system.220  
Any medical practitioner who fails to report an adverse event is being dishonest.221  
Dishonesty undermines the trusting association that is the hallmark of the good 
doctor-patient relationship.222    
 
There will also be occasions where the patient is the one to report that something is 
not quite ‘right’.  The open disclosure system adopted in a health care organisation 
must be able to cope with initiation of open disclosure processes by the patient 
rather than a clinician. 
 
The duty of the medical practitioner to disclose an adverse event both to the patient 
and to appropriate authorities arises in several ways.  It is a code obligation223 that 
is bolstered by the statutory imprimatur given to the code.224  Wu claims that any 
code requirement is supplemented by a more recently recognised ethical obligation 
upon the medical practitioner.225  As exploration of the tenets of open disclosure 
reveals, disclosure of medical errors is the ‘right thing to do’.226  Several 
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commentators declare that the ethical obligation to disclose a medical error is also 
an acknowledgement of the patient’s autonomy.227 
 
Faunce and Bolsin argue that following an adverse event, a patient is in a situation 
of heightened vulnerability.  Therefore, there is a case for attaching a fiduciary 
duty to the obligation to report adverse events.228  The legal obligation to advise a 
patient, prior to any procedure, of all material risks associated with that 
procedure229 should now extend to a fiduciary obligation to disclose any adverse 
events as soon as possible.230  
 
There is now judicial recognition of the duty of the medical practitioner to disclose 
any adverse event as soon as possible.  The case of Wighton v Arnot231 illustrates 
the obligation for prompt disclosure.  A surgeon considered it possible that the 
patient had sustained nerve damage during his surgery on an abscess on the 
patient’s neck.  However, nothing was said and three years had elapsed before it 
was confirmed that nerve damage had been sustained.  By then it was too late for 
remedial action to be taken.  The medical practitioner was not found negligent in 
the performance of the surgery and the dividing of the accessory nerve in the 
process.  What was negligent was the failure to inform the plaintiff.232  His resort to 
the principle of therapeutic privilege as the reason for the failure to inform was not 
accepted by the court.233 
 
In Tasmania, Dr David Edis was reprimanded and suspended for one month, not 
for the spinal surgery carried out on the wrong level, but for failure to disclose it to 
the patient.234 
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In England, in the case of Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority,235 Sir John 
Donaldson MR stated that in professional negligence cases, particularly medical 
negligence cases, there is ‘ ... a duty of candour resting on the professional man.’236 
 
As Madden and Cockburn conclude, in their opinion,  
[i]t is difficult to argue against the recognition in Australia of a broad ethical 
obligation on the part of a medical practitioner to promptly disclose, certainly in a 
clear case, the fact of an adverse event and the possibility of any negligent aspect to 
the treatment.237 
 
5 Conclusion 
It is clear that the former reflex of medical practitioners to ‘retreat behind a sullen 
veil of secrecy’238 when an adverse event has occurred is no longer acceptable.  Not 
only is the outcome for the patient of a failure to disclose potentially a disaster for 
the patient, it also has ongoing implications for the medical practitioner.  Any 
medical practitioner who fails to disclose what has happened, in breach of his or 
her ethical obligations, is at risk of legal and disciplinary consequences.239  But in 
addition, the medical practitioner has to live with the fact of the adverse event and 
the accompanying self-recriminations of substandard professional performance 
both from the fact of the occurrence of the adverse event and from the failure to 
disclose it.  As the Open Disclosure Standard Review Report declares,  
Openly discussing adverse events with patients ... and as a result enabling and 
witnessing their closure and forgiveness, can assist healthcare professionals achieve 
their own closure and ameliorate feelings of shame or guilt.240 
 
Failure to disclose undermines the medical profession’s declaration of its 
trustworthiness.241  Public perceptions of medical practitioners as untrustworthy 
have been present in publicity concerning medical scandals.242 
 
However, most practitioners would prefer that they never have to face the prospect 
of invoking open disclosure following an adverse incident.  One way of minimising 
                                                      
235 Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353. 
236 Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353, 360 (Sir John Donaldson MR). 
237 Bill Madden and Tina Cockburn, 'Duty to Disclose Medical Error in Australia' (2005) 14 
Australian Health Law Bulletin 13, 18. 
238 Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 61. 
239 Tasmanian Board of the Medical Board of Australia v Dr David Edis [2014] TASHPT 1. 
240 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Open Disclosure Standard Review 
Report (June 2012) 44. 
241 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [3.10]. 
242 See eg, Thomas A Faunce and Stephen N C Bolsin 'Three Australian Whistleblowing Sagas: 
Lessons for Internal and External Regulation' (2004) 181 MJA 44. 
 311 
the risks that medical practitioners face every day would be greater adoption of 
checklists, and it is to a consideration of their benefits to which this chapter now 
turns. 
 
E HOW WIDER USE OF CHECKLISTS CAN ENHANCE SAFETY 
 
1 Introduction 
Donabedian describes quality assurance as ‘ ... all actions taken to establish, 
protect, promote, and improve the quality of health care’.243  In his view, the key 
object of quality assurance should be the performance of medical practitioners 
when they are caring for patients.244  The actions that are required to ‘establish and 
protect’ lie, firstly, in determining protocols to achieve quality to specified 
standards of excellence.245  The second part of the process is the actions to 
‘promote and improve’, namely to ensure that the protocols are consistently 
applied.  As Donabedian states: ‘ ... it is ... necessary to have a formal predictable 
monitoring activity ... uniformly implemented ... .’246  That is where checklists can 
assist.  Showing that each factor has been considered and achieved is ideally 
demonstrated by the ‘tick box’ behaviour associated with checklists.   
 
American Surgeon, Atul Gawande has been an enthusiastic promoter of checklists 
as a way of reducing avoidable errors in medical practice.247  Checklists are 
designed to eliminate those simple steps that can easily be forgotten but which may 
have catastrophic consequences if not implemented.  Checklists can operate in any 
context where strict compliance with protocols is essential for quality, safety and 
operational issues.  As discussed in Chapter III, the requirement for all health care 
institutions to be accredited to the National Safety and Quality Health Service 
Standards248 introduces to all aspects of health service organisations the necessity 
for checklists.   
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The centrality of checklists in achieving safe and quality practice lies in Standard 1 
of the ten standards in the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards 
that requires ‘[A]n organisation-wide management system ... for the development, 
implementation and regular review of policies, procedures and/or protocols.’249  
For example, Standard 6.1, ‘Clinical Handover’ provides that this criterion will be 
achieved by: 
Developing and implementing an organisational system for structured clinical 
handover that is relevant to the healthcare setting and specialties, including: 
 documented policy, procedures and/or protocols 
 agreed tools and guides.250 
 
As the literature attests, errors are not limited to institutional settings and the 
adoption of checklists by individual practitioners could be a simple but effective 
way for medical practitioners to standardise their processes and provide safe, 
quality patient-centred care.  Consequently, this section will argue that a simple, 
yet effective method for promoting quality and safety in medical practice is the 
wider adoption of checklists.   
 
This section commences by examining evidence for the efficacy of checklists in 
assuring safe, quality medical practice.  That review is followed by considering 
some ways that checklists can be implemented in practice.  The following part will 
deal with barriers to wider adoption of checklists by medical professionals.  
Finally, the section concludes that checklists are so important to the promotion of 
safe and quality practice that they should not be considered as trivial tools but that 
medical schools should be educating their students in the benefits of their regular 
use. 
 
2 How Checklists Can Promote Safety and Quality 
In 2006, Gawande was asked by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to lead the 
development of a surgical safety checklist.251  WHO was concerned about the 
dramatic increase in surgical procedures world-wide and had perceived that much 
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of it was unsafe.252  Gawande looked at the figures and found that the number of 
surgical procedures throughout the world had overtaken childbirth but the death 
rate was many times higher, leaving millions of people throughout the world either 
dead or disabled.253 
 
Gawande and his group eventually developed a checklist involving 19 items, and 
divided it to be used in three stages, the Sign in (before administration of 
anaesthesia), the Time out (before skin excision) and the Sign out (before the 
patient leaves the operating theatre).254  The WHO checklist was trialled in eight 
hospitals around the world, including high-, middle- and low-income countries.255  
It was found that ‘ ... a checklist based program was associated with a significant 
decline in the rate of complications and death from surgery in a diverse group of 
institutions around the world’.256 
 
Checklists have been an essential tool in the achievement of the safety record of 
the aviation industry.  They are also used in building projects257 and other 
industries where safety is critical as it should be in medical practice.  There is now 
substantial evidence that introduction of surgical safety checklists has reduced 
mortality and morbidity in surgery patients.258  But checklists can extend to more 
facets of medical practice than surgery.  
  
Atul Gawande maintains that there are three sorts of problems in the world — 
simple, complicated and complex.259  Medical practice creates problems of great 
complexity.  Among the simplest and most effective methods of minimising errors 
in medical practice is to adopt checklists as a way of supplementing technical 
knowledge and judgement.  As he points out, in complex environments there are 
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two possible human failings.  The first is the fallibility of human memory, 
especially with regard to routine matters when more complex events are unfolding.  
The second is that some simple steps can, in some circumstances, be omitted.260  
Likewise, Winters et al observe that influential research has shown that our minds 
can only retrieve up to seven pieces of information and when we are tired or 
stressed that can drop to three.261  Checklists can catch the mental flaws to which 
we are all subject, namely deficiencies in memory, attention and thoroughness.262  
 
In addition to catching omissions due to memory lapses, checklists also have other 
advantages.  A widely-recognised advantage263 is the improvement in 
communication between team members that leads to clear demarcation of the tasks 
and responsibilities of each person in the team.  Gillespie and Marshall state that 
any safety checklist should intend to ‘ ... improve work processes through better 
team communications’.264  Good communication is imperative because, as Winters 
et al observe: ‘ ... miscommunication is common and a major contributor to 
medical error.265  Similarly, Pitcher et al note that: [m]iscommunication is a major 
source of patient dissatisfaction ... and a major contributor to clinical error’.266  
Research has also shown that checklists can flatten the hierarchy267 that is often a 
feature of medical teams268 and empowers junior practitioners and nurses to remind 
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more senior practitioners to adhere to relevant safety procedures.269  Checklists can 
also act as an aide memoire so that important matters are not forgotten.270  Their 
adoption also goes with the internalising of a safety culture for medical 
procedures.271 
 
A qualitative study carried out to check experience after two years with the WHO 
Surgical Safety Checklist concluded that, despite evidence that wrong-site surgeries 
were still occurring: 
All professions recognise the checklist as an element that enhances safety in the OR 
[operating room], and increasingly so as it has become an integral part of the daily 
routines.  However, challenges that need to be addressed include making the Sign-in 
part a team effort, making room for pause in performance during the Time-out and 
Sign-out and cross-checking in order to avoid automated use of the checklist’.272 
 
Verdaasonk et al reviewed the literature and suggested that introduction of a 
surgical safety checklist should provide: 
 a defense [sic] strategy to prevent human errors 
 a memory aid to enhance task performance 
 standardization of the tasks to facilitate team coordination 
 a means to create and maintain a safety culture in the operating room 
 support [of] quality control by hospital management, government, and 
inspectors.273 
 
However, checklists need not be restricted to surgery.  Winters et al comment that 
checklists can be ‘ ... applied to the whole spectrum of the care process’.274  The 
function of a medical practitioner can be divided into diagnosis, treatment and 
monitoring, each of which can be further divided into decision (whether and what 
to do), execution (carrying the process out) and interpretation (what is the result 
and what does it mean).  Errors can occur anywhere on this spectrum and 
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checklists can be introduced to standardise processes and reduce errors.275  
Anaesthetists have long been using checklists to check that their equipment is 
operating satisfactorily.276  
 
3 Ways of Implementing Checklists in Practice 
What becomes apparent in the relevant literature is that satisfactory adoption of the 
use of checklists is not dependent on their implementation being mandated by 
management.  As elaborated below, acceptance of the benefits of checklist use has 
many facets including, education, commitment by senior medical practitioners and 
local modification of checklists to adapt to prevailing practices.  As the discussion 
of electronic record keeping in Chapter III has shown, computer programs can 
become a kind of checklist or aide memoire that can see medical practitioners 
having to advert to particular important matters in making a detailed record of 
patient contacts.  Reed et al also tested a novel tool, an audio system that reminded 
members of the medical team when various procedures had to be performed.277 
 
An important and evidence-based source of information about treatment protocols 
is issued as guidelines by the Medical Board of Australia and the learned specialty 
colleges.  Guidelines to best practice in a wide variety of circumstances are 
important benchmarks by which to measure professional behaviour.  Some of these 
guidelines could be issued in the form of checklists.  As Chapter III has shown, 
courts and tribunals refer to codes and guidelines as the touchstone for good 
medical practice, in other words, for professionalism.278  In the United States, 
adherence to guidelines can be used as ‘safe harbors [sic]’ to protect medical 
practitioners from malpractice claims.  As Mello, Studdert and Kachalia comment: 
[P]hysicians who adhere to a preapproved clinical practice guideline should be able 
to use compliance as a strong, if not impenetrable, shield against malpractice claims.  
Safe harbors continue to attract attention because they offer a potential two-for-one 
                                                      
275 Bradford D Winters et al, 'Clinical Review: Checklists – Translating Evidence into Practice' (2009) 
13 Critical Care 210 (6). 
276 Bradford D Winters et al, 'Clinical Review: Checklists – Translating Evidence into Practice' (2009) 
13 Critical Care 210 (3);  David M Gaba, 'Anaesthesiology as a Model for Patient Safety in Health 
Care' (2000) 320 BMJ 785, 786;  Paul O’Connor et al, 'Surgical Checklists: the Human Factor' (2013) 
7 Patient Safety in Surgery 14 (5);  E G G Verdaasdonk et al, 'Requirements for the Design and 
Implementation of Checklists for Surgical Processes' (2009) 23 Surgical Endoscopy 715, 717;  
Bradford D Winters et al, 'Clinical Review: Checklists – Translating Evidence into Practice' (2009) 
13 Critical Care 210 (5). 
277 Sophie Reed et al, 'Does a Novel Method of Delivering the Safe Surgical Checklist Improve 
Compliance?  A Closed Loop Audit' (2016) 32 International Journal of Surgery 99, 100. 
278 See eg, Medical Board of Australia v Hocking and Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] 
ACAT 44;  Dr A v Health District (No 2) [2014] NSWIRComm 50;  Medical Board of Australia v 
Kanapathipillai [2016] ACAT 16;  Medical Board of Australia and Veettill [2015] WASAT 124;  
Alroe v Medical Board of Australia [2015] QCAT 482;  Crickitt v Medical Council of NSW (No 2) 
[2015] NSWCATOD 115;  Medical Board of Australia v Mbo [2015] ACAT 69. 
 317 
policy benefit: they address physicians’ concerns over nonmeritorious lawsuits, and 
by providing an incentive to follow evidence-based guidelines, they may address 
current gaps in guideline adherence and improve healthcare quality’.279 
 
By issuing each guideline in the form of a checklist, not only will it be easy for the 
medical practitioner to adhere to all the requirements of the guideline, but to also 
prove that he or she has done so.  As Mello and her colleagues claim, healthcare 
quality also would be enhanced. 
 
The importance of education and training of all participants has been emphasised 
by several researchers.280  Vats et al pointed out that successful implementation of a 
checklist was dependent on training.281  Pitcher et al conclude that the use of a 
checklist not only improves consideration of care, but that cannot be confirmed 
without the documentation a checklist provides and that; [i]integral to this process 
is education and reinforcement by all team members’.282  O’Connor et al observed 
that training raised the frequency of implementation of checklists dramatically.283  
Similarly, Hannam et al noted that a model of what is necessary to establish good 
checklist practice included comprehensive education.284 
 
Both Hannam and O’Connor and their colleagues also commented that satisfactory 
implementation of checklist use was highly dependent on ‘ ... engagement of 
relevant leadership “champions”’285 or ‘[d]emonstrated support ... from senior 
personnel’.286  Similarly, O’Connor et al proposed a regulatory pyramid that 
required the engagement of opinion leaders.287 
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Several researchers commented on the greater acceptance of checklists when they 
were modified to deal with local conditions or practices.  Gillespie and Marshall 
stated that tailoring should not only deal with local context but should also ‘ 
...address barriers’.288  Winters et al emphasised the need to incorporated local data, 
and local beliefs and experience into the process for developing a checklist for any 
clinical purpose.289  Vats et al commented that successful implementation of a 
checklist required support for essential local adaptations.290  Hannam et al 
suggested that: ‘Optimisation of checklist design to suit local circumstances may 
also be important and provides an opportunity to involve checklist users with its 
development’.291 
 
The importance of local adaptations has been recognised by WHO.  The Royal 
Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS) has prepared and promulgated a 
Surgical Safety Checklist and refers its members to the Implementation Manual of 
the World Health Organisation.292  The RACS Surgical Safety Checklist has been 
adapted from the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.  The Implementation Manual 
clearly states that:  ‘[t]he Checklist is not a regulatory device or a component of 
official policy: it is intended as a tool for use by clinicians interested in improving 
the safety of their operation and reducing unnecessary surgical deaths and 
complications.’293  The Implementation Manual also states that:  [t]he checklist is 
not intended to be comprehensive.  Additions and modifications to fit local practice 
are encouraged’,294 a direction echoed in the RACS Surgical Safety Checklist. 
 
4 Barriers to Wider Adoption of Checklists 
As this part details, some of the barriers to wider adoption of checklists in medical 
practice include disengagement by medical practitioners, that their use takes up too 
much time in an already busy work schedule, that the steep hierarchy in medical 
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practice means that nurses are discouraged from taking charge of the process, 
engagement by senior practitioners is necessary and that use of checklists is merely 
a ‘tick box’ exercise.  In addition, some parts of the WHO model were not 
followed because no-one was taking relevant responsibility. 
 
A potent barrier is disengagement by some medical practitioners who appear to 
feel that something so simple as a checklist is tantamount to insult as they do not 
need to be reminded of basic procedures.  Gawande reports that when checklists 
were first proposed in the United States, uptake was slow.  ‘Some physicians were 
offended by the notion that they needed checklists’.295  ‘Charts and checklists, 
that’s nursing stuff — boring stuff.  They are nothing that we doctors, with our 
extra years of training and specialization, would ever need or use’.296  Introduction 
of checklists by hospital safety officers are regarded by some physicians ‘ ... as an 
irritant, as interference on our terrain.  This is my patient.  This is my operating 
room.  And the way I carry out an operation is my business and my responsibility.  
Who do these people think they are, telling me what to do?’297  Similarly, Winters 
et al have commented that physicians have resisted using checklists on the basis 
that relying on a checklist is an insult to their intelligence and they doubt whether 
checking boxes will prevent medical mistakes.  They ‘ ... believe they know their 
job ... ’ and that they do not need prompts.298  Haugen et al report that surgeons are 
the most reluctant to use a checklist.299  Similarly, Vats et al noted that some 
consultant surgeons were not very enthusiastic.300 
 
Another criticism is that completing a checklist takes up too much time.  Reed et al 
described results from a French study where staff in half the centres surveyed 
reported that the checklist took too long to complete, they were already under 
heavy work pressures and they could not see any benefit from the process.301  
However, as Pitcher et al observed: ‘ ... once the use of the checklist became 
routine, extra time was minimal’.  Possible extra time might be well-spent when 
considered against reduction in calls regarding what orders, management or 
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discharge plans were in place.302  This observation points up how inconsistent 
delivery of relevant services may lead to omission of necessary items.303 
 
When Vats et al carried out their pilot survey concerning the practical challenges of 
introducing the WHO checklist, they noted that the ‘steep hierarchy’ in most 
operating theatres was a barrier to nurses being in charge of completing a checklist, 
and that implementation was much more carefully attended to when surgeons or 
anaesthetists were receptive to their use.304  Similarly, Pitcher et al pointed out that 
their survey showed that encouragement by consultants and registrars was 
important in the adoption of checklists to facilitate the handover process.305 
 
Another observation by Reed et al concerning a French study, was that one-quarter 
of the centres studied stated that items were ticked off when they had not been 
checked, because of time pressures and also to satisfy auditors that the checklists 
were being used.306  Vats et al also reported that some teams saw use of the surgical 
safety checklist as merely a tick box exercise.307  Haugen et al counsel that 
practitioners must engage with the checklist process and avoid automated use of 
checklists.308  
 
Reed et al found that, in many of the cases they studied, adopting the sign out 
aspect of the WHO checklist was not occurring.  It appeared that nobody was 
taking responsibility for it, and that members of the team were either disappearing 
or becoming engaged in other activities.309  Both Vats et al310 and Haugen et al 
emphasised the importance of Time Out and Sign Out aspects of the WHO 
checklist both as a way of completing the checklist process and as a way of cross-
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checking with all members of the team.311  Without some-one taking responsibility, 
the omission of the step could lead to failure to notice that some important step had 
not been carried out. 
 
Hannam et al noted in passing that it was essential to maintain commitment, or the 
attention needed for appropriate use of checklists may well diminish over time.312 
 
5 Conclusion 
The safety benefits of the use of checklists have been widely reported.313  Hannam 
et al commented that their investigation of previous studies provided data 
supporting the contention that compliance with the surgical safety checklist 
impacts potential safety benefits.314  Haugen et al’s study confirmed that use of the 
surgical safety checklist could optimise safety and improve the safety culture.315 
 
Safety in the practice of medicine is not limited to surgery, but embraces all 
contacts between patient and health practitioner.  As the above account shows, use 
of checklists can be adapted to local conditions and to varying aspects of health 
care.  Their use in all health care organisations is mandated by the National Safety 
and Quality Health Service Standards but it is clear that their adoption can extend 
to individual practitioners for all matters including diagnosis, provision of advice 
and implementation of treatment protocols.  Safe medicine shows the concern for 
the patient required by the elements of patient-centred care. 
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F CONCLUSIONS 
 
The legal and ethical duty of medical practitioners is to make the care of patients 
their first priority.  These obligations are coupled with the more recent emphasis on 
the concept of patient-centred care in all aspects of medical practice as a way to 
enhance quality medical practice.  In addition, the importance of patient-centred 
care in promoting the safety of patients has been demonstrated.  Attention to 
patient safety is imperative if the disturbingly high incidence of iatrogenic injury in 
the Australian health care system is to be pared back.  An essential safety culture 
has sometimes been missing in day to day clinical activities.  Whilst by no means 
are medical practitioners implicated in all adverse events, the most serious 
problems are directly or indirectly related to the activities of medical practitioners.  
Failure to deal openly with injured patients is a prime example of the self-
interest/altruism dichotomy316 inherent in the gap between the requirement for 
patient-centred care and the reality of patient experience. 
 
Risk management is essential in medical practice.317  Medical practice is inherently 
hazardous318 so systems must be developed to make sure that risks do not 
eventuate, but if they do, that their seriousness is minimised.319  The first thing to 
do is to recognise where the riskiest aspects of medical practice lie.320  However, it 
is not possible to design systems without data collection.321  The best way to collect 
necessary data is to have adverse events and near misses reported.322  This must 
occur every time an adverse event is identified or the figures will be skewed.  Near 
misses must be reported for the same reason.323  Information from near misses can 
be a potent learning tool.324   
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It is never possible to have totally risk-free practice but dangers can be minimised.  
Medical practice can learn from other industries like engineering325 or aviation326 
that operate within a safety culture that dominates all their activities.  Aviation and 
engineering are dealing with safety.  Despite the intimacy of the doctor/patient 
relationship, doctors must adopt a safety culture and checklists are essential tools to 
make sure nothing is missed.  In Chapter III, Healy observed that high-risk 
industries assume both human fallibility and system fallibility.  Checklists are 
designed to minimise human and system fallibility that are directly applicable to 
medical practice. 
 
Checklists are an integral part of safety systems.  Adverse events of any kind 
(including near misses) are analysed by those dangerous industries and the best 
ways of preventing recurrence are then designed.  As adverse events continue to 
occur, modifications can be made to the safety plan and relevant checklists.  It is 
essential that everyone involved is conscious of the culture of safety.  Patients are 
entitled to safe health care.327 
 
Adopting the principles of open disclosure is a legal and ethical imperative for 
medical practitioners.  Medical practitioners are not always responsible for adverse 
events that occur, but the way the aftermath is handled is an ethical duty.  As the 
cases of Wighton v Arnot,328 Dr David Edis329 and Dr Malone 330 show, failure to 
report and adopt open disclosure principles can be the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings under the National Law where examples of deficient practices can 
influence compliance by medical practitioners with their open disclosure 
obligations.  Disciplinary bodies should take a stringent stance about reporting 
failures. 
 
One way of making sure that reports are made when the circumstances require is to 
introduce regulatory techniques such as making open disclosure part of contracts 
for employment of clinical staff.  A further option is enhancing education about 
open disclosure in medical schools, that could be achieved by the Medical Board of 
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Australia through its accreditation processes for medical schools, and health 
service providers.  If the proposed revalidation system for medical practitioners is 
adopted in Australia, one module in the necessary appraisals could be a 
requirement to demonstrate familiarity with, and adoption of, the principles and 
practices of open disclosure. 
 
However, as is clear from the discussion in this chapter, separating the event from 
blame is a way of enhancing compliance with open disclosure principles such as 
the requirement to report.  Emphasising the safety aspects inherent in the 
requirement to report over any allocation of blame has been shown by evidence of 
improved reporting from airline pilots.331  Therefore, it is worth investigating how 
blame can be decoupled from assigning responsibility for an adverse event.  Thus, 
it is pertinent to ask whether the time has come for the adoption of a scheme of ‘no 
fault’ compensation for all injuries, including those incurred through medical error.  
This possibility was canvassed in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER VII: LESSONS FOR A PATIENT-CENTRED 
FUTURE FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE AND 
CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis set out to examine whether the law can enforce quality patient-centred 
care in Australia.  It argued that there is a gap between the rhetoric of patient-
centred care and the reality of patient experience and suggested that this gap could 
be minimised if there were a closer adherence to the ideals and tenets of medical 
professionalism.  It also argued that observance of the principles of medical 
professionalism leads to quality patient-centred medical practice.  Good medical 
practice is patient-centred.1  Good medical practice epitomises medical 
professionalism.  The Medical Board of Australia’s, Good Medical Practice: A 
Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia (the MBA Code) sets out principles and 
standards which must be observed by all medical practitioners and observes that 
‘[p]rofessionalism embodies all the qualities described here, and includes self-
awareness and self-reflection’.2  
 
Part A of this chapter reviews the main arguments of each preceding chapter and 
looks at changes that could be achieved through hard law and soft law approaches 
that would bring about a patient-centred approach.   
 
Part B then proceeds to reiterate the significance of this research and its 
contribution to the literature whilst Part C makes some suggestions for future 
research where patient-centred care may provide new insights.  Part D is an 
epilogue. 
 
A CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter I argued that the conceptual basis for patient-centred care lies in its affinity 
with medical professionalism.  It also analysed three important concepts which 
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arose frequently throughout the discussion in this thesis, duty, quality and patient-
centred care. 
 
Given the importance of medical professionalism, Chapter II commenced by 
examining what is encompassed in the idea of medical professionalism.  Charters 
of medical professionalism and codes of ethics have urged adherence to 
professional norms but medical practice still exhibits examples of dismissive 
behaviour towards patients, humiliation of students and bullying of colleagues all 
of which depreciate professional ideals.  Multiple factors that divert attention from 
the patient are at work in day-to-day medical practice;  some of these have been 
learned or absorbed during the training process and reinforced during ongoing 
medical experience.  
 
Chapter II explained that the values of integrity, truthfulness, dependability and 
compassion are promoted by medical practitioner bodies and their codes as being 
as important as technical competence.3  The chapter proposed that one way to 
internalise the ideals expressed in medical codes and charters could be a greater 
emphasis on the teaching of medical ethics.  It also argued that the Giving Voice to 
Values method has been shown to be an effective way of instilling ethical values.   
 
While provisions in the codes permit medical practitioners to decline to perform 
legally-available medical procedures based upon a conscientious objection, those 
provisions can conflict with other provisions promoting the primacy of the patient.  
As Dickens observes, the resort to conscientious objection to deprive some patients 
of necessary medical care is tantamount to elevating a protection for medical 
practitioners to the status of an assault on the rights of some patients.4  This is 
especially so where the government has bestowed on doctors a practical and legal 
monopoly.  Currently missing in Australia is any obligation to refer the patient 
(and the patient’s records) to another practitioner who would be prepared to 
perform the procedure refused.  The MBA Code should be amended to make 
referral to another practitioner a code responsibility, as it is for United Kingdom 
medical practitioners.  The Medical Board of Australia (MBA) should also make it 
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a requirement for medical practitioners to put up a notice in their waiting rooms 
advising patients about procedures that will not be undertaken on conscientious 
grounds. 
 
Chapter III explored the regulatory regime for medical practitioners in Australia.  
The provisions of the Australia-wide Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 
(the National Law) are augmented by a raft of soft law policies embodied in codes, 
guidelines, charters, standards, frameworks and directions that have the purpose of 
influencing the behaviour of those being regulated in order to achieve government 
regulatory goals.  As was evident in Chapter III, use of soft law instruments 
provides flexibility to, and speed of response by, regulators faced with changing 
events in complex regulatory environments like the health care system.   
 
The principles of Responsive Regulation5 promote regulatory goals through 
persuasion backed by sanctions.  Courts and tribunals are authorised by section 41 
of the National Law to refer to codes and guidelines as evidence of what, in any 
circumstance, constitutes professional behaviour, including whether negligent care 
has been exhibited.  The success of national regulatory legislation for health 
practitioners suggests that there are other areas of the law controlling the behaviour 
of medical practitioners which might be enhanced by national legislation.   
 
Chapter III showed that two recurring problems found in disciplinary cases dealt 
with by tribunals were inadequate record keeping and deficient clinical knowledge.  
Chapter III contended that more detail is required in medical records to protect 
both practitioner and patient.  Detailed patient records are also necessary to support 
professional colleagues who must assume management of a patient.  Chapter III 
also advocated a need for the MBA to mandate computerised record keeping to 
prompt practitioners about matters that should be recorded.  It particularly 
recommended that a paragraph similar to Clause 1(f) of the New South Wales 
regulations be incorporated into the MBA Code.  Clause 1(f) compels medical 
practitioners to record the outcome of any treatment regimen.  Computerised 
medical records would also be a basis for the proposed centralised system of 
medical records.  Furthermore, Chapter III argued strongly in favour of the 
introduction in Australia of a system of revalidation of medical practitioners as is 
in existence in the United Kingdom.  Revalidation, even if strongly linked to 
                                                      
5 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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continuing professional development obligations, is the best way to make sure that 
each medical practitioner on the roll is up-to-date and fit to practise. 
 
Chapter IV explored some cases where the law appears to have been complicit in 
the subjugation of the interests of patients to practitioner concerns.  Firstly, the 
medical profession has long insisted that any proposed treatment protocol should 
be based on the judgement of a ‘responsible body of medical opinion’ in 
accordance with the Bolam case.6  Yet, every patient will have a number of non-
medical matters to take into consideration, matters that will influence whether he or 
she will proceed with a recommended treatment.  Chapter IV argued that 
paternalistic attitudes and decisions invoked by medical practitioners without 
necessarily regarding patient wishes are no longer acceptable.   
 
Chapter IV then scrutinised the requirement that medical practitioners obtain the 
consent of their patients before the commencement of any treatment.  It noted that 
consent is not just a formality to be observed as a way of shielding the practitioner 
from litigation.  Proper consent involves providing the patient with sufficient 
relevant information so the patient can make an informed choice about available 
options, including the option not to accept medical treatment at all.  Courts have, 
on occasion, assisted some medical practitioners to override patient choice, by 
doubting the mental capacity of a patient who has elected a course of action not 
recommended by the medical practitioner.  This has occurred despite careful 
judicial formulation of detailed tests to determine mental capacity.  Such tests 
ignore Lord Donaldson’s pronouncement in In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),7 
that the decision of a patient should be respected whether it appears rational or not.  
This section concluded that consent is so fundamental to patient-centred medical 
practice that it should always be honoured even if the outcome from withholding of 
consent is the death of the patient. 
 
Chapter IV also contended that civil liability legislation throughout Australia, 
passed in the wake of the Ipp Inquiry, has made it much more difficult for patients 
with valid claims for medically-caused injury to be properly compensated.8  As a 
result, injured patients, who cannot obtain compensation through the tort system, 
must rely on the social welfare safety net.  However, the ‘reforms’ have achieved a 
                                                      
6 See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587 (McNair J). 
7 In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 115. 
8 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report). 
 329 
stabilisation of premiums for medical practitioners in accordance with the Ipp 
terms of reference.  Incidentally, according to Faunce, the ‘reforms’ have also 
guaranteed good profits to medical indemnity insurers.9  
 
Chapter IV noted that the Ipp Panel had recommended that proposed civil liability 
legislation should be harmonised between jurisdictions10 even if it is not identical.  
The current matrix of differing legislation discriminates between patients, 
depending on the State in which the injury occurs and and the circumstances of it, 
resulting in complications for solicitors who are advising injured clients.  In 
addition, insurance companies have difficulties in setting insurance premiums.  
Chapter IV recommended that harmonisation of legislation should still be 
undertaken. 
 
Chapter IV also made a case for a National Injuries Insurance Scheme of ‘no fault’ 
compensation to be introduced in Australia.  Severing the link between 
compensation and the tort system would mean that fulfilling the needs of all 
injured patients’ would be the prime focus.11  ‘No fault’ compensation could 
achieve several goals all of which align with patient-centred care principles, in that 
it would: 
 encourage the reporting of of medical mishaps, particularly where injury is caused 
to the patient; 
 foster a climate of quality improvement; 
 facilitate the disciplining of incompetent or dangerous medical practitioners; 
 reinforce the candour and probity of the doctor-patient relationship; 
 expedite the compensation of injured patients in a manner which is fair and 
sustainable.12  
 
Chapter V explored how observance of instructions given in advance directives can 
be undermined by medical and legislative obstacles.  The Australian Health 
Ministers’ Advisory Council has promoted mechanisms to permit competent 
                                                      
9 Thomas Faunce, 'Disclosure of Material Risk as Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648;  [2013] HCA 19' (2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53, 62. 
10 The Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (September 2002) 
(the Ipp Report) [2.2], also [13.8–13.14]. 
11 However, the proposed National Injury Insurance Scheme has been quietly put aside.  Antony 
Scholefield,  'Ministers Dump No-Fault Insurance Scheme' Australian Doctor (Online) (16 June 
2017) <https://www.australiandoctor.com.au/news/latest-news/ministers-dump-no-fault-insurance-
scheme>.  COAG Communiqué, 9 June 2017: ‘Leaders agreed with Treasurers advice not to proceed 
with a medical treatment stream of the National Injury Insurance Scheme (NIIS) at this time. Leaders 
asked Treasurers to review the cost implications of this decision in the context of the Productivity 
Commission Review of NDIS Costs. Leaders also asked Treasurers, in consultation with the 
Disability Reform Council, for advice on a general accident stream of the NIIS for the first COAG of 
2018.’ 
12 David M Studdert and Troyen A Brennan, 'No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The 
Prospect for Error Prevention' (2001) 286 JAMA 217, 219. 
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individuals to give directions about health and social care preferences in 
anticipation of being unable to do so in the future.  Parliaments in Australia and the 
United Kingdom have legislated relevant procedures.  The mere fact of thinking 
about future contingencies improves communication both with family members 
and with health practitioners.13  However, some legislation circumscribes strict 
observance of the terms of an advance directive by health practitioners whilst 
courts have not always upheld their provisions.  The fact that the patient might die 
if doctors follow directions in an advance directive has sometimes raised a question 
as to whether that patient had legal capacity at the time the advance directive was 
made.   
 
Chapter V recommended that the law governing preparation, interpretation and 
implementation of advance directives should be at least be harmonised if not made 
identical throughout all the Australian jurisdictions.  Similar legislative 
requirements would enhance their adoption nationwide and prevent 
misunderstandings, especially by health practitioners, as to what is permitted in one 
or other jurisdiction.  Education of undergraduates in medical schools and graduate 
medical practitioners would also assist.  Making sure that the law surrounding 
advance directives was part of continuing professional development obligations is 
one way of ensuring better understanding.  The Victorian Legal and Social Issue 
Committee recommended a government-funded public awareness campaign 
including for advance directives.14  The Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory 
Council recommended that government policies should require health, mental and 
aged care facilities have clear procedures for recording the existence of advance 
care planning documents.15  This chapter proposed that it should be compulsory for 
every person being admitted to any health care environment, not just aged care 
facilities, to have an advance directive or enduring power of attorney.  The 
existence and terms of one of these instruments could also be part of the proposed 
national system of electronic records.   
 
                                                      
13 See eg, Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care 
Planning - 2006 [1.1],  [3.4];  Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework 
for Advance Care Directives (at September 2011) 4, 25.  In its issue of 27 April 2017, The Economist 
argues for more conversations about people’s wishes as death approaches, as a way to make the dying 
process less traumatic for most patients. 
14 Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council, Inquiry into End of 
Life Choices (Final Report, June 2016) 146. 
15 Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, A National Framework for Advance Care 
Directives (at September 2011) [5.3]. 
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Chapter VI examined the problem of how health care practitioners respond to the 
high incidence of medically caused (iatrogenic) injury in Australia.  Despite the 
legal and ethical duty to make the care of the patient the medical practitioner’s first 
priority and to practise patient-centred medicine, these obligations can be brushed 
aside when an adverse medical event occurs, raising the conflict between 
practitioner and patient interests.  Adopting the principles of open disclosure is a 
legal and ethical imperative for medical practitioners.  As the cases of Wighton v 
Arnot,16 Dr David Edis17 and now Dr Malone18 show, failure to report and adopt 
open disclosure principles can be the subject of disciplinary proceedings under the 
National Law.19 
 
Adverse medical events should be better managed than they are at present.  Despite 
the obligation in the MBA Code to implement open disclosure procedures at once, 
there is recent evidence that open disclosure is not always being promptly 
initiated.20  Students in medical schools need better education concerning open 
disclosure obligations.  Practitioners also need continuing professional 
development reinforcing the duty of open disclosure.  Employed health 
practitioners should be contractually bound to implement open disclosure protocols 
for any medical mishap.  Emphasis on open disclosure education should also stress 
that reporting of all adverse events and near misses is imperative.  Failure to report 
should be should be dealt with by disciplinary tribunals as serious professional 
misconduct. 
 
Further, the MBA Code should also require medical practitioners to issue an 
apology.  Harmonising state and territory legislation to confirm that an apology 
does not imply fault would encourage such a change to be made.   
 
Last but certainly not least, wider adoption of checklists for even straightforward 
medical procedures would, as the research has shown, produce a dramatic 
reduction in iatrogenic injuries.  All health service organisations must now be 
                                                      
16 Wighton v Arnot [2005] NSWSC 637. 
17 Tasmanian Board of the Medical Board of Australia v Dr David Edis [2014] TASHPT 1. 
18 Staff Writer, 'Surgeon Botches Spinal Surgery Then Misleads GP and Patient', Medical Observer 
(Online) (28 September 2016) <http://www.medicalobserver.com.au/professional-news/surgeon-
botches-spinal-surgery-then-misleads-gp-and-patient>. 
19 Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia 
(at March 2014) [3.10.5], [6.2.1]. 
20 See eg, Inquiry under Section 122 of the Health Services Act 1997, Off-Protocol Prescribing of 
Chemotherapy for Head and Neck Cancers, Interim Report, (31 March 2016) [29] and [62].   
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accredited to the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards.21  The 
protocols for accreditation require 256 actions under 10 standards.  Because of the 
variety of health service delivery models, flexibility is permitted.22  However, the 
regulators can require that the key criteria for each of the actions should be in the 
form of a checklist.  For example, compliance with Standard 3, Preventing and 
Controlling Healthcare Associated Infections requires the development and regular 
monitoring of ‘policies, procedures and/or protocols’.23  Demonstrating compliance  
with the relevant protocols is simpler using a checklist.24  The ACSQHC paper on 
Patient-Centred Care provided checklists for organisations to assess their 
‘readiness to implement patient-centred care’.25  Likewise, clinical protocols issued 
by the learned colleges should be in the form of checklists.  
 
B SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
This thesis concludes that the law (both soft and hard) has a role to play in 
enforcing quality in patient centred care.  That role does not have to be disruptive 
or revolutionary;  however, nor does this thesis display an intention to disrupt or 
revolutionise medical practice  Rather, one of its key points is that a number of 
small changes, easily made and properly coordinated, can prioritise the ongoing 
obligation of medical practitioners to practise in a patient-centred manner.  Indeed, 
the originality of the recommendations made in this thesis lies in recognising the 
power to be wrought by changes that are both achievable and cumulative.  The 
achievability of these proposed changes is underscored by the fact that the majority 
of them can be made by regulatory bodies without legislative intervention.  When 
implemented in a coordinated fashion (as opposed to piecemeal adoption) their 
cumulative power could be significant. 
 
Other recommendations could only be implemented by legislative change, by 
changes to the hard law.  This is, of course, an inherently more difficult mechanism 
                                                      
21 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012).  Version 2 of the Standards comprises eight standards.  It is 
scheduled for release in November 2017.  <https://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-
work/assessment-to-the-nsqhs-standards/national-standards-program-updates-and-consultations/>. 
22 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012) 4. 
23 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Safety and Quality Health 
Service Standards (September 2012) 28. 
24 In similar vein, Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Australian Safety 
and Quality Framework for Health Care (at December 2010) ‘sets out a vision for ... high quality 
care ... and sets out the actions needed to achieve this vision’.  Each of the actions is amenable to a 
checklist format. 
25 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (2011) 5. 
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for change.  Commonwealth legislation would be required for introduction of ‘no 
fault’ injury compensation.  Also, states and territories would have to meet in a 
COAG type environment before it would be possible to adopt ‘mirror’ legislation, 
let alone harmonise differing legislative schemes.  
 
There were many elements in issue but this thesis identified insufficient reflection 
upon and adherence to medical ethical values as a major element to be addressed.  
One of the most powerful reasons for this failure to internalise medical ethics lies 
in the way medical students learn about the non-technical aspects of medical 
professionalism.  ‘The hidden curriculum of unscripted influences’26 absorbed by 
osmosis during training to become a doctor,27 has been identified by numerous 
writers as equally influential as formal education.28 
 
This thesis also showed how the law has been co-opted by medical practitioner 
lobbies to promote their interests by diverting attention from sub-standard clinical 
practices.  Failures by medical practitioners, supported by the law, to put the 
patient’s ‘needs and preferences’29 front and centre illustrates the dichotomy 
recognised by Jonsen as the ‘profound moral paradox’ pervading medicine, ‘the 
incessant conflict between two basic principles of morality: self-interest and 
altruism’.30  This particular dichotomy is on display throughout this thesis in 
varying contexts.31 
                                                      
26 Frederic W Hafferty, , 'Beyond Curriculum Reform: Confronting Medicine's Hidden Curriculum' 
(1998) 73 Academic Medicine 403, 404. 
27 Thomas Faunce, Who Owns Our Health? (UNSW Press, 2007) 89. 
28 See eg, Heidi Lempp and Clive Seale, 'The Hidden Curriculum in Undergraduate Medical 
Education: Qualitative Study of Medical Students' Perceptions of Teaching' (2004) 329 BMJ 770, 
770;  T A Faunce and S N Bolsin, 'Fiduciary Disclosure of Medical Mistakes: The Duty to Promptly 
Notify Patients of Adverse Health Care Events' (2005) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 478, 478;  
Jack Coulehan, 'Teaching Professionalism: Engaging the Mind but not the Heart' (2005) 80 Academic 
Medicine 892, 894;  Alan Cribb and Sarah Bignold, 'Towards the Reflexive Medical School: the 
Hidden Curriculum and Medical Education Research' (1999) 24 Studies in Higher Education 195, 
197;  Susan P Phillips, 'Blinded by Belonging: Revealing the Hidden Curriculum' (2013) 47 Medical 
Education 124, 125;  Liz Mossop et al, 'Analysing the Hidden Curriculum: Use of a Cultural Web' 
(2013) 47 Medical Education 134, 136. 
29 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, Patient-Centred Care (August 2011) 
7. 
30 Albert R Jonsen, 'Watching the Doctor' (1982) 308 NEJM 1531, 1532.  
31 See eg,  
 assertion of a conscientious objection against undertaking some legal procedures (see 
Chapter II); 
 disciplinary proceedings brought after mandatory notifications (see Chapter III); 
 the deference shown to medical practitioners by the law where proper compensation for 
injuries caused to patients by medical misadventure is strictly confined by civil liability 
legislation in force throughout Australia (see Chapter IV); 
 the conflict between self-determination of the patient and paternalistic judgments 
exemplified by failure to honour advance directives (see Chapter V); and 
 the failure to observe the requirements of open disclosure after an adverse medical incident 
(see Chapter VI). 
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C FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Having identified a substantial number of elements of medical practice which 
detract from the ethical obligation to practise patient-centred care, this thesis has 
also identified some areas for future research which arise out of the findings in this 
thesis. 
 
1 Immediate Problems for Research 
As adoption of patient-centred care principles has been shown to promote higher 
quality and safer clinical practice, it is important that more work goes into the 
development of and articulation of the theory of patient-centred care.  As has been 
observed, patient-centred care is good medical practice which, in turn, relates back 
to the values which underpin medical professionalism. 
 
Related to this suggestion for further investigation is how regulation of medical 
professionals can be enhanced.  Codes of practice should be developed by detailing 
further what professionalism in the 21st Century embraces.  To that end, many of 
the shortcomings identified in this thesis could be minimised by redrafting some of 
the provisions of the MBA Code to clarify the doctor’s obligations to his or her 
patients.  An example of this recasting of provisions of the MBA Code is 
suggestions concerning the conscientious objection provisions as outlined in 
Chapter II.  As they stand, there is a conflict with the overriding duty to patient 
primacy. 
 
It is now over 20 years since the publication of ‘The Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study’.32  Obviously, the actual study was undertaken even earlier than the 
publication date.  It is imperative that another similar study be instituted to 
determine whether the initiatives adopted in response to the disturbing incidence of 
iatrogenic injury have been successful in reducing the numbers.  Another aspect of 
any survey would be to detail those areas where the most injuries occur so that 
more effort can be applied to reducing their occurrence. 
 
                                                      
32 Ross McL Wilson et al, 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study' (1995) 163 Medical Journal 
of Australia 458. 
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Related to this question is investigating whether the Surgical Safety Checklist is 
being adopted in Australia.  It is not mandated by the Royal Australasian College 
of Surgeons, but is left to be adapted to local conditions.  Adoption of checklists, 
whether locally modified or not, is imperative for safer medical practice.  How and 
whether procedures for such things as reducing medication errors, management of 
patient falls, documentation of handover systems and minimising cross-infection 
are being implemented, are all subjects amenable to further research.  Research 
should also investigate how improvements in these procedures can be accurately 
measured. 
 
2 Further Case Studies 
This thesis also examined two case studies, the compliance by medical 
practitioners with advance care directives, and the problems created by medical 
mishaps.  The latter case study has suggested the institution of further research into 
incidence of medical injuries as proposed above.  However, two further subjects 
for case studies arise out of matters canvassed in the chapter concerning advance 
directives.  There is room for more detailed analysis of the way mental capacity is 
determined and its ramifications for the patients concerned.  There is also need for 
more comprehensive investigation into end-of-life choices related to withholding 
and withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment.   
 
3 Wider Research 
Related to end-of-life decisions arising out of withholding and withdrawing 
medical treatment are the more vexed questions of legalising euthanasia or 
physician-assisted dying.  Subjecting those questions to analysis using patient-
centred care principles may well provide some new insights into what is at stake 
and how legislation should be framed.  Such an investigation could include 
examining the human rights implications of denying access to these procedures, 
how to determine when persons under 18 years of age have sufficient 
understanding of any decision to choose to die and how much a decision to ask for 
assistance to die is a true indication of mental incapacity. 
 
Likewise, examining other contentious issues through the lens of patient-centred 
care may illuminate the issues and detach them from the influences exerted on 
lawmakers by religious inclinations.  Some of these issues include questions of 
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reproductive rights for disabled citizens,33 how to deal with catastrophically-injured 
neonates,34 conditions for access to late-term abortions,35 separation of conjoined 
twins and assisted decision-making for persons who are mentally limited to give 
them the maximum possible autonomy.36 
 
D EPILOGUE 
 
Attentiveness to the patient emphasises the patient’s dignity and autonomy.  
Showing people that they are valued and that someone cares about what happens to 
them leads patients and their carers to report positively about their experiences 
within the health system.  The King’s Fund report remarked upon the patient 
representative who ‘ ... aspired to seeing doctors more aware of the communication 
and information needs of their patients, so that the service provided is based on the 
patient “as a whole person”’.37    
 
The optimistic conclusion is that all is not lost.  Medical practitioners are 
necessarily very intelligent.  Their elevated status in society need not blind them to 
what matters to the ordinary people upon whom their livelihood depends.  The 
Royal College of Physicians reported an idealistic trainee who said: ‘Medical 
practice requires neither humility nor altruism. Good medical practice, however, 
requires both.’38   
 
This thesis has shown that medical regulators and parliaments have the power to 
regulate for and enhance the quality inherent in the obligation to practise patient-
centred care. 
 
                                                      
33 See eg, Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott, Health Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 
2nd ed, 2014) 104. 
34 See eg, Eduard Verhagen and Pieter J J Sauer, 'The Groningen Protocol — Euthanasia in Severely 
Ill Newborns' (2005) 352 NEJM 959;  B A Manninen, 'A Case for Justified Non-Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia: Exploring the Ethics of the Groningen Protocol' (2006) 32 Journal of Medical Ethics 643. 
35 See eg, Julia Medew, '"Abortion Tourism" Brings Scores of Women to Victoria for Late 
Terminations' The Age (Online) (26 October 2016) <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/abortion-
tourism-brings-scores-of-women-to-victoria-for-late-terminations-20151026-gkiw6u.html>. 
36 See eg, ACT Government, Mental Health, Justice, Health and Alcohol & Drug Services 
(MJHADS), Decision Making Capacity (February 2016);  Kirsten J McCaffery et al, 'Shared Decision 
Making in Australia in 2011' (2011) 105 Zeitschrift für Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualität im 
Gesundheitswesen 234. 
37 Vijaya Nath, Becky Seale and Mandip Kaur, Medical Revalidation (The King’s Fund, March 2014) 
24. 
38 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society: Medical Professionalism in a Changing World 
(Report of a Working Party, December 2005) 20. 
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To repeat Sir Donald Irvine’s observation:  ‘The obvious question is why a 
profession with so many conscientious people could act so defensively.  How does 
this behaviour fit with a profession committed to putting patients first?’39 
                                                      
39 Donald H Irvine, 'Everyone Is Entitled to a Good Doctor' (2007) 186 MJA 256, 257. 
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APPENDIX IIIA 
 
Tribunal and Supreme Court Decisions 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 
 
Victoria -7 
Boundary violations - 2 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing -  2 
Deficient clinical standards  - 3 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment - 3 
Case Name Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Crawford 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2013] 
VCAT 1946 
Failure to advise possible complications from 
proposed surgery, inappropriate procedure - 
complainant prone to exaggeration, 
breakdown in trust 
Divergence of expert opinions so not persuaded that 
allegations made out - not unprofessional conduct 
18 
November 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v McGrath 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2014] 
VCAT 641 
Health Professions Registration Act 2005 - 
agreed statement of facts - 9 consultations, 
failed to provide privacy for patient while she 
undressed, leave room or aids to privacy - 
physical examination when only there to 
discuss MRI, no informed consent - failure to 
make adequate notes on 2 occasions 
Unprofessional conduct - caution, reprimand, conditions upon 
registration - appropriate penalties to protect the public 
28 May 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Myers 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2013] 
VCAT 1315 
Unprofessional conduct not of serious nature 
for allegation 1 & 4 - allegation 3 not proven 
to Tribunal’s satisfaction - allegation 5, 
unprofessional conduct - allegation 2, 
unprofessional conduct of serious nature - 
reprimand for unprofessional conduct - 
Relist for submission about appropriate disposition 31 July 2013 
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caution with respect of obtaining informed 
consent concerning treatment and fees, need 
to communicate clearly, written notification 
of fee structure, counselling 
Orchard v Medical 
Board of Australia 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2013] 
VCAT 1729  
Application for review of decision of 
respondent not to renew registration on 
grounds of impairment, not fit and proper, 
inability to practise safely 
Respondent ordered to register applicant, but subject to 
conditions 
9 October 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v O’Toole 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2014] 
VCAT 143 
Health Professions Registration Act 2005 & 
Medical Practice Act 1994 - inappropriate 
prescribing of Schedule 8 drug to drug-
dependant person - reported by coroner that 
contribution to death of former jockey - 
agreed facts - remorse, felt worry for chronic 
pain of patient 
Agreed that unprofessional conduct - agreed caution, 
reprimand, conditions upon registration - challenging patient, 
previously unblemished record 
14 February 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Perry 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2013] 
VCAT 2016 
Allegations, boundary violations, sexual , 19 
October 2010 - complaint to police not 
proceeded with - notification to Board - 
differences about the evidence - relevance of 
context - formal hearing 17 December 2013 
 all contentious evidence except 1 item to be admitted 29 
November 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Shetty 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2014] 
VCAT 136 
Inappropriate prescribing of Schedule 4 & 8 
drugs - 14 March 2006 to 7 July 2008 - 
Medical Practice Act 1994 & Health 
Professions Registration Act 2005 
Orders by consent - unprofessional conduct of serious nature 
and professional misconduct, caution, reprimand conditions 
imposed on registration 
13 January 
2014 
  
  393 
Western Australia - 6 
Boundary violations 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards - 5 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia and Boyd 
[2013] 
WASAT 123 
Medical Act 1894 - ‘alternative’ treatment of 
cancer patients in 2005 - 5 patients died within 
weeks of commencing treatment, subject of 
coroner inquest - treatment not in accord with 
accepted medical practice and probably led to 
earlier death of at least 4 patients - allegations of 
improper or infamous conduct in  professional 
respect or alternatively, gross carelessness or 
incompetency 
Surrendered registration 10 January 2010, but tribunal can 
still order removal of name from register, seriousness of 
behaviour recognised by removal of name, sufficient 
deterrent to others, no need for further penalties 
9 August 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Dekker 
[2013] 
WASAT 182 
Medical Practitioners Act 2008 - Failure to stop 
and render assistance after ‘near miss’ accident, 
reported to police - improper conduct in 
professional respect 
Guilty of improper conduct in professional respect, 
sufficiently close nexus between conduct and profession - 
reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by 
colleagues of good repute and competency - further 
hearing to determine penalty and costs 
14 November 
2013 
Langton and 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
WASAT 170 
Application to vary conditions on registration - 
mediation - payment of Board’s costs? 
Prima facie each party bears own costs - no reason to vary 
in this case 
14 October 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Whiteside  
[2013] 
WASAT 18 
Medical Practitioners Act 2008 - Allegation that 
lack of medical knowledge and skill to practise 
safely as GP, some failure of records of medical 
history and clinical notes, following Professional 
Services Review - illustrative of broad concerns 
Some failings but did not amount to ‘competency’ matter - 
application dismissed 
20 November 
2013 
Medical Board of [2013] Medical Practitioners Act 2008 - Allegations of Reprimand, registration subject to conditions, review in 5 3 July 2013 
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Australia and 
Woollard 
WASAT 101 carelessness about treatment of two patients - 
agreed facts after mediation - also professional 
misconduct 
years, fine of $75,000.00, costs of Board 
Bernadt v Medical 
Board of Australia 
[2013] 
WASCA 259 
Order to suspend, application to set aside - 
factual findings being challenged - immediate 
action as interim procedure, need further action? 
performance and conduct aspects of professional 
misconduct - construction of s 158 National Law, 
immediate action still valid even if no further action taken 
- any immediate action can be overtaken by a decision of a 
panel or the Tribunal - no express option to do nothing but 
omission did not vitiate anterior decision - dismiss the 
appeal 
18 November 
2013 
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ACT - 3 
Boundary violations 2 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping  
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Speldewinde 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2014] 
ACAT 27 
Inappropriate conversation and physical contact with 
2 female patients - contrary to [8.2.1] of Good 
Medical Practice - s 40 [sic] National Law code as 
evidence 
Unsatisfactory professional performance - Reprimand, 
consent order 
2 May 2014 
Hocking v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2014] 
ACTSC 48 
Immediate decision by MBA to suspend registration - 
a number of notifications - application for declaration 
and prohibition 
Application dismissed 21 March 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Khalil 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2013] 
ACAT 76 
Sexual/romantic relationship with patient Professional misconduct - Reprimand - registration 
suspended for 9 months from 17 May 2013 to 17 
February 2014 - conditions upon return to practice 
21 November 
2013 
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South Australia - 2 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Bradley v 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
SAHPT 5 
Appeal against MBA decision to refuse general or specialist 
registration - failed to comply with conditions on earlier 
determination 
No power of tribunal to overturn original 
decision of Medical Professional Conduct 
Tribunal made 23 March 2007 - no appeal 
under s 199 Nat Law 
20 September 
2013 
Larsen v 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia  
[2013] 
SAHPT 4 
Appeal against refusal of limited registration - three (four?) 
previous applications 
s 65 and 66 Nat Law, does not have approved 
program of study ss 5 & 49(5) Nat Law, or any 
other under ss 53 and 58 appeal dismissed 
3 September 
2013 
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Tasmania - 2 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping 
Impairment  
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Tasmanian Board 
of the Medical 
Board of Australia 
v Dr David Edis 
[2014] 
TASHPT 1 
Surgery on spine, wrong level, did not disclose error 
for several months - not fact of error but failure to 
disclose - remorseful, has insight - need for general 
deterrent, but one-off event - no indication that clinical 
or professional skills require remedial treatment, or 
need to protect the public 
s 196 Nat Law - professional misconduct - reprimand - 
one month suspension - conditions - fine, costs of 
applicant 
24 March 
2014 
Tasmanian Board 
of the Medical 
Board of Australia 
v Dr Ian Stefan 
Visagie 
[2013] 
TASHPT 2 
Intimate sexual relationship with female patient - admit 
allegations, professional misconduct - option of 
cancellation of registration if case involves exploitation 
of vulnerable patient, otherwise can consider mitigating 
factors eg character, community standing - expressed 
remorse - agreed sanctions, appropriate in interests of 
justice, protection of public, integrity of medical 
profession 
Reprimand, suspend registration for 12 months - 
conditions before reregistration, pay costs of Board 
22 October 
2013 
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Northern Territory- 2 
Boundary violations - 2 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards   
Inadequate record keeping 
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgeme
nt 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Keith 
Forrest 
[2014] 
NTHPRT 1 
Sexual relationship with patient - prescriptions in name of 
wife, but self use - stress of practice - admitted both 
allegations no previous disciplinary actions - 31 years - 
Professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct  - 
reprimand - practice to continue subject to conditions - 
pay Board’s costs 
18 
February 
2014 
Dr Shahin Alam v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
NTHPRT 4 
Immediate action requiring female chaperon  - Costs sought 
by Board - appeal by medical practitioner withdrawn, expert 
evidence did not provide firm basis for appeal, delays by 
Alam before withdrawing 
Costs awarded to the Board 29 
October 
2013 
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Queensland - 25 
Boundary violations - 5 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 1 
Improper prescribing - 1 
Deficient clinical standards  - 8 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment  
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Azam v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 588 
Immediate action under s 156 Nat Law, impose 
conditions - application for interim order to review 
decision of Board and to remove conditions 
No jurisdiction to grant stay of immediate action 
decision - stay refused 
26 July 2013 
Azam v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 611 
Immediate action under s 156 Nat Law, reasonable belief 
- chaperone conditions on registration - application to 
remove or amend conditions - Review under s 125 Nat 
Law 
Application refused 4 November 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Bhamjee 
[2013] 
QCAT 259 
Registration suspended 2 February 2011, application for 
stay refused -Disciplinary proceedings commenced - all 
allegations conceded - conduct constituted professional 
misconduct- s 159 Nat Law  - diagnosis and treatment, 
inadequate records, prescribing medications not clinically 
indicated, narcotic analgesics, (some patients drug-
dependent), anabolic steroids 
Professional misconduct - registration cancelled from 2 
February 2011, cannot reapply for 5 years - no other 
sanction appropriate because of variety, scope, degree 
and period of unprofessional conduct, reregistrtion in 5 
years a generous concession by the Board, had shown 
increased insight into conduct 
25 July 2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Blomeley 
[2014] 
QCAT 160 
s 193 Nat Law - sexual relationship, admitted, 
acknowledged inappropriate, confessed shame and 
apology - conditions imposed, including chaperone 
Professional misconduct - registration suspended for 15 
months from 1 July 2014, chaperone conditions to 
continue, reprimand, pay Board’s costs 
23 May 2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Chandra 
[2014] 
QCAT 271 
Sexual and inappropriate conduct to female patient - s 
196 Nat Law - imposed chaperone conditions by 
immediate action on 22 May 2012 - many breaches of 
conditions, 4 false statutory declarations that had 
complied - forged letters threatening legal action - has 
admitted 
Reprimand - registration suspended for 2 years, 
chaperone conditions on registration for 1 year 
following resumption of practice - further education 
and counselling, $85,000.00 costs of MBA 
20 May 2014 
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Chaudhry v 
Medical Board of 
Australia (No 2) 
[2014] 
QCAT 288 
s 140, 1411, 160 Nat Law - complaint that applicant had 
not checked reports on computer - no relationship of 
independent contractor - operated his own immunology 
practice - access records of patients - misapprehension 
but no mala fides 
Application to set aside conditions granted, immediate 
effect - no serious risk to patients 
7 May 2014 
Cruceru v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
QCAT 353 
s 112 Nat Law - renew limited registration, imposed new 
condition - application for stay - required to proceed to 
general registration by certain date, but wife terminally 
ill, unreasonable to burden applicant 
Stay granted - de novo hearing on merits may raise 
other factors - costs by applicant 
12 June 2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Doolabh 
[2013] 
QCAT 702 
Health Practitioners (Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 
1999 - delivery of 2 babies, 2008 & 2009, neither 
survived - allegation of unprofessional conduct - should 
Board call one expert, or one for each incident, dispute 
concerning documents to go before Tribunal 
Board to call one expert only for each baby - agreed 
documents to be presented 
13 
September 
2013 
Escamilla v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 632 
Ss 67, 73, 112, 202, 272, 279 Nat Law - limited 
registration held, renewed 3 times - not eligible to apply 
for general or specialist registration - Board’s decision 
not to register or renew - no utility in granting stay 
Applications for stay refused 11 October 
2013 
Jaravaza v 
Medical Board of 
Australia (No 2) 
[2013] 
QCAT 475 
Unaware whether had sat OSCE exam in May 2013 - 
practitioner advised that had sat but failed, now no longer 
contesting decision of Board, not pursue proceedings 
further - wanted time to wind up his practice 
Stay order cease to have effect, withdrawn application 
for review 
26 July 2013 
Ladhams v 
Medical Board of 
Australia (No 2) 
[2014] 
QCAT 286 
Ss 156j, 157 Nat Law - immediate action - Treatment of 
Lyme Disease - disagreement, does it exist in Australia? - 
proposed conditions on registration - disagreement on 
treatment - conditions prohibits diagnosis of Lyme 
disease in all circumstances, some conditions onerous 
Confirm decision of MBA to take immediate action, 
but remove some conditions and substitute others 
14 April 
2014 
Li v Medical 
Board of 
Australia (No 2) 
[2013] 
QCAT 594 
Ss 156, 157, 201, 202 - appeal from MBA decision to 
take immediate action, imposing conditions on 
registration, English proficiency etc - consent order, set 
aside immediate action, remove conditions - had passed 
oral exam of RANZCOG, able to communicate 
effectively 
Decision to impose conditions set aside and conditions 
removed - Board did not interview Li but relied on 
report, capacity to opine queried - costs of Li payable 
by MBA 
5 November 
2013 
Medical Board of [2013] s 196 Nat Law - retired October 2008, finished medical  professional misconduct - reprimand - prohibit ability 1 November 
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Australia v Love QCAT 608 career but also sexual relationship with vulnerable patient 
over 5 years - no denial of allegations, just not take part 
in proceedings, no apology for exploitative nature of 
relationship -  - professional misconduct - how to 
sanction when no longer registered - need to uphold 
standards and maintain public confidence - absence of 
remorse - 
to apply for registration for 6 years - cannot impose 
future conditions - Love to pay costs of Board 
2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Martin 
[2013] 
QCAT 376 
Ss 288, 289 Nat Law - 2 referrals, some matters should 
have been under Nat Law - unsatisfactory treatment of 2 
patients, false and misleading responses to investigator, 
also Coroner’s Court - unsupervised work in 
contravention of conditions 
unsatisfactory professional conduct under previous law, 
professional misconduct under Nat Law - agreed 
sanction, Tribunal not normally upset - reprimand, 
suspend for 12 months, 6 months first, no breach of 
conditions for 3 years - no surgical procedure without 
supervision, 12 months - monitoring and reporting 
conditions, pay board costs - file amended conditions 
8 July 2013 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Martin 
[2014] 
QCAT 304 
s 193 Nat Law - procedure on eyelid, asymmetry, 
claimed supervision (conditions on registration) - 6 
breaches 
Reprimand, conditions imposed, separate reprimand 
from Tribunal - costs to be determined 
22 May 2014 
Nigah v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
QCAT 204 
Ss9, 12,67,199 Nat Law - passed all exams - applied for 
limited registration in area of need, MBA refused, no 
relevant practical experience for position, so experience 
in general practice - sought review, de novo hearing - 
area of need declaration has lapsed - satisfied at time he 
made application 
Must now refuse application for review 11 March 
2014 
Nobleta v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 730 
Hearing date, purported application to vacate date with 
consent order - review of decision to refuse limited 
registration - needed registration to sit exams, discretion 
to extend stay 
No reason why hearing of substantive application is no 
longer appropriate - application for directions refused, 
hearing on 31 March 2014 
6 December 
2013 
Nobleta v 
Medical Board of 
Australia (No 2) 
[2014] 
QCAT 77 
s 85 Nat Law - fresh application for limited registration 
necessary - cannot sit for exams unless registered, has 
passed exams to date 
stay extended to 31 August 2014 26 February 
2014 
Pearse v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 392 
Ss 9, 155, 156, 157, 199 Nat Law - immediate action - 
notification to AHPRA by patient - prior notification in 
similar terms - inappropriate behaviour with female 
patient - impose least onerous conditions, but chaperone 
professional misconduct, chaperone conditions, 
instituted, no further investigation of complaint - good 
character, no serious risk, nor immediate action 
necessary - set aside MBA immediate action 
16 August 
2013 
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conditions necessary 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Putha 
[2014] 
QCAT 159 
Ss 5,6 193, 196 Nat Law - improperly registered, 
provided false statements in application for registration - 
courses to support limited registration for area of need - 
anonymous informant alleged deceit in application, 
knowingly exaggerated experience in India - registration 
suspended immediate action, remorseful - no suggestion 
of medical incompetence 
Board seeks ban for 5 years, pay board costs - has 
already been suspended for 12 months - but need 
deterrent - cancel registration for further period of 1 
year, unnecessary to reprimand - professional 
misconduct in misleading statements in application 
26 May 2014 
Reben v Medical 
Board of 
Australia  
[2014] 
QCAT 410 
Ss 160, 161, 162, 178, 193 Nat Law - impose chaperone 
conditions on registration, ancillary matters of 
compliance and audit - application for stay and review - 
no procedural fairness, denies allegations - circumstantial 
only - specialist haematologist 
Cogent reasons for stay of decision until further order 
of Tribunal - costs reserved 
23 May 2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Rosenbaum 
[2013] 
QCAT 722 
Agreed disciplinary matter with Board - agreed sanctions Reprimand -- conditions on registration that implement 
and maintain a referral plan - not apply for review of 
conditions for 1 year, pay costs of Board 
29 
November 
2013 
Sharma v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
QCAT 305 
s 191 Nat Law - impose conditions on registration - 
application for stay - conditions will adversely impact on 
professional and private life 
Stay granted until substantive review of panel’s 
decision 
25 June 2014 
Vega Vega v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
QCAT 328 
Immediate action under s 156 Nat Law,  to suspend 
registration and impose conditions - application for order 
to review decision of Board - offer undertaking - appeal 
under s 199 - removed incorrect kidney on 22 January 
2014 - should have referred to tertiary hospital, multiple 
co-morbidities - reasonable to perform in Rockhampton - 
adverse event not avoided 
Suspend decisions of MBA to suspend registration and 
impose conditions - not appropriate matter to award 
costs - no evidence that pose serious risk to patients - 
had consulted widely 
27 June 2014 
WD v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2013] 
QCAT 614 
Ss 156, 157, 158, 169, 199 Nat Law - immediate action 
to suspend registration - application to stay - reasonable 
belief of board that serious risk posed - previous 
conditions, drug dependence - allegations by nurse - 
dedication to patients in remote area - lack of insight 
Immediate action to suspend necessary because of 
impairment - reasonable conditions imposed - confirm 
decision, not apply for review for 3 months - then 
establish if decision still appropriate 
8 November 
2013 
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New South Wales - 10  
Boundary violations - 2 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing - 4  
Deficient clinical standards  - 2 
Inadequate record keeping - 4 
Impairment - 4  
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Athour 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
28 
Works as GP but also at Opiod Substitution Clinic - 
not performed rapid detoxification procedures since 
advised to stop  - potentially risky, high rate of 
relapse - not aware that required authority to 
prescribe, consent required - conditions imposed on 
registration - conduct serious, 14 complaints 
Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct - Reprimand and conditions insufficient, so 
fine, pay costs of HCCC 
14 March 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Baez 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
3 
Not registered since 1 January 2008 - allegations of 
sexual misconduct with 4 women - denial -  affair 
with D, Baez confronted by wife 
Complaints re A,C , D proved, B dismissed- professional 
misconduct 
3 February 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Bennett 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
46 
Allegation re inappropriate prescribing of drugs, 27 
May 2008 - 12 October 2010 - failed to maintain 
adequate records - complaint for January 2008 to 
November 2011, inappropriate prescribing and 
contravention of conditions of registration - agreed 
statements of fact - no longer registered 
If registered would have cancelled registration, 
disqualified for 5 years, pay costs of HCCC - MBA 
record in national register that would have cancelled 
registration 
6 May 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Dr 
Della Bruna 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
31 
3 complaints - failure to account for, and improper 
administration of pethidine and other restricted 
substances, 1 January 2009 to 30 March 2010, 
inadequate record keeping - admitted substance, if 
not entirety of each complaint, conditions imposed 
23  
August 2010 - remorse, insight shown, undertaken 
Professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional 
conduct - sufficiently serious to justify suspension or 
cancellation, not necessarily appropriate - not necessary 
to protect health and safety of public or to maintain 
reputation of profession - not necessary to prohibit 
practice other than in hospital, 3 years only - reprimand, 
conditions on registration, pay costs of HCCC 
8 April 2014 
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rehabilitative steps 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Howe 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
30 
Complaint that physical and mental impairments, 
PD, mild cognitive impairment etc, sufficiently 
serious to impair physical and mental capacity to 
practise - impairment for PD proven - not proven 
that impair capacity to practise - previous chaperone 
conditions - registration suspended 16 December 
2011 
Re-registration subject to conditions - each party to pay 
its own costs 
7 April 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Dr 
Jamieson 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
56 
unsatisfactory professional conduct in treatment of 
10 patients, improper/unethical conduct relating to 
practice, repeated occurrences - admitted subject to 
clarification of inaccuracies - prescribing for addicts 
- notifications  so performance review, conditions 
on registration imposed June 2010 - failure to keep 
adequate records 
Conclusion that conduct sufficiently serious to justify 
suspension or cancellation of registration, but not 
compelled to, need to show that permanently unfit to 
practise, not order only if unfit - other protective orders? - 
reprimand and impose conditions, not apply to vary for 3 
years, pay costs of HCCC 
21 May 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Naiyer (No 1) 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
54 
3 complaints - contested factual circumstances - 
failure to detail examinations of genital and anal 
regions, pelvic - knowledge skill etc substantially 
below reasonably expected, improper /unethical 
conduct in practise, provided false information to 
HCCC, unnecessary - inappropriate sexual conduct  
Hearing of evidence, findings of inappropriate conduct of 
sexual nature, failure to maintain appropriate professional 
boundaries 
13 May 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Qasim 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
42 
Allegations of unsatisfactory professional conduct, 
professional misconduct in practice of medicine, 
impairment, paranoid or delusional disorder - letters 
to other practitioners, medical receptionist gave 
evidence, made up a referral as doctor had refused 
to see patient - Prof Smith raised concerns with 
Medical Council - refuse to see patient if not agree 
with her thinking - abnormal behaviour in body 
corporate meetings where lived - concerns about 
mental health 
Tribunal accepts that serious psychiatric disorder, 
constitutes impairment - limited insight to impairment - 
registration cancelled at once, no application to re-
register for 4 years - pay two-tenths of costs of HCCC 
2 May 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
65 
Finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct in 
2007, prescribing of benzodiazepines, conditions 
imposed on registration - allegations that some 
Reasons for failure to comply with condition, flagrant 
disregard, persistent, contumelious disregard -resent 
condition, unnecessary burden financially and otherwise - 
16 June 2014 
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Townsend conditions contravened, failure to enrol in course, 
issues in general prescribing, PSC reprimand - 
health issues, anxiety about HCCC proceedings - 
sought review as no evidence of current 
inappropriate prescribing - evidence of health issues, 
part time practice retire at end of 2014 - concession 
of unsatisfactory professional conduct 
importance of compliance with conditions, Cancel 
registration, minimum of one year before review, 
undertaken by Tribunal - costs against practitioner 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Philipiah 
[2013] 
NSWCA 342 
Appeal against orders made by Medical Tribunal, 
reprimand, suspension, orders re lifting of 
suspension, no costs - impairment found, but still 
competent to practise - conditions when re-
registered in NSW 
Appeal allowed, conditions on re-registration 18 October 
2013 
 
 
 
 
All jurisdictions total - 57 
Boundary violations -14 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs -1 
Improper prescribing - 7 
Deficient clinical standards  - 20 
Inadequate record keeping - 7 
Impairment - 7 
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APPENDIX IIIB 
 
Tribunal and Supreme Court Decisions - 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 
 
Victoria  - 7  
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 1 
Improper prescribing - 2 
Deficient clinical standards  - 2 
Inadequate record keeping - 2  
Impairment  
Case Name Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Bajpe 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2014] 
VCAT 1162 
Conviction for inappropriate drug prescribing 
for drug-dependent patients, numerous counts 
of obtaining property by deception - 
reprimand and registration cancelled for 2 
years - several applications for re-registration 
- has not come to terms with his actions, 
embarrassed, self-pity not remorse or insight 
Unprofessional conduct, activities before 1 July 2007, 
professional misconduct 1 July 2007 to3 0 June 2010 - 
Unprofessional conduct from 1 July 2010 - cautioned and 
reprimanded - disqualified from applying for re-registration 
until 31 December 2016. 
17 
September 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Dixit 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2015] 
VCAT 809 
Patient asleep, could not be woken - failed to 
call ambulance or seek further treatment, 
never regained consciousness - died a week 
later, brain injury from drug overdose - 
remorse, tried to save family from 
embarrassment because of overdose - breach 
of professional boundaries, treating family 
friend 
Professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct, 
reprimand - conditions on registration, updating education 
especially regarding emergencies 
9 June 2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Garland 
[2015] 
VCAT 873 
Prescribed Schedule 8 poisons in breach of 
Drugs Poisons and Controlled Substances 
Reprimand, specific and general deterrence - conditions on 
registration 
17 June 
2015 
  407 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
Act 1981 (Vic) - convicted for 36 offences - 
failure to recognise signs of drug dependence, 
ignorance of some legislative requirements - 
has now attended courses to address 
shortcomings - offences between 2009 and 
2010, nothing since - several distressing 
events in 2009/10 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Kumar 
(Review and 
Regulation)(Revised) 
[2014] 
VCAT 1267 
Failure to keep adequate clinical notes 
concerning medication, prescription or 
sample pack, psychiatrist - failure to inform 
patient’s GP - findings made with consent of 
parties 
Caution, practice subject to periodic inspection 8 October 
2014 
Taj v Medical Board 
of Australia 
(Correction) (Review 
and Regulation)  
[2015] 
VCAT 250 
Review of decision of Medical Board not to 
approve application for specialist registration 
under s 57 National Law 
Satisfied that applicant has not completed the requisite 
training for recognition as a specialist physician - has spent 
years in practice but has not followed recognised pathways to 
ensure all competencies have been met 
4 March 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Zebic 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2015] 
VCAT 139 
Application by medical practitioner for re-
registration - suspended in 2010 - history of 
drug abuse, diagnosed illnesses - breached 
registration conditions  requiring urinalysis 
and hair sampling - wrote 4 prescriptions 
while suspended - professional misconduct 
Reprimanded - stringent conditions imposed on registration - 
review period of 12 months - suspension revoked so can 
practise as a medical practitioner 
16 February 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Dr ZOF 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2014] 
VCAT 1548 
Inappropriate romantic/sexual relationship 
with patient/employee - failure to keep proper 
patient records for this patient - failure to 
monitor this patient on anti-depressants - 
great power imbalance 
Majority finding of professional misconduct and 
unprofessional conduct - future hearing date to address issue 
of determinations 
12 
December 
2014 
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Western Australia - 5 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing - 2 
Deficient clinical standards  - 4 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Bowles 
[2014] 
WASAT 115 
Inadequate procedure alleged for colonoscopy 
and gastroscopy, removal of polyp for biopsy 
using diathermy, too close to ampulla, 
pancreatitis developed and patient died - 
unsatisfactory professional performance? 
Professional misconduct? 
Application dismissed - no evidence that conduct engaged 
in showed either professional misconduct or unsatisfactory 
professional performance - no basis to find that conduct 
substantially below standard reasonably expected of 
practitioner of equivalent training and experience - 
application dismissed 
5 September 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Myers 
[2014] 
WASAT 137 
Application by MBA to suspend registration - 
inappropriate conduct with patient in hospital - 
no therapeutic relationship - pattern of boundary 
violations dating back to 2004 - failed to be 
deterred by caution, counselling or fine - 
persistent inability to recognise appropriate 
boundaries, escalating pattern of conduct- poses 
too great a risk to the public to continue practise  
Guilty of professional misconduct - currently not 
registered, disqualified for 5 years from reapplying for 
registration, fine of $10,000.00, pay board’s costs 
23 October 
2014 
 
19 February 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Palaniappan  
VR:156/2014 Limited registration for area of need, application 
for surgical trainee program RACS 2013 - altered 
certificate of registration to read general 
registration - applied for 2014, altered 
registration certificate again - RACS advised 
MBA that discovered falsification, failed to 
display qualities of integrity and truthfulness 
Professional misconduct, reprimand, fine and pay Board’s 
costs 
29 January 
2015 
Medical Board of [2014] Treatment of 2 children with ADHD - Finding of unprofessional conduct - reprimand and fine of 1 July 2014 
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Australia and 
Roberts 
WASAT 76 recommended corporal punishment - derogatory 
and accusatory notes about the children 
$15,000.00 - condition on registration, certificate from 
senior medical practitioner that note taking and written 
communication with patients of acceptable standard - pay 
half Board’s costs 
20 October 
2014 
27 January 
2015 
Yoong and Medical 
Board of Australia  
[2015] 
WASAT 6 
Performance and Professional Standards Panel 
determined that in consultation with a patient, 
behaved in a way that constituted unprofessional 
conduct (abrupt and discourteous, failure to 
communicate and remain courteous, respectful 
and compassionate) - reprimand and two 
conditions on registration - application to set 
decision aside but need to determine whether 
right of appeal on substantive finding or only on 
penalty  
Appeal under s 199 Nat Law is hearing de novo, so can 
look at both outcome and conduct leading to it finding by 
Panel that unprofessional conduct so Yoong has right of 
appeal to Tribunal, not limited to appeal against the 
penalty imposed by the Panel 
28 January 
2015 
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ACT - 4 
Boundary violations 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 1 
Improper prescribing - 1 
Deficient clinical standards - 2 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Hocking and 
Hocking v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2015] 
ACAT 44 
Specialist orthopaedic surgeon - FRACS - complaints 
led to conditions upon registration, including 
retraining and supervision - failure to advise patient 
B’s mother of restrictions upon registration, needed 
for informed consent - should refer patient when 
proposed procedure not within scope of surgeon’s 
practice - attempt at cover-up in operation report - 
Patient A, injected with Platelet Rich Plasma, 
unproven technology, failed to advise parents, failed 
to refer to surgeon who was not restricted about 
surgery - has exhibited insight, personal 
responsibility 
Patient B, unsatisfactory professional performance and 
and unprofessional conduct, failure to refer, cover up in 
second record, poor clinical performance, but 
improvements in last 12 months so conduct does not 
merit deregistration - Patient A treatment was novel, 
should have referred, no case to answer - Professional 
misconduct has a performance aspect and a conduct 
component - previous conditions on registration set aside, 
impose new conditions which are not unduly restrictive 
and provide correct balance between practice and public 
safety.-  
19 June 2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Tausif 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2015] 
ACAT 4 
Allegations of inappropriate prescribing of Schedule 
4 & 8 drugs  - inadequate examination of patients - 
inadequate record keeping - extensive reference by 
Tribunal to Code provisions - admitted professional 
misconduct- proposal for immediate action under s 
156 Nat Law, breach of previous conditions , not 
proceeded with - registration suspended by MBA - 
appeal 
Registration restored subject to conditions - professional 
misconduct substantially contributed to by lack of 
clinical supervision and mentorship - found practice 
where mentor to supervise her - 6 monthly reports, 
review conditions in 24 months 
16 January 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Adams 
[2015] 
ACAT 8 
Taking amounts of opiates larger than required and 
using himself - anaesthetist - conditions on 
registration - agreed to urine and blood testing but 
Undertaking that not practise medicine from 13 
November 2013, seek approval of Board before returning 
to work - applicant did not suspend - respondent still 
27 January 
2015 
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(Occupational 
Discipline) 
not hair - Board proposed to suspend registration, 
show cause 
subject to undertakings, no evidence that not complying - 
engage in professional misconduct, reprimand, practise 
and health conditions for first  years after return to 
practise 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Al-
Naser 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2015] 
ACAT 15 
Employed medical practitioner in sexual relationship 
with patient - not aware until 2012, conflict of 
interest by treating the patient, did not refer her to 
another medical practitioner - did not report 
(mandatory) sexual activity of employed medical 
practitioner, - boundary violations by respondent 
Professional misconduct - reprimand - conditions 
imposed on registration - 2 years before review of bar on 
acting as supervisor 
4 February 
2015 
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South Australia - 6 
Boundary violations - 3 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 1 
Improper prescribing - 1 
Deficient clinical standards - 2 
Inadequate record keeping - 2 
Impairment - 1 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v 
Henning 
[2014] 
SAHPT 7 
Inadequate treatment of female patient who was medical 
practitioner and former colleague - 90 particulars of allegations 
and 36 sub-particulars -presumption that innocence of 
inappropriate professional conduct? facts admitted deemed 
proved but otherwise Board bears onus of proof - failure to 
advise of possible attempted suicide, failure to detain under 
Mental Health Act 1993 -  
Unsatisfactory professional performance, 
professional misconduct - submissions to be 
heard 
s 193 Nat Law 
18 August 
2014 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v Dr 
I 
[2014] 
SAHPT 18 
use of prescription pad of another practitioner - wrote 
prescriptions for drugs of dependence for herself - admissions 
in writing, formally admitted professional misconduct - two 
charges  plea of guilty - no conviction recorded but fined - 
already punished, so concern about protection of the public - 
has insight into problems, seeking help - conditions imposed by 
Board on registration 
Professional misconduct - reprimand in 
strongest possible terms, conditions on 
registration, name suppressed 
5 December 
2014 
Crowe v 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
SAHPT 8 
Appeal against MBA decision to impose conditions on 
registration - denies that cognitively impaired, leading to 
executive dysfunction, affects ability to plan, carry out 
cognitive tasks, defective monitoring of performance, 
reasonable belief of Board -  
Appeal dismissed - evidence points one way, 
there is cognitive impairment - decision of 
MBA confirmed - impose conditions on 
registration 
s 193 Nat Law 
17 July 2014 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v 
Curran 
[2015] 
SAHPT 4 
Psychiatrist - Treatment of Patient, and daughter of practitioner 
- not proper psychiatric examination - mindfulness based 
therapy - based reside in practitioner’s home - prescribing 
drugs for daughter - failure to keep adequate records - failure to 
Reprimand in strongest possible terms  - fine of 
$15,000.00 - conditions on registration - costs 
of board 
29 May 2015 
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refer for independent assessment - breach of professional 
boundaries -professional misconduct 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v 
Gale 
[2015] 
SAHPT 3 
Sexual relationship with 2 patients - prescribed drugs of 
dependence to 9 patients without proper authorities - breach of 
confidentiality - admitted to both professional misconduct and 
unprofessional conduct 
Purpose of disciplinary proceedings, to protect 
the public, not punish the practitioner - high 
end of both professional misconduct and 
unprofessional conduct - reprimand, not 
practise for 5 years, take into account 2 years 
already non practising 
13 May 2015 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v 
Trewren 
[2015] 
SAHPT 5 
Sexual relationship with patient - failure to keep adequate 
records - referral to psychologist, vulnerable patient - previous 
fine for assault - professional misconduct, unsatisfactory 
professional performance 
Orders are primarily to protect the public - 
reprimand, suspension for 6 months, no fine 
conditions imposed on registration - pay 
board’s costs 
29 May 2015 
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Tasmania - 4 
Boundary violations 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards - 1 
Inadequate record keeping  
Impairment - 2 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Sansom v Medical 
Board of Australia 
[2014 
TASSC 67 
s 144 Nat Law notification - complaint about who had 
treated man who died - insufficient evidence, 
allegations lacking in substance, no evidence of bias or 
fraud in decision 
Decision by MBA under s 155 Nat Law to take no 
further action - application to review decision refused, 
no merit in any grounds 
18 December 
2014 
Dr Humphrey 
Gomes v 
Tasmanian Board 
of the Medical 
Board of Australia 
[2014] 
TASHPT 3 
Show cause why not suspend - notifications to 
February 2014 - conditions imposed on 7 December 
2012 - 7 further notifications so more conditions - 
drinking alcohol - failure to comply with restrictions, 
contemptuous/dismissive attitude - immediate action to 
suspend - little insight - contempt for sanctions, 
unwilling to accept that others can restrict his activities 
Immediate action warranted - but suspension open-
ended - need further submissions 
11 August 
2014 
Tasmanian Board 
of the Medical 
Board of Australia 
v Dr Humphrey 
Gomes 
[2015] 
TASHPT 4 
Conditions requiring breathalyser and blood alcohol 
tests previously imposed, breached - cautioned for non-
compliance - arrogance and contempt for imposed 
authority - deliberate breach - prescribed narcotic drugs 
for 5 patients without proper authorities, failed to 
respond to warnings - prescribed antidepressant  and 
antipsychotic medication for his wife but took it 
himself - failed to notify National Board of 2 
convictions for PSA - practised with alcohol in blood 
in reckless disregard of patient safety 
Professional misconduct is inclusory and not 
exhaustive, including conduct not falling within 
paragraphs of definition - unprofessional conduct has 
both performance and conduct components -
unsatisfactory professional performance has only 
performance aspect (Roberts [2014] WASAT 76) - 
found both professional misconduct and 
unprofessional conduct - relist for sanctions hearing 
6 May 2015 
Tasmanian Board 
of the Medical 
[2015] 
TASHPT 3 
Two patients with prostate enlargement and urine flow 
issues - failed to perform digital rectal examination - 
All categories of defective standard of care are judged 
against expectations of medical peers - unprofessional 
23 April 2015 
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Board of Australia 
v Dr Anthony 
Alfred Lyall 
failed to refer to specialist urologist - clearly indicated 
by symptoms - used complementary medicines, assist 
urine flow but affected other test results, ought not be 
used before diagnosis 
conduct - relist for sanctions hearing 
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Northern Territory - 4  
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 2 
Improper prescribing 
Deficient clinical standards  
Inadequate record keeping  
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgeme
nt 
Coppa v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
NTSC 48 
s 169 Nat Law - challenge to requirement for health 
assessment - 2 notifications - substance abuse - reasonable 
belief of impairment? - justification for unwillingness does 
not bear scrutiny - safety of patients 
Plaintiff’s application dismissed, no order prohibiting 
publication 
17 
October 
2014 
Wijeneka 
Liyanage v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
NTHPRT 4 
Registration suspended under immediate action s 156 Nat 
Law - allegation of sexual relationship with a patient - no 
previous disciplinary proceedings - relationship terminated, 
but reported by patient’s new medical practitioner - 
deception of wife - experimenting with dating web site - 
deplorable behaviour but does not tend to bring disgrace to 
the profession 
isolated incident - no evidence that will be repeated, 
protection of public does not require immediate action 
to suspend - set aside decision of Medical Board - 
further submission 
8 
December 
2014 
Philip Nitschke v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
NTHPRT 5 
Contacted as advocate for assisted dying - no doctor/patient 
relationship, but was there sufficient connection to the 
profession - action with man who subsequently committed 
suicide - duty to protect and promote health including 
prolonging life - suicide is not illegal 
Reasonable belief that need for immediate action to 
protect public health or safety - serious risk to persons, 
confusion ass activities inconsistent with Code of 
Conduct 
22 
December 
2014 
Daniel Van Dijk v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
NTHPRT 2 
Prescribed Schedule 8 medication for his own use, using 
names of others without their consent - admitted facts, 
conduct constituted professional misconduct - agreement 
about action, Suspension for 6 months, return to work 
subject to conditions - but did not admit conduct and set 
about putting it right, in fact did not admit for 4 years and 
Not fit at this stage to return to practice - reprimand - 
remove name from register, refrain from reapplying 
for registration for 9 months 
28 
October 
2014 
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during that period did what he could to thwart Board’s 
investigation, lies - eventually sought assistance - but no 
independent evidence that he had changed - admits that 
guilty of professional misconduct, but no demonstrable 
contrition or remorse, no demonstrated insight 
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Queensland  -  12 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs 
Improper prescribing - 1 
Deficient clinical standards - 7 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Andersen 
[2014] 
QCAT 374 
Inappropriate prescribing of pseudoephedrine - no 
previous disciplinary proceedings - jointly proposed 
suspension, but suspension of that for 12 months - not 
authorised by Nat Law - also proposed conditions 
s 225 Nat Law - professional misconduct - amend 
proposed orders - suspend from 1 September 2014 to 
28 September 2014 
30 July 2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Andrew 
[2015] 
QCAT 94 
Issued certificates, contrary to specialist report, that 
patient fit to drive motor vehicle - patient struck and 
killed pedestrian, evidence that seizure - no independent 
verification that seizure -free for 12 months - also 
certificate for Centrelink, dangers to co-workers in 
workplace setting - difficult patient, insisting on 
certificate - certificates given in 2006 and 2009 
Admission that unsatisfactory professional conduct - 
tribunal found professional misconduct - prohibition on 
issuing certificates of fitness to drive - course in 
managing difficult patients - general deterrence served 
by fine rather than suspension - $10,000.00 and costs 
of MBA 
23 March 
2015 
Aziz v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
QCAT 99 
Registered vascular surgeon, conditions imposed 26 
November 2014 by Medical Board of Australia under s 
178 National Law - error occurred in complex procedure 
- admitted - no other complaints 
Agreed orders by parties - set aside finding of 
unsatisfactory professional performance and imposition 
of conditions - parties bear their own costs 
9 February 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Cooke 
[2015] 
QCAT 103 
Hip replacement, hip fractured a few days later - further 
surgery - deep wound infection, reviewed several times, 
failure to diagnose, treatment inappropriate 
Finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct, grounds 
for disciplinary action - later submissions about penalty 
27 March 
2015 
Clarke v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
QCAT 630 
Performance and Professional Standards Panel of MBA 
found unsatisfactory professional performance, 
reprimand and conditions on registration - s 199 Nat Law 
application to review - failure to note blood test results 
pre total knee arthroplasty, proper consent, collaborate 
Reprimand, review of conditions - mentoring 
conditions to address shortcomings, not generally - also 
retraining 
21 
November 
2014 
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with other specialists, delay with Clexane - inadequate 
notes - complications to patient 
Dey v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
 
[2014] 
QCAT 546 
s 201 Nat Law - review of MBA decision not to renew 
limited registration - passed RACGP exams but other 
complaints made - eligible for specialist registration, but 
English test required -application for stay withdrawn - 
Board wants costs 
Costs of Board granted 31 October 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Gomez 
[2015] 
QCAT 121 
Abused trust and position of influence inherent in doctor-
patient relationship by failing to maintain appropriate 
professional boundaries - whether to admit evidence of 3 
other patients 
Evidence of 2 patient admitted, other patient’s evidence 
not probative - striking similarity in evidence of two 
patients 
22 April 
2015 
Hettwer v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
QCAT 146 
Application to AHPRA for limited registration for area of 
need - provided false employment confirmation, 
inaccurate work experience in CV - false and misleading 
conduct, not fit and proper to hold registration - 
application for review subsequently withdrawn 
Order for Hettwer to pay costs of MBA 29 April 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Holding 
[2014] 
QCAT 632 
s 193 Nat Law - boundary violation, text messages,  Reprimand, fine of $5000.00 - conditions on 
registration, pay Board’s costs 
21 
November 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Moodley 
[2014] 
QCAT 476 
s 289 Nat Law - previous disciplinary proceedings - 
complaints of unlawful and indecent assault - also 
convictions - still registered but currently under 
suspension - no remorse, not fit and proper person 
unsatisfactory conduct, discreditable to medical 
profession - application to cancel registration, 
protective not punitive - 5 years prohibition, pay 
Board’s costs 
20 August 
2014 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Patel 
[2015] 
QCAT 133 
MBA brought disciplinary proceedings on 9 grounds - no 
longer resides in Australia - first 4 grounds relate to false 
and misleading information provided to former Medical 
Board of Queensland about special registration and its 
renewal - 5 grounds relate to medical procedures, 
clinically inappropriate level of risk, conditions imposed 
in USA - incorrect diagnosis, incompetence 
demonstrated, lack of adequate knowledge - death of 
several patients 
Finding of unsatisfactory professional 
conduct,misconduct in professional respect, conduct 
discreditable to profession, fraudulent and dishonest 
behaviour, other improper or unethical conduct - if had 
been registered Tribunal must decide whether would 
have cancelled registration, struck off in US  - should 
never again be registered to practice medicine in 
Australia, pay costs of MBA 
11 May 2015 
Radovic v 
Medical Board of 
[2014] 
QCAT 631 
s199 Nat Law - conditional registration as psychiatrist in 
area of need, not renewed on expiry - treatment of 
Agreed sanction, not depart provided within reasonable 
range - reprimand only, no future conditions - no order 
21 
November 
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Australia patient, finding of unsatisfactory professional 
performance - application to review panel decision, 
impose less onerous conditions if re-registered - not 
permissible, only caution or reprimand 
as to costs 2014 
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New South Wales - 27 
Boundary violations - 4 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 5 
Improper prescribing - 10 
Deficient clinical standards  -9 
Inadequate record keeping - 9 
Impairment - 10 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Bahrecial Board 
of Australia v 
Patelamy v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
116 
Deregistered 2008, no practise since - application to 
reinstate - is he person of good character and fit for 
registration - inappropriate sexual conduct with 2 
women - found unsatisfactory professional conduct 
and professional misconduct, conditions imposed on 
registration - 2008 complaint that falsified copy of 
registration card provided for application to engage 
in ophthalmology training 
Question whether has learned and gained insight into 
behaviour, since 2008 has character reformed - no public 
interest in forever denying chance of redemption and 
rehabilitation - risk of further sexual misconduct low, but 
lack of remorse or insight to past mistakes - application 
for reinstatement dismissed, not apply to CAT for further 
2 years, pay costs of respondent 
16 October 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Baraz 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
39 
FRACGP - Agreed 2012 to be placed on Impaired 
Registrants Panel, drug addiction and depression - 
conditions on registration - prescribing and self-
administering Schedule 8 drugs - breach of 
conditions 
Instances of unsatisfactory professional conduct, justify 
suspension or cancellation of registration, so amount to 
professional misconduct - finding of serious professional 
misconduct - need protective orders reprimand, suspend 
for 3 months, conditions during suspension and on 
subsequent registration - pay costs of HCCC 
27 April 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Edwards 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
90 
Failed to comply with conditions of order of 
Medical Tribunal on 14 September 2011 - issue of 
depression - findings of unsatisfactory professional 
conduct and professional misconduct, reprimand, 
conditions on registration 
Registration cancelled, not eligible to seek review for 1 
year, pay costs of HCCC 
13 August 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Epstein 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
21 
General physician of many years’ standing - interest 
in anti-ageing medicine - inadequate record keeping, 
failure to conduct clinical examination of patients, 
inappropriate prescribing - no judgement about 
Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct found - numerous breaches of relevant 
regulations, serious departure from appropriate standard 
of care to be expected of practitioner with similar 
30 March 
2015 
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validity of anti-ageing medicine - only Australian 
practitioner of this type of anti-ageing medicine - 
conduct does not demonstrate lack of knowledge, 
experience, skill, judgement or care simply because 
course of therapy does not conform to given 
professional norm provided pursuing respectable 
though minority view - examined records of 40 
patients - failed to report to referring doctors, failed 
to keep proper medical records - frequent failure to 
take full clinical history, failure to record weight 
changes - continue to treat where patients did not 
have blood tests when ordered 
specialist training and long experience - complaints for 
later period to be dealt with at later hearing 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Follent 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
31 
HCCC has consulted with Medical Council of NSW 
- allegation of unsatisfactory professional conduct - 
failure to maintain adequate medical records - 
failure to conduct physical examinations - failure to 
organise appropriate investigations, refer to 
specialists - inappropriate prescribing of restricted 
and addictive drugs - professional misconduct 
because of more than one instance of unsatisfactory 
professional conduct - concessions made by 
respondent - burden on practitioner to show matters 
which support right to continue to practise medicine 
Proceedings stood over on interim basis - hear evidence 
of ability of respondent to safety practise medicine, 
hearing August 2015 -  conditions imposed on 
registration, monitoring of compliance 
31 March 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Goh 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
106 
Complaint from HCCC, improper or unethical 
conduct relating to practice of medicine, wrote 
prescriptions for self and patients and falsely signed 
as other  medical practitioners - contravened 
conditions imposed on 8 July 2011, guilty of 
professional misconduct by engaging in 
unsatisfactory professional conduct on number of 
occasions, impairment, addiction and major 
depressive episode - insufficient physical or mental 
capacity, knowledge or skill to practise medicine - 8 
July 2014 requested name be removed from register 
On the evidence, would have removed from register if not 
already applied for removal - would have been for 2 years 
but time has already elapsed so one year - should be 
recorded, respondent to pay applicant’s costs 
26 
September 
2014 
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Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Dr 
Hofer 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
74 
7 July found complaints of unsatisfactory 
professional conduct and professional misconduct, 
majority of patients from low socio-economic 
background, many have history of drug/alcohol 
abuse - request to restore Schedule 8 prescribing 
rights, led to enquiry about prescribing practices - 
previously had self-administered - did not exercise 
proper medical judgement when issuing 
prescriptions, also inadequate records,  
Reprimand, registration subject to conditions, pay 50% of 
costs of HCCC - protective orders - order to deregister 
not appropriate - positive steps to change prescribing 
practices, significant effort to migrate patient records, not 
just his own, to electronic system 
9 July 2014 
Ibrahim v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
108 
Application for limited registration in area of need 
refused - gap in clinical practice since 2007, 
inadequacy of supervision plan, inadequate 
performance in pre-employment structured clinical 
interview - appeal decision 
Appeal dismissed, refuse application for limited 
registration - costs to be determined 
1 October 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Ivits 
[2014 
NSWCATOD 
148 
Admission that unsatisfactory professional conduct 
and professional misconduct - prescribing drugs of 
addiction and restricted substances without proper 
authority, or inappropriately, failed to seek advice, 
failed to conduct appropriate tests, inadequate 
records 
Reprimand, practise subject to conditions, pay costs of 
HCCC 
10 
December 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Khan 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
83 
September 2012 following inquiry, relinquished 
authority to prescribe, administer and possess 
Schedule 4 or 8 drugs - complaint about 28 patients, 
June 2013 status of non-practising, 26 May 2014 
suffering ill health, determined to retire - should 
proceedings be continued, public interest 
HCCC to withdraw complaint, dismiss application filed 
on 4 April 2014, no costs order 
22 July 2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Kwan 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
72 
Earlier proceedings about inappropriate prescribing 
of Schedule 4D drugs professional misconduct, 
protective orders made - conduct which 
demonstrates that knowledge skill etc substantially 
below reasonable expectations - exceeded 
authorities to prescribe, no medical judgement about 
whether appropriate - admitted unsatisfactory 
professional conduct  
Insufficient insight into gravity of misconduct, poses a 
risk if remains on register, so cancel registration for 2 
years, pay costs of HCCC 
7 July 2014 
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Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Low 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
18 
Prescribing addictive drugs (some addicted already), 
failure to keep adequate records - thought he was 
doing the best for patients - has now seen his error, 
sorry for his conduct - glowing references - 
attending pain management course, prescribing 
course - conditions on registration since 2012 - now 
computerised medical records system in place - 
ignorance and naïvety 
Evidence does not establish that permanently unfit to 
practise so deregistration not an option - serious 
professional misconduct which damage reputation of the 
profession and erode public confidence, require 
reprimand - practise under supervision to entrench best 
practice also mentor - also conditions on registration 
23 March 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Manners 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
156 
Application to withdraw complaints - eye 
complaints and surgery - sexual intercourse with 
patient, denied to HCCC - inappropriate text 
communications - surrendered registration on 27 
August 2014, no intention to reapply - application to 
withdraw proceedings - can restart proceedings if he 
reapplies 
Satisfied that poses no risk to public, deterrent effect no 
necessary in circumstances - leave granted to withdraw 
complaints and application for orders filed 8 May 2014, 
consent to complaints being withdrawn, application for 
disciplinary orders dismissed - no order as to costs 
10 October 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Dr 
Nikolova-Trask 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
149 
Issues of boundary violations, inappropriate sexual 
relationship with patients, what are appropriate text 
or Facebook communications - called on Good 
Medical Practice 8.2, longstanding even if not in 
force at time of alleged conduct - assertion that no 
power imbalances, minimise type of care to some 
patients 
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct - improper conduct - unlikely to engage in 
sexual relationship with patient in future, but lack of 
insight, serious breach of standards - 3 months 
suspension, should be longer but for circumstances, 
conditions on future registration, pay costs of HCCC 
11 
December 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Osborne 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
118 
Treatment of 2 elderly patients in final stages of life 
- administration of morphine contrary to clinical 
guidelines and in excess of recognised dosage - 
admitted by practitioner - failed to keep records of 
consultations - has impairment, depressive disorder 
Tribunal not satisfied that conduct solely attributable to 
depressive disorder - thought guidelines not needed - 
hastened death of the patients - fact that conduct 
sufficiently serious to justify suspension does not mean 
removing practitioner - suspension for 6 months 
commencing in 14 days, conditions upon resumption of 
practice, costs of HCCC 
20 October 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Quach 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
2 
Allegations of incompetency, also impairment 
(narcissistic personality disorder) - finding of 
reasonable medical knowledge but has created a 
niche where he charges excessive fees and so feels 
obliged to dramatically over-investigate and provide 
Professional misconduct found, mental impairment likely 
to detrimentally affect capacity to practise medicine - 
Stood over until April for Stage 2 - what protective orders 
should be made - denied that suffering from narcissistic 
personality disorder, lacks insight about difficulties 
5 February 
2015 
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unusually extensive medical treatment eg administer 
IV antibiotics outside safe medical setting - 
Performance Assessment in 2009, imposed practice 
conditions - complaints by Quach against other 
medical practitioners - evidence that fabricates 
stories, believe anyone other than Quach - Stage 1 - 
Stage 2 will be- [354] “authoritative and not 
particularly patient centred” 
Rahman v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
26 
Appeal against decision not to renew limited 
registration - had passed written examination but 
failed clinical examination after several attempts - 
several positive references - if re-registered will 
have practical experience and help from supervising 
practitioners prior to next exam in June 2015 
Appeal granted, respondent pay half appellant’s costs 24 March 
2015 
Dr Reid v 
Medical Council 
of NSW 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
152 
Appeal against decision to suspend - many 
complaints, concern about performance, clinical 
judgement, patient management - not sufficient 
specifics about patient consent - respond to 
criticisms legitimate differences in professional 
opinion, supported by eminent specialists, but panel 
found unsatisfactory professional performance and 
impose conditions - subsequent re-assessment - 
using novel techniques for prolapse -overriding 
concern for safety of public [58] always operated in 
patient centred manner - encourages patients to 
make a choice between simple and more complex 
surgery 
No evidence of failure to inform patients of proposed 
surgery, whether novel - reject argument that risk to 
health or safety of any person - no evidence upon which 
Tribunal should suspend, resist practice conditions, 3 
should remain, suspension should be lifted - costs ordered 
to appellant 
19 
December 
2014 
Reimers v 
Medical Council 
of NSW 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
38 
Application for review of order of 4 November 2003 
by Medical Tribunal of New South Wales to cancel 
registration - using drugs of addiction - impaired 
competency as anaesthetist, breach of protocols 
regarding drugs registers - diverted drugs to own use 
- Tribunal removed name from register, no 
application for review for 10 years - applied to 
Not satisfied that applicant is fit and proper person for 
reregistration as a medical practitioner - must be satisfied 
that drug-free and will remain so, no supporting evidence 
- limited evidence that endeavoured to remain up-to-date 
with medical knowledge, only superficial and spasmodic 
- inadequate character references - inconclusive evidence 
of future plans to work under supervision 
27 April 
2015 
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register in Victoria and Queensland, applications 
refused - false pretences charge, also assault, not 
relevant to these proceedings - belated expressions 
of remorse, lack of insight - drug free for some 
years, but 14 years since medical practice 
Roberts v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
35 
Application for reinstatement under s 163B (1)(c) 
Nat Law - removed from register in 2007, no 
application to reinstate before 5 years - prescribed 
drugs of addiction, failed to exercise adequate 
medical judgement, inadequate record keeping - 
conduct of counselling clinic for drug-dependence - 
has kept up-to-date with medicine, undertaken 
numerous courses - reports from psychiatrists and 
other medical practitioners noted substantial 
character and behavioural changes, insight into 
earlier behaviours - recommend reinstatement 
Reinstatement ordered subject to stringent conditions - no 
order as to costs 
22 April 
2015 
HealthCare 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Shinwari 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
59 
Engage in rapid opioid detoxification treatment - 
failure to properly assess patient A with heroin and 
other drug use, inadequate records, patient died - 
failure to make proper enquiries for patient B, 
inadequate records - rapid opioid detoxification has 
high attrition rate, inferior procedure, should not be 
conducted outside hospital - ill-equipped for ROD 
Practice conditions imposed following finding of 
professional misconduct Stage 2 hearing in September 
2015, audit report to be prepared - documents to be 
served on tribunal 
15 June 2015 
Singh v Medical 
Council of NSW 
(No 2) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
28 
Appeal from decision of Medical Council of NSW 
that practitioner be suspended - supervision 
condition on registration breached - inappropriate 
prescribing of Schedule 8 drugs, professional 
misconduct, blatant repeated transgressions - 
unimpressive witness - inadequate records -  
Appeal dismissed, costs against applicant - has been 
extended leniency over extended period of time - 
protection of public requires suspension 
18 March 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Street 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
124 
s 86a, 150, 165 Nat Law - treatment of patients and 
abuse of prescription authority, inadequate records, 
allegation of impairment - psychiatrist, episodic 
history of addictions -2012 conditions on practice - 
has admitted all complaints, agrees conduct was 
objective of protecting health and safety of public, also 
protect from similar misconduct from other medical 
practitioners, public interest in rehabilitation but too early 
to consider allowing return to practice - egregious 
conduct proven, order for cancellation if had still been 
29 October 
2014 
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professional misconduct - surrendered registration 
February 2013 
registered, also disqualification for 18 months -costs 
against respondent 
Healthcare 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Thomas 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
60 
Repeated improper prescribing for drug dependent 
patients, failure to keep proper medical records - 
acknowledged gravity of conduct, shown remorse 
and insight into wrongness of conduct, no adverse 
reports during 24 months of restrictive conditions 
Professional misconduct, registration cancelled for 
minimum of 12 months 
24 June 2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Vo 
[2014] 
NSWCATOD 
127 
Two complaints, inappropriate sexual conduct with 
young male patients, practitioner says 
uncharacteristic, major depressive illness, 
shoplifting conviction 2002, required to repay 
$150,000.00 to Medicare - 2012 report, referred to 
Good Medical Practice 3.2.6 - conduct deliberate 
and intentional 
Cancellation of registration is only appropriate order - 
unfitness as at time of hearing, practitioner’s complete 
disregard of ethical standards, breach of Code, untruthful, 
no weight on expressed remorse, except for effect on his 
wife and children - two years before apply for 
reinstatement, register order by AHPRA, non-publication 
of patients or practitioner’s children, pay costs of HCCC 
3 November 
2014 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
XC 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
9 
Former medical practitioner - addicted to Stillnox 
while at university - subsequent addictions to other 
scheduled drugs, forged prescriptions - attempt by 
NSW Medical Board for many years to manage 
practitioner, imposed conditions on registration, lied 
to board about why she did not attend drug 
screenings - voluntarily surrendered registration, 
agreed that not fit to practise - being treated for 
addictions  - in remission for some but relapse for 
others 
Would de-register her if she were still registered - 
disqualified for 18 months from applying for re-
registration 
23 February 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v Do 
[2014] 
NSWCA 307 
Treatment of drug dependent de facto partner, died 
of overdose of amitriptylene - inappropriate 
prescribing - inadequate records of treatment  - 
professional misconduct, voluntarily stopped work -  
not registered at time of tribunal order, no 
disqualification order made, but conditions imposed 
- appeal by HCCC, Tribunal did not give proper 
consideration to full scope of protection public and 
profession, what orders should be made  by re-
exercise of Tribunal’s disciplinary power 
Tribunal did not address public interest in denouncing 
conduct as unacceptable, did not address fact that conduct 
revealed knowledge, skill and judgement significantly 
below standard of practitioner of her skill and training, 
therefore court must re-exercise Tribunal power - appeal 
allowed, effect that conduct publicly recorded as 
deserving of cancellation of registration, disqualified for 
18 months from 2 August 2013 - no order for costs 
4 September 
2014 
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All jurisdictions total - 59 
Boundary violations - 11 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 10 
Improper prescribing - 17 
Deficient clinical standards  - 27 
Inadequate record keeping - 16 
Impairment - 13 
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APPENDIX IIIC 
 
Tribunal and Supreme Court Disciplinary Decisions 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 
 
 
Victoria - 5 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 2 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping - 2 
Impairment - 
 
Case Name Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Black 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2016] 
VCAT 892 
Pleaded guilty to 2 charges of knowingly 
possessing child pornography, no term of 
imprisonment but good behaviour bond - 
agrees with board that professional 
misconduct - victim of molestation as a child 
- being treated for consequences - psychiatric 
treatment, depression - remorse and shame, 
low risk of reoffending - protective not 
punitive orders - factors against cancellation 
Reprimand, suspend for 3 months, health and practice 
conditions imposed 
7 June 2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Fox 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2016] 
VCAT 408 
Inappropriate prescribing - inappropriate 
medical management - criminal conviction -
breach of permit obligations Schedule 8 drugs 
- inadequate record keeping - professional 
misconduct, unprofessional conduct - 115 
Reprimand, suspension for 12 months, conditions on 
registration 
Principles applicable to determinations for disciplinary 
offences 
protection of the public - maintenance of professional 
11 April 
2016 
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charges - agreed settlement between regulator 
and practitioner 
standards in eyes of public -weighing of public interest in 
practitioner continuing to practise against public interest in 
protecting clients from repetition of the conduct - evidence of 
insight and/or remorse, where relevant - role of general and 
specific deterrence 
Kemp v Medical 
Board of Australia 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2016] 
VCAT 290 
Immediate action by board, imposing 
conditions on registration, necessary for 
public safety where possible risk - application 
for stay for 6 weeks only, only for 2 of 
conditions - concerns about treatment of 
multiple sclerosis patient, investigation led to 
requirement for performance assessment, 
propose suspension but conditions requested - 
concerns with treatment of Lyme’s disease - 
stay of part of conditions for limited time granted 24 February 
2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Koniuszko 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2016] 
VCAT 492 
Ophthalmologist, but practise outside that 
specialty - failure to refer patients - Failed to 
obtain permits to prescribe Schedule 8 drugs - 
inadequate storage for Schedule 8 drugs -
prescribing for family members - incomplete 
records - Professional misconduct,  
Reprimand - conditions upon registration for 5 years 1 April 2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Smith 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2016] 
VCAT 243 
Sexual relationship with mother of a patient - 
professional misconduct - notification from 
psychiatrist 
Reprimand - conditions upon registration, review after 14 
months 
23 February 
2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Win 
(Review and 
Regulation) 
[2015] 
VCAT 1289 
Made false declaration to obtain provisional 
registration in Australia - admission that 
conduct amounted to professional misconduct 
- qualified in Burma but blacklisted - 
knowing it was wrong, created false 
certificate of good standing - Australian 
citizenship granted - conduct bringing 
medical profession and system into question - 
unacceptable conduct so reprimand 
appropriate 
Caution, reprimand, conditions on registration 19 August 
2015 
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Western Australia - 2 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping - 2 
Impairment - 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Paterson 
[2016] 
WASAT 60 
Finding of deficient record keeping - questions 
about diagnosis of ADHD 
Conduct not a scale of gravity sufficiently serious in eyes 
of professional colleagues of good repute and competence, 
to warrant punishment and disciplinary action to protect 
the public 
25 May 2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia and 
Veettill 
[2015] 
WASAT 124 
Allegations of sexual assault of patient - breach 
of professional boundaries by telephoning, attend 
home met for coffee, unsatisfactory professional 
performance - sexual misconduct so professional 
misconduct, power imbalance and breach of trust 
Conditions on registration previously imposed to continue 
for 12 months after the period of suspension for 12 months 
- pay Board’s costs 
23 February 
2016 
Woollard v The 
Medical Board of 
Australia Sitting as 
a Performance and 
Professional 
Standards Panel 
[2015] 
WASC 332 
Challenge to Board’s panel finding that 
unsatisfactory professional performance because 
patient suffered stroke during coronary 
angioplasty - failed to obtain informed consent, 
failed to maintain clear and accurate records of  
discussions with the patient - board resolved to 
caution 
Application to review dismissed 9 September 
2015 
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ACT - 2 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 1 
Improper prescribing - 
Deficient clinical standards  - 
Inadequate record keeping - 
Impairment - 
 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Kanapathipillai 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2016] 
ACAT 16 
Repeated self-medication with drugs, and alcohol- 
misleading Board and other medical practitioners - 
personality disorder? impairment? - Professional 
misconduct - no evidence that permanently unfit to 
practise, but failure to follow Board conditions 
Registration suspended for 2 years - after resumption of 
practice, registration subject to conditions for 2 years - 
abstaining from drug use, see psychiatrist regularly - pay 
Board’s costs 
9 March 
2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v MBO 
(Occupational 
Discipline) 
[2015] 
ACAT 69 
Two notifications, boundary violations  SMS 
messages with one patient - intimate relationship 
with another former patient  - consent orders - 
Professional misconduct 
Reprimand, suspend registration - conditions once re-
registered 
8 October 
2015 
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South Australia - 1 
Boundary violations - 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping - 
Impairment - 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v 
Siow 
[2016] 
SAHPT 1 
Caused patient with terminal illness and patient’s family to 
have unreasonable expectations of beneficial treatment and 
prolongation of life, failure to organise palliative care or 
provide counselling to family - professional misconduct - has 
developed insight - agreed penalty 
Reprimand, fine of $12,000, conditions on 
registration for 12 months - pay Board’s costs 
22 January 
2016 
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Tasmania - 2 
Boundary violations - 1,  
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 
Deficient clinical standards  - 1 
Inadequate record keeping - 
Impairment - 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Tasmanian 
Board of the 
Medical 
Board of 
Australia v Dr 
Wijtek 
Majchrzak 
[2016] 
TASHPT   2 
Supplied testosterone to two patients where not medically 
indicated, only for body building - practitioner conceded that 
professional misconduct, possible ill effects on patients - 
challenging and insistent patients 
reprimanded, subjected to conditions about 
prescribing of anabolic steroids, also to attend 
course on dealing with demanding clients,  pay 
costs of the board 
2 May 2016 
Dr Edward 
Sibahi v 
Tasmanian 
Board of 
Australia of 
the Medical  
[2015] 
TASHPT 7 
Notification to respondent, personal interactions in workplace, 
complaint about vaginal examination of patient in labour, 
complaint from patient about personal nature of conversation - 
board considered boundaries violated, imposed conditions, 
requiring notification to employer, colleagues - need reports 
from employer addressing professional conduct and 
performance, chaperone for intimate examination of females - 
seeking stay 
Tribunal accepts serious issue to be tried, but 
risk that compliance with conditions could 
adversely affect employment - grant partial 
stay, modified conditions 
15 July 2015 
Dr Edward 
Sibahi v 
Tasmanian 
Board of 
Australia of 
[2016] 
TASHPT 1 
Following 2015 case, tribunal issued notice to Tweed Hospital 
NSW to produce documents including complaints against 
practitioner - practitioner’s counsel inspected documents and 
objected to their being inspected by Board - court may allow 
inspection if apparently relevant or are subject matter of 
Allow inspection by Board 22 March 
2016 
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the Medical  litigation, don’t have to be relevant to prove or not a fact in 
issue - relevant to question of whether professional boundaries 
maintained 
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Northern Territory - 2 
Boundary violations - 1 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 
Deficient clinical standards  - 
Inadequate record keeping - 1 
Impairment - 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgeme
nt 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Ajay 
Naidu 
[2015] 
NTHPRT 6 
Medical care to patient A, sexual relationship - treated 
husband and children without recognising conflict - 
inadequate notes, children were practitioner’s not husband’s 
- now aware that professional misconduct - notification to 
AHPRA by husband - practitioner not aware that boundary 
violations - breach of trust 
No uneven power relationship with patient A, - practitioner 
considers that no harm done!! 
Reprimand, suspended for 4 months, complete ethics 
course, report of board  - review of conditions in 12 
months - practitioner to pay Board’s costs 
27 
November 
2015 
Naidu v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2016] 
NTSC 8 
Appeal on grounds that only unprofessional conduct not 
professional misconduct, tribunal misdirected itself, made 
findings of fact without evidence - four month suspension 
manifestly excessive for protection of public and 
maintenance of ethical and professional standards 
Clear evidence of effect on patient’s husband, factual 
allegations not dispute by appellant - tribunal's quoting 
from codes and guidelines OK because they simply 
repeat long-established ethical principles, providing 
for health and safety of community, reliance on Do 
case overemphasised this - nothing to suggest this had 
occurred - no error of principle - appeal dismissed 
18 
February 
2016 
Nitschke v 
Medical Board of 
Australia  
[2015] 
NTSC 39 
Decision by Board to suspend registration, immediate action 
- not function of court to determine if appellant behave in 
way that constitutes professional misconduct, rather whether 
posed a serious risk to persons so necessary to take 
immediate action, interim action - impact on practitioner, 
also safety of public 
Accept some grounds of appeal (1, 2.1,4), dismiss 
others (2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2) - Set aside decision of 
Tribunal and substitute decision setting aside 
immediate action decision of the board 
6 July 
2015 
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Medical Board of 
Australia v Alam 
[2015] 
NTHPRT 7 
Police notification, allegations of indecent assaults - agreed 
facts, unsatisfactory professional performance 
Conditions upon registration, review in 12 months 11 
December 
2015 
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Queensland - 14 
Boundary violations - 5 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 
Improper prescribing - 3 
Deficient clinical standards  - 4 
Inadequate record keeping - 4 
Impairment - 2 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Alroe v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
QCAT 482 
Application to set aside decision of Medical Board to 
refuse registration as specialist general practitioner - had 
complied with required conditions - extensive discipline 
and registration history - failure to demonstrate remorse - 
board wanted to impose further conditions - fit and 
proper has both character and competence aspects - no 
risk to public 
No need for further conditions, has discharged onus to 
demonstrate that fit and proper - no further conditions 
required, should be unconditionally registered 
23 
November 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Bethania Surgery 
[2015] 
QCAT 550 
Dr Sylvia Yu - husband is Chinese medical practitioner, 
not registered in Australia - allowed him to perform 2 
procedures, claimed for them on Medicare as if she had 
performed them - provided false and misleading 
information to Board’s investigators - 1 allegation not 
substantiated but admitted other procedure - no 
background of prior offending - practice changes made 
Reprimand only, 6 months on Board’s register - not 
appropriate to order costs, other allegations by Board 
not substantiated 
20 October 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Bourke 
[2015] 
QCAT 400 
Notification from coroner - death of child following 
surgery - common ground that failed to take swab of 
neck region or give prophylactic antibiotics, serious 
infection - practitioner conceded that unsatisfactory 
professional conduct - failures were isolated error of 
clinical judgement 
Finding of unsatisfactory professional performance, 
reprimand, to remain on register for 12 months 
6 October 
2015 
Chaudhry v 
Medical Board of 
[2015] 
QCAT 414 
Decision of tribunal to set aside conditions imposed by 
Medical Board 
Medical Board to pay costs related to review 
proceedings 
3 October 
2015 
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Australia 
De Lacy v 
Medical Board of 
Australia 
[2016] 
QCAT 53 
Application to remove conditions refused by board 
following consent order - treatment of 11 patients - out of 
practise, need reskilling -  
Registration subject to conditions of supervision -  18 March 
2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v de 
Silva 
[2016] 
QCAT 63 
Unsatisfactory professional conduct, statement of agreed 
facts - post-surgical patient, perforated duodenum by 
original surgeon - lack of communication between 
surgeons - agreed sanctions 
Caution, undertakings given to Board, no record on 
Board’s register, bear own costs 
30 May 2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Ferguson 
[2015] 
QCAT 511 
Practising subject to conditions - Breach of conditions 
regarding prescribing of restricted substances, failure to 
attend meetings with supervisor - poor prescribing of 
drugs of dependency, poor medical management of some 
patients - lack of insight, brief and unclear notes - 
professional misconduct alleged - finding of impairment 
of executive functioning 
Practitioner must not be registered until establishes to 
satisfaction of Board that fit to practise, pay costs of 
the Board 
12 
November 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Gomez (No 2) 
[2015] 
QCAT 539 
Finding of inappropriate conduct relating to examination 
of 2 female patients - breach of undertakings given in 
respect of previous disciplinary proceedings - voluntarily 
ceased practice, practical suspension of 6 months 
Further suspension of 6 months, undertaking not to 
treat female patients - pay Board’s costs 
15 
September 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Kapadia 
[2015] 
QCAT 401 
False or misleading information given in application for 
limited registration - failed to disclose pending UK 
complaint, also when renewing specialist registration - 
errors in treatment and patient died, very poor records, 
but had remediated himself so no concern about fitness to 
practise - admitted that unprofessional conduct, no 
intention to deliberately mislead - has shown insight and 
remorse 
Reprimand, pay Board’s costs 12 October 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Kelly 
[2016] 
QCAT 35 
Provided medical certificate, not a patient - pressure to 
provide certificate - conduct amounts to unprofessional 
conduct - agreed sanction 
Reprimand on register for 12 months,  pay board’s 
costs 
9 February 
2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Kyaw 
[2016] 
QCAT 34 
Improperly obtained registration, certificate of 
registration status Myanmar Medical Board - no 
advantage to practitioner, was eligible by other 
experience - dishonesty which attracts sanction - genuine 
Has paid board’s agreed costs - reprimand to remain on 
register for 2 years 
11 March 
2016 
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remorse, accepts that professional misconduct - 
proceedings were justified 
Dr Choo-Tian 
Lee v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2016] 
QCAT 23 
Application to stay operation of decision of respondent to 
change condition 3 of conditions imposed on registration, 
require chaperone register - application for non-
publication order - inappropriate sexual behaviour - no 
adverse effect on reputation if stay of change and non-
publication order not granted 
Application for stay refused - non-publication of 
material that might identify complainant ordered 
23 January 
2016 
Ofili v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
QCAT 438 
Application by Medical Board to vary directions made Application refused - convenience of MBA irrelevant 
to compliance with the directions made - also prejudice 
to the doctor 
16 October 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Ong 
[2016] 
QCAT 54 
Inappropriate prescribing of restricted drugs, inadequate 
record-keeping - conditions on registration- admitted that 
professional misconduct 
Suspension for 1 month, conditions upon registration, 
requires continuing mentoring, regular audits to review 
record-keeping, review in12 months, pay costs of 
Board 
20 May 2016 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Pearse 
[2015] 
QCAT 442 
Allegation of inappropriate examination of female patient 
- course of events related by patient unlikely - seeing 
psychiatrist, traumatic experiences in childhood 
Board has not proven alleged misconduct, referral 
dismissed 
4 November 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Shah 
[2016] 
QCAT 158 
Inappropriately trying to involve himself in treatment of 
now-deceased former wife without her consent, including 
accessing her medical records, knowingly making and 
failing to correct false statements made to AHPRA - 
problems with marriage - unconvincing witness, his 
version of events at odds with other evidence - failed to 
maintain professional boundaries, breached professional 
code of conduct - tribunal satisfied that he knew what he 
was doing was wrong, character flaw in inability to be 
honest with collages and frank with regulatory authorities 
- professional misconduct found 
Suspension of registration for 6 monthss, conditions 
imposed on registration, no review of conditions for 3 
months, pay costs of the board 
22 March 
2016 
Small v Medical 
Board of 
Australia 
[2015] 
QCAT 396 
Immediate action by Medical Board, conditions imposed 
on registration, subsequently withdrawn - application for 
costs 
Costs of medical practitioner for review proceedings to 
be paid by Board 
6 October 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Stark 
[2016] 
QCAT 175 
Agreed statements of facts, and joint submission on 
sanction thereby avoiding substantive hearings some 
Reprimand and suspension of two years, retraining by 
completing tertiary level course on clinical record 
2 March 
2016 
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unprofessional conduct and some professional 
misconduct, inappropriate prescribing, treating persons in 
close personal relationship, inappropriate storage and 
handling of controlled drugs, substandard documentation, 
recklessly untrue statements to Board’s investigator, 
performing surgery while impaired 
keeping, conditions in place for four years after 
suspension lifted - tribunal is satisfied with agreed 
sanctions, payment of Board’s costs 
Medical Board of 
Australia v 
Tabriz 
[2015] 
QCAT 530 
Allegation of sexual relationship and breaches of 
confidentiality - sexual impropriety admitted, breaches of 
confidentiality not proven - not all Board’s allegations 
substantiated, unnecessarily protracted proceedings 
Costs divided between parties in relation to different 
parts of the proceedings 
6 November 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Vucak 
[2015] 
QCAT 367 
Sexual relationship with former patient, exploited 
therapeutic relationship - slow to recognise that that 
conduct inappropriate, no real relationship! - unlikely 
that events occur again, no need for specific deterrence 
Reprimand to remain on register for 12 months, 
suspended for 3 months, comply with conditions, 
course in professional boundary management 
20 August 
2015 
Medical Board of 
Australia v Wong 
[2016] 
QCAT 112 
Voluntary cessation of practice after multiple charges of 
sexual assault - concedes that decision of impairment can 
be made - long-standing schizophrenia - now ha good 
insight into illness and need for treatment - fit to practise 
under supervision - Board not seeking finding of 
professional misconduct but conduct capable of 
amounting to unprofessional conduct - but suitable to 
practise under conditions 
May continue to practise subject to conditions 21 June 2016 
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New South Wales - 21 
Boundary violations - 7 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs -2 
Improper prescribing - 9 
Deficient clinical standards  - 5 
Inadequate record keeping - 10 
Impairment - 5 
 
Case Citation Allegation Result Date of 
Judgement 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Astor-Finn 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
73 
Recurring mental illness, conditions on registration 
2010-2014 - registration suspended 2014, failure to 
comply with conditions - failure to respond to 
communications of HCCC - hearing in absence of 
practitioner, difficulty in service of documents - 
finding of impairment - finding that lack of mental 
competence  to practise medicine 
Registration cancelled - not reapply for 18 months 7 June 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Athour  
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
5 
Sexual relationship with patient A, inappropriate 
prescribing of Schedule 4 and Schedule 8 drugs to 
patient A - previous tribunal findings of 
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct, permitted to continue practice with 
conditions - gifts and money to patient A, 
inadequate records - no admission that caused harm 
to patient A - power imbalance, deficient 
understanding of professional responsibilities - no 
insight 
Cancel registration - not reapply for 3 years, pay Board’s 
costs 
14 January 
2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
BXD (No 1) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
134 
Wrongful or inappropriate prescription of drugs to 
family members (daughters A & B, husband C) also 
self-prescriptions relying on false prescriptions in 
name of husband - A with mental health problems, 
failed to disclose that her daughter, B with mental 
Reprimand, registration subject to conditions, pay costs 
of Board 
7 December 
2015 
  443 
health and weight loss problems - failure to maintain 
records - has admitted all allegations, confined to 
family members, never outsiders - Difficult family 
circumstances - but range of deceptive conduct - 
level of insight? - finding of professional 
misconduct 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Cheng (No 1) 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
61 
allegations of inappropriate conduct in examination 
of 5 female patients - application for non-
publication order 
Application refused 16 May 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Chowdhury 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
65 
Conditions imposed on re-registration in 2011 - 
false notification to Medical Council that conditions 
of observed practice completed - failure to respond 
to requests from Medical Council - not a witness of 
credit  - lack of honesty and candour with Medical 
Council- breaches of conditions found, constitutes 
professional misconduct 
Reconvene for hearing related to disciplinary orders 2 July 2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Chowdhury (No 
2) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
127 
Finding of professional misconduct - findings bore 
on honesty and candour, prior disciplinary history, 
similar findings, submission that does impact fitness 
to practise - lack of contrition or remorse - no 
problem with competence, problem lies with 
question of honesty, integrity and fitness of 
character - not satisfied that respondent has 
addressed deficiency of character identified 10 years 
before 
Cancel registration, not reapply for 2 years, pay costs of 
respondent 
11 
November 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
CNU 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
50 
Allegation of inappropriate behaviour on examining 
one female patient - excellent character references 
for medical practitioner - none of complaints 
established - non-publication order of both 
complainant and medical practitioner 
Non-publication order, no disciplinary order 6 May 2016 
Dr Crickett v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
86 
Appeal from decision of Medical Council to 
suspend practice - charged with murder, solicitor 
notified Council, free on conditional bail - 
denied application to have appeal upheld before Board 
reopens case - health and safety, public interest to be 
upheld 
20 August 
2015 
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Wales suspended despite no immediate concerns that 
medical practice posed significant risk to health and 
safety of anyone -  - concern about impact of 
allegations on reputation and standing of medical 
profession, public confidence, focus of public trust - 
respondent wanted to reopen case, appellant wanted 
appeal upheld before that permitted - rejected 
Crickitt v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales (No 2) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
115 
Appeal from decision to suspend registration, 
charged with murder of wife - not concerned about 
risk to public but impact of allegations on standing 
of medical profession - treating wife, inadequate 
records - could exhibit similar misconduct to 
patients, lies to police, manipulation of patient 
records 
Appeal dismissed - Continue suspension for 6 months or 
until terminated by Medical Council or it decides whether 
to pursue formal complaints - reserve costs 
22 October 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Daly 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
113 
Treatment of 12 patients not accord with level of 
knowledge, skill or judgment of equivalent 
experience practitioner - records inadequate - found 
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct - incorrect prescribing of Schedule 4D 
and 8 drugs - ignored conditions on registration - 
highly regarded by peers, compassionate with 
patients - taken steps to remedy problems 
Reprimand, conditions on registration, some critical 
compliance conditions regarding Schedule 4 and 8 drug 
prescribing - pay costs of HCCC 
19 October 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Flekser 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
1 
Claimed right to private practice, not entitled to do 
so - claimed and paid fees when not present at 
procedure - knowingly? recklessly indifferent? - 
inconsistencies in evidence before HCCC and 
Medical Council - deliberate fraud? - seeing 
psychiatrist, keep up with Jones!! - stress, financial 
pressures - repeated resort to lack of memory, 
adversely reflect on his credit - Tribunal concluded 
that deliberate scheme to claim for as many 
procedures as possible whether or not participated - 
conduct amounts to professional misconduct 
Parties to consider reasons for decision - timetable for 
further submission, and orders to be sought.  Further 
hearing? 
19 January 
2016 
Health Care [2016] Findings of deliberate claims for assisting Cancel registration - pay costs of HCCC - should be at 23 May 2016 
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Complaints 
Commission v 
Flekser (No 2) 
NSWCATOD 
65 
operations - false entries in audit - submissions that 
expected registration to be cancelled, making 
arrangements to repay incorrect payments - doing 
everything to accept responsibility for his actions - 
good references about professional competence, did 
not address character 
least 3 years before application for re-registration, need to 
establish a case 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Follent (No 2) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
106 
31 March 2015 finding of professional misconduct, 
matter stood over while audit of practice - dramatic 
improvement of medical records, diagnosis 
improving 
Reprimanded, continue practice subject to conditions, pay 
costs of applicant 
30 
September 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Ghannoum 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
149 
Prescribing of restricted and addictive drugs, some 
to addicted patients - inadequate records, treating 
family members - inadequate examination of 
patients - ceased practising in 2009/10 - conditions 
on non-practising registration, breached conditions 
when back in practice - professional misconduct 
Reprimand, conditions on registration proposed 17 
December 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Ghannoum (No 
2) 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
17 
Examination of proposed orders - finding of 
professional misconduct 
Reprimand, conditions on registration - pay costs of 
applicant 
8 February 
2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Khan 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
32 
Death of 8 year old child, septic shock after ruptured 
appendix - inappropriate prescribing for self and 
relatives, failed to maintain proper records - mild 
cognitive impairment and/or vascular dementia - 
guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct not 
professional misconduct - registration suspended so 
could not surrender registration - not competent to 
practise - impaired Registrants Panel found 
impairment 
Registration cancelled, because of age unlikely to 
reapply, pay costs of HCCC 
23 March 
2016 
Dr Marburg v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
87 
ENT Surgeon - History of complaints to Medical 
Board of NSW - recent decision to preclude 
applicant from performing surgical procedures in 
any setting, private or hospital - appeal from that 
Imposed practice conditions, substituted for those 
imposed by Medical Council 
7 August 
2015 
  446 
decision - conceded that serious deficiencies in 
clinical competence, also over-servicing - conditions 
imposed, no evidence that any relevant risk in 
general practice, consent to conditions about ear 
surgery -  
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Marino 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
37 
Failed to adequately assess emotionally unstable 
patient presenting with diarrhoea, failed to make 
proper records , improper prescribing- failed to 
maintain professional boundaries, engaged in sexual 
activity - no opportunity to test evidence by cross-
examination - several instances of unsatisfactory 
professional conduct so professional misconduct 
Matter stood over to hear submissions concerning 
protective orders to be made 
5 April 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Marino (No. 2) 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
75 
Finding of professional misconduct - 
acknowledgement of errors in treatment, has 
reflected on outcome of tribunal’s decision - 
difficult patient, had transgressed professional 
boundaries - lack of honesty before the tribunal - 
reprehensible conduct  but not persuaded that 
cancellation appropriate, but nor is reprimand - 
finding of professional misconduct 
Registration suspended for 9 months, conditions imposed 
- practitioner to pay complainant’s costs 
10 June 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Nguyen-Phuoc 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
81 
Inadequate treatments of patients, failure to record 
details of examinations and tests ordered, 
information and advice given - failed to adequately 
diagnose - given ‘complementary’ medicine - 
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct 
Adjourn proceedings for further hearing 7 August 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Bao-Quy 
Nguyen-Phuoc 
(No 2) 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
94 
Character references provided but previous 
disciplinary proceedings - argued that he offers hope 
where traditional medicine has failed 
Cancellation of registration, not permit to reapply for a 
further three years - prohibition on providing ‘alternative’ 
health services until re-registered as medical practitioner - 
pay costs of HCCC 
14 
September 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
Allegation of aggravated indecent assault - pleaded 
guilty and sentenced - conditions on registration - 
Registration cancelled, two years before reapply - notify 
Medical Council of NSW - recommend that AHPRA 
22 April 
2016 
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Commission v 
Pakalu 
49 has demonstrated remorse - but risk of reoffending 
‘fairly high’ - dishonestly giving history to 
psychiatrist - lacks insight 
notify PNG authorities - pay costs of HCCC 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Priyamanna 
[2015] 
NSWATOD 
138 
Examination of patient, sexually inappropriate 
manner - admits unsatisfactory professional 
conduct, not professional misconduct - focus on 
credibility of witness - found unsatisfactory 
professional conduct and professional misconduct - 
history of inappropriate examination of female 
patients in Queensland, denied sexual element - 
accept veracity of patient rather than practitioner - 
inappropriate behaviour found, caused distress to 
patient - non-publication order for patient’s name 
List for Stage 2 Hearing 10 
December 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Priyamanna (No 
2) 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
3 
In light of findings in Stage 1 - not automatic to 
suspend or cancel registration when professional 
misconduct found, must assess if practitioner is unfit 
to practise, gravity of circumstances, remorse and 
insight, not punitive, must protect the public, also 
educative and deterrent role - also point to 
Queensland matters - penalty not referable to worst 
case but extent conduct departs from proper 
standards 
Cancel registration, not reapply for 2 years - pay costs of 
HCCC 
13 January 
2016 
Ristevski v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
18 
Application for reinstatement of former medical 
practitioner - had been struck off, inappropriate 
sexual relationship with much younger woman, had 
been a patient, not kept records for whole time - 
charged with assault, found guilty - guilt of 
professional misconduct - now must determine if 
appropriate to reinstate, fit and proper? - now has 
insight, has maintained professional knowledge, 
supported by colleagues - likelihood of reoffence is 
low - problem with the assault 
Reinstate subject to conditions, pay costs of respondent 1 June 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
Breaches of conditions on registration - has 
impairment, major depressive disorder, long-term 
Guilty of professional misconduct, discharged suspension 
of registration - conditions imposed - pay costs of HCCC 
23 February 
2016 
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Commission v 
Rixon 
24 severe anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse or 
dependence - impaired registrant’s panel - 
undertakings about conduct given -HCCC proposed 
orders on mentoring and practice restrictions, 
accepted by Rixon -  
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Saldevar 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
96 
“inherited” small cohort of patients - prescribed 
Schedule 8 drugs for drug-dependent patients - 
inadequate records - professional misconduct - onus 
on medical practitioner to show that should be 
permitted to continue to practise - had insight into 
his problems dealing with difficult patients - well-
liked - not passive, but attempt to adopt shared 
decision-making approach - serious allegations 
normally require suspension or cancellation - 
primarily protective, not to punish practitioner - no 
longer prescribes drugs of addiction 
Reprimand, conditions upon registration, audit of 
practice, professional mentor and supervision - pay costs 
of the Board 
14 August 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Sharah  
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
99 
Registration suspended 21 October 2013, 16 
January 2015 advised AHPRA that decided to 
relinquish registration - now 80 years old - 
application to stop enquiry into treatment of some 
patients - complaint that guilty of professional 
misconduct, unsatisfactory professional conduct had 
impairment therefore not competent, disputed 
particulars - violations of professional boundaries, 
inappropriate religious advice - complaints proven - 
application for prohibition order 
Disqualified from registration - cannot reapply for 2 years 
- pay costs of HCCC 
23 
September 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Shinwari (No 2)  
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
107 
involved in rapid detoxification treatment - 
professional misconduct found, what protective 
orders are required - in some respects, lack of 
insight, need to deter 
Reprimand, conditions imposed on registration - pay 
costs of applicant 
8 October 
2015 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Singh 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
85 
Complaint of unsatisfactory professional conduct 
and professional misconduct, registration currently 
suspended - unable to serve documents - adjourn 
sine die or withdraw proceedings 
Order to withdraw proceedings, not determined so 
suspension remains in place and public is protected 
29 June 2016 
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Smithson v 
Medical Council 
of New South 
Wales 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
82 
Application for reinstatement to register of medical 
practitioners - registration cancelled in 2000, 
addiction to heroin and failure to maintain 
professional boundaries - impaired - application that 
addiction now overcome, has obtained law degrees 
in interim - has demonstrated insight into behaviour- 
has overcome hurdle to being reinstated, but should 
be subject to conditions to ensure patient safety and 
personal well-being and health 
Reinstated subject to both supervision and mentoring 
conditions, pay costs of Medical Council 
28 June 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Suri 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
54 
Inappropriate prescribing of drugs of addiction, 
breach of regulations re drugs of addiction, stolen 
prescription pads, failure to store correctly, failure to 
record, discrepancies in records - conceded that 
professional misconduct - protective order  required 
but not cancel registration - will outsource pain 
management in future 
Suspend registration for 3 month, when re-registered will 
be subject to conditions pay costs of HCCC 
6 May 2016 
Health Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Tan 
[2016] 
NSWCATOD 
77 
Inappropriate prescribing of drugs of addiction and 
restricted drugs - failure to maintain adequate 
medical records -  conceded serious misconduct - 
Medical Council recommended seeking of 
psychiatric treatment - greater insight into 
vulnerabilities but had not completely resolved - 
referred to forensic psychiatrist for opinion, finding 
of impairment - no explanation by psychiatrists for 
behaviour - registration not renewed but can be dealt 
with as if still registered - finding of conduct which 
is contemptible, outrageous and unethical, facile 
explanations of misconduct 
Finding of professional misconduct, registration 
cancelled, prohibition order on directly providing mental 
health services unless re-registered - disqualified from re-
registration for 3 years 
17 June 2016 
Heath Care 
Complaints 
Commission v 
Torrinello 
[2015] 
NSWCATOD 
90 
Application to hear disciplinary matter, request of 
HCCC and solicitor for Torrinello complaint 
withdrawn and application dismissed - not in public 
interest to hear complaint - alleged inappropriate 
prescribing, failed to maintain professional 
boundaries with 4 patients, breach confidentiality, 
Consent to withdrawal of complaint, application for 
disciplinary order and findings dismissed - no order as to 
costs 
1 September 
2015 
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inadequate records - has retired, ill health, 
undertakes not to practise - no risk to public 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All jurisdictions total - 49 
Boundary violations - 17 
Self-medication - alcohol or drugs - 3 
Improper prescribing - 14 
Deficient clinical standards  - 13 
Inadequate record keeping - 19 
Impairment - 7 
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APPENDIX IVA 
 
Civil Liability Legislation 
 
 
 NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT 
Limitation 
Period 
Limitation Act 
1969 (NSW) 
s 50C(1)(a) - 3 
years from date 
on which cause 
of action is 
discoverable; 
(b) - 12 years 
from  date act 
or omission 
where injury 
alleged to have 
occurred; 
whichever is the 
earlier 
Limitation of 
Actions Act 
1958 (Vic) 
s 27D(1)(a) - 3 
years from date 
where cause 
discoverable; 
(b) 12 years 
from date of act 
or omission 
where injury 
alleged to have 
occurred; 
whichever is 
earlier 
Limitation of 
Actions Act 
1974 (Qld) 
s 11(1) - 3 
years from date 
cause of action 
arose 
(2) - no 
limitation for 
dust related 
injury 
Limitation Act 
2005 (WA) 
s 14(1) - 3 years 
from date on 
which cause of 
action accrued 
s 55 - when 
cause of action 
accrues 
Limitation of 
Actions Act 
1936 (SA) 
s 36(1) - 3 years 
after cause of 
action accrued; 
s 36(2) - 3 years 
after injury 
comes to 
person’s 
knowledge 
Limitation Act 
1974 (Tas) 
s 5A (a) - 3 
years 
commencing on 
date of 
discoverability; 
(b) 12 years 
commencing on 
date of act or 
omission 
resulting in 
injury; 
whichever is 
earlier 
Limitation Act 
1985 (ACT) 
s 16B(2)(a) - 3 
years after day 
injured person 
first knows of 
injury 
(b) - 3 years 
after date injury 
happened 
Limitation Act 
(NT) 
s 12)1) - 3 years 
from date on 
which cause of 
action accrues 
Limitation 
Period where 
disability at 
time of accrual 
of action 
s 50F -(1) - 
running of 
limitation 
period 
suspended for  
period of 
s 27E(2)(a) - 6 
years from date 
where cause 
discoverable; 
(b) - 12 years 
from date of act 
s 29(2)(c)  - 3 
years from date 
person ceased 
to be under 
disability, or 
died; whichever 
s 30(1) - where 
under 15 years, 
cannot 
commence after 
6 years from 
date since cause 
s 45(1) extends 
time in s 36 by 
time whilst 
legal disability 
exists or 
continues after 
s 26(1) - 6 years s 30 - running 
of limitation 
period 
suspended for 
period of 
disability; 
s 36(1) - 
running of 
limitation 
period 
suspended for 
period of 
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duration of 
disability 
(3) - unless 
facts known by 
capable parent 
or guardian 
or omission 
where injury 
alleged to have 
occurred; 
whichever is 
earlier 
is earlier 
 
 
Personal 
Injuries 
Proceedings 
Act 2002 (Qld) 
s 19 - limitation 
periods 
suspended 
while claimant 
under legal 
disability 
of action 
accrued 
s 31(1) - if 
person is 15, 16 
or 17 when 
cause accrued, 
cannot 
commence if 
person has 
reached 21 
years 
s 32(1) - 
limitation 
period 
suspended for 
period when no 
guardian 
s 35(1) if under 
mental 
disability, 
limitation 
period 
suspended for 
period where no 
guardian 
time right to 
bring the action 
arose 
s 45A (1) - if 
time extended 
to more than 6 
years, must give 
notice within 6 
years from date 
of incident 
except if action 
against person 
committing the 
tort 
s30B(3)(a) - 
claims relating 
to health 
services for 
children - 6 
years after 
aware of the 
injury;(b) - 12 
years after day 
of accident 
giving rise to 
injury; 
whichever is 
earlier 
duration of 
disability 
Apologies or 
Expressions of 
Regret 
Civil Liability 
Act 2002 
(NSW)  
s 69(1) - not 
admission of 
liability, not 
relevant to 
deciding fault; 
(2) evidence of 
apology not 
Wrongs Act 
1958 (Vic) 
s 14J(1) - 
apology is not 
admission of 
liability, or 
unprofessional 
conduct, 
carelessness, 
incompetence 
Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld)  
s 72 - 
expressions of 
regret 
inadmissible in 
proceedings; 
s 72D(1) - 
apology not 
admission of 
Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) 
s 5AH(1) - 
apology is not 
admission of 
fault or liability, 
not relevant to 
determine fault 
or liability; 
(2) evidence of 
Civil Liability 
Act 1936 (SA) 
s 75 - no 
admission of 
liability or fault 
inferred from 
expression of 
regret for 
incident 
Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) 
s 7(1) - apology 
is not express or 
implied 
admission of 
fault or liability, 
not relevant to 
determining 
fault or liability; 
Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) 
s 14(1) - 
apology is not 
admission of 
liability, not 
relevant to 
deciding fault 
(2) evidence of 
Personal 
Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) 
s 13 - 
expression of 
regret is not 
admissible in 
evidence 
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admissible as 
evidence of 
fault or liability 
or 
unsatisfactory 
professional 
performance, 
for any 
profession 
fault or 
liability, not 
relevant to 
determine fault 
or liability; 
(2) - evidence 
of apology not 
admissible as 
evidence of 
fault or liability 
apology not 
admissible as 
evidence of 
fault or liability 
(2) - evidence 
of apology not 
admissible as 
evidence of 
fault or liability 
apology not 
admissible as 
evidence of 
fault or liability 
Notice of 
Claims for 
Personal 
Injuries 
  Personal Injuries 
Proceedings 
Act 2002 (Qld) 
s 9 - notice of 
claim to 
proposed 
defendant; 
s 9A(2) - 
medical 
negligence 
cases, must 
give initial 
notice; earlier 
of 
(4) within 9 
months of 
medical 
incident or 
when 
symptoms 
become 
apparent, or 
within 1 month 
of instructing 
   s 51(1) - notice of claims for 
personal 
injuries 
(3) - within 9 
months from 
injury or day 
symptoms 
appear 
Personal 
Injuries (Civil 
Claims) Act 
(NT) 
s 8(1) - notice 
of claim to be 
given within 12 
months of 
incident, or 
within 12 
months of 
symptoms 
becoming 
apparent 
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solicitor; 
s 20C(1) - 6 
years for child 
claimant or 18 
months after 
instructing 
solicitor, 
whichever is 
earlier 
Protection of 
Good 
Samaritans 
from Liability 
s 57 - act or 
omission made 
in good faith for 
assisting person 
apparently 
injured or at 
risk of injury 
s 31B(2) - act or 
omission done 
in good faith to 
assist at scene 
of provide 
information to 
someone else at 
the scene 
 s 5AD(1) - act or omission 
done in good 
faith and 
without 
recklessness in 
assisting person 
in apparent 
need of 
emergency 
assistance; 
(2) medically 
qualified good 
samaritans 
s 74(2) - no 
liability for act 
or omission 
done in good 
faith and 
without 
recklessness in 
assisting person 
in in apparent 
need of 
emergency 
assistance; 
(2) medically 
qualified good 
samaritans 
s 35B(2) - not 
liable  for 
anything done 
in good faith 
and without 
recklessness in 
providing 
assistance at 
scene of 
emergency, or 
providing 
communication 
at scene of 
accident 
s 5(1) - act or 
omission made 
honestly and 
without 
negligence in 
assisting a 
person injured 
or in need of 
medical 
assistance 
Personal 
Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) 
s 8(1) - no 
liability for act 
done in good 
faith and 
without 
recklessness 
while giving 
emergency 
assistance; 
(2) medical 
practitioners 
Protection of 
Volunteers 
from Liability 
s 61 - act or 
omission done 
in good faith 
when doing 
community 
work for 
community 
organisation 
s 37(1) - act or 
omission done 
in good faith 
when doing 
community 
work for 
community 
association 
s 39(1) - act or 
omission done 
in good faith 
when doing 
community 
work for 
community 
association 
  s 47(1) - no liability for 
anything done 
in good faith 
when doing 
community 
work 
s 8 - act or 
omission made 
honestly and 
without 
recklessness in 
carrying out 
voluntary 
community 
work for 
community 
s 7(1) - no 
liability where 
act done in 
good faith and 
without 
recklessness 
while doing 
community 
work for a 
community 
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organisation organisation 
Protection of 
Food Donors 
from Liability 
s 58C - no 
liability for 
donated food in 
good faith and 
charitable 
purpose,  and if 
food fit at time 
it was left, was 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
s 31F(2) - no 
liability for 
donated food in 
good faith and 
charitable 
purpose,  and if 
food fit at time 
it was left, was 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
s 38A - no 
liability for 
distributing 
food where 
food fit at time 
it was left, was 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
 s 74A(2) - no liability arising 
from 
consumption of 
food donated or 
distributed; 
(3) no immunity 
if knew or 
recklessly 
indifferent to 
fact that when 
food left control 
it was unsafe 
s 35F(1) - no 
liability for 
food donor who 
donated food, in 
good faith for 
charitable 
purpose; food 
safe to consume 
at time it was 
left, was 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
s 11B - no 
liability if food 
was fit at time it 
was left, was 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
s 7A - no 
liability for 
food donor in 
good faith for 
charitable 
purpose, if food 
fit for 
consumption at 
time it was left, 
handled 
correctly and 
within relevant 
time limits 
Breach of Duty 
of Care 
s 5B(1) - not 
negligent unless 
risk foreseeable 
and not 
insignificant, 
reasonable 
person would 
take precautions 
s 48(1) - not 
negligent unless 
risk foreseeable 
and not 
insignificant, 
reasonable 
person would 
take precautions 
s 9 - no breach 
of duty against 
risk of harm 
unless risk 
foreseeable, not 
insignificant, 
and reasonable 
person take 
precautions 
s 5B - no 
liability unless 
risk foreseeable, 
not 
insignificant, 
and reasonable 
person take 
precautions 
s 31 - to 
determine if 
negligent, 
standard is 
reasonable 
person in 
position of 
defendant with 
all information 
reasonably had 
at time of 
incident 
s 32(1) - not 
negligent unless 
risk foreseeable, 
not 
insignificant, 
and reasonable 
person take 
precautions 
s 11(1) - no 
breach of duty 
to take 
reasonable care 
unless 
foreseeable risk, 
risk not 
insignificant, 
reasonable 
person in 
position of 
person would 
take precautions 
to avoid risk 
s 42 - 
reasonable 
person in 
position of 
defendant, in 
possession of 
all reasonable 
information 
Common Law 
Donoghue v 
Stevenson 
[1932] AC 562 
- must take 
reasonable care 
to avoid acts or 
omissions 
which can be 
foreseen as 
likely to injure 
your neighbour 
ie person 
closely and 
directly affected 
that ought to be 
reasonably in 
contemplation 
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Causation s 5D(1) - 
negligence was 
a necessary 
condition of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
include 
defendant; 
(2) - court to 
consider where 
negligence 
cannot be 
established as 
necessary 
condition, 
whether  and 
why 
responsibility 
should be 
imposed on 
negligent party; 
(3) determine 
factual 
causation 
subjectively in 
light of all 
relevant 
circumstances, 
statements by 
injured person 
about what 
would have 
done are 
s 51(1)- 
negligence was 
a necessary 
condition of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
include 
defendant; 
(2) court to 
consider where 
negligence 
cannot be 
established as 
necessary 
condition, 
whether  and 
why 
responsibility 
should be 
imposed on 
negligent party; 
(3) determine 
factual 
causation 
subjectively in 
light of all 
relevant 
circumstances, ; 
(4) in 
determining 
scope, whether 
and why 
liability should 
s 11(1) - 
negligence was 
a necessary 
condition of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
include 
defendant; 
(2) - court to 
consider where 
negligence 
cannot be 
established as 
necessary 
condition, 
whether  and 
why 
responsibility 
should be 
imposed on 
negligent party; 
(3) determine 
factual 
causation 
subjectively in 
light of all 
relevant 
circumstances, 
statements by 
injured person 
about what 
would have 
done are 
s 5C (1)- fault 
was a necessary 
condition of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
extend to 
tortfeasor; 
(2) - court to 
consider where 
negligence 
cannot be 
established as 
necessary 
condition, 
whether  and 
why 
responsibility 
should be 
imposed on 
negligent party 
or left to lie 
where it fell; 
(3) determine 
factual 
causation by 
considering 
what injured 
person would 
have done if 
tortfeasor not at 
fault, evidence 
of injured 
person about 
s 34(1) - 
negligence was 
a necessary 
condition of 
harm. 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
extend to 
defendant; 
(2) where not 
possible to 
assign risk then 
court may apply 
principle where 
responsibility to 
be assigned to 
defendants, 
consider each 
defendant 
individually, 
reasons for 
bringing 
defendant 
within scope of 
liability; 
(3) - court to 
consider 
whether and 
why 
responsibility to 
be imposed on 
negligent party 
s 13(1) - breach 
of duty 
necessary 
element of 
occurrence of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability for 
harm to extend 
to defendant; 
(2) where 
cannot establish 
whether breach 
has occurred, 
court to 
consider 
whether and 
why 
responsibility 
should be 
imposed; 
(3) in deciding 
factual 
causation, 
matter to be 
decided 
subjectively in 
light of 
circumstances, 
statement about 
what plaintiff 
would have 
done is 
inadmissible; 
s 45(1) - 
negligence was 
a necessary 
condition of 
harm, 
appropriate for 
scope of 
liability to 
include 
defendant; 
(2) - court to 
consider where 
negligence by a 
number of 
people and no 
possible to 
assign 
responsibility, 
apply common 
law principles, 
consider 
position of each 
defendant and 
state reasons for 
bringing within 
scope of 
liability; 
(3) in 
determining 
scope, whether 
and why 
liability should 
be imposed 
Common Law 
injury would 
not have 
occurred but/for 
the defendant’s 
action -- must 
also be 
necessary 
consequence of 
defendant’s 
action - risk 
must not be too 
remote 
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inadmissible 
unless against 
interest; 
(4) in 
determining 
scope, whether 
and why 
liability should 
be imposed 
be imposed inadmissible 
unless against 
interest; 
(4) in 
determining 
scope, whether 
and why 
liability should 
be imposed 
what would 
have done are 
inadmissible; 
(4) in 
determining 
scope, whether 
and why 
liability should 
be imposed 
(4) scope of 
liability, court 
to determine 
whether and 
why to impose 
responsibility 
on party in 
breach 
Onus/Burden of 
Proof 
s 5E - plaintiff 
bears onus on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
s 52 - plaintiff 
bears burden on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
s 12 - plaintiff 
bears onus on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any 
fact relevant to 
issue of 
causation 
s 5D - plaintiff 
bears onus on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
s 35 - plaintiff 
bears burden on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
s 14 - plaintiff 
bears onus on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
s 46 - plaintiff 
bears onus on 
balance of 
probabilities of 
proving any fact 
relevant to issue 
of causation 
Common Law 
plaintiff must 
discharge duty 
of submitting 
evidence to 
show how 
incident 
happened and 
which shows 
reasonable 
finding that 
defendant’s 
conduct caused 
it 
Legal disability       s 60 - no need to comply with 
obligations 
under this 
chapter 
 
Professional 
Negligence/Sta
ndard of Care 
s 5O - (1) A 
person 
practising a 
profession (a 
professional) 
does not incur a 
s 59 - no 
liability if 
shown that 
acted in manner 
widely accepted 
by peers as 
s 22(1) - no 
breach of duty 
if established 
that acted in 
way widely 
accepted by 
s 5PB - no 
negligent act or 
omission of 
health 
professional if 
in accordance 
s 41(1) - no 
liability if 
establish that 
provider acted 
in manner 
widely accepted 
s 22(1) - no 
breach of duty 
if establish that 
act in manner 
widely accepted 
by peers as 
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liability in 
negligence 
arising from the 
provision of a 
professional 
service if it is 
established that 
the professional 
acted in a 
manner that (at 
the time the 
service was 
provided) was 
widely accepted 
in Australia by 
peer 
professional 
opinion as 
competent 
professional 
practice. 
(2) However, 
peer 
professional 
opinion cannot 
be relief on for 
the purposes of 
this section if 
the court 
considers that 
the opinion is 
irrational. 
(3)  and (4) can 
rely on more 
than one widely 
competent 
professional 
practice in 
circumstances, 
provided the 
court does not 
consider that 
the opinion is 
irrational 
peers as 
competent 
professional 
practice in 
circumstances 
with practice  
widely accepted 
by peers as 
competent 
professional 
practice in 
circumstances 
by members of 
same profession 
as competent 
professional 
practice 
competent 
professional 
practice 
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accepted 
opinion 
Damages for 
Non-economic 
Loss 
s 16 - minimum 
of 15% of most 
extreme case - 
$350,000.00 - 
sliding scale 
s 28LE - no 
damages unless 
significant 
injury; 
s 28LF - 
determination 
of significant 
injury; 
s 28LG - as 
determined by 
medical 
practitioner; 
 s 9 - restrictions on damages for 
non-pecuniary 
loss 
s 52 - 
limitations on 
damages for 
non-economic 
loss 
s 27 - 
restrictions on 
damages for 
non-economic 
loss 
 s 27 - maximum amount limited 
($350,000.00) - 
restrictions on 
how awarded 
Contributory 
Negligence 
s 5R(1) - same 
principles for 
determining 
contributory 
negligence in 
determining 
whether the 
person who 
suffered harm 
was 
contributorily 
negligent 
(2)(a) - standard 
of care required 
by person who 
suffered harm is 
that of 
reasonable 
person in the 
position of that 
person; 
s 23B(1) - 
subject to the 
section, person 
liable in respect 
of damage 
suffered by 
another person 
may recover 
contribution 
from any other 
person liable in 
respect of the 
same damage 
(whether jointly 
with the first-
mentioned 
person or 
otherwise) 
s 23 - same 
principles for 
determining 
contributory 
negligence in 
determining 
whether the 
person who 
suffered harm 
was 
contributorily 
negligent 
(2)(a) - 
standard of care 
required by 
person who 
suffered harm 
is that of 
reasonable 
person in the 
position of that 
s 5K(1) - same 
principles for 
determining 
contributory 
negligence in 
determining 
whether the 
person who 
suffered harm 
was 
contributorily 
negligent 
(2)(a) - standard 
of care required 
by person who 
suffered harm is 
that of 
reasonable 
person in the 
position of that 
person; 
s 62 - same 
principles for 
determining 
contributory 
negligence in 
determining 
whether the 
person who 
suffered harm 
was 
contributorily 
negligent 
(2)(a) - standard 
of care required 
by person who 
suffered harm is 
that of 
reasonable 
person in the 
position of that 
person; 
s 23(1) - same 
principles for 
determining 
contributory 
negligence in 
determining 
whether the 
person who 
suffered harm 
was 
contributorily 
negligent 
(2)(a) - standard 
of care required 
by person who 
suffered harm is 
that of 
reasonable 
person in the 
position of that 
person; 
s 19 - wrong 
means an act or 
omission 
(whether or not 
an offence - (a) 
that gives rise 
to a liability in 
tort in relation 
to which a 
defence of 
contributory 
negligence is 
available at 
common law; 
s 47 - court may 
determine 
reduction of 
100% 
Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 
(NT) 
s  15 - “wrong” 
means an act or 
omission that: 
(a) gives rise to 
a liability in the 
tort of 
negligence; 
s 16 (1)(b) - 
damages 
recoverable in 
respect of 
wrong to be 
reduced  to the 
extent the court 
thinks is just 
and equitable 
having regard to 
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(b) determine 
matter of basis 
of what person 
knew or should 
have known at 
the time 
s 5S - court may 
determine 
reduction of 
100% 
person; 
(b) determine 
matter of basis 
of what person 
knew or should 
have known at 
the time 
s 24 - court 
may determine 
reduction of 
100% 
(b) determine 
matter of basis 
of what person 
knew or should 
have known at 
the time 
(b) determine 
matter of basis 
of what person 
knew or should 
have known at 
the time 
s 63 - court may 
determine 
reduction of 
100% 
(b) determine 
matter of basis 
of what person 
knew or should 
have known at 
the time 
Wrongs Act 
1954  
s 4 - court may 
determine 
reduction of 
100% 
claimants share 
of responsibility 
Personal 
Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act  
s 17 - court 
must assess 
damages on 
basis that 
damages to 
which claimant 
may be entitled 
in absence of 
contributory 
negligence are 
to be reduced 
by 25% or 
greater 
percentage 
determined by 
court to be 
appropriate in 
the 
circumstances 
Exemplary 
Damages 
excluded 
s 21 - excluded 
for personal 
injury 
 s 52 - excluded for personal 
injury 
    Personal Injuries (Civil 
Claims) Act s 
19 - excluded 
for personal 
injury 
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APPENDIX VA  
 
Advance Directives Legislation 
 
 
 Advance Care Directives Act 2013 
(SA) 
Guardianship and 
Administration Act 
1990 (WA) 
Medical Treatment 
(Health 
Directions) Act 
2006 (ACT) 
Advance Personal 
Planning Act 2013 
(NT) 
Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (Qld) 
Medical 
Treatment 
Planning and 
Decisions Bill 2016 
(Vic) 
Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (UK) 
Name Advance Care 
Directive- s 3(1) 
Advance health 
directive - s 3(1),  
s 110ZH 
Health Direction -  
s 7(1) 
Advance Consent 
Decision - s 3 
Advance Care 
Statement - s 3 
Advance health 
directive - s 5(4) 
Advance Care 
Directive - cl 3 
advance directive 
sets out binding 
instructions or 
preferences - cl 12 
Advance decision -  
s 24 
Interstate 
Recogniti
on 
Yes - s 33 Yes - s 110ZA Not specified Yes - s 88 Yes - s 40 Yes - cl 95  
Common 
Law 
preserved 
Probably Yes - s 110ZB Yes - s 6 Yes - s 55 Yes - s 39 (but see 
s 66(1) 
Guardianship and 
Administration Act 
2000) 
Yes - cl 10 - 
nothing in this Part 
affects any right of 
a person under any 
other law to refuse 
medical treatment 
No 
Registrati
on 
No provisions No provision Copy of direction 
or note about 
direction to be 
placed on patient’s 
file - s 14 
May be registered - 
 s 87 
optional registration  
so validity or effect 
not affected - s 
87(2) 
No provision to 
register advance 
health directive or 
revocation 
No provision No provision 
Eligibility Person 18 years or Person who has Adult may make Adult who has Adult principal - s Any person Person who has 
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and 
capacity 
over and of sound 
mind - s 7(1) 
reached 18 years of 
age and has full 
legal capacity - s 
110P 
s 3 -  mental 
disability includes 
an intellectual 
disability, a 
psychiatric 
condition, an 
acquired brain 
injury and 
dementia;  
s 4(3) - Every 
person shall be 
presumed to be 
capable of -  
(a) looking after his 
own health and 
safety;  
(b) making 
reasonable 
judgments in 
respect of matters 
relating to his 
person;                                                            
(c) managing his 
own affairs; and                                        
(d) making 
reasonable 
judgments in 
respect of matters 
relating to his 
estate,                                                             
until the contrary is 
direction - s 7(1) 
Cannot be made for 
any person with 
impaired decision-
making capacity -  
s 7(3)(b) 
As per s 9  Powers 
of Attorney Act 
2006 (ACT) 
(1) a person has 
decision-making 
capacity if the 
person can make 
decisions in 
relation to the 
person’s affairs and 
understands the 
nature and effect of 
the decisions. 
(2)  a person has 
impaired decision-
making capacity if 
the person cannot 
make decisions in 
relation to the 
person’s affairs or 
does not understand 
the nature or effect 
of the decisions the 
person makes in 
relation to the 
person’s affairs. 
planning capacity - 
s 8 
Adult has planning 
capacity when he or 
she has decision-
making capacity for 
making an advance 
personal plan - s 
4(a) 
Adult has decision-
making capacity 
where the adult can 
understand and 
retain information, 
and communicate 
the decision in 
some way - s 6(1) 
Adult is presumed 
to have decision-
making capacity 
until the contrary is 
shown -  
s 6(2) 
35 
Principal may only 
make directive 
where understands 
(a) nature and 
likely effects of 
each direction 
(b) it operates only 
while principal has 
impaired capacity -  
s 42(1) 
Capacity of an 
adult  is presumed - 
Schedule 1 Part 1 
Section 1 
Capacity means 
person is capable of  
(a) understanding 
nature and effect of 
decisions 
(b) freely and 
voluntarily making 
decision 
(c) communication 
decision in some 
way - Schedule 3 s 
3 
(including a child) 
who has decision 
making capacity in 
relation to each 
statement in the 
directive and 
understands the 
nature and effect of 
each statement in  
the directive - cl 13 
Decision-making 
capacity - cl 4 
(1)(a) understand 
information 
relevant to decision; 
(b) retain 
information 
necessary to make 
decision; (c) use or 
weigh information 
as part of making 
decision; (d) 
communicated 
decision in some 
way. 
cl 4(2) - for 
purposes of ss (1), 
adult presumed to 
have decision-
making capacity 
unless there is 
evidence to the 
contrary 
 
reached 18 years 
and has capacity - s 
24(1) 
Person lacks 
capacity if is 
unable to make a 
decision for himself 
because of 
impairment or or 
disturbance in 
functioning of the 
brain - s 2(1) 
Unable to make 
decision where 
unable to 
(a) understand 
relevant 
information 
(b) retain that 
information 
(c) use or weigh 
information in 
making decision 
(d) communicate 
decision in any way 
-  
s 3(1) 
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proved to the 
satisfaction of the 
State 
Administrative 
Tribunal.                                                         
Direction Enable directions 
about future health 
care - s 9(a), in 
accordance with 
person’s wishes and 
values 
Can make advance 
health directive 
containing 
treatment decisions 
for future treatment 
- s 110P 
An adult can make 
a direction to 
refuse, or require 
withdrawal of 
medical treatment 
generally, or of a 
particular kind -  
s 7(1) 
Adult with planning 
capacity can make 
an advance personal 
plan to make 
consent decisions 
about future health 
care action - s 
8(1)(a) 
Principal may give 
directions and 
information for 
future health care, 
and may appoint 
one or more 
persons as 
attorneys if 
directions 
inadequate - s 35(1) 
and may consent or 
direct that 
treatment be 
withdrawn - s 35 
(2) 
Is not revoked by 
impaired capacity 
of principal - s 
35(4) 
Instructional 
directive in advance 
care directive - 
medical treatment - 
cl 6(1)(a) 
Values directive in 
advance care 
directive - basis for 
medical treatment 
outcomes - cl 6(2) 
Makes a decision 
that (a) if at later 
time in specified 
circumstances a 
treatment is 
proposed or 
continued and  
(b) he lacks 
capacity,  
then treatment is 
not to be carried 
out or continued - s 
24(1)  
May be expressed 
in layman’s terms - 
 s 24 (2) 
Condition
s of use 
Reference to 
provision of health 
care includes 
reference to 
withhold or 
withdraw treatment, 
including life-
sustaining treatment 
- s 5 
Maker must 
understand the 
nature of the 
treatment decision 
or consequences of 
the treatment 
decision -  
s 110R(2) 
Treatment decision 
Person must be 
informed about 
(a) nature of illness 
(b) alternative 
available treatment 
(c) consequences of 
available forms of 
treatment 
(d) consequences of 
health care action 
for an adult means 
commencing, 
continuing, 
withholding or 
withdrawing health 
care for the adult - s 
3 
may apply to all or 
Direction to 
withhold life-
sustaining 
treatment is not 
valid unless  
(a) principal has a 
terminal illness and 
is expected to die 
within 1 year, or 
Person with 
decision-making 
capacity if -
understands the 
information 
relevant to the 
decision and effect 
of the decision, 
retains that 
Must be applicable 
to the treatment in 
question - s 25(1) 
Advance decision 
is not applicable 
where person has 
capacity to give or 
refuse consent - s 
25(3) 
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Health practitioner 
cannot be 
compelled to 
provide specific 
health care - s 6 
 
Can only be 
implemented when 
impaired decision-
making capacity - s 
34 
operates any time 
maker is unable to 
make reasonable 
judgements about 
treatment as if the 
decision had been 
made while of full 
legal capacity - s 
110S 
Does not operate if 
circumstances not 
reasonably 
anticipated at time 
treatment decision 
made, or would 
have caused a 
reasonable person 
the change mind -  
s 110S(3) 
remaining 
untreated - s 11(2) 
Health professional 
must not give effect 
to the direction 
unless belief on 
reasonable grounds 
that person giving 
the direction 
understood the 
information 
provided, weighed 
the options and 
then has confirmed 
the refusal or 
decision for 
withdrawal - s 
11(3) 
 
particular health 
care action, in all 
circumstances, only 
stated or only 
where not stated - s 
38 
Has effect for all 
purposes as if 
decision made by 
the adult and the 
adult had full legal 
capacity and was 
fully informed 
about the health 
care action -  
s 41 
(b) is in a persistent 
vegetative state, or 
(c) is permanently 
unconscious with 
no prospect of 
regaining 
consciousness, or 
(d) severe illness 
where no prospect 
of recovery other 
than with life-
sustaining 
measures - s 36(2) 
Any direction to 
withhold or 
withdraw artificial 
hydration or 
nutrition must not 
be inconsistent with 
good medical 
practice -  
s 36(2)(b) 
 
information 
necessary to make 
that decision, 
uses or weighs that 
information as part 
of process of 
making the 
decision, 
communicates the 
decision and view 
and needs as to 
decision in some 
way - cl 4 
Adult is presumed 
to have decision-
making capacity 
unless there is 
evidence to the 
contrary - cl 4(2) 
Not applicable to 
life-sustaining 
treatment unless 
patient’s decision 
verified by 
statement that it 
will continue to 
apply -  
s 25(5) and is in 
writing and signed 
by the patient in 
presence of witness 
who signs in 
patient’s presence - 
s 25)6) 
Formal 
Requirem
ents 
Must use advance 
care directive form 
- s 3(1) 
- complete the form 
and have it 
witnessed - s 11(2) 
- not invalidated 
where informal 
language, 
insufficient 
information, no 
Must be in  
(a) form prescribed 
by regulations 
(b) maker 
encouraged to seek 
legal advice 
(b) signed by 
maker 
(c) witnessed by 2 
persons authorised 
to take declarations 
In writing, orally or 
any other way - s 
7(2) 
Signed in presence 
of 2 witnesses who 
sign in each other’s 
presence - s 8 
Where direction is 
not written, must be 
witnessed by 2 
health professionals 
In form approved 
under s 86(1)  - s 9 
Signed and 
witnesses by an 
authorised witness 
who believes the 
adult is the person 
the adult purports to 
be and is at least 18 
years of age, 
understands nature 
Must be in 
approved form - s 
44(1) 
In writing - s 44(2) 
Signed by principal 
and signed and 
dated by eligible 
witness -  
s 44(3) 
Witness must sign 
certificate stating 
Formal 
requirements - cl 16 
Witnessing and 
certification 
requirements - cl 17 
Two adult 
witnesses, sign and 
date in presence of 
donor and each 
other - one witness 
must be authorised 
If applicable to life-
sustaining 
treatment, must be 
in writing and 
witnessed - s 25(6) 
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legal advice - s 
11(5) 
(e) signed in the 
presence of the 
maker and each 
other - s 110QA(1) 
Form in directions 
must include 
provision if maker 
wishers to indicate 
whether legal and 
medical advice 
obtained and who 
from - s110QA 
including a medical 
practitioner present 
at the same time - s 
9 
and effect of plan  
and is acting 
voluntarily -  
s 10 
Where non-
compliance with 
formal 
requirements, may 
have effect as 
statement of adult’s 
views and wishes -  
s 13 
Court may declare 
attempt valid where 
intention is clear -  
s 13(3)  
signed in presence 
of principal who 
appeared to have 
capacity - s 44(5) 
Also certificate 
signed and dated by 
non-witness doctor 
certifying capacity 
of principal - s 
44(6)– (7) 
witness - cl  3 - 
registered medical 
practitioner or 
person authorised to 
take affidavits 
Revocatio
n 
Only in accordance 
with prescribed 
regulations - s 29 
Decision in 
advance health 
directive taken to 
have been revoked 
if maker has 
changed mind since 
making the 
directive - s 
110S(6) 
State 
Administrative 
Tribunal may 
declare that 
treatment decision 
taken to have been 
revoked under  
s 110S(6) - s 
110Z(1) and may 
revoke that 
May be revoked by 
the person who 
made the direction 
by clearly 
expressing decision 
to health 
professional or any 
other person to 
revoke - s 10(1) 
Decision to revoke 
may be made in 
writing, orally or 
any other way - s 
10(2) 
May be amended or 
revoked at any time 
as long as has 
planning capacity, 
in accordance with 
ss 9 & 10 
Principal may 
revoke written 
advance health 
directive only if has 
capacity - s 48(1) 
Amendment or 
revocation - cl 20 - 
amendment made 
on face of original 
advance care 
directive - 
revocation by an 
later advance care 
directive given by 
the donor - if not in 
accordance with cl 
21, amendment or 
revocation has no 
effect, but may be 
taken into account 
as statement of 
preferences and 
values 
May withdraw or 
alter advance 
decision at any 
time while has 
capacity -  
s 24(3)  
Withdrawal need 
not be in writing - s 
24(4) 
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decision - s 
110Z(3) 
Vitiating 
Factors  
Not valid if 
decision not made 
voluntarily or is 
made as result of 
inducement or 
coercion - s 
110R(1) 
 Must be acting voluntarily - s 10  
 a person must not 
induce another 
person to give an 
advance care 
directive - cl 14 
a person must not 
knowingly make a 
false or misleading 
statement about 
another person’s 
advance care 
directive - some 
statements in 
directive forbidden 
- cl 18 
Undue influence - 
common law 
Medical 
Treatment   
Act does not apply 
to palliative care - s 
6(2) 
but patient has a 
right to adequate 
pain relief - s 17 
health care action 
commencing, 
continuing, 
withholding or 
withdrawing, 
subject to 
restrictions 
specified - s3 & s 
38 
 Does not apply to medical treatment 
for mental illness, 
or neurosurgery for 
mental illness - cl 
48 
before treating 
anyone without 
capacity, must 
make reasonable 
efforts to ascertain 
if person has 
advance care 
directive -  cl 
50(1)(a) 
may refuse to 
comply with 
instructional 
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directive if belief 
on reasonable 
grounds that no 
longer consistent 
with values - cl 51 
 
Medical 
practitione
r 
The objects of this 
Act include the 
following: (f) to 
protect health 
practitioners and 
others giving effect 
to the directions, 
wishes and values 
of a person who has 
given an advance 
care directive; s 9(f)  
-Medical 
practitioner must 
comply with 
binding provision in 
advance care 
directive, act in 
consistency   with 
specified principles 
- s 35(1) but can 
refuse to comply if 
believes on 
reasonable grounds 
that provision not 
apply in particular 
circumstances, or 
reflect current 
wishes - s 36(2) -  
If treatment action 
taken reasonably 
believing patient is 
unable to make 
decisions, relying 
in good faith on 
advance health 
directive, then 
health professional 
is taken to have 
taken treatment 
action as if decision 
had been made by 
the patient with full 
legal capacity - s 
110ZL(2) 
Duty of health 
professional or 
anyone else to 
advise and inform 
the patient -  
s 6(3)(a) 
Duty to provide 
medical treatment 
other than medical 
treatment refused 
or withdrawn - s 
6(3)(b) 
health care provider 
protected if 
reasonably believes 
adult has impaired 
decision-making 
capacity and relies 
on consent - applies 
even if health care 
action will hasten 
the adult’s death - s 
45 
No liability if 
health provider not 
aware of existence 
of an advance 
health directive - s 
102 
No liability for 
failure to comply 
with advance health 
directive where 
health provider has 
reasonable ground 
to believe that it is 
uncertain or 
inconsistent with 
good medical 
practice, or that 
circumstances have 
changed to the 
extent that the 
terms of the 
direction are 
inappropriate - s 
103 
Must record in 
patient record after 
administering 
treatment to person 
without capacity, 
reasons that 
satisfied that no 
capacity - cl 56(1)  
-If can’t locate 
advance care 
directive, may 
administer routine 
treatment without 
consent, if 
significant 
treatment, needs 
consent of Public 
Advocate - cl 63  
significant 
treatment - cl 3 - 
routine treatment is 
treatment which is 
not significant - cl 3 
medical practitioner 
cannot be 
compelled by 
statement in 
advance directive, 
No liability for 
carrying out or 
continuing 
treatment unless 
satisfied that valid 
and applicable 
advance decision 
exists - s 26(2) 
or for consequences 
of withholding or 
withdrawing 
treatment where 
valid and 
applicable advance 
decision exists - s 
26(3) 
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May refuse to act 
on conscientious 
grounds - s 37 
to perform futile or 
non-beneficial 
treatment - cl 8 
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APPENDIX VIA 
 
Incidence of Iatrogenic Injury 
 
 Australia 19921 Colorado/Utah 19922 New York 19843 
Incidence of Adverse Events 16.6% 2.9% 3.7% 
Negligence  32.6% Utah  27.5% Colorado 
27.6% 
Human Error   69% 
High Preventability 51.2%   
Minor Injury 46.6% 50% 70.5% 
Permanent Injury 13.7% 20.1% 2.6% 
Death 4.9% 6.6% 13.6% 
Operations  44.9%  
Adverse Drug  Reactions  19.3%  
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